How I Did It - "Decoupling Access Points from CloudVision AGNI with a BIG‑IP RADIUS Proxy"
Modern network access control platforms like Arista CloudVision AGNI are designed to be centralized policy engines, not edge‑facing protocol endpoints. Introducing a BIG-IP as RADIUS proxy between external access points (APs) and AGNI aligns the architecture with that design intent while solving several real‑world operational, security, and scalability challenges.
F5OS Radius failures with Clearpass
Hello, First post ever on devcentral so I ask that you take it easy on me haha. Anyways, recently stood up some new R-series F5s and F5OS is a new world for me. Currently running iSeries appliances. Going through some of the basic configurations and I've made my way to authentication. I've added radius as one of my accepted authentication options and created my server group with the clearpass server attached in that group. Selected radius, put in the correct IP, radius secret, etc. Per the documentation it looks good. Going into clearpass for those familiar - Created my new F5 device, put in the shared secret, added new device to my existing F5 device group. Essentially all I've ever had to do when working with other vendors. Attempting logins with my user account I get hit with "Permission Denied" at the login screen. This is where I am lost. I check clearpass, my access tracker says I successfully authenticated. Clearpass shows no obvious issues. I log back into F5OS with my local admin and I check the login activity. Shows my user account and a big ole "Success" for the login attempt. I apologize for the word salad. I was trying to put my process out there including that both F5OS and Clearpass seem happy with my attempt but the F5OS login page says denied. Anyone have any R-series appliances using clearpass for radius and authentication? I'm curious what I'm missing.
R-Series after upgrading to 1.8 - RADIUS Auth stopped working
Radius user authentication was working just fine while running v1.40. After upgrading to 1.80 any attempt is "Failed authentication." Running tcpdump does not show any traffic going to the RADIUS server and the RADIUS server has not entry of the failures in it's log. I have deleted and recreated the radius server group - that did not help. I have deleted and recreated users - that did not help. Any guidance for what to try next is appreciated. Dave
In Radius auth, how to allow second attempt of token input when the first input is incorrect?
We currently have a Radius authentication in our access policy on F5 APM. Sometimes the user may mis-input the token received from SMS and we would like the Radius authentication page to ask the user to input again instead of redirecting back to logon page on first mis-input, in other words to have a second attempt for token input with the same token from SMS. Can we achieve this function in F5 APM? Thanks a lot.APM Domain/Username for RADUIS Auth
Hello community, could you help me with the following?. I've a simple per session AD Authentication policy -> working fine 2nd. I've a per-request-policy for specific paths which are secured with a 2FA Radius auth -> working also fine For user simplicity I would take over the username (domain\username) from per session AD Logon Page to per-request Logon Page. This only works in part :-/ At the moment I can pre-fill the username via session variable "session.logon.last.logonname" in the Logon Page. Username in Logon Page set to "Ready Only" After generating an OTP the APM log is showing the following error: "RADIUS Agent: Failed to read Username Source session variable:" Obviously, the variable is empty, despite pre-filling. I experimented a little with Variable Assign (implemented after Logon Page) but nothing changed. -> "RADIUS Agent: Failed to read Username Source session variable:" session.logon.last.username = expr { "[mcget {session.logon.last.domain}]\\[mcget {session.logon.last.username}]" } or session.logon.last.logonname = expr { "[mcget {session.logon.last.domain}]\\[mcget {session.logon.last.username}]" } Everything is working fine with a manual input of the domain\username in the Logo Page. Does someone have an idea to solve the issue/problem? Thanks a lot.
