F5 BIG-IP and NetApp StorageGRID - Providing Fast and Scalable S3 API for AI apps
F5 BIG-IP, an industry-leading ADC solution, can provide load balancing services for HTTPS servers, with full security applied in-flight and performance levels to meet any enterprise’s capacity targets. Specific to the S3 API, the object storage and retrieval protocol that rides upon HTTPS, an aligned partnering solution exists from NetApp, which allows a large-scale set of S3 API targets to ingest and provide objects. Automatic backend synchronization allows any node to be offered up as a target by a server load balancer like BIG-IP. This allows overall storage node utilization to be optimized across the node set, and scaled performance to reach the highest S3 API bandwidth levels, all while offering high availability to S3 API consumers. If one node fails or is undergoing maintenance, the overall service continues. S3 compatible storage is becoming popular for AI applications due to its superior performance over traditional protocols such as NFS or CIFS, as well as enabling repatriation of data from the cloud to on-prem. These are scenarios where the amount of data faced is large, this drives the requirement for new levels of scalability and performance; S3 compatible object storages such as NetApp StorageGRID are purpose-built to reach such levels. Sample BIG-IP and StorageGRID Configuration This document is based upon tests and measurements using the following lab configuration. All devices in the lab were virtual machine-based offerings. The S3 service to be projected to the outside world, depicted in the above diagram and delivered to the client via the external network, will use a BIG-IP virtual server (VS) which is tied to an origin pool of three large-capacity StorageGRID nodes. The BIG-IP maintains the integrity of the NetApp nodes by frequent HTTP-based health checks. Should an unhealthy node be detected, it will be dropped from the list of active pool members. When content is written via the S3 protocol to any node in the pool, the other members are synchronized to serve up content should they be selected by BIG-IP for future read requests. The key recommendations and observations in building the lab include: Setup a local certificate authority such that all nodes can be trusted by the BIG-IP. Typically the local CA-signed certificate will incorporate every node’s FQDN and IP address within the listed subject alternate names (SAN) to make the backend solution streamlined with one single certificate. Different F5 profiles, such as FastL4 or FastHTTP, can be selected to reach the right tradeoff between the absolute capacity of stateful traffic load-balanced versus rich layer 7 functions like iRules or authentication. Modern techniques such as multi-part uploads or using HTTP Ranges for downloads can take large objects, and concurrently move smaller pieces across the load balancer, lowering total transaction times, and spreading work over more CPU cores. The S3 protocol, at its core, is a set of REST API calls. To facilitate testing, the widely used S3Browser (www.s3browser.com) was used to quickly and intuitively create S3 buckets on the NetApp offering and send/retrieve objects (files) through the BIG-IP load balancer. Setup the BIG-IP and StorageGrid Systems The StorageGrid solution is an array of storage nodes, provisioned with the help of an administrative host, the “Grid Manager”. For interactive users, no thick client is required as on-board web services allow a streamlined experience all through an Internet browser. The following is an example of Grid Manager, taken from a Chrome browser; one sees the three Storage Nodes setup have been successfully added. The load balancer, in our case the BIG-IP, is set up with a virtual server to support HTTPS traffic and distributed that traffic, which is S3 object storage traffic, to the three StorageGRID nodes. The following screenshot demonstrates that the BIG-IP is setup in a standard HA (active-passive pair) configuration and the three pool members are healthy (green, health checks are fine) and receiving/sending S3 traffic, as the byte counts are seen in the image to be non-zero. On the internal side of the BIG-IP, TCP port 18082 is being used for S3 traffic. To do testing of the solution, including features such as multi-part uploads and downloads, a popular S3 tool, S3Browser, was downloaded and used. The following shows the entirety of the S3Browser setup. Simply create an account (StorageGRID-Account-01 in our example) and point the REST API endpoint at the BIG-IP Virtual Server that is acting as the secure front door for our pool of NetApp nodes. The S3 Access Key ID and Secret values are generated at turn-up time of the NetApp appliances. All S3 traffic will, of course, be SSL/TLS encrypted. BIG-IP will intercept the SSL traffic (high-speed decrypt) and then re-encrypt when proxying the traffic to a selected origin pool member. Other valid load balancer setups exist; one might include an “off load” approach to SSL, whereby the S3 nodes safely co-located in a data center may prefer to receive non-SSL HTTP S3 traffic. This may see an overall performance improvement in terms of peak bandwidth per storage node, but this comes at the tradeoff of security considerations. Experimenting with S3 Protocol and Load Balancing With all the elements in place to start understanding the behavior of S3 and spreading traffic across NetApp nodes, a quick test involved creating a S3 bucket and placing some objects in that new bucket. Buckets are logical collections of objects, conceptually not that different from folders or directories in file systems. In fact, a S3 bucket could even be mounted as a folder in an operating system such as Linux. In their simplest form, most commonly, buckets can simply serve as high-capacity, performant storage and retrieval targets for similarly themed structured or unstructured data. In the first test, we created a new bucket (“audio-clip-bucket”) and uploaded four sample files to the new bucket