bot defense
29 TopicsA Full-Stack Defense Against Frontier AI Threats
Frontier AI doesn't just attack faster — it logs in, with valid credentials, and abuses what your applications are designed to do. Here's how F5 Distributed Cloud catches what no single security layer can see: AI-driven WAF, learned API business logic, bot defense, and cross-layer correlation, built into the delivery platform itself.200Views1like0CommentsBot Defense causing a lot of false positives
Hello DevCentral Community, While configuring a Bot Defense profile for our websites, we noticed a lot of false positives, where legitimate browsers are flagged as Malicious Bots to a point where we cannot safely enable Malicious Bot blocking. The detected anomalies are mostly : Device ID Deletion (can be worked around by raising the threshold from 3 to ~10) Resource request without browser verification cookie Session Opening Browser Verification Timed out (more rarely) We have tried various configuration, none of which worked properly. Currently, our test bot defense profile is as follows : DoS Attack Mitigation Mode : Enabled API Access for Browsers and Mobile Applications : Enabled Exceptions: Device ID Deletions : Block for 600s Detect after 10 (instead of 3) access attemps in 600s No microservice Browser Access : Allow Browser Verification : Verify After Access (Blocking) / 300s grace perdiod (we also tried verify before, but the white challenge page isn't acceptable for our users) Device ID mode : Generate After Access (we also tried Generate Before access) Single page application : Enabled (we also tried to disable it) Cross Domain Requests : Allow configured domains; validate upon request (with all of our websites added in related site domains) We also tried with allow all requests After a bit of digging around, we noticed the following : The false positives often happen after visiting a website that loads various resources from other domains, and we believe the issue might be linked to cross domain requests Google Chrome (and derivatives) are dropping the TS* cookies for cross domain requests, even with the domains added in the related domain list After creating an iRule that updates TS* cookies with SameSite=None; Secure, some previously blocked requests were now allowed but not all Disabling the check for the detected anomalies feel like it would severely affect the bot defense effectiveness. We have opened a support ticket related to this is issue over a year ago and haven't found any solution yet. Has anyone faced a similar problem before, and has managed to solve it ? If so, how ? Thank you for any help. RegardsSolved665Views0likes5CommentsProblem with sending BotDefense logs to remote server
Hi, I have a question about sending logs to a remote log-management server. When I want to create a bot defense logging profile, it doesn't offer me a remote server in the config menu, but only a local storage, am I doing something wrong? I'm already using a remote server for ASM.. thank you for any advice ===================== I set the same for ASM and the option is already there - I use it fine Bot Defense - creating new Logging Profile ..to see that the option to select a defined Remote Publisher location is missing529Views0likes5CommentsJavaScript Supply Chains, Magecart, and F5 XC Client-Side Defense (Demo)
JavaScript Supply Chain Attacks are on the Rise With a firewall, a WAF, bot defense, and a SIEM, you control and monitor web traffic entering the data center. Criminals have adapted their strategies to attack your customers in the browser. New web architectures involving dozens of third-party JavaScript files make this new attack surface even more vulnerable. Increasing Web Page Complexity Enterprises cannot keep track of all the scripts and changes that go on in their website and attackers are exploiting this lack of surveillance to introduce malicious code into the supply chain that their web page relies on. Most use 3rd party libraries (eg. Marketing Scripts) Most 3rd party libraries themeselves depend on another set of 3rd party libraries (eg. jQuery.js) Final page loads on end user's browser can easily contain scripts from 20-30 different organizations Magecart, Formjacking, and E-skimming These attacks occur when a threat actor injects one or many malicious scripts into a legitimate page or code repo to create a software supply chain man-in-the-browser attack (SC-MITB). The attacker can then run keyloggers and any other JavaScript based attacks on the end-users browser stealing any credit card data, username and password combinations etc... which will be sent to the attackers command and control server as pictured below. What is Distributed Cloud Client-Side Defense? F5® Distributed Cloud Client-Side Defense (CSD) provides a multi-phase protection system that protects web applications against Magecart-style and other malicious JavaScript attacks. This multi-phase protection system includes detection, alerting, and mitigation. Detection. A continuously evolving signal set allows CSD to understand when scripts on web pages exhibit signs of exfiltration. CSD