RADIUS server using APM to authenticate users
Problem this snippet solves: this code convert APM policy to a RADIUS server. Code description When a Radius request is accepted by the VS: the radius client IP address is checked against a Datagroup list. if in list : The shared secret is extracted from Datagroup list if not : drop the packet the password is decrypted with radius secret if request code is Access-Request, an APM session is created and radius attributes are set as session variable (including username and password) Access session is evaluated and return allow or deny result If the Access policy include radius attribute stored in variable session.result.radius_attr , attributes are added to the radius response return Access-Accept or Access-Reject response code based on the session result. Supported request Packet types: Access-Request (1) Returned Packet types: Access-Accept (2) Access-Reject (3) Required request attributes User-Name (1) User-Password (2) Optional request attributes NAS-IP-Address (4) : IP address NAS-Port (5) : Integer NAS-Identifier (32) : String NAS-Port-Type (61) : Integer All other attributes are ignored by this irule Supported response Attributes All RFC2865 attributes are allowed. Vendor specific attributes are not supported yet. Note : First version of this code was an enhancement of John McInnes RADIUS Server iRule who had to parse all RADIUS Data (RADIUS::avp did not exist when he wrote it's irule). The irule structure is still the same, but binary operations are optimized and more than 16 bytes passwords support is now included. thanks to Kai Wilke who show previous limitations and leads me to the right direction on how to decode long passwords. Versions : 1.0 : First version based on RADIUS commands. Required RADIUS profile assigned to the virtual server 1.1 : Added Request Message-Authenticator attribute validation / Response Message-Authenticator insertion (Asked by Sam Hall). To support this feature, the code is rewritten to decode binary data. Radius profile is not required anymore. (31/05/2018) 1.2 : correction on the Request Message-Authenticator attribute validation, a binary conversion to same type is required after [string replace ...] command (1/06/2018) 1.3 : Changed Datagroup radius_clients values format to list of parameters and values. this allow to configure per radius client parameters instead of global parameters (Message-Authenticator validation, ...) (1/06/2018) 1.4 : Security improvement while decoding packet (default decoded integer are signed values, where packet decoding length must be unsigned integer. Thank you Kai wilke for the advices) and added duplicate packet detection (4/06/2018) How to use this snippet: Create an Access Policy authenticating users. Define Access profile name in variable static::apmpolicy create a data group list radius_clients with values: IPAddress := "KEY radius\\ secret [REQMSGAUTH_REQUIRE 1] [RESPMSGAUTH_INSERT 1] [RFC_2865_COMPLIANCE 1]" IPAddress := "KEY another\\ radius\\ secret [REQMSGAUTH_REQUIRE 1] [RESPMSGAUTH_INSERT 0] [RFC_2865_COMPLIANCE 1]" KEY parameter must be followed by the shared secret, if it contains space, add 2 \ characters before each space. this parameter is required. REQMSGAUTH_REQUIRE (optional) define if Message-Authenticator attribute is required in request. default value is 0* RESPMSGAUTH_INSERT (optional) define if Message-Authenticator attribute is inserted in response. default value is 0 RFC_2865_COMPLIANCE (optional) define if the request must respect RFC 2865 (required attributes). default value is 0 create a virtual server with RADIUS profile to manage RADIUS::avp commands. If you requires to add radius attributes in RADIUS response, create the APM variable session.result.radius_attr with text value (one line, space characters must be escaped): Attribute1ID Attribute1Value Attribute2ID Attribute2Value Attribute3ID Attribute3Value example : 18 Authentication\ Successful 