Forum Discussion
HowTo: Getting an awesome Qualys SSL-Labs rating... (Feb 2017 Update)
Hi Folks,
I've posted in August 2016 a Client SSL Profile configuration to achive a top notch Qualys SSL-Labs rating.
HowTo: Getting an awesome Qualys SSL-Labs rating...
https://devcentral.f5.com/questions/howto-getting-an-awesome-qualys-ssl-labs-rating-48120
In the meantime the Qualys SSL-Labs has decided to put very soon a penalty on those web sites, which are still supporting DES / IDEA algorythms via TLS1.2 (aka. every block cipher with a block size of less or equal 64-bit) .
Penalty for using 3DES with TLS 1.2 (C)
In late August, security researchers demonstrated an attack against ciphers that use 64-bit encryption blocks. The attack has been called Sweet32. The attack is not practical because it requires a very large amount of traffic, but it’s a good reminder that older and weaker ciphers need be retired as a matter of routine. In TLS, that means avoiding 3DES (EDIT 27 Jan: and other ciphers that use 64-bit blocks, for example IDEA). Now, for sites that need to support an old user base completely retiring 3DES might not be possible (hint: Windows XP), but there’s no reason to use this cipher with modern browsers. To that end, we’ll be modifying our grading criteria to penalise sites that negotiate 3DES with TLS 1.2. Such sites will have their scores capped at C. We are aware that most servers don’t allow per-protocol cipher suite configuration, but that shouldn’t be a problem in this case. Sites that negotiate strong cipher suites with modern clients will not be affected if they support 3DES, provided they keep it at the end of their ordered list of suites." -Quallys SSL Labs (see Link)
The result of the announced rating changes is currently just a little warning message which states that the grade will be caped to C very soon:
To maintain your awesome A / A+ grade in the future, you have to change your supported cipher suites once again, so that every DES based algorythm gets either completely removed (this may have a compatibility impact) or at least gets placed at the very buttom of the Cipher Suite list.
Previous Chipher-List (for v11 and v12):
!SSLv2:!EXPORT:!DHE+AES-GCM:!DHE+AES:!DHE+3DES:ECDHE+AES-GCM:ECDHE+AES:RSA+AES-GCM:RSA+AES:ECDHE+3DES:RSA+3DES:-MD5:-SSLv3:-RC4:@STRENGTH
Updated Chipher-List (for v11 and v12):
!SSLv2:!EXPORT:!DHE+AES-GCM:!DHE+AES:!DHE+3DES:ECDHE+AES-GCM:ECDHE+AES:RSA+AES-GCM:RSA+AES:ECDHE+3DES:RSA+3DES:-MD5:-SSLv3:-RC4
After applying the updated Chipher-List, you'll receive a clean A or even A+ (depending on HSTS configurations) rating again, while still supporting those Windows XP/IE8 or other legacy clients:
Cheers, Kai
Additional search tags for the lovely Google bot:
Preventing Logjam Attack
Preventing Sweet32 Attack
Default SSL Profile is a little bit insecure
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x9e) DH 1024 bits FS WEAK 128 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (0x6b) DH 1024 bits FS WEAK 256 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x39) DH 1024 bits FS WEAK 256 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0x67) DH 1024 bits FS WEAK 128 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x33) DH 1024 bits FS WEAK 128 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0x16) DH 1024 bits FS WEAK 112
38 Replies
Hi Folks,
If you additional want to eleminate the
warnign message...ECDH public server param reuse : Yes
... then enable the "Single DH use" option within the Client SSL Profile.
Cheers, Kai
- nathe
Cirrocumulus
Good work Kai
Thanx Kai!!!
You're welcome ;-)
Cheers, Kai
- Sebastian_Mania
Nimbostratus
thank you
- G_Ring_136714
Nimbostratus
Kai,
Thanks...found this to be very useful in improving site security. One question though...
Per F5 (https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K13167034), in order to mitigate Sweet23 (CVE2016-2183) you need to disable all DES-CBC3 ciphers in the SSL Profile (or set the renegotiation size to 1GB). While the above Cipher list does allow for an A/A+ rating from SSL Labs, when I ran vulnerablity scans against an ssl profile with the exact cipher list above, the site was still showing vulnerable to Sweet32. I modified the Cipher list to remove any remaining DES-CBC3 ciphers and scans then came back as not-vulnerable to Sweet32.
Here's my Cipher-list after I took into account the F5 recommendation to remove all DES-CBC3:
!SSLv2:!EXPORT:!DHE+AES-GCM:!DHE+AES:!DHE+3DES:!ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:!ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:!ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA:!ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:!ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:!DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE+AES-GCM:ECDHE+AES:RSA+AES-GCM:RSA+AES:ECDHE+3DES:RSA+3DES:-MD5:-SSLv3:-RC4
For readability, here's the diff in what I added to the Cipher List:
!ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:!ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:!DHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:!ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA:!ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:!ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:!DES-CBC3-SHA
Your thoughts?
Hi G.Ring,
removing DES completely from the cipher list, will have certain compability impact. If you drop DES ciphers you'll also drop any WinXP/IE8 and other legacy browser which won't support AES.
By setting DES cipher to the very buttom of the list, you'll make sure that every modern browser (the majority at these day) will be still protected against the Sweet23 attack. Only legacy browser may become a victim of Sweet23 then, but becomming a victim of an attack will be still very unlikely since the Sweet23 attack requires a very large amount of sniffed network traffic.
But thanks for pointing out, that the official F5 recommendation is to limit the the Renegotiation Size setting to 1 GB, so that no one can collect enought data from the same SSL session to pull off any birthday calculations.
Your thoughts?
Remove DES completely if compatibility isn't a concern, or move DES to the buttom of your cipher list while enforcing Renegotiation Size limits of 1 GB. ;-)
Cheers, Kai
Thanks, looks really good!
- Seth_Randall_31
Nimbostratus
We tend to disable 3DES unless we have a system that absolutely needs it. We usual work with them to upgrade if we can. The ciphers we've been using are:
!SSLv2:!EXPORT:!DHE:!3DES:RSA+AES-GCM:RSA+AES:ECDHE+AES-GCM:ECDHE+AES:!MD5:!SSLv3:!RC4
For easy of entry, you can deny all DHE and all 3DES by just using !DHE and !3DES instead of specifying each one. At least you can on 11.6.0.
Seth: better to use ECDHE before RSA.
!SSLv2:!EXPORT:!DHE+AES-GCM:!DHE+AES:ECDHE+AES-GCM:ECDHE+AES:RSA+AES-GCM:RSA+AES:-MD5:-SSLv3:-RC4:!3DES This give A+, without 3DES support.
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