How to get a F5 BIG-IP VE Developer Lab License
(applies to BIG-IP TMOS Edition) To assist DevOps teams improve their development for the BIG-IP platform, F5 offers a low cost developer lab license.This license can be purchased from your authorized F5 vendor. If you do not have an F5 vendor, you can purchase a lab license online: CDW BIG-IP Virtual Edition Lab License CDW Canada BIG-IP Virtual Edition Lab License Once completed, the order is sent to F5 for fulfillment and your license will be delivered shortly after via e-mail. F5 is investigating ways to improve this process. To download the BIG-IP Virtual Edition, please log into downloads.f5.com (separate login from DevCentral), and navigate to your appropriate virtual edition, example: For VMware Fusion or Workstation or ESX/i:BIGIP-16.1.2-0.0.18.ALL-vmware.ova For Microsoft HyperV:BIGIP-16.1.2-0.0.18.ALL.vhd.zip KVM RHEL/CentoOS: BIGIP-16.1.2-0.0.18.ALL.qcow2.zip Note: There are also 1 Slot versions of the above images where a 2nd boot partition is not needed for in-place upgrades. These images include_1SLOT- to the image name instead of ALL. The below guides will help get you started with F5 BIG-IP Virtual Edition to develop for VMWare Fusion, AWS, Azure, VMware, or Microsoft Hyper-V. These guides follow standard practices for installing in production environments and performance recommendations change based on lower use/non-critical needs fo Dev/Lab environments. Similar to driving a tank, use your best judgement. DeployingF5 BIG-IP Virtual Edition on VMware Fusion Deploying F5 BIG-IP in Microsoft Azure for Developers Deploying F5 BIG-IP in AWS for Developers Deploying F5 BIG-IP in Windows Server Hyper-V for Developers Deploying F5 BIG-IP in VMware vCloud Director and ESX for Developers Note: F5 Support maintains authoritativeAzure, AWS, Hyper-V, and ESX/vCloud installation documentation. VMware Fusion is not an official F5-supported hypervisor so DevCentral publishes the Fusion guide with the help of our Field Systems Engineering teams.78KViews13likes144CommentsImplementing SSL Orchestrator - High Level Considerations
Introduction This article is the beginning of a multi-part series on implementing BIG-IP SSL Orchestrator. It includes high availability and central management with BIG-IQ. Implementing SSL/TLS Decryption is not a trivial task. There are many factors to keep in mind and account for, from the network topology and insertion point, to SSL/TLS keyrings, certificates, ciphersuites and on and on. This article focuses on pre-deployment tasks and preparations for SSL Orchestrator. This article is divided into the following high level sections: Solution Overview Customer Use Case Architecture & Network Topology Please forgive me for using SSL and TLS interchangeably in this article. Software versions used in this article: BIG-IP Version: 14.1.2 SSL Orchestrator Version: 5.5 BIG-IQ Version: 7.0.1 Solution Overview Data transiting between clients (PCs, tablets, phones etc.) and servers is predominantly encrypted with Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and its evolution Transport Layer Security (TLS)(ref. Google Transparency Report). Pervasive encryption means that threats are now predominantly hidden and invisible to security inspection unless traffic is decrypted.The decryption and encryption of data by different devices performing security functions potentially adds overhead and latency.The picture below shows a traditional chaining of security inspection devices such as a filtering web gateway, a data loss prevention (DLP) tool, and intrusion detection system (IDS) and next generation firewall (NGFW). Also, TLS/SSL operations are computationally intensive and stress the security devices’ resources.This leads to a sub-optimal usage of resource where compute time is used to encrypt/decrypt and not inspect. F5’s BIG-IP SSL Orchestrator offers a solution to optimize resource utilization, remove latency, and add resilience to the security inspection infrastructure. F5 SSL Orchestrator ensures encrypted traffic can be decrypted, inspected by security controls, then re-encrypted—delivering enhanced visibility to mitigate threats traversing the network. As a result, you can maximize your security services investment for malware, data loss prevention (DLP), ransomware, and next-generation firewalls (NGFW), thereby preventing inbound and outbound threats, including exploitation, callback, and data exfiltration. The SSL Orchestrator decrypts