27 3600 Code : when RULE_INIT { set static::apmpolicy "/Common/AP_RADIUS_SERVICE" set static::client_list "radius_clients" } when CLIENT_ACCEPTED { binary scan [md5 [UDP::payload]] H* PAYLOAD_HASH switch [set DUPLICATE_RESPONSE [table lookup -subtable [IP::client_addr] $PAYLOAD_HASH]] { "" { # Do nothing, not in table } drop { log local0. "Duplicate packet detected with drop decision... dropping again" UDP::drop; return } default { log local0. "Duplicate packet detected sending same answer from table" UDP::respond [binary format H* $DUPLICATE_RESPONSE] return } } set RespLength 20 set RespAVP "" ############## START OF ALLOWED RADIUS CLIENT IP VALIDATION ################# if {![class match [IP::client_addr] equals $static::client_list]} { log local0. "RADIUS Client not in Datagroup : [IP::client_addr]" # RFC 2865 : A request from a client for which the RADIUS server does not have a shared secret MUST be silently discarded table add -subtable [IP::client_addr] $PAYLOAD_HASH "drop" 30 600 UDP::drop return } # Set default values if Datagroup miss this configuration set RADCLIENT(REQMSGAUTH_REQUIRE) 0 set RADCLIENT(RESPMSGAUTH_INSERT) 0 set RADCLIENT(RFC_2865_COMPLIANCE) 1 #Retreive RADIUS client shared secret and radius client capabilities. array set RADCLIENT [class match -value [IP::client_addr] equals $static::client_list] if {[binary scan [UDP::payload] cH2Sa16 QCODE IDENTIFIER QLEN Q_AUTHENTICATOR] != 4 || [set QLEN [expr {$QLEN & 0xFFFF}]] > [UDP::payload length] || $QLEN > 4096} { table add -subtable [IP::client_addr] $PAYLOAD_HASH "drop" 30 600 UDP::drop return } else { # Store only PAYLOAD in variable if Length field is valid (less than 4096 and less than payload length). prevent variable allocation if payload not valid. # Octets outside the range of the Length field MUST be treated as padding and ignored on reception. set PAYLOAD [UDP::payload $QLEN] } switch $QCODE { 1 { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 0 #Store All attribute in array QUERY_ATTR with Attrbute ID as Key for {set record_offset 20} {$record_offset < $QLEN } {incr record_offset $QAVP_LEN} { # If an Attribute is received in an Access-Accept, Access-Reject or Access-Challenge packet with an invalid length, # the packet MUST either be treated as an Access-Reject or else silently discarded. if {([binary scan $PAYLOAD @${record_offset}cc QAVP_TYPE QAVP_LEN] != 2) || ([set QAVP_LEN [expr {$QAVP_LEN & 0xFF}]] < 3) || ($record_offset+$QAVP_LEN > $QLEN) } { table add -subtable [IP::client_addr] $PAYLOAD_HASH "drop" 30 600 UDP::drop return } switch -- [set QAVP_TYPE [expr { $QAVP_TYPE & 0xFF}]] { 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 24 - 32 - 61 {binary scan $PAYLOAD @${record_offset}x2a[expr {$QAVP_LEN -2}] QUERY_ATTR($QAVP_TYPE)} 80 { binary scan $PAYLOAD @${record_offset}x2a[expr {$QAVP_LEN -2}] QUERY_ATTR($QAVP_TYPE) binary scan [string replace $PAYLOAD $record_offset [expr {$record_offset + 18}] [binary format ccH32 80 18 [string repeat 0 32]]] a* UNSIGNED_REQUEST } } } #Assign attibutes to expected variable, with decoding if required. set USER_NAME [expr {[info exists QUERY_ATTR(1)] ? $QUERY_ATTR(1) : ""}] set USER_PASSWORD [expr {[info exists QUERY_ATTR(2)] ? $QUERY_ATTR(2) : ""}] set CHAP_PASSWORD [expr {[info exists QUERY_ATTR(3)] ? $QUERY_ATTR(3) : ""}] if {[info exists QUERY_ATTR(4)]} {binary scan $QUERY_ATTR(4) c4 octets; foreach octet $octets {lappend r [expr {$octet & 0xFF}]}; set NAS_IP_ADDRESS [join $r .] } else {set NAS_IP_ADDRESS "" } if {[info exists QUERY_ATTR(5)]} {binary scan $QUERY_ATTR(5) I NAS_PORT; set NAS_PORT [expr {$NAS_PORT & 0xFFFFFFFF}] } else {set NAS_PORT "" } set STATE [expr {[info exists QUERY_ATTR(24)] ? $QUERY_ATTR(24) : ""}] set NAS_IDENTIFIER [expr {[info exists QUERY_ATTR(32)] ? $QUERY_ATTR(32) : ""}] #if {[info exists QUERY_ATTR(61)]} {binary scan $QUERY_ATTR(61) I NAS_PORT_TYPE; set NAS_PORT_TYPE [expr {$NAS_PORT_TYPE & 0xFFFFFFFF}] } else {set NAS_PORT_TYPE "" } set MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR [expr {[info exists QUERY_ATTR(80)] ? $QUERY_ATTR(80) : ""}] #EVALUATE REQUEST MESSAGE-AUTHENTICATOR if {$RADCLIENT(REQMSGAUTH_REQUIRE) && ($MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR equals "" || ![CRYPTO::verify -alg hmac-md5 -key $RADCLIENT(KEY) -signature $MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR $UNSIGNED_REQUEST])} { # RFC 2869 : A RADIUS Server receiving an Access-Request with a Message-Authenticator Attribute present MUST calculate the correct value # of the Message-Authenticator and silently discard the packet if it does not match the value sent. log local0. "[IP::client_addr] : wrong or missing Message-Authenticator attribute" table add -subtable [IP::client_addr] $PAYLOAD_HASH "drop" 30 600 UDP::drop return } if {$RADCLIENT(RFC_2865_COMPLIANCE)} { if {$NAS_IP_ADDRESS == "" && $NAS_IDENTIFIER == ""} { # RFC 2865 : It MUST contain either a NAS-IP-Address attribute or a NAS-Identifier attribute (or both). set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "REQUEST NOT RFC COMPLIANT" } elseif {$USER_PASSWORD == "" && $CHAP_PASSWORD == "" && $STATE == ""} { # RFC 2865 : An Access-Request MUST contain either a User-Password or a CHAP-Password or a State. set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "REQUEST NOT RFC COMPLIANT" } elseif {$USER_PASSWORD ne "" && $CHAP_PASSWORD ne ""} { # RFC 2865 : An Access-Request MUST NOT contain both a User-Password and a CHAP-Password. set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "REQUEST NOT RFC COMPLIANT" } } if {$USER_PASSWORD == ""} { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "USER-PASSWORD NOT SET BUT REQUIRED" } elseif {$USER_NAME == ""} { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "USER-NAME NOT SET BUT REQUIRED" } } 2 - 3 - 11 { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "RADIUS CODE NOT SUPPORTED - NOT A RADIUS CLIENT" } 4 - 5 - 6 - 10 { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "RADIUS CODE NOT SUPPORTED - NOT A RADIUS ACCOUNTING SERVER" } default { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "RADIUS CODE NOT SUPPORTED" } } ############## END OF RFC COMPLIANCE AND SERVER FEATURES VALIDATION ################# # DO NOT RELEASE UDP PACKET. Drop it to prevent further process by irule or load balancing to an internal server. # When UDP packet dropped, PAYLOAD is dropped and RADIUS Commands not available anymore. UDP::drop if {$REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED == 0} { ########## START OF PASSWORD DECRYPTION ############################ binary scan [md5 "$RADCLIENT(KEY)$Q_AUTHENTICATOR"] H* bx_hex binary scan $USER_PASSWORD H* px_full_hex set Password_Padded "" for {set x 0} {$x<[string length $px_full_hex]} {set x [expr {$x+32}]} { set px_hex [string range $px_full_hex $x [expr {$x+31}]] append Password_Padded [binary format W [expr 0x[string range $px_hex 0 15] ^ 0x[string range $bx_hex 0 15]]] append Password_Padded [binary format W [expr 0x[string range $px_hex 16 31] ^ 0x[string range $bx_hex 16 31]]] binary scan [md5 "$RADCLIENT(KEY)[binary format H* $px_hex]"] H* bx_hex } binary scan $Password_Padded A* PASSWORD ########## END OF PASSWORD DECRYPTION ############################ ########## START OF APM AUTHENTICATION ############################ set flow_sid [ACCESS::session create -timeout 60 -lifetime 300] ACCESS::policy evaluate -sid $flow_sid -profile $static::apmpolicy \ session.logon.last.username $USER_NAME \ session.logon.last.password $PASSWORD \ session.server.landinguri "/" \ session.logon.last.NAS_IP_Address $NAS_IP_ADDRESS \ session.logon.last.NAS_Port $NAS_PORT \ session.logon.last.NAS_Identifier $NAS_IDENTIFIER \ session.logon.last.NAS_Port_Type $NAS_PORT if {[ACCESS::policy result -sid $flow_sid] equals "allow"} { set ResponseCode 2 if {![info exists RAVP(18)] } {set RAVP(18) "Good username Password"} } else { set ResponseCode 3 if {![info exists RAVP(18)] } {set RAVP(18) "wrong username Password"} } array set RAVP [ACCESS::session data get -sid $flow_sid session.result.radius_attr] ACCESS::session remove -sid $flow_sid ########## END OF APM AUTHENTICATION ############################ } else { set ResponseCode 3 if {[info exists RAVP(18)] } { log local0. $RAVP(18)} } ########## ENCODING AND DELIVERY OF RADIUS RESONSE ############################ foreach attrID [array names RAVP] { incr RespLength [set attrLength [expr {[string length $RAVP($attrID)]+2}]] append RespAVP [binary format cca* $attrID $attrLength $RAVP($attrID)] } #CALCULATE RESPONSE MESSAGE-AUTHENTICATOR if {$RADCLIENT(RESPMSGAUTH_INSERT)} { set UNSIGNED_RespAVP $RespAVP[binary format ccH32 80 18 [string repeat 0 32]] incr RespLength 18 append RespAVP [binary format cc 80 18][CRYPTO::sign -alg hmac-md5 -key $RADCLIENT(KEY) [binary format cH2Sa16a* $ResponseCode $IDENTIFIER $RespLength $Q_AUTHENTICATOR $UNSIGNED_RespAVP]] } binary scan [md5 [binary format cH2Sa16a[expr {$RespLength-20}]a[string length $RADCLIENT(KEY)] $ResponseCode $IDENTIFIER $RespLength $Q_AUTHENTICATOR $RespAVP $RADCLIENT(KEY) ]] H* ResponseAuth set RESPONSE [binary format cH2SH32a* $ResponseCode $IDENTIFIER $RespLength $ResponseAuth $RespAVP] UDP::respond $RESPONSE binary scan $RESPONSE H* RESPONSE_HEX table add -subtable [IP::client_addr] $PAYLOAD_HASH $RESPONSE_HEX 15 60 } Tested this on version: 12.0RADIUS server authenticating user with Google Authenticator
Problem this snippet solves: This code create a RADIUS server to authenticate users with Authenticator algorithm (Google Authenticator and Microsoft Authenticator apps) Code description When a Radius request is accepted by the VS: the radius client IP address is checked against a Datagroup list. if in list : The shared secret is extracted from Datagroup list if not : drop the packet the password is decrypted with radius secret if request code is Access-Request, the request username is searched in a datagroup and the user key is extracted The code is calculated and compared with radius password provided in the RADIUS request. return Access-Accept or Access-Reject response code based on the authenticator algorithm result. Supported request Packet types: Access-Request (1) Returned Packet types: Access-Accept (2) Access-Reject (3) Required request attributes User-Name (1) User-Password (2) Optional request attributes NAS-IP-Address (4) : IP address NAS-Port (5) : Integer NAS-Identifier (32) : String NAS-Port-Type (61) : Integer All other attributes are ignored by this irule Supported response Attributes All RFC2865 attributes are allowed. Vendor specific attributes are not supported yet. Note : Many thanks to Kai wilke, John McInnes and George Watkins who shared their snippets I used to write this irule. Versions : 1.0 : First version based on RADIUS commands. Required RADIUS profile assigned to the virtual server 1.1 : Added Request Message-Authenticator attribute validation / Response Message-Authenticator insertion (Asked by Sam Hall in RADIUS server using APM to authenticate users code). To support this feature, the code is rewritten to decode binary data. Radius profile is not required anymore. (31/05/2018) 1.2 : correction on the Request Message-Authenticator attribute validation, a binary conversion to same type is required after [string replace ...] command (1/06/2018) How to use this snippet: Create an Access Policy authenticating users. Define Access profile name in variable static::apmpolicy create a data group list google_auth_keys with values: username := "Authenticator key" create a data group list radius_clients with values: IPAddress := "radius secret" create a virtual server with RADIUS profile to manage RADIUS::avp commands. Code : proc ga_validate {hmac_mode key_size b32_key token allowed_clock_skew_units} { ############################################################################################## # Initialize the