using S3Browser. We then zeroed the statistics for each pool member on the BIG-IP, to see if even this small upload would spread S3 traffic across more than a single NetApp device. Immediately after the upload, the counters reflect that two StorageGRID nodes were selected to receive S3 transactions. Richly detailed, per-transaction visibility can be obtained by leveraging the F5 SSL Orchestrator (SSLO) feature on the BIG-IP, whereby copies of the bi-directional S3 traffic decrypted within the load balancer can be sent to packet loggers, analytics tools, or even protocol analyzers like Wireshark. The BIG-IP also has an onboard analytics tool, Application Visibility and Reporting (AVR) which can provide some details on the nuances of the S3 traffic being proxied. AVR demonstrates the following characteristics of the above traffic, a simple bucket creation and upload of 4 objects. With AVR, one can see the URL values used by S3, which include the bucket name itself as well as transactions incorporating the object names as URLs. Also, the HTTP methods used included both GETS and PUTS. The use of HTTP PUT is expected when creating a new bucket. S3 is not governed by a typical standards body document, such as an IETF Request for Comment (RFC), but rather has evolved out of AWS and their use of S3 since 2006. For details around S3 API characteristics and nomenclature, this site can be referenced. For example, the expected syntax for creating a bucket is provided, including the fact that it should be an HTTP PUT to the root (/) URL target, with the bucket configuration parameters including name provided within the HTTP transaction body. Achieving High Performance S3 with BIG-IP and StorageGRID A common concern with protocols, such as HTTP, is head-of-line blocking, where one large, lengthy transaction blocks subsequent desired, and now queued transactions. This is one of the reasons for parallelism in HTTP 1.X, where loading 30 or more objects to paint a web page will often utilize two, four, or even more concurrent TCP sessions. Another performance issue when dealing with very large transactions is, without parallelism, even those most performant networks will see an established TCP session reach a maximum congestion window (CWND) where no more segments may be in put inflight until new TCP ACKs arrive back. Advanced TCP options like TCP exponential windowing or TCP SACK can help, but regardless of this, the achievable bandwidth of any one TCP session is bounded and may also frequently task only one core in multi-core CPUs. With the BIG-IP serving as the intermediary, large S3 transactions may default to “multi-part” uploads and downloads. The larger objects become a series of smaller objects that conveniently can be load-balanced by BIG-IP across the entire cluster of NetApp nodes. As displayed in the following diagram, we are asking for multi-part uploads to kick in for objects larger than 5 megabytes. After uploading a 20-megabyte file (technically, 20,000,000 bytes) the BIG-IP shows the traffic distributed across multiple NetApp nodes to the tune of 160.9 million bits. The incoming bits, incoming from the perspective of the origin pool members, confirm the delivery of the object with a small amount of protocol overhead (bits divided by eight to reach bytes). The value of load balancing manageable chunks of very large objects will pay dividends over time with faster overall transaction completion times due to the spreading of traffic across NetApp nodes, more TCP sessions reaching high congestion window values, and no single-core bottle necks in multicore equipment. Tuning BIG-IP for High Performance S3 Service Delivery The F5 BIG-IP offers a set of different profiles it can run its Local Traffic Manager (LTM) module in accordance with; LTM is the heart of the server load balancing function. The most performant profile in terms of attainable traffic load is the “FastL4” profile. This, and other profiles such as “OneConnect” or “FastHTTP”, can be tied to a virtual server, and details around each profile can be found here within the BIG-IP GUI: The FastL4 profile can increase virtual server performance and throughput for supported platforms by using the embedded Packet Velocity Acceleration (ePVA) chip to accelerate traffic. The ePVA chip is a hardware acceleration field programmable gate array (FPGA) that delivers high-performance L4 throughput by offloading traffic processing to the hardware acceleration chip. The BIG-IP makes flow acceleration decisions in software and then offloads eligible flows to the ePVA chip for that acceleration. For platforms that do not contain the ePVA chip, the system performs acceleration actions in software. Software-only solutions can increase performance in direct relationship to the hardware offered by the underlying host. As examples of BIG-IP virtual edition (VE) software running on mid-grade hardware platforms, results with Dell can be found here and similar experiences with HPE Proliant platforms are here. One thing to note about FastL4 as the profile to underpin a performance mode BIG-IP virtual server is that it is layer 4 oriented. For certain features that involve layer 7 HTTP related fields, such as using iRules to swap HTTP headers or perform HTTP authentication, a different profile might be more suitable. A bonus of FastL4 are some interesting specific performance features catering to it. In the BIG-IP version 17 release train, there is a feature to quickly tear down, with no delay, TCP sessions no longer required. Most TCP stacks implement TCP “2MSL” rules, where upon receiving and sending TCP FIN messages, the socket enters a lengthy TCP “TIME_WAIT” state, often minutes long. This stems back to historically bad packet loss environments of the very early Internet. A concern was high latency and packet loss might see incoming packets arrive at a target very late, and the TCP state machine would be confused if no record of the socket still existed. As such, the lengthy TIME_WAIT period was adopted even though this is consuming