exchange
50 TopicsBig-IP and ADFS Part 1 – “Load balancing the ADFS Farm”
Just like the early settlers who migrated en masse across the country by wagon train along the Oregon Trail, enterprises are migrating up into the cloud. Well okay, maybe not exactly like the early settlers. But, although there may not be a mass migration to the cloud, it is true that more and more enterprises are moving to cloud-based services like Office 365. So how do you provide seamless, or at least relatively seamless, access to resources outside of the enterprise? Well, one answer is federation and if you are a Microsoft shop then the current solution is ADFS, (Active Directory Federation Services). The ADFS server role is a security token service that extends the single sign-on, (SSO) experience for directory-authenticated clients to resources outside of the organization’s boundaries. As cloud-based application access and federation in general becomes more prevalent, the role of ADFS has become equally important. Below, is a typical deployment scenario of the ADFS Server farm and the ADFS Proxy server farm, (recommended for external access to the internally hosted ADFS farm). Warning…. If the ADFS server farm is unavailable then access to federated resources will be limited if not completely inaccessible. To ensure high-availability, performance, and scalability the F5 Big-IP with LTM, (Local Traffic Manager), can be deployed to load balance the ADFS and ADFS Proxy server farms. Yes! When it comes to a load balancing and application delivery, F5’s Big-IP is an excellent choice. Just had to get that out there. So let’s get technical! Part one of this blog series addresses deploying and configuring the Big-IP’s LTM module for load balancing the ADFS Server farm and Proxy server farm. In part two I’m going to show how we can greatly simplify and improve this deployment by utilizing Big-IP’s APM, (Access Policy Manager) so stay tuned. Load Balancing the Internal ADFS Server Farm Assumptions and Product Deployment Documentation - This deployment scenario assumes an ADFS server farm has been installed and configured per the deployment guide including appropriate trust relationships with relevant claims providers and relying parties. In addition, the reader is assumed to have general administrative knowledge of the BIG-IP LTM module. If you want more information or guidance please check out F5’s support site, ASKF5. The following diagram shows a typical, (albeit simplified) process flow of the Big-IP load balanced ADFS farm. Client attempts to access the ADFS-enabled external resource; Client is redirected to the resource’s applicable federation service; Client is redirected to its organization’s internal federation service, (assuming the resource’s federation service is configured as trusted partner); The ADFS server authenticates the client to active directory; The ADFS server provides the client with an authorization cookie containing the signed security token and set of claims for the resource partner; The client connects to the resource partner federation service where the token and claims are verified. If appropriate, the resource partner provides the client with a new security token; and The client presents the new authorization cookie with included security token to the resource for access. VIRTUAL SERVER AND MEMBER POOL – A virtual server, (aka VIP) is configured to listen on port 443, (https). In the event that the Big-IP will be used for SSL bridging, (decryption and re-encryption), the public facing SSL certificate and associated private key must be installed on the BIG-IP and associated client SSL profile created. However, as will be discussed later SSL bridging is not the preferred method for this type of deployment. Rather, SSL tunneling, (pass-thru) will be utilized. ADFS requires Transport Layer Security and Secure Sockets Layer (TLS/SSL). Therefore pool members are configured to listen on port 443, (https). LOAD BALANCING METHOD – The ‘Least Connections (member)’ method is utilized. POOL MONITOR – To ensure the AD FS service is responding as well as the web site itself, a customized monitor can be used. The monitor ensures the AD FS federation service is responding. Additionally, the monitor utilizes increased interval and timeout settings. The custom https monitor requires domain credentials to validate the service status. A standard https monitor can be utilized as an alternative. PERSISTENCE – In this AD FS scenario, clients establish a single TCP connection with the AD FS server to request and receive a security token. Therefore, specifying a persistence profile is not necessary. SSL TUNNELING, (preferred method) – When SSL tunneling is utilized, encrypted traffic flows from the client directly to the endpoint farm member. Additionally, SSL profiles are not used nor are SSL certificates required to be installed on the Big-IP. In this instance Big-IP profiles requiring packet analysis and/or modification, (ex. compression, web acceleration) will not be relevant. To further boost the performance, a Fast L4 virtual server will be used. Load Balancing the ADFS Proxy Server Farm Assumptions and Product Deployment Documentation - This deployment scenario assumes an ADFS Proxy server farm has been installed and configured per the deployment guide including appropriate trust relationships with relevant claims providers and relying parties. In addition, the reader is assumed to have general administrative knowledge of the BIG-IP LTM module. If you want more information or guidance please check out