Base32 alphabet to binary conversation (see RFC 4648) # set b32_to_binary [list \ A 00000 B 00001 C 00010 D 00011 E 00100 F 00101 G 00110 H 00111 \ I 01000 J 01001 K 01010 L 01011 M 01100 N 01101 O 01110 P 01111 \ Q 10000 R 10001 S 10010 T 10011 U 10100 V 10101 W 10110 X 10111 \ Y 11000 Z 11001 2 11010 3 11011 4 11100 5 11101 6 11110 7 11111 \ 0 "" 1 "" = "" " " "" \ ] if { [string length [set key [string map -nocase $b32_to_binary $b32_key]]] >= $key_size } then { # Convert the translated ga(key) binary string representation to binary set binary_key [binary format B$key_size $key] # Initialize clock timeframe based on Unix epoch time in seconds / 30 set clock [expr { [clock seconds] / 30 } ] ############################################################################################## # Configure the allowed clock skew units (1 unit = +/-30 seconds in both directions) # set allowed_clock_range {0} for {set i 1} {$i <= $allowed_clock_skew_units} {incr i} {lappend allowed_clock_range -$i $i} ############################################################################################## # Perform verification of the provided token foreach x $allowed_clock_range { ############################################################################################## # Perform verification of the provided token for time frame clock + $x # # Calculate hex encoded HMAC checksum value for wide-int value of time frame clock+ x using key_binary as secret binary scan [CRYPTO::sign -alg $hmac_mode -key $binary_key [binary format W* [expr { $clock + $x }]]] H* hmac_tmp # Parse offset based on the last nibble (= 4 bits / 1 hex) of the hmac_tmp HMAC checksum and multiply with 2 for byte to hex conversation set offset [expr { "0x[string index $hmac_tmp end]" * 2 } ] # Parse (= 4 bytes / 8 hex) from hmac_tmp starting at the offset value, then remove the most significant bit, perform the modulo 1000000 and format the result to a 6 digit number set token_calculated [format %06d [expr { ( "0x[string range $hmac_tmp $offset [expr { $offset + 7 } ]]" & 0x7FFFFFFF ) % 1000000 } ]] # Compare token_calculated with user provided token value if { $token_calculated equals $token } then { # The provided token is valid" return 1 break } } } else { return -1 } return 0 } when RULE_INIT { set static::client_list "radius_clients" set static::RFC_2865_FULL_COMPLIANCE 1 set static::MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR_REQUIRED 1 } when CLIENT_ACCEPTED { set RespLength 20 set RespAVP "" ############## START OF ALLOWED RADIUS CLIENT IP VALIDATION ################# if {![class match [IP::client_addr] equals $static::client_list]} { log local0. "RADIUS Client not in Datagroup : [IP::client_addr]" # RFC 2865 : A request from a client for which the RADIUS server does not have a shared secret MUST be silently discarded UDP::drop return } #Retreive RADIUS client shared secret set secret [class match -value [IP::client_addr] equals $static::client_list] if {[binary scan [UDP::payload] cH2Sa16a* QCODE QID QLEN Q_AUTHENTICATOR QAVP] != 5} { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "REQUEST AUTHENTICATOR FAILURE" } #Store Request ID in Response ID set RID $QID switch $QCODE { 1 { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 0 set USER_NAME "" set USER_PASSWORD "" set CHAP_PASSWORD "" set NAS_IP_ADDRESS "" set NAS_PORT "" set NAS_PORT_TYPE "" set MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR "" set UNSIGNED_REQUEST [UDP::payload] set NAS_IDENTIFIER "" set QAVP_LIST_LEN [expr {$QLEN - 20}] set record_offset 0 while {[expr {$QAVP_LIST_LEN - $record_offset}] > 4} { binary scan $QAVP @${record_offset}cc QAVP_TYPE QAVP_LEN set QAVP_VAL_LEN [expr {$QAVP_LEN -2}] binary scan $QAVP @${record_offset}x2a${QAVP_VAL_LEN} QAVP_VAL switch $QAVP_TYPE { 1 { set USER_NAME $QAVP_VAL } 2 { set USER_PASSWORD $QAVP_VAL } 3 { set CHAP_PASSWORD $QAVP_VAL } 4 { binary scan $QAVP_VAL c4 octets foreach octet $octets { lappend