RADIUS server using APM to authenticate users
Problem this snippet solves: this code convert APM policy to a RADIUS server. Code description When a Radius request is accepted by the VS: the radius client IP address is checked against a Datagroup list. if in list : The shared secret is extracted from Datagroup list if not : drop the packet the password is decrypted with radius secret if request code is Access-Request, an APM session is created and radius attributes are set as session variable (including username and password) Access session is evaluated and return allow or deny result If the Access policy include radius attribute stored in variable session.result.radius_attr , attributes are added to the radius response return Access-Accept or Access-Reject response code based on the session result. Supported request Packet types: Access-Request (1) Returned Packet types: Access-Accept (2) Access-Reject (3) Required request attributes User-Name (1) User-Password (2) Optional request attributes NAS-IP-Address (4) : IP address NAS-Port (5) : Integer NAS-Identifier (32) : String NAS-Port-Type (61) : Integer All other attributes are ignored by this irule Supported response Attributes All RFC2865 attributes are allowed. Vendor specific attributes are not supported yet. Note : First version of this code was an enhancement of John McInnes RADIUS Server iRule who had to parse all RADIUS Data (RADIUS::avp did not exist when he wrote it's irule). The irule structure is still the same, but binary operations are optimized and more than 16 bytes passwords support is now included. thanks to Kai Wilke who show previous limitations and leads me to the right direction on how to decode long passwords. Versions : 1.0 : First version based on RADIUS commands. Required RADIUS profile assigned to the virtual server 1.1 : Added Request Message-Authenticator attribute validation / Response Message-Authenticator insertion (Asked by Sam Hall). To support this feature, the code is rewritten to decode binary data. Radius profile is not required anymore. (31/05/2018) 1.2 : correction on the Request Message-Authenticator attribute validation, a binary conversion to same type is required after [string replace ...] command (1/06/2018) 1.3 : Changed Datagroup radius_clients values format to list of parameters and values. this allow to configure per radius client parameters instead of global parameters (Message-Authenticator validation, ...) (1/06/2018) 1.4 : Security improvement while decoding packet (default decoded integer are signed values, where packet decoding length must be unsigned integer. Thank you Kai wilke for the advices) and added duplicate packet detection (4/06/2018) How to use this snippet: Create an Access Policy authenticating users. Define Access profile name in variable static::apmpolicy create a data group list radius_clients with values: IPAddress := "KEY radius\\ secret [REQMSGAUTH_REQUIRE 1] [RESPMSGAUTH_INSERT 1] [RFC_2865_COMPLIANCE 1]" IPAddress := "KEY another\\ radius\\ secret [REQMSGAUTH_REQUIRE 1] [RESPMSGAUTH_INSERT 0] [RFC_2865_COMPLIANCE 1]" KEY parameter must be followed by the shared secret, if it contains space, add 2 \ characters before each space. this parameter is required. REQMSGAUTH_REQUIRE (optional) define if Message-Authenticator attribute is required in request. default value is 0* RESPMSGAUTH_INSERT (optional) define if Message-Authenticator attribute is inserted in response. default value is 0 RFC_2865_COMPLIANCE (optional) define if the request must respect RFC 2865 (required attributes). default value is 0 create a virtual server with RADIUS profile to manage RADIUS::avp commands. If you requires to add radius attributes in RADIUS response, create the APM variable session.result.radius_attr with text value (one line, space characters must