on-board resources to maintain the state. With FastL4, the “fast” close with TCP reset option now exists, such that any incoming TCP FIN message observed by BIG-IP will result in TCP RESETS being sent to both endpoints, normally bypassing TIME_WAIT penalties. OneConnect and FastHTTP Profiles As mentioned, other traffic profiles on BIG-IP are directed towards Layer 7 and HTTP features. One interesting profile is F5’s “OneConnect”. The OneConnect feature set works with HTTP Keep-Alives, which allows the BIG-IP system to minimize the number of server-side TCP connections by making existing connections available for reuse by other clients. This reduces, among other things, excessive TCP 3-way handshakes (Syn, Syn-Ack, Ack) and mitigates the small TCP congestion windows that new TCP sessions start with and only increases with successful traffic delivery. Persistent server-side TCP connections ameliorate this. When a new connection is initiated to the virtual server, if an existing server-side flow to the pool member is idle, the BIG-IP system applies the OneConnect source mask to the IP address in the request to determine whether it is eligible to reuse the existing idle connection. If it is eligible, the BIG-IP system marks the connection as non-idle and sends a client request over it. If the request is not eligible for reuse, or an idle server-side flow is not found, the BIG-IP system creates a new server-side TCP connection and sends client requests over it. The last profile considered is the “Fast HTTP” profile. The Fast HTTP profile is designed to speed up certain types of HTTP connections and again strives to reduce the number of connections opened to the back-end HTTP servers. This is accomplished by combining features from the TCP, HTTP, and OneConnect profiles into a single profile that is optimized for network performance. A resulting high performance HTTP virtual server processes connections on a packet-by-packet basis and buffers only enough data to parse packet headers. The performance HTTP virtual server TCP behavior operates as follows: the BIG-IP system establishes server-side flows by opening TCP connections to pool members. When a client makes a connection to the performance HTTP virtual server, if an existing server-side flow to the pool member is idle, the BIG-IP LTM system marks the connection as non-idle and sends a client request over the connection. Summary The NetApp StorageGRID multi-node S3 compatible object storage solution fits well with a high-performance server load balancer, thus making the F5 BIG-IP a good fit. S3 protocol can itself be adjusted to improve transaction response times, such as through the use of multi-part uploads and downloads, amplifying the default load balancing to now spread even more traffic chunks over many NetApp nodes. BIG-IP has numerous approaches to configuring virtual servers, from highest performance L4-focused profiles to similar offerings that retain L7 HTTP awareness. Lab testing was accomplished using the S3Browser utility and results of traffic flows were confirmed with both the standard BIG-IP GUI and the additional AVR analytics module, which provides additional protocol insight.Overview of MITRE ATT&CK Tactic : TA0009 - Collection
This article is a continuation of our MITRE ATT&CK series. In this article, we focus on the Collection tactic, and the techniques adversaries use to gather, stage, and organize data from compromised systems before exfiltration. As attackers progress through an intrusion, Collection becomes critical for assembling sensitive files, credentials, screenshots, and other high‑value information that will fuel data theft, espionage, or destructive operations.Overview of MITRE ATT&CK Tactic: TA0040 - Impact
This article focuses on the Impact Tactic, and the techniques adversaries use to manipulate, disrupt or damage the systems and data as they reach the final stage of an attack. This is one of the critical tactics, as it highlights the adverse effects attackers can cause, including exploitation, operational disruption, data destruction, or financial gainOverview of MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - TA0010 Exfiltration
Introduction In current times of cyber vulnerabilities, data theft is the ultimate objective with which attackers monetize their presence within a victim network. Once valuable information is identified and collected, the attackers can package sensitive data, bypass perimeter defences, and finalize the breach. Exfiltration (MITRE ATT&CK Tactic TA0010) represents a critical stage of the adversary lifecycle, where the adversaries focus on extracting data from the systems under their control. There are multiple ways to achieve this, either by using encryption and compression to avoid detection or utilizing the command-and-control channel to blend in with normal network traffic. To avoid this data loss, it is important for defenders to understand how data is transferred from any system in the network and the various transmission limits imposed to maintain stealth. This article walks through the most common Exfiltration techniques and how F5 solutions provide strong defense against them. T1020 - Automated Exfiltration To exfiltrate the data, adversaries may use automated processing after gathering the sensitive data during collection. T1020.001 – Traffic Duplication Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some devices for traffic analysis, which can be used by adversaries to automate data exfiltration. T1030 – Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration of the data in limited-size packets instead of whole files to avoid network data transfer threshold alerts. T1048 – Exfiltration over Alternative Protocol Stealing of data over a different protocol or channel other than the command-and-control channel created by the adversary. T1048.001 – Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Symmetric Encryption uses shared or the same keys/secrets on all the channels, which requires an exchange of the value used to