RADIUS server authenticating user with Google Authenticator
Problem this snippet solves:
This code create a RADIUS server to authenticate users with Authenticator algorithm (Google Authenticator and Microsoft Authenticator apps)
Code description
When a Radius request is accepted by the VS:
-
the radius client IP address is checked against a Datagroup list.
- if in list : The shared secret is extracted from Datagroup list
- if not : drop the packet
-
the password is decrypted with radius secret
-
if request code is Access-Request, the request username is searched in a datagroup and the user key is extracted
-
The code is calculated and compared with radius password provided in the RADIUS request.
-
return Access-Accept or Access-Reject response code based on the authenticator algorithm result.
Supported request Packet types:
- Access-Request (1)
Returned Packet types:
- Access-Accept (2)
- Access-Reject (3)
Required request attributes
- User-Name (1)
- User-Password (2)
Optional request attributes
- NAS-IP-Address (4) : IP address
- NAS-Port (5) : Integer
- NAS-Identifier (32) : String
- NAS-Port-Type (61) : Integer
All other attributes are ignored by this irule
Supported response Attributes
All RFC2865 attributes are allowed. Vendor specific attributes are not supported yet.
Note : Many thanks to Kai wilke, John McInnes and George Watkins who shared their snippets I used to write this irule.
Versions :
1.0 : First version based on RADIUS commands. Required RADIUS profile assigned to the virtual server
1.1 : Added Request Message-Authenticator attribute validation / Response Message-Authenticator insertion (Asked by Sam Hall in RADIUS server using APM to authenticate users code). To support this feature, the code is rewritten to decode binary data. Radius profile is not required anymore. (31/05/2018)
1.2 : correction on the Request Message-Authenticator attribute validation, a binary conversion to same type is required after
[string replace ...]How to use this snippet:
- Create an Access Policy authenticating users.
- Define Access profile name in variable
static::apmpolicy -
create a data group list
with values:google_auth_keysusername := "Authenticator key" -
create a data group list
with values:radius_clientsIPAddress := "radius secret" -
create a virtual server with RADIUS profile to manage RADIUS::avp commands.
Code :
proc ga_validate {hmac_mode key_size b32_key token allowed_clock_skew_units} {
##############################################################################################
# Initialize the Base32 alphabet to binary conversation (see RFC 4648)
#
set b32_to_binary [list \
A 00000 B 00001 C 00010 D 00011 E 00100 F 00101 G 00110 H 00111 \
I 01000 J 01001 K 01010 L 01011 M 01100 N 01101 O 01110 P 01111 \
Q 10000 R 10001 S 10010 T 10011 U 10100 V 10101 W 10110 X 10111 \
Y 11000 Z 11001 2 11010 3 11011 4 11100 5 11101 6 11110 7 11111 \
0 "" 1 "" = "" " " "" \
]
if { [string length [set key [string map -nocase $b32_to_binary $b32_key]]] >= $key_size } then {
# Convert the translated ga(key) binary string representation to binary
set binary_key [binary format B$key_size $key]
# Initialize clock timeframe based on Unix epoch time in seconds / 30
set clock [expr { [clock seconds] / 30 } ]
##############################################################################################
# Configure the allowed clock skew units (1 unit = +/-30 seconds in both directions)
#
set allowed_clock_range {0}
for {set i 1} {$i <= $allowed_clock_skew_units} {incr i} {lappend allowed_clock_range -$i $i}
##############################################################################################
# Perform verification of the provided token
foreach x $allowed_clock_range {
##############################################################################################
# Perform verification of the provided token for time frame clock + $x
#
# Calculate hex encoded HMAC checksum value for wide-int value of time frame clock+ x using key_binary as secret
binary scan [CRYPTO::sign -alg $hmac_mode -key $binary_key [binary format W* [expr { $clock + $x }]]] H* hmac_tmp
# Parse offset based on the last nibble (= 4 bits / 1 hex) of the hmac_tmp HMAC checksum and multiply with 2 for byte to hex conversation
set offset [expr { "0x[string index $hmac_tmp end]" * 2 } ]