detects network requests made by malicious scripts that attempt to exfiltrate PII data. Alerting. CSD generates timely alerts on the behavior of malicious scripts, provided by a continuously improving Analysis Engine. The Analysis Engine contains a machine learning component for accurate and informative analysis and provides details on the behavior of malicious script to help troubleshoot and identify the root cause. Mitigation. CSD detects threats in real-time and provides enforcement with one-click mitigation. CSD leverages the same obfuscation and signal technology as F5® Distributed Cloud Bot Defense, delivering unparalleled efficacy. High Level Distributed Cloud Client-Side Defense Architecture Client-Side Defense Demo: Learn about the risks of JavaScript supply-chain attacks (aka Magecart), the costs of Formjacking and PII Harvesting, and how to detect and mitigate this threat vector. Regain security control of your apps with F5’s Distributed Cloud Client-Side Defense. Related Resources Deploy Bot Defense on any Edge with F5 Distributed Cloud (SaaS Console, Automation) F5 Client-Side Defense Product Page Client-Side Defense Documentation5.4KViews5likes0CommentsOperationlizing Online Fraud Detection, Prevention, and Response
Overview A rapidly growing use of digital channels, ample use of AI and ML programs and an endless availability of stolen user credentials to perpetrate attacks and retool as needed have resulted in more sophisticated and common fraud attacks – resulting in increasingly high fraud losses. Fraud organizations continue to struggle with the volume, sophistication, and rapidly evolving threat landscape. As fraudsters fine tune their attack methods, fraud teams are challenged with increased complexity and operational costs. Operationalizing Online Fraud Prevention Demo See in real-time how Distributed Cloud Account Protection stops Online Fraud Attacks and provides a simple and intuitive UI for Fraud Analysts to investigate potential fraud and provide direct feedback to the decision making AI Fraud Engine. Demo Portion Begins at 2:31 Related Resources Deploy Bot Defense on any Edge with F5 Distributed Cloud (SaaS Console, Automation) How Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud - Part 2 JavaScript Supply Chains, Magecart, and F5 XC Client-Side Defense (Demo) Bots, Fraud, and the OWASP Automated Threats Project (Overview) F5 Distributed Cloud Bot Defense (Overview and Demo) F5.com Account Protection2.2KViews4likes0CommentsOWASP Automated Threats - Credential Stuffing (OAT-008)
Introduction: In this OWASP Automated Threat Article we'll be highlighting OAT-008 Credentials Stuffing with some basic threat information as well as a recorded demo to dive into the concepts deeper. In our demo we'll show how Credential Stuffing works with Automation Tools to validate lists of stolen credentials leading to manual Account Takeover and Fraud. We'll wrap it up by highlighting F5 Bot Defense to show how we solve this problem for our customers. Credential Stuffing Description: Lists of authentication credentials stolen from elsewhere are tested against the application’s authentication mechanisms to identify whether users have re-used the same login credentials. The stolen usernames (often email addresses) and password pairs could have been sourced directly from another application by the attacker, purchased in a criminal marketplace, or obtained from publicly available breach data dumps. Unlike OAT-007 Credential Cracking, Credential Stuffing does not involve any bruteforcing or guessing of values; instead credentials used in other applications are being tested for validity Likelihood & Severity Credential stuffing is one of the most common techniques used to take-over user accounts. Credential stuffing is dangerous to both consumers and enterprises because of the ripple effects of these breaches. Anatomy of Attack The attacker acquires usernames and passwords from a website breach, phishing attack, password dump site. The attacker uses automated tools to test the stolen credentials against many websites (for instance, social media sites, online marketplaces, or web apps). If the login is successful, the attacker knows they have a set of valid credentials. Now the attacker knows they have access to an account. Potential next steps include: Draining stolen accounts of stored value or making purchases. Accessing sensitive information such as credit card numbers, private messages, pictures, or documents. Using the account to send phishing messages or spam. Selling known-valid credentials to one or more of the compromised sites for other attackers to use. OWASP Automated Threat (OAT) Identity Number OAT-008 Threat Event Name Credential Stuffing Summary Defining Characteristics Mass log in attempts used to verify the validity of stolen username/password pairs. OAT-008 Attack Demographics: Sectors Targeted Parties Affected Data Commonly Misused Other Names and Examples Possible Symptoms Entertainment Many Users Authentication Credentials Account Checker Attack Sequential login attempts with different credentials from the same