the traffic and forwards unencrypted traffic to the different security devices for inspection leveraging its optimized and hardware-accelerated SSL/TLS stack.As shown below the BIG-IP SSL Orchestrator classifies traffic and selectively decrypts traffic.It then forwards it to the appropriate security functions for inspection.Finally, once duly inspected the traffic is encrypted and sent on its way to the resource the client is accessing. Deploying F5 and inline security tools together has the following benefits: Traffic Distribution for load sharing Improve the scalability of inline security by distributing the traffic across multiple Security appliances, allowing them to share the load and inspect more traffic. Agile Deployment Add, remove, and/or upgrade Security appliances without disrupting network traffic; converting Security appliances from out-of-band monitoring to inline inspection on the fly without rewiring. Customer Use Case This document focuses on the implementation of BIG-IP SSL Orchestrator to process SSL/TLS encrypted traffic and forward it to a security inspection/enforcement devices. The decryption and forwarding behavior are determined by the security policy. This ensures that only targeted traffic is decrypted in compliance with corporate and regulator policy, data privacy requirements, and other relevant factors. The configuration supports encrypted traffic that originates from within the data center or the corporate network.It also supports traffic originating from clients outside of the security perimeter accessing resources inside the corporate network or demilitarized zone (DMZ) as depicted below. The decrypted traffic transits through different inspection devices for inbound and outbound traffic. As an example, inbound traffic is decrypted and processed by F5’s Advanced Web Application Firewall (F5 Advanced WAF) as shown below. *Can be encrypted or cleartext as needed As an example, outbound traffic is decrypted and sent to a next generation firewall (NGFW) for inspection as shown in the diagram below. The BIG-IP SSL Orchestrator solution offers 5 different configuration templates. The following topologies are discussed in Network Insertion Use Cases. L2 Outbound L2 Inbound L3 Outbound L3 Inbound L3 Explicit Proxy Existing Application In the use case described herein, the BIG-IP is inserted as layer 3 (L3) network device and is configured with an L3 Outbound Topology. Architecture & Network Topology The assumption is that, prior to the insertion of BIG-IP SSL Orchestrator into the network (in a brownfield environment), the network looks like the one depicted below.It is understood that actual networks will vary, that IP addressing, L2 and L3 connectivity will differ, however, this is deemed to be a representative setup. Note: All IP addressing in this document is provided as examples only.Private IP addressing (RFC 1918) is used as in most corporate environments. Note: the management network is not depicted in the picture above.Further discussion about management and visibility is the subject of Centralized Management below. The following is a description of the different reference points shown in the diagram above. a.This is the connection of the border routers that connect to the internet and other WAN and private links. Typically, private IP addressing space is used from the border routers to the firewalls. b.The border switching connects to the corporate/infrastructure firewall.Resilience is built into this switching layer by implementing 2 link aggregates (LAG or Port Channel ®). c.The “demilitarized zone”(DMZ) switches are connected to the firewall.The DMZ network hosts application that are accessible from untrusted networks such as the Internet. d.Application server connect into the DMZ switch fabric. e.Firewalls connect into the switch fabric.Typically core and distribution infrastructure switching will provide L2 and L3 switching to the enterprise (in some case there may be additional L3 routing for larger enterprises/entities that require dynamic routing and other advanced L3 services. f.The connection between the core and distribution layers are represented by a bus on the figure above because the actual connection schema is too intricate to picture.The writer has taken the liberty of drawing a simplified representation.Switches actually interconnect with a mixture of link aggregation and provide differentiated switching using virtualization (e.g. VLAN tagging, 802.1q), and