be escaped): Attribute1ID Attribute1Value Attribute2ID Attribute2Value Attribute3ID Attribute3Value example : 18 Authentication\ Successful 27 3600 Code : when RULE_INIT { set static::apmpolicy "/Common/AP_RADIUS_SERVICE" set static::client_list "radius_clients" } when CLIENT_ACCEPTED { binary scan [md5 [UDP::payload]] H* PAYLOAD_HASH switch [set DUPLICATE_RESPONSE [table lookup -subtable [IP::client_addr] $PAYLOAD_HASH]] { "" { # Do nothing, not in table } drop { log local0. "Duplicate packet detected with drop decision... dropping again" UDP::drop; return } default { log local0. "Duplicate packet detected sending same answer from table" UDP::respond [binary format H* $DUPLICATE_RESPONSE] return } } set RespLength 20 set RespAVP "" ############## START OF ALLOWED RADIUS CLIENT IP VALIDATION ################# if {![class match [IP::client_addr] equals $static::client_list]} { log local0. "RADIUS Client not in Datagroup : [IP::client_addr]" # RFC 2865 : A request from a client for which the RADIUS server does not have a shared secret MUST be silently discarded table add -subtable [IP::client_addr] $PAYLOAD_HASH "drop" 30 600 UDP::drop return } # Set default values if Datagroup miss this configuration set RADCLIENT(REQMSGAUTH_REQUIRE) 0 set RADCLIENT(RESPMSGAUTH_INSERT) 0 set RADCLIENT(RFC_2865_COMPLIANCE) 1 #Retreive RADIUS client shared secret and radius client capabilities. array set RADCLIENT [class match -value [IP::client_addr] equals $static::client_list] if {[binary scan [UDP::payload] cH2Sa16 QCODE IDENTIFIER QLEN Q_AUTHENTICATOR] != 4 || [set QLEN [expr {$QLEN & 0xFFFF}]] > [UDP::payload length] || $QLEN > 4096} { table add -subtable [IP::client_addr] $PAYLOAD_HASH "drop" 30 600 UDP::drop return } else { # Store only PAYLOAD in variable if Length field is valid (less than 4096 and less than payload length). prevent variable allocation if payload not valid. # Octets outside the range of the Length field MUST be treated as padding and ignored on reception. set PAYLOAD [UDP::payload $QLEN] } switch $QCODE { 1 { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 0 #Store All attribute in array QUERY_ATTR with Attrbute ID as Key for {set record_offset 20} {$record_offset < $QLEN } {incr record_offset $QAVP_LEN} { # If an Attribute is received in an Access-Accept, Access-Reject or Access-Challenge packet with an invalid length, # the packet MUST either be treated as an Access-Reject or else silently discarded. if {([binary scan $PAYLOAD @${record_offset}cc QAVP_TYPE QAVP_LEN] != 2) || ([set QAVP_LEN [expr {$QAVP_LEN & 0xFF}]] < 3) || ($record_offset+$QAVP_LEN > $QLEN) } { table add -subtable [IP::client_addr] $PAYLOAD_HASH "drop" 30 600 UDP::drop return } switch -- [set QAVP_TYPE [expr { $QAVP_TYPE & 0xFF}]] { 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 24 - 32 - 61 {binary scan $PAYLOAD @${record_offset}x2a[expr {$QAVP_LEN -2}] QUERY_ATTR($QAVP_TYPE)} 80 { binary scan $PAYLOAD @${record_offset}x2a[expr {$QAVP_LEN -2}] QUERY_ATTR($QAVP_TYPE) binary scan [string replace $PAYLOAD $record_offset [expr {$record_offset + 18}] [binary format ccH32 80 18 [string repeat 0 32]]] a* UNSIGNED_REQUEST } } } #Assign attibutes to expected variable, with decoding if required. set USER_NAME [expr {[info exists QUERY_ATTR(1)] ? $QUERY_ATTR(1) : ""}] set USER_PASSWORD [expr {[info exists QUERY_ATTR(2)] ? $QUERY_ATTR(2) : ""}] set CHAP_PASSWORD [expr {[info exists QUERY_ATTR(3)] ? $QUERY_ATTR(3) : ""}] if {[info exists QUERY_ATTR(4)]} {binary scan $QUERY_ATTR(4) c4 octets; foreach octet $octets {lappend r [expr {$octet & 0xFF}]}; set NAS_IP_ADDRESS [join $r .] } else {set NAS_IP_ADDRESS "" } if {[info exists QUERY_ATTR(5)]} {binary scan $QUERY_ATTR(5) I NAS_PORT; set NAS_PORT [expr {$NAS_PORT & 0xFFFFFFFF}] } else {set NAS_PORT "" } set STATE [expr {[info