HTTP client (based on IP, User Agent, device, fingerprint, patterns in HTTP headers, etc.) Financial Application Owner Account Checking High number of failed login attempts Government Account Takeover Increased customer complaints of account hijacking through help center or social media outlets Retail Login Stuffing Social Networking Password List Attack Password re-use Use of Stolen Credentials Credential Stuffing Demo: In this demo we will be showing how attackers leverage automation tools with increasing sophistication to execute credential stuffing against the sign in page of a web application. We'll then have a look at the same attack with F5 Distributed Cloud Bot Defense protecting the application. In Conclusion: A common truism in the security industry says that there are two types of companies—those that have been breached, and those that just don’t know it yet. As of 2022, we should be updating that to something like “There are two types of companies—those that acknowledge the threat of credential stuffing and those that will be its victims.” Credential stuffing will be a threat so long as we require users to log in to accounts online. The most comprehensive way to prevent credential stuffing is to use an anti-automation platform. OWASP Links OWASP Automated Threats to Web Applications Home Page OWASP Automated Threats Identification Chart OWASP Automated Threats to Web Applications Handbook F5 Related Content Deploy Bot Defense on any Edge with F5 Distributed Cloud (SaaS Console, Automation) F5 Bot Defense Solutions F5 Labs "I Was a Human CATPCHA Solver" The OWASP Automated Threats Project OWASP Automated Threats - CAPTCHA Defeat (OAT-009) How Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud Part: 1 How Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud Part: 2 F5 Distributed Cloud Bot Defense F5 Labs 2021 Credential Stuffing Report
5.3KViews5likes0CommentsOWASP Automated Threats - OAT-005 Scalping
Introduction: In this OWASP Automated Threat Article we'll be highlighting OAT-005 Scalping with some basic threat information as well as a recorded demo to dive into the concepts deeper. In our demo we'll show how Automation is used to monitor and wait for goods or services to become available and then take rapid action to beat normal users to obtain them. We'll wrap it up by highlighting F5 XC Bot Defense to show how we solve this problem for our customers. Scalping Description: Acquisition of goods or services using the application in a manner that a normal user would be unable to undertake manually. Although Scalping may include monitoring awaiting availability of the goods or services, and then rapid action to beat normal users to obtain these. Scalping includes the additional concept of limited availability of sought-after goods or services, and is most well known in the ticketing business where the tickets acquired are then resold later at a profit by the scalpers. OWASP Automated Threat (OAT) Identity Number OAT-005 Threat Event Name Scalping Summary Defining Characteristics Obtain limited-availability and/or preferred goods/services by unfair methods. OAT-005 Attack Demographics: Sectors Targeted Parties Affected Data Commonly Misused Other Names and Examples Possible Symptoms Entertainment Many Users NA Bulk purchase High peaks of traffic for certain limited-availability goods or services Financial Application Owner Purchase automation Increased circulation of limited goods reselling on secondary market Retail Purchase bot Queue jumping Ticket Scalping Scalping Demo: In this demo we will be showing a simple example of how automation is used to monitor and wait for goods or services to become available and then take rapid action to beat normal users to obtain them. We'll then have a look at the same attack with F5 Distributed Cloud Bot Defense protecting the application. In Conclusion: Scalping Bots are a real problem for organization and customers as they are made up of a vast ecosystem to acquire large amounts of inventory at scale to be sold for a profit. F5 has the solutions to provide superior efficacy to interrupt and stop this unwanted automation. OWASP Links OWASP Automated Threats to Web Applications Home Page OWASP Automated Threats Identification Chart OWASP Automated Threats to Web Applications Handbook F5 Related Content Deploy Bot Defense on any Edge with F5 Distributed Cloud (SaaS Console, Automation) F5 Bot Defense Solutions The OWASP Automated Threats Project OWASP Automated Threats - CAPTCHA Defeat (OAT-009) OWASP Automated Threats - Credential Stuffing (OAT-008) OWASP Automated Threats - OAT-001 Carding Operationlizing Online Fraud Detection, Prevention, and Response JavaScript Supply Chains, Magecart, and F5 XC Client-Side Defense (Demo) How Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud Part: 1 How Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud Part: 2 F5 Distributed Cloud Bot Defense2.5KViews5likes1CommentMaking Mobile SDK Integration Ridiculously Easy with F5 XC Mobile SDK Integrator
