Forum Discussion
Chrome V 124+ on MacOS - Virtual Server Access Issue
(editors note: this is not just MacOS - appears to be all Chrome browsers regardless of OS)
It appears that the latest version of Google Chrome (version 124) on MacOS (ed. any OS) has broken the above code. With debugging turned on, we get this when a MacOS client accesses a virtual server with this rule:
No SSL/TLS protocol detected ; connection is rejected (0x0000)
Can anyone else confirm this? Any idea how to fix it? Stanislas_Piro2
----
(Editors Note: This forum post was created via a comment on the OG Article written by Eric_Chen here:
How to use SNI Routing with BIG-IP.
That article contains 'the above code' and 'the rule' referenced here)
Brad_Baker / LiefZimmerman / Eric_Chen / Stan_PIRON_F5 / Stanislas_Piro2
I have patched my copy of the original iRule with what I think is a working fix, but I would love if someone in the community could validate it, because my knowledge of the intricacies of the TLS packet is not strong.
Essentially, I have replaced this if check in the original...
# If valid TLS 1.X CLIENT_HELLO handshake packet if { [binary scan $payload cH4Scx3H4x32c tls_record_content_type tls_version tls_recordlen tls_handshake_action tls_handshake_version tls_handshake_sessidlen] == 6 && \ ($tls_record_content_type == 22) && \ ([string match {030[1-3]} $tls_version]) && \ ($tls_handshake_action == 1) && \ ($payloadlen == $tls_recordlen+5)} {
...with this block, which is intended to determine whether the reported TLS record length is longer than the payload we have and, if so, collect more packets until we have enough:
# Keep collecting if CLIENT_HELLO messages that span more than one packet... if {![info exists payloadscan]} { set payloadscan [binary scan $payload cH4Scx3H4x32c tls_record_content_type tls_version tls_recordlen tls_handshake_action \ tls_handshake_version tls_handshake_sessidlen] } if {($payloadscan == 6)} { if {($tls_recordlen < 0 || $tls_recordlen > 16389)} { # if we are asked to collect more than we will handle, bail... log local0.warn "[IP::remote_addr] : parsed TLS record length ${tls_recordlen} outside of handled length (0..16389)" reject return } elseif {($payloadlen < $tls_recordlen+5)} { # if we have not collected enough yet, collect some more TCP::collect [expr {$tls_recordlen+5 - $payloadlen}] return } } # If valid TLS 1.X CLIENT_HELLO handshake packet if {($payloadscan == 6) && \ ($tls_record_content_type == 22) && \ ([string match {030[1-3]} $tls_version]) && \ ($tls_handshake_action == 1) && \ ($payloadlen == $tls_recordlen+5)} {
This has allowed the rest of the original logic to capture the SNI server name and my services to resume operation.
However, one new thing of note, is that the resulting values in $tls_handshake_preferred_version now include an extra value. If I log this value, I can see...
- Firefox returns 0304 0303 0302 0301
- Chrome/Edge with --ssl-version-max=tls1.2 return 0303 only
- Chrome/Edge v124 return xAxA 0304 0303
The xAxA value changes every time -- so far, I have seen 1A1A, 7A7A, 8A8A, DADA and FAFA. (I do not see a 7Fxy, as indicated in the switch statement).
I am now wondering if this is just an implementation detail of the new Chrome TLS packet, or if I/we are now reading the preferred values from the wrong position in the payload.
Is anyone able to verify the above?
My impression/understanding is that you need a client SSL profile associated with the VIP for SSL::Extensions to be valid in an iRule. I could have that wrong though.
No, a SSL Persistence Profile is sufficient enough for SNI based routing functionality. Give it a try, it works in my setups like a charm and it is ridiculous easy.
I do not read the thread completely, but why all this TCP::collect stuff? I personally use a SSL Persistence Profile with a simple iRule:
when CLIENTSSL_CLIENTHELLO priority 100 { set sni_name "" if { [SSL::extensions exists -type 0] } { binary scan [SSL::extensions -type 0] {@9A*} sni_name log local0. "SNI: $sni_name" } switch -- [string tolower $sni_name] { ... } }
- Brad_BakerCirrus
Here's the original article about this (with now broken code): https://community.f5.com/kb/technicalarticles/multiple-certs-one-vip-tls-server-name-indication-via-irules/275951
Per https://clouddocs.f5.com/cli/tmsh-reference/v16/modules/ltm/ltm_rule_command_SSL_extensions.html SSL::Extensions is only valid during:
CLIENTSSL_CLIENTCERT CLIENTSSL_HANDSHAKE CLIENTSSL_CLIENTHELLO SERVERSSL_HANDSHAKE SERVERSSL_SERVERHELLO SERVERSSL_CLIENTHELLO_SENDMy impression/understanding is that you need a client SSL profile associated with the VIP for SSL::Extensions to be valid in an iRule. I could have that wrong though.
In this case we have a single VIP acting as a SNI router. It looks at the SNI domain and then re-routes traffic to hundreds of destination VIPs based on a datagroup mapping.
If we used the SSL::Extensions we'd have to have all our Client SSL profiles (hundreds of them) associated with the SNI router VIP.
And at least my experience has been if you have multiple Client SSL profiles associated with a VIP F5 doesn't always pick the correct ssl profile to use.
- candcCirrus
It's not just Brad's article which espouses this approach. https://devcentral.f5.com/s/articles/sni-based-pool-selection-without-clientssl-profile-1119 also describes using raw TCP data in the CLIENT_DATA event to grab SNI like this.
My workaround/patch is specific to the iRule described in the URL above, from which our own SNI handing was heavily derived.
Reworking this to use CLIENTSSL_CLIENTHELLO and SSL::extensions may well be a reasonable next-step but, for the time being, I just needed to get the original iRule in working state again...
I can't speak to the issue technically but I am interested in whether you get a resolution here?
If Eric_Chen or Stan_PIRON_F5 can't help right away (or at all?) perhaps a new post in the Technical Forum is in order.I may even be able to move it automagically for you if you like
- Brad_BakerCirrus
I have not heard from anyone so far. It seems this issue may be greater in scope than I realized. Its not just chrome 124 on Mac apparently its impacting Google Chrome 124, Google Chrome 125 and Google Chrome 126 on Windows, Linux, and Mac, Google Chrome 125/126 are pre-release though.
- msaundersNimbostratus
Related?
Some ​Google Chrome users report having issues connecting to websites, servers, and firewalls after Chrome 124 was released with the new quantum-resistant X25519Kyber768 encapsulation mechanism enabled by default.
These errors are not caused by a bug in Google Chrome but instead caused by web servers failing to properly implement Transport Layer Security (TLS) and not being able to handle larger ClientHello messages for post-quantum cryptography.
Reference:
Google Chrome's new post-quantum cryptography may break TLS connections (bleepingcomputer.com)
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