encrypt and decrypt the data. This symmetric encryption leads to the implementation of Symmetric Cryptographic Algorithms, like RC4, AES, baked into the protocols, resulting in multiple layers of encryption. T1048.002 – Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Asymmetric encryption algorithms or public-key cryptography require a pair of cryptographic keys that can encrypt/decrypt data from the corresponding keys on each end of the channel. T1048.003 – Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol Instead of encryption, adversaries may obfuscate the routine channel without encryption within network protocols either by custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (base64, hex-code) and embedding the data. T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Adversaries can also steal the data over command-and-control channels and encode the data into normal communications. T1011 – Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration can also occur through a wired Internet connection, for example, a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection or Bluetooth. T1011.001 – Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Bluetooth can also be used to exfiltrate the data instead of a command-and-control channel in case the command-and-control channel is a wired Internet connection. T1052 – Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Under circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration occurs through a physical medium. Adversaries can exfiltrate data using a physical medium, for example, say a removable drive. Some examples of such media include external hard drives, USB drives, cellular phones, or MP3 players. T1052.001 – Exfiltration Over USB One such circumstance is where the adversary may attempt to exfiltrate data over a USB connected physical device, which can be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between other disconnected systems. T1567 – Exfiltration Over Web Services Adversaries may use legitimate external Web Service to exfiltrate the data instead of their command-and-control channel. T1567.001 – Exfiltration to Code Repository To exfiltrate the data to a code repository, rather than adversary’s command-and-control channel. These code repositories are accessible via an API over HTTPS. T1567.002 – Exfiltration to Cloud Storage To exfiltrate the data to a cloud storage, rather than their primary command-and-control channel. These cloud storage services allow storage, editing and retrieval of the exfiltrated data. T1567.003 – Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites To exfiltrate the data to a text storage site, rather than their primary command-and-control. These text storage sites, like pastebin[.]com, are used by developers to share code. T1567.004 – Exfiltration Over Webhook Adversaries also exfiltrate the data to a webhook endpoint, which are simple mechanisms for allowing a server to push data over HTTP/S to a client. The creation of webhooks is supported by many public services, such as Discord and Slack, that can be used by other services, like GitHub, Jira, or Trello. T1029 – Scheduled Transfer To exfiltrate the data, the adversaries may schedule data exfiltration only at certain times of the day or at certain intervals, blending the traffic patterns with general activity. T1537 – Transfer Data to Cloud Account Many a times, exfiltration of data can also be through transferring the data through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environment to another cloud account under adversary control on the same service. How F5 Can Help F5 offers a comprehensive suite of security solutions designed to safeguard applications and APIs across diverse environments, including cloud, edge, on-premises, and hybrid platforms. These solutions enable robust risk management to effectively mitigate and protect against MITRE ATT&CK Exfiltration threats, delivering advanced functionalities such as: Web Application Firewall (WAF): Available across all F5 products, the WAF is a flexible, multi-layered security solution that protects web applications from a wide range of threats. It delivers consistent defense, whether applications are deployed on-premises, in the cloud, or in hybrid environments. HTTPS Encryption: F5 provides robust HTTPS encryption to secure sensitive data in transit, ensuring protected communication between users and applications by preventing unauthorized access or data interception. Protecting sensitive data with Data Guard: F5's WAF Data Guard feature prevents sensitive data leakage by detecting and blocking exposure of confidential information, such as credit card numbers and PII. It uses predefined patterns and customizable policies to identify transmissions of sensitive data in application responses or inputs. This proactive mechanism secures applications against data theft and ensures compliance with regulatory standards. For more information, please contact your local F5 sales team. Conclusion Adversaries Exfiltration of data often aims to steal sensitive information by packaging it to evade detection, using methods such as compression or encryption. They may transfer the data through command-and-control channels or alternate paths while applying stealth techniques like transmission size limitations. To defend against these threats, F5 provides a layered approach with its advanced offerings. The Web Application Firewall (WAF) identifies and neutralizes malicious traffic aimed at exploiting application vulnerabilities. HTTPS encryption ensures secure data transmission, preventing unauthorized interception during the attack. Meanwhile, a data guard policy set helps detect and block exposure of confidential information, such as credit card numbers and PII. Together, these F5 solutions effectively counteract data exfiltration attempts and safeguard critical assets. Reference links MITRE | ATT&CK Tactic 10 – Exfiltration MITRE ATT&CK: What It Is, how it Works, Who Uses It and Why | F5 Labs MITRE ATT&CK®What's new in BIG-IP v21.0?