# Parse (= 4 bytes / 8 hex) from hmac_tmp starting at the offset value, then remove the most significant bit, perform the modulo 1000000 and format the result to a 6 digit number
set token_calculated [format %06d [expr { ( "0x[string range $hmac_tmp $offset [expr { $offset + 7 } ]]" & 0x7FFFFFFF ) % 1000000 } ]]
# Compare token_calculated with user provided token value
if { $token_calculated equals $token } then {
# The provided token is valid"
return 1
break
}
}
} else {
return -1
}
return 0
}
when RULE_INIT {
set static::client_list "radius_clients"
set static::RFC_2865_FULL_COMPLIANCE 1
set static::MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR_REQUIRED 1
}
when CLIENT_ACCEPTED {
set RespLength 20
set RespAVP ""
############## START OF ALLOWED RADIUS CLIENT IP VALIDATION #################
if {![class match [IP::client_addr] equals $static::client_list]} {
log local0. "RADIUS Client not in Datagroup : [IP::client_addr]"
# RFC 2865 : A request from a client for which the RADIUS server does not have a shared secret MUST be silently discarded
UDP::drop
return
}
#Retreive RADIUS client shared secret
set secret [class match -value [IP::client_addr] equals $static::client_list]
if {[binary scan [UDP::payload] cH2Sa16a* QCODE QID QLEN Q_AUTHENTICATOR QAVP] != 5} {
set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1
set RAVP(18) "REQUEST AUTHENTICATOR FAILURE"
}
#Store Request ID in Response ID
set RID $QID
switch $QCODE {
1 {
set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 0
set USER_NAME ""
set USER_PASSWORD ""
set CHAP_PASSWORD ""
set NAS_IP_ADDRESS ""
set NAS_PORT ""
set NAS_PORT_TYPE ""
set MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR ""
set UNSIGNED_REQUEST [UDP::payload]
set NAS_IDENTIFIER ""
set QAVP_LIST_LEN [expr {$QLEN - 20}]
set record_offset 0
while {[expr {$QAVP_LIST_LEN - $record_offset}] > 4} {
binary scan $QAVP @${record_offset}cc QAVP_TYPE QAVP_LEN
set QAVP_VAL_LEN [expr {$QAVP_LEN -2}]
binary scan $QAVP @${record_offset}x2a${QAVP_VAL_LEN} QAVP_VAL
switch $QAVP_TYPE {
1 {
set USER_NAME $QAVP_VAL
}
2 {
set USER_PASSWORD $QAVP_VAL
}
3 {
set CHAP_PASSWORD $QAVP_VAL
}
4 {
binary scan $QAVP_VAL c4 octets
foreach octet $octets {
lappend r [expr {$octet & 0xFF}]
}
set NAS_IP_ADDRESS [join $r .]
}
5 {
binary scan $QAVP_VAL I NAS_PORT
set NAS_PORT [expr {$NAS_PORT & 0xFFFFFFFF}]
}
24 {
set STATE $QAVP_VAL
}
32 {
set NAS_IDENTIFIER $QAVP_VAL
}
61 {
binary scan $QAVP_VAL I NAS_PORT_TYPE;
set NAS_PORT_TYPE [expr {$NAS_PORT_TYPE & 0xFFFFFFFF}];
}
80 {
set MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR $QAVP_VAL
set UNSIGNED_RAVP [string replace $QAVP $record_offset [expr {$record_offset + 18}] [binary format ccH32 80 18 [string repeat 0 32]]]
set UNSIGNED_REQUEST [binary format cH2Sa16a* $QCODE $QID $QLEN $Q_AUTHENTICATOR $UNSIGNED_RAVP]
}
default {
}
}
set record_offset [expr {$record_offset + $QAVP_LEN}]
}
#EVALUATE REQUEST MESSAGE-AUTHENTICATOR
if {$static::MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR_REQUIRED && ($MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR equals "" || ![CRYPTO::verify -alg hmac-md5 -key $secret -signature $MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR $UNSIGNED_REQUEST])} {
# RFC 2869 : A RADIUS Server receiving an Access-Request with a Message-Authenticator Attribute present MUST calculate the correct value
# of the Message-Authenticator and silently discard the packet if it does not match the value sent.
log local0. "[IP::client_addr] : wrong or missing Message-Authenticator attribute"
UDP::drop
return
}
if {$static::RFC_2865_FULL_COMPLIANCE} {
if {$NAS_IP_ADDRESS == "" && $NAS_IDENTIFIER == ""} {
# RFC 2865 : It MUST contain either a NAS-IP-Address attribute or a NAS-Identifier attribute (or both).
set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1
set RAVP(18) "REQUEST NOT RFC COMPLIANT"
} elseif {$USER_PASSWORD == "" && $CHAP_PASSWORD == "" && $STATE == ""} {
# RFC 2865 : An Access-Request MUST contain either a User-Password or a CHAP-Password or a State.
set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1
set RAVP(18) "REQUEST NOT RFC COMPLIANT"