possibly further frame/packet encapsulation (e.g. QinQ, VxLAN). g.The core and distribution switching are used to create 2 broadcast domains. One is the client network, and the other is the internal application network. h.The internal applications are connected to their own subnet. The BIG-IP SSL Orchestrator solution is implemented as depicted below. In the diagram above, new network connections are depicted in orange (vs. blue for existing connections).Similarly to the diagram showing the original network, the switching for the DMZ is depicted using a bus representation to keep the diagram simple. The following discusses the different reference points in the diagram above: a.The BIG-IP SSL Orchestrator is connected to the core switching infrastructure A new VLAN and network are created on the core switching infrastructure to connect to the firewalls (North) to the BIG-IP SSL Orchestrator devices. b.The client network (South) is connected to the BIG-IP via a second VLAN and network. c.The SSL Orchestrator devices are connected to a newly created inspection network.This network is kept separate from the rest of the infrastructure as client traffic transits through the inspection devices unencrypted.As an example, Web Application Firewalls (BIG-IP ASM) are used to filter inbound traffic. d. The LAN configuration for the connection to the BIG-IP ASM is as depicted below. e. The NGFW is connected to the INSPECTION switching network in such a manner that traffic traverses it when the BIG-IP SSL Orchestrator is configured to push traffic for inspection. Summary This article should be a good starting point for planning your initial SSL Orchestrator deployment. We covered the solution overview and use cases. The network topology and architecture was explained with the help of diagrams. Next Steps Click Next to proceed to the next article in the series4.5KViews7likes4CommentsFile Uploads and ASM
File Uploads through a WAF Let’s say we have a web application with a form field that permits the upload of arbitrary files. It would appear to the user similar to the below: Aside from photos, the application may permit users to upload Word documents, Excel spreadsheets, PDF’s, and so forth. This can cause many false positives when the web application is protected by ASM, because the uploaded files may: Contain attack signatures. Image files may be parsed as ASCII, and suspicious-looking strings detected; Word or Excel documents may contain XSS tags or SQL injection strings. After all, Mr. ‘Select’ – ‘Union City’ -- is one of our most valuable customers. Contain illegal metacharacters, like XSS tags <> Be so large that the maximum request size (10MB by default) is exceeded Trip other violations It is therefore necessary to inform ASM that a particular parameter on a form field is one that contains a file upload so that checking for attack signatures and metacharacters can be disabled. Why not just disable the signature? Simply, because we do not want to introduce unnecessary exposure into the security policy. Just because a particular signature causes a false positive on the file upload transaction does not mean it should do elsewhere on the web application. At the time of writing, ASM permits attack signatures to be selectively disabled on parameters, but not URLs. Identify the Upload Parameter(s) Use a HTTP inspection tool such as Fiddler, Burp or Developer Tools to determine the name of the upload parameter and URL. In this case, we are uploading a JPG file named DSCF8205.JPG; the parameter used to transfer the file is called ‘filename1’. The URL is /foo.cfm. NOTE: This can also be obtained from the ASM request log; however these do sometimes get truncated making it impossible to determine the parameter name if it occurs more than 5KB into the request. Define the Upload Parameter(s) Assuming the upload is specific to a given URL, create that URL in the ASM policy. Next, create a parameter with the name we discovered earlier, and ensure it is set to type ‘File Upload’. Alternate Configuration Options If file upload is possible in many parts of the site using the same filename, create the parameter globally without defining the URL as we did first here If many file upload parameters are present on a single page with a similar name (e.g. filename1, filename2, filename3…), create a wildcard parameter name filename* ‘Disallow file upload of executables’ is a desirable feature. It checks the magic number of the uploaded file and blocks