Introduction In November of 2025 F5 released the latest version of BIG-IP software, v21.0. This release is packed with fixes and new features that enhance the F5 Application Delivery and Security Platform (ADSP). These changes complement the Delivery, Security and Deployment aspects of the ADSP. New SSL Orchestrator Features SNI Preservation SNI (Server Name Indication) Preservation is now supported for Inbound Gateway Mode. This preserves the client’s original SNI information as traffic passes through the reverse proxy, allowing backend TLS servers to access and use this information. This enables accurate application routing and supports security workflows like threat detection and compliance enforcement. Previous software versions required custom iRules to enable this functionality. Note: SNI preservation is enabled by default. However, if you have existing Inbound Gateway Topologies, you must redeploy them for the change to take effect. iRule Control for Service Entry and Return Previously, iRules were only available on the entry (ingress) side, limiting customization to traffic entering the Inspection Service. iRule control is now extended to the return-side traffic of Inspection Services. You can now apply iRules on both sides of an Inspection Service (L2, L3, HTTP). This enhancement provides full control over traffic entering and leaving the Inspection Service, enabling more flexible, powerful, and fine-grained traffic handling. The Services page will now include configuration for iRules on service entry and iRules on service return. A typical use-case for this feature is what we call Header Enrichment. In this case, iRules are used to add headers to the payload before sending it to the Inspection Service. The headers could contain the authenticated username/group membership of the person who initiated the connection. This information can be useful for Inspection Services for either logging, policy enforcement, or both. The benefit of this feature is that the authenticated username/group membership header can be removed from the payload on egress, preventing it from being leaked to origin servers. New Access Policy Manager (APM) Features Expanded Exclusion Support for Locked Client Mode Previously, APM-locked client mode allowed a maximum of 10 exclusions, preventing administrators from adding more than 10 destinations. This limitation has now been removed, and the exclusion list can contain more than 10 entries. OAuth Authorization Server Max Claims Data Support The max claim data size is set to 8kb by default, but a large claim size can lead to excessive memory consumption. You must allocate the right amount of memory dynamically as required based on claims configuration. New Features in BIG-IP v21.0.0 Control Plane Performance and Scalability Improvements The BIG-IP 21.0.0 release introduces significant improvements to the BIG-IP control plane, including better scalability and support for large-scale configurations (up to 1 million objects). This includes MCPD efficiency enhancements and eXtremeDB scale improvements. AI Data Delivery Optimize performance and simplify configuration with new S3 data storage integrations. Use cases include secure ingestion for fine-tuning and batch inference, high-throughput retrieval for RAG and embeddings generation, policy-driven model artifact distribution with observability, and controlled egress with consistent security and compliance. F5 BIG-IP optimizes and secures S3 data ingress and egress for AI workloads. Model Context Protocol (MCP) support for AI traffic Accelerate and scale AI workloads with support for MCP that enables seamless communication between AI models, applications, and data sources. This enhances performance, secures connections, and streamlines deployment for AI workloads. F5 BIG-IP optimizes and secures S3 data ingress and egress for AI workloads. Migrating BIG-IP from Entrust to Alternative Certificate Authorities Entrust is soon to be delisted as a certificate authority by many major browsers. Following a variety of compliance failures with industry standards in recent years, browsers like Google Chrome and Mozilla made their distrust for Entrust certificates public last year. As such, Entrust certificates issued on or after November 12, 2024, are deemed insecure by most browsers. Conclusion Upgrade your BIG-IP to version 21.0 today to take advantage of these fixes and new features that enhance the F5 Application Delivery and Security Platform (ADSP). These changes complement the Delivery, Security and Deployment aspects of the ADSP. Related Content SSL Orchestrator Release Notes BIG-IP Release Notes BLOG F5 BIG-IP v21.0: Control plane, AI data delivery and security enhancements Press Release F5 launches BIG-IP v21.0 Introduction to BIG-IP SSL OrchestratorModernizing F5 Platforms with Ansible