exists QUERY_ATTR(24)] ? $QUERY_ATTR(24) : ""}] set NAS_IDENTIFIER [expr {[info exists QUERY_ATTR(32)] ? $QUERY_ATTR(32) : ""}] #if {[info exists QUERY_ATTR(61)]} {binary scan $QUERY_ATTR(61) I NAS_PORT_TYPE; set NAS_PORT_TYPE [expr {$NAS_PORT_TYPE & 0xFFFFFFFF}] } else {set NAS_PORT_TYPE "" } set MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR [expr {[info exists QUERY_ATTR(80)] ? $QUERY_ATTR(80) : ""}] #EVALUATE REQUEST MESSAGE-AUTHENTICATOR if {$RADCLIENT(REQMSGAUTH_REQUIRE) && ($MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR equals "" || ![CRYPTO::verify -alg hmac-md5 -key $RADCLIENT(KEY) -signature $MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR $UNSIGNED_REQUEST])} { # RFC 2869 : A RADIUS Server receiving an Access-Request with a Message-Authenticator Attribute present MUST calculate the correct value # of the Message-Authenticator and silently discard the packet if it does not match the value sent. log local0. "[IP::client_addr] : wrong or missing Message-Authenticator attribute" table add -subtable [IP::client_addr] $PAYLOAD_HASH "drop" 30 600 UDP::drop return } if {$RADCLIENT(RFC_2865_COMPLIANCE)} { if {$NAS_IP_ADDRESS == "" && $NAS_IDENTIFIER == ""} { # RFC 2865 : It MUST contain either a NAS-IP-Address attribute or a NAS-Identifier attribute (or both). set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "REQUEST NOT RFC COMPLIANT" } elseif {$USER_PASSWORD == "" && $CHAP_PASSWORD == "" && $STATE == ""} { # RFC 2865 : An Access-Request MUST contain either a User-Password or a CHAP-Password or a State. set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "REQUEST NOT RFC COMPLIANT" } elseif {$USER_PASSWORD ne "" && $CHAP_PASSWORD ne ""} { # RFC 2865 : An Access-Request MUST NOT contain both a User-Password and a CHAP-Password. set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "REQUEST NOT RFC COMPLIANT" } } if {$USER_PASSWORD == ""} { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "USER-PASSWORD NOT SET BUT REQUIRED" } elseif {$USER_NAME == ""} { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "USER-NAME NOT SET BUT REQUIRED" } } 2 - 3 - 11 { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "RADIUS CODE NOT SUPPORTED - NOT A RADIUS CLIENT" } 4 - 5 - 6 - 10 { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "RADIUS CODE NOT SUPPORTED - NOT A RADIUS ACCOUNTING SERVER" } default { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "RADIUS CODE NOT SUPPORTED" } } ############## END OF RFC COMPLIANCE AND SERVER FEATURES VALIDATION ################# # DO NOT RELEASE UDP PACKET. Drop it to prevent further process by irule or load balancing to an internal server. # When UDP packet dropped, PAYLOAD is dropped and RADIUS Commands not available anymore. UDP::drop if {$REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED == 0} { ########## START OF PASSWORD DECRYPTION ############################ binary scan [md5 "$RADCLIENT(KEY)$Q_AUTHENTICATOR"] H* bx_hex binary scan $USER_PASSWORD H* px_full_hex set Password_Padded "" for {set x 0} {$x<[string length $px_full_hex]} {set x [expr {$x+32}]} { set px_hex [string range $px_full_hex $x [expr {$x+31}]] append Password_Padded [binary format W [expr 0x[string range $px_hex 0 15] ^ 0x[string range $bx_hex 0 15]]] append Password_Padded [binary format W [expr 0x[string range $px_hex 16 31] ^ 0x[string range $bx_hex 16 31]]] binary scan [md5 "$RADCLIENT(KEY)[binary format H* $px_hex]"] H* bx_hex } binary scan $Password_Padded A* PASSWORD ########## END OF PASSWORD DECRYPTION ############################ ########## START OF APM AUTHENTICATION ############################ set flow_sid [ACCESS::session create -timeout 60 -lifetime 300] ACCESS::policy evaluate -sid $flow_sid -profile $static::apmpolicy \ session.logon.last.username $USER_NAME \ session.logon.last.password $PASSWORD \ session.server.landinguri "/" \ session.logon.last.NAS_IP_Address $NAS_IP_ADDRESS \ session.logon.last.NAS_Port $NAS_PORT \ session.logon.last.NAS_Identifier $NAS_IDENTIFIER \ session.logon.last.NAS_Port_Type $NAS_PORT if {[ACCESS::policy result -sid $flow_sid] equals "allow"} { set ResponseCode 2 if {![info exists RAVP(18)] } {set RAVP(18) "Good username Password"} } else { set ResponseCode 3 if {![info exists RAVP(18)] } {set RAVP(18) "wrong username Password"} } array set RAVP [ACCESS::session data get -sid $flow_sid session.result.radius_attr] ACCESS::session remove -sid $flow_sid ########## END OF APM AUTHENTICATION ############################ } else { set ResponseCode 3 if {[info exists RAVP(18)] } { log local0. $RAVP(18)} } ########## ENCODING AND DELIVERY OF RADIUS RESONSE ############################ foreach attrID [array names RAVP] { incr RespLength [set attrLength [expr {[string length $RAVP($attrID)]+2}]] append RespAVP [binary format cca* $attrID $attrLength $RAVP($attrID)] } #CALCULATE RESPONSE MESSAGE-AUTHENTICATOR if {$RADCLIENT(RESPMSGAUTH_INSERT)} { set UNSIGNED_RespAVP $RespAVP[binary format ccH32 80 18 [string repeat 0 32]] incr RespLength 18 append RespAVP [binary format cc 80 18][CRYPTO::sign -alg hmac-md5 -key $RADCLIENT(KEY) [binary format cH2Sa16a* $ResponseCode $IDENTIFIER $RespLength $Q_AUTHENTICATOR $UNSIGNED_RespAVP]] } binary scan [md5 [binary format cH2Sa16a[expr {$RespLength-20}]a[string length $RADCLIENT(KEY)] $ResponseCode $IDENTIFIER $RespLength $Q_AUTHENTICATOR $RespAVP $RADCLIENT(KEY) ]] H* ResponseAuth set RESPONSE [binary format cH2SH32a* $ResponseCode $IDENTIFIER $RespLength $ResponseAuth $RespAVP] UDP::respond $RESPONSE binary scan $RESPONSE H* RESPONSE_HEX table add -subtable [IP::client_addr] $PAYLOAD_HASH $RESPONSE_HEX 15 60 } Tested this on version: 12.0RADIUS server authenticating user with Google Authenticator
Problem this snippet solves: This code create a RADIUS server to authenticate users with Authenticator algorithm (Google Authenticator and Microsoft Authenticator apps) Code description When a Radius request is accepted by the VS: the radius client IP address is checked against a Datagroup list. if in list : The shared secret is extracted from Datagroup list if not : drop the packet the password is decrypted with radius secret if request code is Access-Request, the request username is searched in a datagroup and the user key is extracted The code is calculated and compared with radius password provided in the RADIUS request. return Access-Accept or Access-Reject response code based on the authenticator algorithm result. Supported request Packet types: Access-Request (1) Returned Packet types: Access-Accept (2) Access-Reject (3) Required request attributes User-Name (1) User-Password (2) Optional request attributes NAS-IP-Address (4) : IP address NAS-Port (5) : Integer NAS-Identifier (32) : String NAS-Port-Type (61) : Integer All other attributes are ignored by this irule Supported response Attributes All RFC2865 attributes are allowed. Vendor specific attributes are not supported yet. Note : Many thanks to Kai wilke, John McInnes and George Watkins who shared their snippets I used to write this irule. Versions : 1.0 : First version based on RADIUS commands. Required RADIUS profile assigned to the virtual server 1.1 : Added Request Message-Authenticator attribute validation / Response Message-Authenticator insertion (Asked by Sam Hall in RADIUS server using APM to authenticate users code). To support this feature, the code is rewritten to decode binary data. Radius profile is not required anymore. (31/05/2018) 1.2 : correction on the Request Message-Authenticator attribute validation, a binary conversion to same type is required after [string replace ...] command (1/06/2018) How