the upload if it indicates an executable file. As with all ASM configurations, understanding the HTTP fields passed to the application is key The above procedure should work for most cases, and arbitrary file uploads (except executables) should be allowed. However, there are some cases where additional configuration is required. Didn’t Work? Attack signatures have a defined scope, as seen below: Table C.1Attack signature keywords and usage Keyword Usage content Match in the full content. SeeUsing the content rule option, for syntax information. uricontent Match in the URI, including the query string (unless using theobjonlymodifier). SeeUsing the uricontent rule option, for syntax information. headercontent Match in the HTTP headers. SeeUsing the headercontent rule option, for syntax information. valuecontent Matches an alpha-numeric user-input parameter (or an extra-normalizedparameter, if using thenormmodifier); used for parameter values and XML objects. SeeUsing the valuecontent rule option, for syntax information, andScope modifiers for the pcre rule option, for more information on scope modifiers. An XML payload is checked for attack signatures when thevaluecontentkeyword is used in the signature. Note:Thevaluecontentparameter replaces theparamcontentparameter that was used in the Application Security Manager versions earlier than 10.0. reference Provides an external link to documentation and other information for the rule. SeeUsing the reference rule option, for syntax information. This information can be found in ASM under “Attack Signatures List”. As an example, search for ‘Path Traversal’ attack types and expand signature id’s 200007006 and 200007000: A signature with a ‘Request’ scope does not pay any attention to parameter extraction – it just performs a bitwise comparison of the signature to the entire request as a big flat hex blob. So to prevent this signature from being triggered, we can (a) disable it, (b) use an iRule to disable it on these specific requests. Before we can use iRules on an ASM policy, we need to switch on the ‘Trigger ASM iRule Events’ setting on the main policy configuration page. Further information can be found at: https://techdocs.f5.com/kb/en-us/products/big-ip_asm/manuals/product/asm-implementations-11-5-0/27.html. The below is an iRule that will prevent a request meeting the following characteristics from raising an ASM violation: Is a POST URI ends with /foo.cfm Content-Type is ‘multipart/form-data’ Attack Signature violation raised with signature ID 200007000 when ASM_REQUEST_VIOLATION { if {([HTTP::method] equals "POST") and ([string tolower [HTTP::path]] ends_with "/foo.cfm") and ([string tolower [HTTP::header "Content-Type"]] contains "multipart/form-data") } { if {([lindex [ASM::violation_data] 0] contains "VIOLATION_ATTACK_SIGNATURE_DETECTED") and ([ASM::violation details] contains "sig_data.sig_id 200007000") } { ASM::unblock } } } What if you’re getting a lot of false positives and just want to disable attack signatures with Request scope? when ASM_REQUEST_VIOLATION { if {([HTTP::method] equals "POST") and ([string tolower [HTTP::path]] ends_with "/foo.cfm") and ([string tolower [HTTP::header "Content-Type"]] contains "multipart/form-data") } { if {([lindex [ASM::violation_data] 0] contains "VIOLATION_ATTACK_SIGNATURE_DETECTED") and ([ASM::violation details] contains "context request") } { ASM::unblock } } } But it’s not an attack signature… False positives might also be generated by large file uploads exceeding the system-defined maximum size. This value is 10MB by default and can be configured. See https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K7935 for more information. However, this is a system-wide variable, and it may not be desirable to change this globally, nor may it be desirable to disable the violation. Again, we can use an iRule to disable this violation on the file upload: when ASM_REQUEST_VIOLATION { if {([HTTP::method] equals "POST") and ([string tolower [HTTP::path]] ends_with "/foo.cfm") and ([string tolower [HTTP::header "Content-Type"]] contains "multipart/form-data") } { if {([lindex [ASM::violation_data] 0] contains "VIOLATION_REQUEST_TOO_LONG") } { ASM::unblock } } } ASM iRules reference https://clouddocs.f5.com/api/irules/ASM__violation_data.html https://clouddocs.f5.com/api/irules/ASM__violation.html https://clouddocs.f5.com/api/icontrol-soap/ASM__ViolationName.html13KViews3likes7CommentsIs TCP's Nagle Algorithm Right for Me?