I’ve been meaning to publish this article for some time now. Over the past few months, I’ve been building Ansible automation that I believe will help customers modernize their F5 infrastructure. This especially true for those looking to migrate from legacy BIG-IP hardware to next-generation platforms like VELOS and rSeries. As I explored tools like F5 Journeys and traditional CLI-based migration methods, I noticed a significant amount of manual pre-work was still required. This includes: Ensuring the Master Key used to encrypt the UCS archive is preserved and securely handled Storing UCS, Master Key and information assets in a backup host Pre-configuring all VLANs and properly tagging them on the VELOS partition before deploying a Tenant OS To streamline this, I created an Ansible Playbook with supporting roles tailored for Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform. It’s built to perform a lift-and-shift migration of a F5 BIG-IP configuration from one device to another—with optional OS upgrades included. In the demo video below, you’ll see an automated migration of a F5 i10800 running 15.1.10 to a VELOS BX110 Tenant OS running 17.5.0—demonstrating a smooth, hands-free modernization process. Currently Working Velos Velos Controller/Partition running (F5OS-C 1.8.1) - which allows Tenant Management IP to be in a different VLAN Migrates a standalone F5 BIG-IP i10800 to a VELOS BX110 Tenant OS VLAN'ed Source tenant required (Doesn’t support non-vlan tenants) rSeries Shares MGMT IP with the same subnet as the Chassis Partition. Migrates a standalone F5 BIG-IP i10800 to a R5000 Tenant OS VLAN'ed Source tenant required (Doesn’t support non-vlan tenants) Handles: Configuration and crypto backup UCS creation, transfer, and validation F5OS System VLAN Creation, and Association to Tenant - (Does Not manage Interface to VLAN Mapping) F5 OS Tenant provisioning and deployment inline OS upgrades during the migration Roadmap / What's Next Expanding Testing to include Viprion/iSeries (Using VCMP) Tenant Testing. Supporting hardware-to-virtual platform migrations Adding functionality for HA (High Availability) environments Watch the Demo Video View the Source Code on GitHub https://github.com/f5devcentral/f5-bd-ansible-platform-modernization This project is built for the community—so feel free to take it, fork it, and expand it. Let’s make F5 platform modernization as seamless and automated as possible.
BIG-IP for Scalable App Delivery & Security in Hybrid Environments
Scope: As enterprises deploy multiple instances of the same applications across diverse infrastructure platforms such as VMware, OpenShift, Nutanix, and public cloud environments and across geographically distributed locations to support redundancy and facilitate seamless migration, they face increasing challenges in ensuring consistent performance, centralized security, and operational visibility. The complexity of managing distributed application traffic, enforcing uniform security policies, and maintaining high availability across hybrid environments introduces significant operational overhead and risk, hindering agility and scalability. F5 BIG-IP Application Delivery and Security address this challenge by providing a unified, policy-driven approach to manage secure workloads across hybrid multi-cloud environments. It can be used to scale up application services on existing infrastructure or with new business models. Introduction: This article highlights how F5 BIG-IP deploys identical application workloads across multiple environments. This ensur high availability, seamless traffic management, and consistent performance. By supporting smooth workload transitions and zero-downtime deployments, F5 helps organizations maintain reliable, secure, and scalable applications. From a business perspective, it enhances operational agility, supports growing traffic demands, reduces risk during updates, and ultimately delivers a reliable, secure, and high-performance application experience that meets customer expectations and drives growth. This use case covers a typical enterprise setup with the following environments: VMware (On-Premises) Nutanix (On-Premises) Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Architecture: As illustrated in the diagram, when new application workloads are provisioned across environments such as AWS, GCP, VMware (on-prem), Nutanix (on-prem & VMware) BIG-IP ensures seamless integration with existing services. Platforms Supported Environments VMware On-Prem, GCP, Azure Nutanix On-Prem, AWS, Azure This article outlines the deployment in VMware platform. For deployment in other platforms like Nutanix and GCP, refer the detailed guide below. F5 Scalable Enterprise Workload Deployments Complete Guide Scalable Enterprise Workload Deployment Across Hybrid Environments Enterprise applications are deployed smoothly across multiple environments to address diverse customer needs. With F5’s advanced