r [expr {$octet & 0xFF}] } set NAS_IP_ADDRESS [join $r .] } 5 { binary scan $QAVP_VAL I NAS_PORT set NAS_PORT [expr {$NAS_PORT & 0xFFFFFFFF}] } 24 { set STATE $QAVP_VAL } 32 { set NAS_IDENTIFIER $QAVP_VAL } 61 { binary scan $QAVP_VAL I NAS_PORT_TYPE; set NAS_PORT_TYPE [expr {$NAS_PORT_TYPE & 0xFFFFFFFF}]; } 80 { set MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR $QAVP_VAL set UNSIGNED_RAVP [string replace $QAVP $record_offset [expr {$record_offset + 18}] [binary format ccH32 80 18 [string repeat 0 32]]] set UNSIGNED_REQUEST [binary format cH2Sa16a* $QCODE $QID $QLEN $Q_AUTHENTICATOR $UNSIGNED_RAVP] } default { } } set record_offset [expr {$record_offset + $QAVP_LEN}] } #EVALUATE REQUEST MESSAGE-AUTHENTICATOR if {$static::MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR_REQUIRED && ($MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR equals "" || ![CRYPTO::verify -alg hmac-md5 -key $secret -signature $MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR $UNSIGNED_REQUEST])} { # RFC 2869 : A RADIUS Server receiving an Access-Request with a Message-Authenticator Attribute present MUST calculate the correct value # of the Message-Authenticator and silently discard the packet if it does not match the value sent. log local0. "[IP::client_addr] : wrong or missing Message-Authenticator attribute" UDP::drop return } if {$static::RFC_2865_FULL_COMPLIANCE} { if {$NAS_IP_ADDRESS == "" && $NAS_IDENTIFIER == ""} { # RFC 2865 : It MUST contain either a NAS-IP-Address attribute or a NAS-Identifier attribute (or both). set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "REQUEST NOT RFC COMPLIANT" } elseif {$USER_PASSWORD == "" && $CHAP_PASSWORD == "" && $STATE == ""} { # RFC 2865 : An Access-Request MUST contain either a User-Password or a CHAP-Password or a State. set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "REQUEST NOT RFC COMPLIANT" } elseif {$USER_PASSWORD ne "" && $CHAP_PASSWORD ne ""} { # RFC 2865 : An Access-Request MUST NOT contain both a User-Password and a CHAP-Password. set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "REQUEST NOT RFC COMPLIANT" } } if {$USER_PASSWORD == ""} { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "USER-PASSWORD NOT SET BUT REQUIRED" } elseif {$USER_NAME == ""} { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "USER-NAME NOT SET BUT REQUIRED" } elseif {[set userkey [class lookup $USER_NAME "google_auth_keys"]] equals ""} { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "USER-NAME NOT SET BUT REQUIRED" } } 2 - 3 - 11 { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "RADIUS CODE NOT SUPPORTED - NOT A RADIUS CLIENT" } 4 - 5 - 6 - 10 { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "RADIUS CODE NOT SUPPORTED - NOT A RADIUS ACCOUNTING SERVER" } default { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "RADIUS CODE NOT SUPPORTED" } } ############## END OF RFC COMPLIANCE AND SERVER FEATURES VALIDATION ################# # DO NOT RELEASE UDP PACKET. Drop it to prevent further process by irule or load balancing to an internal server. # When UDP packet dropped, PAYLOAD is dropped and RADIUS Commands not available anymore. UDP::drop if {$REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED == 0} { ########## START OF PASSWORD DECRYPTION ############################ binary scan [md5 "$secret$Q_AUTHENTICATOR"] H* bx_hex binary scan $USER_PASSWORD H* px_full_hex set Password_Padded "" for {set x 0} {$x<[string length $px_full_hex]} {set x [expr {$x+32}]} { set px_hex [string range $px_full_hex $x [expr {$x+31}]] append Password_Padded [binary format W [expr 0x[string range $px_hex 0 15] ^ 0x[string range $bx_hex 0 15]]] append Password_Padded [binary format W [expr 0x[string range $px_hex 16 31] ^ 0x[string range $bx_hex 16 31]]] binary scan [md5 "$secret[binary format H* $px_hex]"] H* bx_hex } binary scan $Password_Padded A* PASSWORD ########## END OF PASSWORD DECRYPTION ############################ ########## START OF GOOGLE AUTHENTICATION ############################ switch -- [call ga_validate "hmac-sha1" 80 $userkey $PASSWORD 10] { -1 { # code verification failed set ResponseCode 3 if {![info exists RAVP(18)] } {set RAVP(18) "wrong username Password"} log local0. "erreur 2 : wrong User Key" } 0 { # code verification failed set ResponseCode 3 if {![info exists RAVP(18)] } {set RAVP(18) "wrong username Password"} } 1 { # code verification successful set ResponseCode 2 if {![info exists RAVP(18)] } {set RAVP(18) "Good username Password"} } default {set result "error: unknown"} } ########## END OF GOOGLE AUTHENTICATION ############################ } else { set ResponseCode 3 if {[info exists RAVP(18)] } { log local0. $RAVP(18)} } ########## ENCODING AND DELIVERY OF RADIUS RESONSE ############################ foreach attrID [array names RAVP] { set RespLength [expr {[set attrLength [expr {[string length $RAVP($attrID)]+2}]] + $RespLength}] append RespAVP [binary format cca* $attrID $attrLength $RAVP($attrID)] } #CALCULATE RESPONSE MESSAGE-AUTHENTICATOR set UNSIGNED_RespAVP $RespAVP[binary format ccH32 80 18 [string repeat 0 32]] #set UNSIGNED_RespAVP $RespAVP[binary format ccH32 80 18 "00000000000000000000000000000000"] set RespLength [expr {18 + $RespLength}] append RespAVP [binary format cc 80 18][CRYPTO::sign -alg hmac-md5 -key $secret [binary format cH2Sa16a* $ResponseCode $RID $RespLength $Q_AUTHENTICATOR $UNSIGNED_RespAVP]] #append RespAVP [binary format ccH32 80 18 "1234567890ABCDEF1234567890ABCDEF"] binary scan [md5 [binary format cH2Sa16a[expr {$RespLength-20}]a[string length $secret] $ResponseCode $RID $RespLength $Q_AUTHENTICATOR $RespAVP $secret ]] H* ResponseAuth UDP::respond [binary format cH2SH32a* $ResponseCode $RID $RespLength $ResponseAuth $RespAVP] }
Freeradius auth for LTM V11.5.1
Guys am running out of inspiration here and hoping you may be able to help. I have set up a FreeRadius server which is successfully authenticating Linux systems and Cisco devices. I have added the config for F5 to the radius server and verified it's triggering correctly for my test user. e.g. (radiusd log extract) Mon Feb 22 14:39:35 2016 : Debug: rlm_perl: Added pair Auth-Type = PAP Mon Feb 22 14:39:35 2016 : Info: ++[perl] = ok Mon Feb 22 14:39:35 2016 : Info: +} group post-auth = ok Sending Access-Accept of id 161 to 192.168.1.90 port 27260 Cisco-AVPair = "shell:priv-lvl=15" F5-LTM-User-Shell = "tmsh" F5-LTM-User-Info-1 = "F5-admin" F5-LTM-User-Role = Administrator F5-LTM-User-Partition = "Common" Mon Feb 22 14:39:35 2016 : Info: Finished request 25. I've then followed the recipe at https://support.f5.com/kb/en-us/solutions/public/14000/300/sol14324.html and believe I have things set right. tmsh sows this when list the auth section: auth radius system-auth { servers { system_auth_name1 } } auth radius-server system_auth_name1 { secret $M$q5$0UFrYg9zh5kLp7xkZOb2vZpgAPggyDPoWmjeIgF5F1I= server 192.168.1.56 } auth remote-role { role-info { F5-admin { attribute F5-LTM-User-Info-1=F5-admin console %F5-LTM-User-Shell line-order 1001 role %F5-LTM-User-Role user-partition %F5-LTM-User-Partition } } } Trying to log in as my test user sadly yields no good outcome, in spite of the the log from the radius server showing it sending an Access-Accept packet with the relevant F5 attributes included. So I guess my question is if there is log file I've been unable to find on the LTM itself which might let me know what I'm doing wrong. This or any other thoughts would be greatly appreciated. Enno.Admin Auth via NPS Radius
Hi Everyone, Am wating to implement radius auth of our BIG-IP administrators (GUI and SSH), radius is a supported auth method so we would like to use the Microsoft NPS services. Has anyone successfully implemented GUI / SSH authentication of BIG-IP Administrators via radius to Microsoft NPS? Would be great to hear of your learnings and any advice you can provide. TIA (currently running v16.1.3.1)