Of all the settings in the TCP profile, the Nagle algorithm may get the most questions. Designed to avoid sending small packets wherever possible, the question of whether it's right for your application rarely has an easy, standard answer. What does Nagle do? Without the Nagle algorithm, in some circumstances TCP might send tiny packets. In the case of BIG-IP®, this would usually happen because the server delivers packets that are small relative to the clientside Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU). If Nagle is disabled, BIG-IP will simply send them, even though waiting for a few milliseconds would allow TCP to aggregate data into larger packets. The result can be pernicious. Every TCP/IP packet has at least 40 bytes of header overhead, and in most cases 52 bytes. If payloads are small enough, most of the your network traffic will be overhead and reduce the effective throughput of your connection. Second, clients with battery limitations really don't appreciate turning on their radios to send and receive packets more frequently than necessary. Lastly, some routers in the field give preferential treatment to smaller packets. If your data has a series of differently-sized packets, and the misfortune to encounter one of these routers, it will experience severe packet reordering, which can trigger unnecessary retransmissions and severely degrade performance. Specified in RFC 896 all the way back in 1984, the Nagle algorithm gets around this problem by holding sub-MTU-sized data until the receiver has acked all outstanding data. In most cases, the next chunk of data is coming up right behind, and the delay is minimal. What are the Drawbacks? The benefits of aggregating data in fewer packets are pretty intuitive. But under certain circumstances, Nagle can cause problems: In a proxy like BIG-IP, rewriting arriving packets in memory into a different, larger, spot in memory taxes the CPU more than simply passing payloads through without modification. If an application is "chatty," with message traffic passing back and forth, the added delay could add up to a lot of time. For example, imagine a network has a 1500 Byte MTU and the application needs a reply from the client after each 2000 Byte message. In the figure at right, the left diagram shows the exchange without Nagle. BIG-IP sends all the data in one shot, and the reply comes in one round trip, allowing it to deliver four messages in four round trips. On the right is the same exchange with Nagle enabled. Nagle withholds the 500 byte packet until the client acks the 1500 byte packet, meaning it takes two round trips to get the reply that allows the application to proceed. Thus sending four messages takes eight round trips. This scenario is a somewhat contrived worst case, but if your application is more like this than not, then Nagle is poor choice. If the client is using delayed acks (RFC 1122), it might not send an acknowledgment until up to 500ms after receipt of the packet. That's time BIG-IP is holding your data, waiting for acknowledgment. This multiplies the effect on chatty applications described above. F5 Has Improved on Nagle The drawbacks described above sound really scary, but I don't want to talk you out of using Nagle at all. The benefits are real, particularly if your application servers deliver data in small pieces and the application isn't very chatty. More importantly, F5® has made a number of enhancements that remove a lot of the pain while keeping the gain: Nagle-aware HTTP Profiles: all TMOS HTTP profiles send a special control message to TCP when they have no more data to send. This tells TCP to send what it has without waiting for more data to fill out a packet. Autonagle:in TMOS v12.0, users can configure Nagle as "autotuned" instead of simply enabling or disabling it in their TCP profile. This mechanism starts out not executing the Nagle algorithm, but uses heuristics to test if the receiver is using delayed