Application Delivery and Security features, organizations can ensure consistent performance, high availability, and robust protection across all deployment platforms. F5 provides a unified and secure application experience across cloud, on-premises, and virtualized environments. Workload Distribution Across Environments Workloads are distributed across the following environments: VMware: App A & App B OpenShift: App B Nutanix: App B & App C → VMware: Add App C → OpenShift: Add App A & App C → Nutanix: Add App A Applications being used: A → Juice Shop (Vulnerable web app for security testing) B → DVWA (Damn Vulnerable Web Application) C → Mutillidae Initial Infrastructure: & B, Nutanix: App B &C, GCP: App B. VMware: In the VMware on-premises environment, Applications A and B are deployed and connected to two separate load balancers. This forms the existing infrastructure. These applications are actively serving user traffic with delivery and security managed by BIG-IP. Web Application Firewall (WAF) is enabled, which will prevent any malicious threats. The corresponding logs can be found under BIG-IP > Security > Event Logs Note: This initial deployment infrastructure has also been implemented on Nutanix and GCP. For the full details, please consult the complete guide here Adding additional workloads: To demonstrate BIG-IP’s ability to support evolving enterprise demands, we will introduce new workloads across all environments. This will validate its seamless integration, consistent security enforcement, and support for continuous delivery across hybrid infrastructures. VMware: Let us add additional application-3 (mutillidae) to the VMware on-premises environment. Try to access the application through BIG-IP virtual server. Apply the WAF policy to the newly created virtual server, then verify the same by simulating malicious attacks. Nutanix: The use case described for VMware is equally applicable and supported when deploying BIG-IP on Nutanix Bare Metal as well as Nutanix on VMware. For demonstration purposes, the Nutanix Community Edition hypervisor is booted as a virtual machine within VMware. Inside this hypervisor, a new virtual machine is created and provisioned using the BIG-IP image downloaded from the F5 Downloads portal. Once the BIG-IP instance is online, an additional VM hosting the application workload is deployed. This application VM is then associated with a BIG-IP virtual server, ensuring that the application remains isolated and protected from direct external exposure. GCP (Google Cloud Platform): The use case discussed above for VMware is also applicable and supported when deploying BIG-IP on public cloud platforms such as Azure, AWS, and GCP. For demonstration purposes, GCP is selected as the cloud environment for deploying BIG-IP. Within the same project where the BIG-IP instance is provisioned, an additional virtual machine hosting application workloads is deployed and associated with the BIG-IP virtual server. This setup ensures that the application workloads remain protected behind BIG-IP, preventing direct external exposure. Key Resources: Please refer to the detailed guide below, which outlines the deployment of Nutanix on VMware and GCP, and demonstrates how BIG-IP delivers consistent security, traffic management, and application delivery across hybrid environments. F5 Scalable Enterprise Workload Deployments Complete Guide Conclusion: This demonstration clearly illustrates that BIG-IP’s Application Delivery and Security capabilities offer a robust, scalable, and consistent solution across both multi-cloud and on-premises environments. By deploying BIG-IP across diverse platforms, organizations can achieve uniform application security, while maintaining reliable connectivity, strong encryption, and comprehensive protection for both modern and legacy workloads. This unified approach allows businesses to seamlessly scale infrastructure and address evolving user demands without sacrificing performance, availability, or security. With BIG-IP, enterprises can confidently deliver applications with resilience and speed, while maintaining centralized control and policy enforcement across heterogeneous environments. Ultimately, BIG-IP empowers organizations to simplify operations, standardize security, and accelerate digital transformation across any environment. References: F5 Application Delivery and Security Platform BIG-IP Data Sheet F5 Hybrid Security Architectures: One WAF Engine, Total Flexibility Distributed Cloud (XC) Github Repo BIG-IP Github RepoLeverage F5 BIG-IP APM and Azure AD Conditional Access Easy button
Integrating F5 BIG-IP APM’s Identity Aware Proxy (IAP) with Microsoft EntraID (Previously called AzureAD) Conditional Access enables fine-grained, adaptable, zero trust access to any application, regardless of location and authentication method, with continuous monitoring and verification.