F5’s support site, ASKF5. In the previous section we configure load balancing for an internal AD FS Server farm. That scenario works well for providing federated SSO access to internal users. However, it does not address the need of the external end-user who is trying to access federated resources. This is where the AD FS proxy server comes into play. The AD FS proxy server provides external end-user SSO access to both internal federation-enabled resources as well as partner resources like Microsoft Office 365. Client attempts to access the AD FS-enabled internal or external resource; Client is redirected to the resource’s applicable federation service; Client is redirected to its organization’s internal federation service, (assuming the resource’s federation service is configured as trusted partner); The AD FS proxy server presents the client with a customizable sign-on page; The AD FS proxy presents the end-user credentials to the AD FS server for authentication; The AD FS server authenticates the client to active directory; The AD FS server provides the client, (via the AD FS proxy server) with an authorization cookie containing the signed security token and set of claims for the resource partner; The client connects to the resource partner federation service where the token and claims are verified. If appropriate, the resource partner provides the client with a new security token; and The client presents the new authorization cookie with included security token to the resource for access. VIRTUAL SERVER AND MEMBER POOL – A virtual server is configured to listen on port 443, (https). In the event that the Big-IP will be used for SSL bridging, (decryption and re-encryption), the public facing SSL certificate and associated private key must be installed on the BIG-IP and associated client SSL profile created. ADFS requires Transport Layer Security and Secure Sockets Layer (TLS/SSL). Therefore pool members are configured to listen on port 443, (https). LOAD BALANCING METHOD – The ‘Least Connections (member)’ method is utilized. POOL MONITOR – To ensure the web servers are responding, a customized ‘HTTPS’ monitor is associated with the AD FS proxy pool. The monitor utilizes increased interval and timeout settings. "To SSL Tunnel or Not to SSL Tunnel” When SSL tunneling is utilized, encrypted traffic flows from the client directly to the endpoint farm member. Additionally, SSL profiles are not used nor are SSL certificates required to be installed on the Big-IP. However, some advanced optimizations including HTTP compression and web acceleration are not possible when tunneling. Depending upon variables such as client connectivity and customization of ADFS sign-on pages, an ADFS proxy deployment may benefit from these HTTP optimization features. The following two options, (SSL Tunneling and SSL Bridging) are provided. SSL TUNNELING - In this instance Big-IP profiles requiring packet analysis and/or modification, (ex. compression, web acceleration) will not be relevant. To further boost the performance, a Fast L4 virtual server will be used. Below is an example of the Fast L4 Big-IP Virtual server configuration in SSL tunneling mode. SSL BRIDGING – When SSL bridging is utilized, traffic is decrypted and then re-encrypted at the Big-IP device. This allows for additional features to be applied to the traffic on both client-facing and pool member-facing sides of the connection. Below is an example of the standard Big-IP Virtual server configuration in SSL bridging mode. Standard Virtual Server Profiles - The following list of profiles is associated with the AD FS proxy virtual server. Well that’s it for Part 1. Along with the F5 business development team for the Microsoft global partnership I want to give a big thanks to the guys at Ensynch, an Insight Company - Kevin James, David Lundell, and Lutz Mueller Hipper for reviewing and providing feedback. Stay tuned for Big-IP and ADFS Part 2 – “APM – An Alternative to the ADFS Proxy”. Additional Links: Big-IP and ADFS Part 2 – “APM–An Alternative to the ADFS Proxy” Big-IP and ADFS Part 3 - “ADFS, APM, and the Office 365 Thick Clients”5.2KViews0likes3CommentsBig-IP and ADFS Part 2 - APM: An Alternative to the ADFS Proxy
So let’s talk Application Delivery Controllers, (ADC). In part one of this series we deployed both an internal ADFS farm as well as a perimeter ADFS proxy farm using the Big-IP’s exceptional load balancing capabilities to provide HA and scalability. But there’s much more the Big-IP can provide to the application delivery experience. Here in part 2 we’ll utilize the Access Policy Manager, (APM) module as a replacement for the ADFS Proxy layer. To illustrate this approach, we’ll address one of the most common use cases; ADFS deployment to federate with and enable single sign-on to Microsoft Office 365 web-based applications. The purpose of the ADFS Proxy server is to receive and forward requests to ADFS servers that are not accessible from the Internet. As noted in part one, for high availability this typically requires a minimum of two proxy servers as well as an additional load balancing solution, (F5 Big-IPs of course). By implementing APM on the F5 appliance(s) we not only eliminate the need for these additional servers but, by implementing pre-authentication at the perimeter and advanced features such as client-side checks, (antivirus validation, firewall verification, etc.), arguably provide for a more secure deployment. Assumptions and Product Deployment Documentation - This deployment scenario assumes the reader is assumed