acknowledgments on a connection; if not, it applies Nagle for the remainder of the connection. If delayed acks are in use, TCP will not wait to send packets but will still try to concatenate small packets into MSS-size packets when all are available. [UPDATE:v13.0 substantially improves this feature.] One small packet allowed per RTT: beginning with TMOS® v12.0, when in 'auto' mode that has enabled Nagle, TCP will allow one unacknowledged undersize packet at a time, rather than zero. This speeds up sending the sub-MTU tail of any message while not allowing a continuous stream of undersized packets. This averts the nightmare scenario above completely. Given these improvements, the Nagle algorithm is suitable for a wide variety of applications and environments. It's worth looking at both your applications and the behavior of your servers to see if Nagle is right for you.1.3KViews2likes5CommentsHow to correctly monitor a Database Oracle
we are configuring a monitor health for a Oracle database which has the next configuration parameters: Send String: select * from dual Response: X user:CONSULTA_ANALISTA password:xxxxxxx connection string: PRODM1 = (DESCRIPTION = (ADDRESS_LIST = (ADDRESS = (PROTOCOL = TCP)(HOST = %node_ip%)(PORT = %node_port%)) ) (CONNECT_DATA = (SID = PRODM1) ) ) Row:3 Column:1 alias address:172.20.1.73 alias service port:1527 the monitor doesn't work and the pool member never is seen up, i have looked at the debug of the connection and this is what i see in a portion of it: [root@ltm1:Active:Changes Pending] monitors tail -30 Common_BD_monitor_PDN-Common_BD-1527.log DATABASE=PRODM1 = (DESCRIPTION = (ADDRESS_LIST = (ADDRESS = (PROTOCOL = TCP)(HOST = %node_ip%)(PORT = %node_port%)) ) (CONNECT_DATA = (SID = PRODM1) ) ) DEBUG=yes MON_INST_LOG_NAME=/var/log/monitors/Common_BD_monitor_PDN-Common_BD-1527.log MON_TMPL_NAME=/Common/BD_monitor_PDN NODE_IP=::ffff:172.20.1.73 NODE_PORT=1527 PASSWORD=nc5gf56y RECVCOLUMN=1 RECVROW=3 RECV_I=X SEND=select * from dual USERNAME=CONSULTA_ANALISTA TMOS_RD: 0 (0) Daemon port: 1521 count='0' converts to '0' Command-line PID filename: /var/run/ORACLE__Common_BD_monitor_PDN_::ffff:172.20. 1.73-0_1527.pid PID file /var/run/DBDaemon-0.pid exists. Checking for correctness of PID. DBDaemon on port 1521 says its PID is 19578. PID matches EXCEPTION connecting to DBDaemon: fflush(): Connection reset by peer i have also tried putting all the info directly like this: ********** Debugging session beginning at: Mon Jul 6 17:07:02 2015 Arguments 1-2: ::ffff:172.20.1.73 1527 Environment variables: COUNT=0 DATABASE=PRODM1 = (DESCRIPTION = (ADDRESS_LIST = (ADDRESS = (PROTOCOL = TCP)(HOST = 172.20.1.73)(PORT = 1527)) ) (CONNECT_DATA = (SID = PRODM1) ) ) DEBUG=yes MON_INST_LOG_NAME=/var/log/monitors/Common_BD_monitor_PDN-Common_BD-1527.log MON_TMPL_NAME=/Common/BD_monitor_PDN NODE_IP=::ffff:172.20.1.73 NODE_PORT=1527 PASSWORD=nc5gf56y RECVCOLUMN=1 RECVROW=1 RECV_I=ok SEND=TNSPING 172.20.1.73 1527 USERNAME=CONSULTA_ANALISTA TMOS_RD: 0 (0) Daemon port: 1521 count='0' converts to '0' Command-line PID filename: /var/run/ORACLE__Common_BD_monitor_PDN_::ffff:172.20.1.73-0_1527.pid PID file /var/run/DBDaemon-0.pid exists. Checking for correctness of PID. DBDaemon on port 1521 says its PID is 19578. PID matches Asking daemon to ping remote database. Expected result not received: Database down, see /var/log/DBDaemon.log for details. Database down, see /var/log/DBDaemon.log for details. If i look into /var/log/DBDaemon.log; it isn't updating. It seems that somehow the process is attached to other monitor over port 1521 an maybe that is the origin of the conflicto and fail of Oracle monitoring: [root@ltm1:Active:Changes Pending] monitors ps -fe|grep DB root 19578 1 0 Jun16 ? Ssl 43:33 /usr/lib/jvm/jre-1.7.0-openjd k.x86_64/bin/java -cp /usr/lib/jvm/jre-1.7.0-openjdk.x86_64/lib/rt.jar:/usr/lib/ jvm/jre-1.7.0-openjdk.x86_64/lib/charsets.jar:/usr/share/monitors/mysql-connecto r-java.jar:/usr/share/monitors/DB_monitor.jar:/usr/share/monitors/sqljdbc4.jar:/ usr/share/monitors/ojdbc6.jar:/usr/share/monitors/postgresql-8.3-604.jdbc3.jar - Xmx64m com.f5.eav.DBDaemon 1521 19578 01.1KViews1like5CommentsConnections vs sessions