Automate Let's Encrypt Certificates on BIG-IP
To quote the evil emperor Zurg: "We meet again, for the last time!" It's hard to believe it's been six years since my first rodeo with Let's Encrypt and BIG-IP, but (uncompromised) timestamps don't lie. And maybe this won't be my last look at Let's Encrypt, but it will likely be the last time I do so as a standalone effort, which I'll come back to at the end of this article. The first project was a compilation of shell scripts and python scripts and config files and well, this is no different. But it's all updated to meet the acme protocol version requirements for Let's Encrypt. Here's a quick table to connect all the dots: Description What's Out What's In acme client letsencrypt.sh dehydrated python library f5-common-python bigrest BIG-IP functionality creating the SSL profile utilizing an iRule for the HTTP challenge The f5-common-python library has not been maintained or enhanced for at least a year now, and I have an affinity for the good work Leo did with bigrest and I enjoy using it. I opted not to carry the SSL profile configuration forward because that functionality is more app-specific than the certificates themselves. And finally, whereas my initial project used the DNS challenge with the name.com API, in this proof of concept I chose to use an iRule on the BIG-IP to serve the challenge for Let's Encrypt to perform validation against. Whereas my solution is new, the way Let's Encrypt works has not changed, so I've carried forward the process from my previous article that I've now archived. I'll defer to their how it works page for details, but basically the steps are: Define a list of domains you want to secure Your client reaches out to the Let’s Encrypt servers to initiate a challenge for those domains. The servers will issue an http or dns challenge based on your request You need to place a file on your web server or a txt record in the dns zone file with that challenge information The servers will validate your challenge information and notify you You will clean up your challenge files or txt records The servers will issue the certificate and certificate chain to you You now have the key, cert, and chain, and can deploy to your web servers or in our case, to the BIG-IP Before kicking off a validation and generation event, the client registers your account based on your settings in the config file. The files in this project are as follows: /etc/dehydrated/config # Dehydrated configuration file /etc/dehydrated/domains.txt # Domains to sign and generate certs for /etc/dehydrated/dehydrated # acme client /etc/dehydrated/challenge.irule # iRule configured and deployed to BIG-IP by the hook script /etc/dehydrated/hook_script.py # Python script called by dehydrated for special steps in the cert generation process # Environment Variables export F5_HOST=x.x.x.x export F5_USER=admin export F5_PASS=admin You add your domains to the domains.txt file (more work likely if signing a lot of domains, I tested the one I have access to). The dehydrated client, of course is required, and then the hook script that dehydrated interacts with to deploy challenges and certificates. I aptly named that hook_script.py. For my hook, I'm deploying a challenge iRule to be applied only during the challenge; it is modified each time specific to the challenge supplied from the Let's Encrypt service and is cleaned up after the challenge is tested. And finally, there are a few environment variables I set so the information is not in text files. You could also move these into a credential vault. So to recap, you first register your client, then you can kick off a challenge to generate and deploy certificates. On the client side, it looks like this: ./dehydrated --register --accept-terms ./dehydrated -c Now, for testing, make sure you use the Let's Encrypt staging service instead of production. And since I want to force action every request while testing, I run the second command a little differently: ./dehydrated -c --force --force-validation Depicted graphically, here are the moving parts for the http challenge issued by Let's Encrypt at the request of the dehydrated client, deployed to the F5 BIG-IP, and validated by the Let's Encrypt servers. The Let's Encrypt servers then generate and return certs to the dehydrated client, which then, via the hook script, deploys the certs and keys to the F5 BIG-IP to complete the process. And here's the output of the dehydrated client and hook script in action from the CLI: # ./dehydrated -c --force --force-validation # INFO: Using main config file /etc/dehydrated/config Processing example.com + Checking expire date of existing cert... + Valid till Jun 20 02:03:26 2022 GMT (Longer than 30 days). Ignoring because renew was forced! + Signing domains... + Generating private key... + Generating signing request... + Requesting new certificate order from CA... + Received 1 authorizations URLs from the CA + Handling authorization for example.com + A valid authorization has been found but will be ignored + 1 pending challenge(s) + Deploying challenge tokens... + (hook) Deploying Challenge + (hook) Challenge rule added to virtual. + Responding to challenge for example.com authorization... + Challenge is valid! + Cleaning challenge tokens... + (hook) Cleaning Challenge + (hook) Challenge rule removed from virtual. + Requesting certificate... + Checking certificate... + Done! + Creating fullchain.pem... + (hook) Deploying Certs + (hook) Existing Cert/Key updated in transaction. + Done! This results in a deployed certificate/key pair on the F5 BIG-IP, and is modified in a transaction for future updates. This proof of concept is on github in the f5devcentral org if you'd like to take a look. Before closing, however, I'd like to mention a couple things: This is an update to an existing solution from years ago. It works, but probably isn't the best way to automate today if you're just getting started and have already started pursuing a more modern approach to automation. A better path would be something like Ansible. On that note, there are several solutions you can take a look at, posted below in resources. Resources https://github.com/EquateTechnologies/dehydrated-bigip-ansible https://github.com/f5devcentral/ansible-bigip-letsencrypt-http01 https://github.com/s-archer/acme-ansible-f5 https://github.com/s-archer/terraform-modular/tree/master/lets_encrypt_module (Terraform instead of Ansible) https://community.f5.com/t5/technical-forum/let-s-encrypt-with-cloudflare-dns-and-f5-rest-api/m-p/292943 (Similar solution to mine, only slightly more robust with OCSP stapling, the DNS instead of HTTP challenge, and with bash instead of python)