} elseif {$USER_PASSWORD ne "" && $CHAP_PASSWORD ne ""} {
# RFC 2865 : An Access-Request MUST NOT contain both a User-Password and a CHAP-Password.
set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1
set RAVP(18) "REQUEST NOT RFC COMPLIANT"
}
}
if {$USER_PASSWORD == ""} {
set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1
set RAVP(18) "USER-PASSWORD NOT SET BUT REQUIRED"
} elseif {$USER_NAME == ""} {
set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1
set RAVP(18) "USER-NAME NOT SET BUT REQUIRED"
} elseif {[set userkey [class lookup $USER_NAME "google_auth_keys"]] equals ""} {
set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1
set RAVP(18) "USER-NAME NOT SET BUT REQUIRED"
}
}
2 - 3 - 11 {
set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1
set RAVP(18) "RADIUS CODE NOT SUPPORTED - NOT A RADIUS CLIENT"
}
4 - 5 - 6 - 10 {
set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1
set RAVP(18) "RADIUS CODE NOT SUPPORTED - NOT A RADIUS ACCOUNTING SERVER"
}
default {
set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1
set RAVP(18) "RADIUS CODE NOT SUPPORTED"
}
}
############## END OF RFC COMPLIANCE AND SERVER FEATURES VALIDATION #################
# DO NOT RELEASE UDP PACKET. Drop it to prevent further process by irule or load balancing to an internal server.
# When UDP packet dropped, PAYLOAD is dropped and RADIUS Commands not available anymore.
UDP::drop
if {$REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED == 0} {
########## START OF PASSWORD DECRYPTION ############################
binary scan [md5 "$secret$Q_AUTHENTICATOR"] H* bx_hex
binary scan $USER_PASSWORD H* px_full_hex
set Password_Padded ""
for {set x 0} {$x<[string length $px_full_hex]} {set x [expr {$x+32}]} {
set px_hex [string range $px_full_hex $x [expr {$x+31}]]
append Password_Padded [binary format W [expr 0x[string range $px_hex 0 15] ^ 0x[string range $bx_hex 0 15]]]
append Password_Padded [binary format W [expr 0x[string range $px_hex 16 31] ^ 0x[string range $bx_hex 16 31]]]
binary scan [md5 "$secret[binary format H* $px_hex]"] H* bx_hex
}
binary scan $Password_Padded A* PASSWORD
########## END OF PASSWORD DECRYPTION ############################
########## START OF GOOGLE AUTHENTICATION ############################
switch -- [call ga_validate "hmac-sha1" 80 $userkey $PASSWORD 10] {
-1 {
# code verification failed
set ResponseCode 3
if {![info exists RAVP(18)] } {set RAVP(18) "wrong username Password"}
log local0. "erreur 2 : wrong User Key"
}
0 {
# code verification failed
set ResponseCode 3
if {![info exists RAVP(18)] } {set RAVP(18) "wrong username Password"}
}
1 {
# code verification successful
set ResponseCode 2
if {![info exists RAVP(18)] } {set RAVP(18) "Good username Password"}
}
default {set result "error: unknown"}
}
########## END OF GOOGLE AUTHENTICATION ############################
} else {
set ResponseCode 3
if {[info exists RAVP(18)] } { log local0. $RAVP(18)}
}
########## ENCODING AND DELIVERY OF RADIUS RESONSE ############################
foreach attrID [array names RAVP] {
set RespLength [expr {[set attrLength [expr {[string length $RAVP($attrID)]+2}]] + $RespLength}]
append RespAVP [binary format cca* $attrID $attrLength $RAVP($attrID)]
}
#CALCULATE RESPONSE MESSAGE-AUTHENTICATOR
set UNSIGNED_RespAVP $RespAVP[binary format ccH32 80 18 [string repeat 0 32]]
#set UNSIGNED_RespAVP $RespAVP[binary format ccH32 80 18 "00000000000000000000000000000000"]
set RespLength [expr {18 + $RespLength}]
append RespAVP [binary format cc 80 18][CRYPTO::sign -alg hmac-md5 -key $secret [binary format cH2Sa16a* $ResponseCode $RID $RespLength $Q_AUTHENTICATOR $UNSIGNED_RespAVP]]
#append RespAVP [binary format ccH32 80 18 "1234567890ABCDEF1234567890ABCDEF"]
binary scan [md5 [binary format cH2Sa16a[expr {$RespLength-20}]a[string length $secret] $ResponseCode $RID $RespLength $Q_AUTHENTICATOR $RespAVP $secret ]] H* ResponseAuth
UDP::respond [binary format cH2SH32a* $ResponseCode $RID $RespLength $ResponseAuth $RespAVP]
}Updated Jun 06, 2023
Version 2.0
Stanislas_Piro2
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