Introduction To prevent attackers from exploiting mobile apps to launch bots, F5 provides customers with the F5 Distributed Cloud (XC) Mobile SDK, which collects signals for the detection of bots. To gain this protection, the SDK must be integrated into mobile apps, a process F5 explains in clear step-by-step technical documentation. Now, F5 provides an even easier option, the F5 Distributed Cloud Mobile SDK Integrator, a console app that performs the integration directly into app binaries without any need for coding, which means no need for programmer resources, no need to integration delays. The Mobile SDK Integrator supports most iOS and Android native apps. As a console application, it can be tied directly into CI/CD pipelines to support rapid deployments. Use Cases While motivations for using SDK Integrator may vary, below are some of the more common reasons: Emergency integrations can be accomplished quickly and correctly. Customers experiencing active bot attacks may need to integrate with F5 Distributed Cloud Bot Defense immediately and minimize integration risks. Apps using 3rd-party libraries may not be suitable for manual integration, particularly when these libraries do not provide APIs for adding HTTP headers into network requests. In such cases, the SDK Integrator can inject SDK calls into the underlying network stack, bypassing the limitations of the network library. Customers who own multiple apps, which may have different architectures, or are managed by different owners, need a single integration method, one which works for all app architectures and is simple to roll out to multiple teams. The SDK Integrator facilitates a universal integration approach. How It Works The work of the SDK Integrator is done through two commands: the first command creates a configuration profile for the SDK injection, and the second performs the injection. Step 1: $ python3 ./create_config.py --target-os Android --apiguard-config ./base_configuration_android.json --url-filter "*.domain.com/*/login" --enable-logs --outfile my_app_android_profile.dat In Step 1, apiguard-config lets the user specify the base configuration to be used in integration. With url-filter we specify the pattern for URLs which require Bot Defense protection, enable-logs allows for APIGuard logs to be seen in the console, outfile specifies the name of this integration profile. Step 2: $ java -jar SDK-Integrator.jar --plugin F5-XC-Mobile-SDK-Integrator-Android-plugin-4.1.1-4.dat --plugin my_app_android_profile.dat ./input_app.apk --output ./output_app.apk --keystore ~/my-key.keystore --keyname mykeyname --keypass xyz123 --storepass xyz123 In Step 2, we specify which SDK Integrator plugin and configuration profile should be used. In the same step, we can optionally pass parameters for app-signing: keystore, keyname, keypass and storepass. Output parameter specifies the resulting file name. The resulting .apk or .aab file is a fully integrated app, which can be tested and released. Injection steps for iOS are similar. The commands are described in greater detail in the SDK Integrator user guides distributed with the SDK Integrator. Mobile SDK Integrator Video In Conclusion In order to thwart potential attackers from capitalizing on mobile apps to initiate automated bots, The F5 Distributed Cloud Mobile SDK Integrator seamlessly incorporates the SDK into app binaries, completely bypassing the necessity for coding making the process easy and fast. Related Content Deploy Bot Defense on any Edge with F5 Distributed Cloud (SaaS Console, Automation) Protecting Your Native Mobile Apps with F5 XC Mobile App Shield Bot Defense for Mobile Apps in XC WAAP Part 1: The Bot Defense Mobile SDK3KViews4likes1CommentProtecting Your Native Mobile Apps with F5 XC Mobile App Shield
Introduction Mobile App Shield is a security technology that integrates directly into mobile applications to provide proactive security against a wide range of attacks, such as tampering, debugging, code injection, code modification and stealing of data from the app. Mobile App Shield is delivered in separate packages for iOS and for Android. Shielding an app with Mobile App Shield is an automated process. Key Capabilities F5 Distribtued Cloud (XC) Mobile App Shield contains multiple security features to counter threats found in the Android and iOS eco-system, and are outlined further below. Product Demo In this Product Demonstration we'll be showcasing Mobile App SHIELD with a product demonstration of how to both integrate SHIELD while also highlighting the protection it provides Conclusion Mobile App Shield represents an advanced security technology seamlessly embedded within mobile applications, offering proactive protection against a diverse array of threats and is easily coupled with XC Bot Defense for comprehensive Mobile App Protection for both Android and iOS. Related Content Deploy Bot Defense on any Edge with F5 Distributed Cloud (SaaS Console, Automation) Bot Defense for Mobile Apps in XC WAAP Part 1: The Bot Defense Mobile SDK F5 Bot Defense Solutions F5 Fraud Solutions F5 Authentication Intelligence The OWASP Automated Threats Project OWASP Automated Threats - CAPTCHA Defeat (OAT-009) OWASP Automated Threats - Credential Stuffing (OAT-008) OWASP Automated Threats - OAT-001 Carding Operationlizing Online Fraud Detection, Prevention, and Response JavaScript Supply Chains, Magecart, and F5 XC Client-Side Defense (Demo) How Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud Part: 1 How Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud Part: 2 F5 Distributed Cloud Bot Defense (Overview and Demo)5.4KViews5likes2CommentsHow Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud - Part 2