to use this snippet: Create an Access Policy authenticating users. Define Access profile name in variable static::apmpolicy create a data group list google_auth_keys with values: username := "Authenticator key" create a data group list radius_clients with values: IPAddress := "radius secret" create a virtual server with RADIUS profile to manage RADIUS::avp commands. Code : proc ga_validate {hmac_mode key_size b32_key token allowed_clock_skew_units} { ############################################################################################## # Initialize the Base32 alphabet to binary conversation (see RFC 4648) # set b32_to_binary [list \ A 00000 B 00001 C 00010 D 00011 E 00100 F 00101 G 00110 H 00111 \ I 01000 J 01001 K 01010 L 01011 M 01100 N 01101 O 01110 P 01111 \ Q 10000 R 10001 S 10010 T 10011 U 10100 V 10101 W 10110 X 10111 \ Y 11000 Z 11001 2 11010 3 11011 4 11100 5 11101 6 11110 7 11111 \ 0 "" 1 "" = "" " " "" \ ] if { [string length [set key [string map -nocase $b32_to_binary $b32_key]]] >= $key_size } then { # Convert the translated ga(key) binary string representation to binary set binary_key [binary format B$key_size $key] # Initialize clock timeframe based on Unix epoch time in seconds / 30 set clock [expr { [clock seconds] / 30 } ] ############################################################################################## # Configure the allowed clock skew units (1 unit = +/-30 seconds in both directions) # set allowed_clock_range {0} for {set i 1} {$i <= $allowed_clock_skew_units} {incr i} {lappend allowed_clock_range -$i $i} ############################################################################################## # Perform verification of the provided token foreach x $allowed_clock_range { ############################################################################################## # Perform verification of the provided token for time frame clock + $x # # Calculate hex encoded HMAC checksum value for wide-int value of time frame clock+ x using key_binary as secret binary scan [CRYPTO::sign -alg $hmac_mode -key $binary_key [binary format W* [expr { $clock + $x }]]] H* hmac_tmp # Parse offset based on the last nibble (= 4 bits / 1 hex) of the hmac_tmp HMAC checksum and multiply with 2 for byte to hex conversation set offset [expr { "0x[string index $hmac_tmp end]" * 2 } ] # Parse (= 4 bytes / 8 hex) from hmac_tmp starting at the offset value, then remove the most significant bit, perform the modulo 1000000 and format the result to a 6 digit number set token_calculated [format %06d [expr { ( "0x[string range $hmac_tmp $offset [expr { $offset + 7 } ]]" & 0x7FFFFFFF ) % 1000000 } ]] # Compare token_calculated with user provided token value if { $token_calculated equals $token } then { # The provided token is valid" return 1 break } } } else { return -1 } return 0 } when RULE_INIT { set static::client_list "radius_clients" set static::RFC_2865_FULL_COMPLIANCE 1 set static::MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR_REQUIRED 1 } when CLIENT_ACCEPTED { set RespLength 20 set RespAVP "" ############## START OF ALLOWED RADIUS CLIENT IP VALIDATION ################# if {![class match [IP::client_addr] equals $static::client_list]} { log local0. "RADIUS Client not in Datagroup : [IP::client_addr]" # RFC 2865 : A request from a client for which the RADIUS server does not have a shared secret MUST be silently discarded UDP::drop return } #Retreive RADIUS client shared secret set secret [class match -value [IP::client_addr] equals $static::client_list] if {[binary scan [UDP::payload] cH2Sa16a* QCODE QID QLEN Q_AUTHENTICATOR QAVP] != 5} { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "REQUEST AUTHENTICATOR FAILURE" } #Store Request ID in Response ID set RID $QID switch $QCODE { 1 { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 