to have general administrative knowledge of the BIG-IP LTM module and basic understanding of the APM module. If you want more information or guidance please check out F5’s support site, ASKF5. The following diagram shows a typical internal and external client access AD FS to Office 365 Process Flow, (used for passive-protocol, “web-based” access). Both clients attempts to access the Office 365 resource; Both clients are redirected to the resource’s applicable federation service, (Note: This step may be skipped with active clients such as Microsoft Outlook); Both client are redirected to their organization’s internal federation service; The AD FS server authenticates the client to active directory; * Internal clients are load balanced directly to an ADFS server farm member; and * External clients are: * Pre-authenticated to Active Directory via APM’s customizable sign-on page; *Authenticated users are directed to an AD FS server farm member. The ADFS server provides the client with an authorization cookie containing the signed security token and set of claims for the resource partner; The client connects to the Microsoft Federation Gateway where the token and claims are verified. The Microsoft Federation Gateway provides the client with a new service token; and The client presents the new cookie with included service token to the Office 365 resource for access. Virtual Servers and Member Pool – Although all users, (both internal and external) will access the ADFS server farm via the same Big-IP(s), the requirements and subsequent user experience differ. While internal authenticated users are load balanced directly to the ADFS farm, external users must first be pre-authenticated, (via APM) prior to be allowed access to an ADFS farm member. To accomplish this two, (2) virtual servers are used; one for the internal access and another dedicated for external access. Both the internal and external virtual servers are associated with the same internal ADFS server farm pool. INTERNAL VIRTUAL SERVER – Refer to Part 1 of this guidance for configuration settings for the internal ADFS farm virtual server. EXTERNAL VIRTUAL SERVER – The configuration for the external virtual server is similar to that of the virtual server described in Part 1 of this guidance. In addition an APM Access Profile, (see highlighted section and settings below) is assigned to the virtual server. APM Configuration – The following Access Policy Manager, (APM) configuration is created and associated with the external virtual server to provide for pre-authentication of external users prior to being granted access to the internal ADFS farm. As I mentioned earlier, the APM module provides advanced features such as client-side checks and single sign-on, (SSO) in addition to pre-authentication. Of course this is just the tip of the iceberg. Take a deeper look at client-side checks at AskF5. AAA SERVER - The ADFS access profile utilizes an Active Directory AAA server. ACCESS POLICY - The following access policy is associated with the ADFS access profile. * Prior to presenting the logon page client machines are checked for the existence of updated antivirus. If the client lacks either antivirus software or does not have updated, (within 30 days) virus definitions the user is redirected to a mitigation site. * An AD query and simple iRule is used to provide single-url OWA access for both on-premise and Office365 Exchange users. SSO CONFIGURATION - The ADFS access portal uses an NTLM v1 SSO profile with multiple authentication domains, (see below). By utilizing multiple SSO domains, clients are required to authenticate only once to gain access to both hosted applications such as Exchange Online and SharePoint Online as well as on-premise hosted applications. To facilitate this we deploy multiple virtual servers, (ADFS, Exchange, SharePoint) utilizing the same SSO configuration. CONNECTIVITY PROFILE – A connectivity profile based upon the default connectivity profile is associated with the external virtual server. Whoa! That’s a lot to digest. But if nothing else, I hope this inspires you to further investigate APM and some of the cool things you can do with the Big-IP beyond load balancing. Additional Links: Big-IP and ADFS Part 1 – “Load balancing the ADFS Farm” Big-IP and ADFS Part 3 - “ADFS, APM, and the Office 365 Thick Clients” BIG-IP Access Policy Manager (APM) Wiki Home - DevCentral Wiki Latest F5 Information F5 News Articles F5 Press Releases F5 Events F5 Web Media F5 Technology Alliance Partners F5 YouTube Feed4.2KViews0likes7CommentsExchange Hybrid SMTP Through F5 (using TLS)
Troubleshooting an Exchange Hybrid mail flow issue where inbound mail is failing to route through the F5 appliance. The overall network setup is Exchange Online <-> Palo Alto NGFW <-> F5 LTM <-> Exchange Pool. By default, Exchange Online will attempt to secure the connection over TCP 25 using TLS 1.2, and it seems this is where the issue is taking place. The F5 virtual server configuration is very straightforward, and I'm attempting to configure it to support SSL Passthrough (not Bridging or Offload). The VS is listening on TCP 25 and is performing a single forward to a backend pool, which I've limited to a known good working Exchange Server. No Client/Server SSL profiles have been configured (i.e., Passthrough) on the virtual server. A traffic capture on the virtual server does not show any STARTTLS negotiation taking place, which supports the TLS error we're receiving on the Exchange Online side. As a test, I've moved the flow of traffic around the F5 to allow direct communication between Exchange Online <-> Palo Alto NGFW <-> Exchange Server, and this is operational, and I can see the TLS negotiation taking place. I've referenced the SMTP deployment guide particularly for the Passthrough configuration option, and everything (other than the port 587 not 25) is correct. Both Exchange Online and the Exchange Server will require TLS, but configuring the F5 in bridging mode will not work as we do not have the private key of Exchange Online. https://www.f5.com/pdf/deployment-guides/f5-smtp-dg.pdf Has anyone run into a similar issue where it appears the TLS negotiation is not taking place? BIG-IP Version: 14.1.2.6 BIG-IP Platform: i7800 Exchange Version: 2016 CU161.8KViews1like1CommentiRule to Redirect autodiscover traffic