Hi all This is my first post so apologies if I'm breaking any standards. I'm having trouble figuring out the difference between connections and sessions. No matter how much I Google this, I'm not finding a simple answer. Let me phrase it this way...if you read the article on "LTM: Dueling Timeouts" (https://devcentral.f5.com/articles/ltm-dueling-timeouts), it says: "Persistence timeouts are actually idle timeouts for a session, rather than a single connection." Unfortunately that statement does not tell us anything meaningful unless the definition of a connection and session is clarified. Or to put it another way, if you consult the F5 V11 configuration guide as it relates to session persistence profiles (http://support.f5.com/kb/en-us/products/big-ip_ltm/manuals/product/ltm-concepts-11-1-0/ltm_persist_profiles.html), it says: "The primary reason for tracking and storing session data is to ensure that client requests are directed to the same pool member throughout the life of a session or during subsequent sessions." So my question here would be, what factors influence whether ongoing HTTP GET requests (as an example) constitute a single session, or subsequent sessions? I'd really appreciate somebody's help here as I know this is a fundamentally basic concept but I'm unable to find a definitive answer.4.3KViews1like5CommentsUse Specific Gateway Pool based on SNAT address
Hi All, Currently we have 3 ISP Links which I am trying to get routing correctly based on outbound SNAT. I have created SNAT Pools for the internal subnets that contain a IPs from each of the three ISPs. The F5 seems to be SNATing to one of the external IP's from the pool then using our Wildcard Server, Round Robin to send the traffic down any one of the three ISP links. This results in the traffic going down the right link only every other time. ISP A ISP B ISP C Internal 192.168.20.0/24 Current Issue F5 -> Snat addresses 192.168.20.0/24 to external IP from ISP A -> Round Robin and send down link ISP A, B or C I would like to configure it so the F5 uses the correct ISP link based on its SNAT address. Someone please tell me this is possible? Best Regards, Scott169Views1like0CommentsUsing APM to authenticate to Windows AD with a UPN that is different then our domain name
Hi all I am trying to use F5 APM to login into a webtop with Windows AD credentials but when using my UPN = myuser@univeristy.com it does not work because our real AD domain is school.univerity.com Without APM, normally a user with UPN student@university.com logs in and AD does a look up in the GAL and finds out who you are and where you belong. IE student@university.com is also student@mail.univeristy.com So when using my APM webtop, if I login as myuser@school.university.com - all works fine. But if I try myuser@school.com - it fails. I have read a SOL12252: Microsoft Active Directory authentication using UPN may fail if the user's UPN suffix does not match the domain suffix This sounds like the right way to go, but I can not seem to get it work. Has anyone had to deal with a similar situation? Thanks Chung1KViews1like8CommentsBIG-IP Configuration Conversion Scripts
Kirk Bauer, John Alam, and Pete White created a handful of perl and/or python scripts aimed at easing your migration from some of the “other guys” to BIG-IP.While they aren’t going to map every nook and cranny of the configurations to a BIG-IP feature, they will get you well along the way, taking out as much of the human error element as possible.Links to the codeshare articles below. Cisco ACE (perl) Cisco ACE via tmsh (perl) Cisco ACE (python) Cisco CSS (perl) Cisco CSS via tmsh (perl) Cisco CSM (perl) Citrix Netscaler (perl) Radware via tmsh (perl) Radware (python)1.7KViews1like13Comments