0 set USER_NAME "" set USER_PASSWORD "" set CHAP_PASSWORD "" set NAS_IP_ADDRESS "" set NAS_PORT "" set NAS_PORT_TYPE "" set MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR "" set UNSIGNED_REQUEST [UDP::payload] set NAS_IDENTIFIER "" set QAVP_LIST_LEN [expr {$QLEN - 20}] set record_offset 0 while {[expr {$QAVP_LIST_LEN - $record_offset}] > 4} { binary scan $QAVP @${record_offset}cc QAVP_TYPE QAVP_LEN set QAVP_VAL_LEN [expr {$QAVP_LEN -2}] binary scan $QAVP @${record_offset}x2a${QAVP_VAL_LEN} QAVP_VAL switch $QAVP_TYPE { 1 { set USER_NAME $QAVP_VAL } 2 { set USER_PASSWORD $QAVP_VAL } 3 { set CHAP_PASSWORD $QAVP_VAL } 4 { binary scan $QAVP_VAL c4 octets foreach octet $octets { lappend r [expr {$octet & 0xFF}] } set NAS_IP_ADDRESS [join $r .] } 5 { binary scan $QAVP_VAL I NAS_PORT set NAS_PORT [expr {$NAS_PORT & 0xFFFFFFFF}] } 24 { set STATE $QAVP_VAL } 32 { set NAS_IDENTIFIER $QAVP_VAL } 61 { binary scan $QAVP_VAL I NAS_PORT_TYPE; set NAS_PORT_TYPE [expr {$NAS_PORT_TYPE & 0xFFFFFFFF}]; } 80 { set MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR $QAVP_VAL set UNSIGNED_RAVP [string replace $QAVP $record_offset [expr {$record_offset + 18}] [binary format ccH32 80 18 [string repeat 0 32]]] set UNSIGNED_REQUEST [binary format cH2Sa16a* $QCODE $QID $QLEN $Q_AUTHENTICATOR $UNSIGNED_RAVP] } default { } } set record_offset [expr {$record_offset + $QAVP_LEN}] } #EVALUATE REQUEST MESSAGE-AUTHENTICATOR if {$static::MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR_REQUIRED && ($MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR equals "" || ![CRYPTO::verify -alg hmac-md5 -key $secret -signature $MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR $UNSIGNED_REQUEST])} { # RFC 2869 : A RADIUS Server receiving an Access-Request with a Message-Authenticator Attribute present MUST calculate the correct value # of the Message-Authenticator and silently discard the packet if it does not match the value sent. log local0. "[IP::client_addr] : wrong or missing Message-Authenticator attribute" UDP::drop return } if {$static::RFC_2865_FULL_COMPLIANCE} { if {$NAS_IP_ADDRESS == "" && $NAS_IDENTIFIER == ""} { # RFC 2865 : It MUST contain either a NAS-IP-Address attribute or a NAS-Identifier attribute (or both). set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "REQUEST NOT RFC COMPLIANT" } elseif {$USER_PASSWORD == "" && $CHAP_PASSWORD == "" && $STATE == ""} { # RFC 2865 : An Access-Request MUST contain either a User-Password or a CHAP-Password or a State. set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "REQUEST NOT RFC COMPLIANT" } elseif {$USER_PASSWORD ne "" && $CHAP_PASSWORD ne ""} { # RFC 2865 : An Access-Request MUST NOT contain both a User-Password and a CHAP-Password. set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "REQUEST NOT RFC COMPLIANT" } } if {$USER_PASSWORD == ""} { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "USER-PASSWORD NOT SET BUT REQUIRED" } elseif {$USER_NAME == ""} { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "USER-NAME NOT SET BUT REQUIRED" } elseif {[set userkey [class lookup $USER_NAME "google_auth_keys"]] equals ""} { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "USER-NAME NOT SET BUT REQUIRED" } } 2 - 3 - 11 { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "RADIUS CODE NOT SUPPORTED - NOT A RADIUS CLIENT" } 4 - 5 - 6 - 10 { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "RADIUS CODE NOT SUPPORTED - NOT A RADIUS ACCOUNTING SERVER" } default { set REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED 1 set RAVP(18) "RADIUS CODE NOT SUPPORTED" } } ############## END OF RFC COMPLIANCE AND SERVER FEATURES VALIDATION ################# # DO NOT RELEASE UDP PACKET. Drop it to prevent further process by irule or load balancing to an internal server. # When UDP packet