In our previous article we discussed how an attackers sophistication evolves in order to bypass anti-automation countermeasures and achieve their actions on the target. In this article and video we walk through some specific automated attack tools and test them against a real endpoint protected by F5 Bot Defense to get a real look at this scenario. When it comes to an attacker being successful with their automation toolkit, it heavily depends on the Anti-Automation solution that is protecteing the web property they are attacking and the sophistication of the attacker. In order to bypass any countermeasures the attacker must make the attack look as human as possible. Let's briefly discuss the different tools we'll be using in our demo starting with low sophistication and ending with a higher sophistication attack. Low sophistication Attacks (e.g. CURL): for run in {1..10} do curl -s 'https://credstuff.acmecorp.com/user/signin' -i -X POST -d "username=1&password=1" > /dev/null echo echo CURL Credential Stuffing attempt $run done sleep 2 done Sample: CURL Script performing basic credential stuffing HTTP POST example CURL is a tool that almost everyone uses these days to transfer data from or to a server, using one of the supported protocols (DICT, FILE, FTP, FTPS, GOPHER, HTTP, HTTPS, IMAP, IMAPS, LDAP, LDAPS, POP3, POP3S, RTMP, RTSP, SCP, SFTP, SMB, SMBS, SMTP, SMTPS, TELNET and TFTP). The command is designed to work without user interaction so of course it lends itself well to automation both good and bad. CURL offers a busload of useful tricks like proxy support, user authentication, FTP upload, HTTP post, SSL connections, cookies, file transfer resume, Metalink, and more. The number of features will make your head spin but it can also facilitate malicious activity and potentially fool origin servers that don't have proper checks in place. CURL can be used to generate automated credential stuffing attacks do to the massive amount of features CURL can generate much of the network traffic, headers, user agents strings and such that a real browser would. This can be used to fool origin servers into thinking it is a real browser and not an automated login attempt. Medium sophistication (e.g. Open Bullet 2) OpenBullet 2 is a cross platform automation suite powered by .NET core. It allows users to perform requests towards a target webapp and offers a lot of tools to work with the results. This software can be used for scraping and parsing data, automated pentesting and much more. This tool can also be used maliciously by attackers for Credential Stuffing and other automated web threats. It allows the user to import proxy lists, build automated attack configurations, leverage third party CAPTCHA solvers, and much more. High sophistication (e.g. Selenium with Python) from selenium import webdriver from selenium.webdriver.common.keys import Keys driver = webdriver.Firefox() driver.get("http://www.python.org") assert "Python" in driver.title elem = driver.find_element_by_name("q") elem.clear() elem.send_keys("pycon") elem.send_keys(Keys.RETURN) assert "No results found." not in driver.page_source driver.close() Sample: Selenium Python Script performing basic browser automation function Selenium is an umbrella project for a range of tools and libraries that enable and support the automation of web browsers. Selenium supports automation of all the major browsers in the market through the use of WebDriver. WebDriver is an API and protocol that defines a language-neutral interface for controlling the behaviour of web browsers. With this ability to automate Web Browsers through the use of scripting can also lend itself to enabling an attacker to attempt to bypass many anti-automation solutions for a variety of different attacks. OWASP has defined a list of many of the different Automated Threats here... Learn more about the Selenium Browser Automation Project here Video Description: Automated attack tools are evolving quickly. Increasing scale, sophistication, and human emulation gives threat actors better chances of bypassing existing Bot Defense countermeasures leading to Account Takeover and Fraud. In this session we'll demonstrate how attacks evolve from bots to fraud. Hope you guys enjoyed this Overview and Demo. If there are any comments or questions please feel free to reach us in the comments section. Thanks! Related Content: Deploy Bot Defense on any Edge with F5 Distributed Cloud (SaaS Console, Automation) How Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud Part: 1 F5 Bot Management
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