dropped, PAYLOAD is dropped and RADIUS Commands not available anymore. UDP::drop if {$REQUEST_NOT_ALLOWED == 0} { ########## START OF PASSWORD DECRYPTION ############################ binary scan [md5 "$secret$Q_AUTHENTICATOR"] H* bx_hex binary scan $USER_PASSWORD H* px_full_hex set Password_Padded "" for {set x 0} {$x<[string length $px_full_hex]} {set x [expr {$x+32}]} { set px_hex [string range $px_full_hex $x [expr {$x+31}]] append Password_Padded [binary format W [expr 0x[string range $px_hex 0 15] ^ 0x[string range $bx_hex 0 15]]] append Password_Padded [binary format W [expr 0x[string range $px_hex 16 31] ^ 0x[string range $bx_hex 16 31]]] binary scan [md5 "$secret[binary format H* $px_hex]"] H* bx_hex } binary scan $Password_Padded A* PASSWORD ########## END OF PASSWORD DECRYPTION ############################ ########## START OF GOOGLE AUTHENTICATION ############################ switch -- [call ga_validate "hmac-sha1" 80 $userkey $PASSWORD 10] { -1 { # code verification failed set ResponseCode 3 if {![info exists RAVP(18)] } {set RAVP(18) "wrong username Password"} log local0. "erreur 2 : wrong User Key" } 0 { # code verification failed set ResponseCode 3 if {![info exists RAVP(18)] } {set RAVP(18) "wrong username Password"} } 1 { # code verification successful set ResponseCode 2 if {![info exists RAVP(18)] } {set RAVP(18) "Good username Password"} } default {set result "error: unknown"} } ########## END OF GOOGLE AUTHENTICATION ############################ } else { set ResponseCode 3 if {[info exists RAVP(18)] } { log local0. $RAVP(18)} } ########## ENCODING AND DELIVERY OF RADIUS RESONSE ############################ foreach attrID [array names RAVP] { set RespLength [expr {[set attrLength [expr {[string length $RAVP($attrID)]+2}]] + $RespLength}] append RespAVP [binary format cca* $attrID $attrLength $RAVP($attrID)] } #CALCULATE RESPONSE MESSAGE-AUTHENTICATOR set UNSIGNED_RespAVP $RespAVP[binary format ccH32 80 18 [string repeat 0 32]] #set UNSIGNED_RespAVP $RespAVP[binary format ccH32 80 18 "00000000000000000000000000000000"] set RespLength [expr {18 + $RespLength}] append RespAVP [binary format cc 80 18][CRYPTO::sign -alg hmac-md5 -key $secret [binary format cH2Sa16a* $ResponseCode $RID $RespLength $Q_AUTHENTICATOR $UNSIGNED_RespAVP]] #append RespAVP [binary format ccH32 80 18 "1234567890ABCDEF1234567890ABCDEF"] binary scan [md5 [binary format cH2Sa16a[expr {$RespLength-20}]a[string length $secret] $ResponseCode $RID $RespLength $Q_AUTHENTICATOR $RespAVP $secret ]] H* ResponseAuth UDP::respond [binary format cH2SH32a* $ResponseCode $RID $RespLength $ResponseAuth $RespAVP] }
Citrix Receiver via accessing with 2fa not RSA radius server
Dear All We have a scenario where the user logs in via citrix receiver which is hosted via f5 , we have enabled AD auth through apm and all is working fine. But now we need to add 2fa .It is not RSA but a radius server. We did it for if the user logs in via web browser and everything is working fine.We tested it out . But when we do the same flow for if the user uses citrix receiver to access , then its giving wrong credentials. We gave in VPE Radius AUTH->AD auth and SSO and still its not working.if we put in the AD auth and then RADIUS AUTH , then the radius server doesn't get any hits.So we put as RADIUS AUTH then AD AUTH .it hits radius server and we can see radius is sending an accept-accept response as well but yet the credentials is not getting authenticated. We have been at it for a while now and its getting frustrating.I dnno what more to do.I tried using variable assign for username and password as well , so that its info is passed on for AD auth bu under event system access logs, it keeps giving pre authentication has failed. PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHAT TO DO . Thank you