Dear all, the SSL certificate in my current virtual server points to autodiscover.abc.com and not autodiscover.abccommodities.com I would like F5 to redirect from autodiscover.abccommodities.com to autodiscover.abc.com in hopes to eliminating the SSL security warning popup from Outlook clients as seen below. Is that possible? I tried this iRule but it wasn't working, still prompts warning. I believe Outlook client is using HTTPS traffic to contact the mail server? when HTTP_REQUEST { if { [string tolower [HTTP::host]] ends_with ".abccommodities.com" } { HTTP::redirect "https://autodiscover.abc.com" } }Solved1.3KViews0likes6Commentsdeviceid for exchange activesync
We have APM set up for exchange activesync - we are also using the deviceid parameter as an added security measure. This is giving me a lot of grief, as this ID is relevant to the email client being used by the device and not to the device itself. With most phones the built in client identifier can be located when you set up the server details, but it's not so with the LG3 built-in client. I need to check the logs for a blocked user in order to locate this ID and it is proving impossible with the LG3. (using other non-built-in clients is possible but the users are not happy with their experience). I am wondering if instead of the email client ID, I could use the actual device ID of the phone (IMEI or UUID). If so, how can this be done? Thanks, Vered1.2KViews0likes2CommentsTo Pre-authenticate or Not to Pre-authenticate
I’m bouncing around in the friendly skies, (turbulence sucks!) on my way back from the Microsoft Exchange conference and one question keeps rolling around in my head; how important is pre-authentication? Granted, it may not be a very compelling topic to most but with the recent announcement of TMG’s end-of-life, it’s at least relevant. Along with other remote access / pre-authentication solutions, including F5’s Access Policy Manager, (APM) many organizations from SMBs to large enterprises have utilized Microsoft’s TMG, (Threat Management Gateway) to provide external pre-authentication for a variety of applications such as MS Exchange and SharePoint. In a nutshell, reverse-proxy with pre-authentication, (aka remote access) solutions act as a secure doorway on the perimeter of the organization and prevent un-authenticated and un-trusted traffic from accessing resources residing on the private internal corporate network. Now to be honest, there’s not much debate in my mind around the value provided by pre-authentication at the edge of the Network. However, discontinuing the use of pre-authentication entirely in the light of TMG’s demise was proposed as a possible solution. Disclaimer --> This is not an official Microsoft recommendation but rather the opinion expressed by an individual presenter. It’s also important to mention that while TMG will no longer be offered as a product after December 1, 2012, mainstream support will still continue into 2015 which should give current users sufficient time to investigate and implement alternative solutions, (such as APM). Now with that said, I think it would behoove us all to quickly review some of what remote access solutions provide the organization before we tear the door off its hinges. Isolation of Internal Domain-joined Resources As I already mentioned pre-authentication resides at the perimeter of the organization’s network and provides a layer of security further isolating internal resources from external access. Rather than allowing direct access to the internal resource, (an Exchange CAS server for example), only authenticated and authorized user connections will be able to pass into the corporate LAN. To provide a multi-layered perimeter security solution this functionality can be combined with other security systems such as IPS and layer 7 firewalls. Multi-factor Authentication I’ll leave it up to you the reader to determine the value of multi-factor authentication. Regardless, whether it’s username and password, certificates, hard/soft tokens, pre-defined security questions, adaptive auth, or any of the other various flavors of authentication methods available; many remote access solutions provide a much more secure authentication mechanism than what can be natively found on most applications. This is especially critical when we consider the vast and ever-growing number of devices organizations need to provide access for as a part of doing business. Endpoint Inspection To dovetail onto the previous comment, providing a username and password is simply not enough. In the age of BYOD, (Bring Your Own Device), an organization should not only have confidence in who the user is that’s accessing the corporate resource, (Exchange via ActiveSync for example) but have confidence that the device used to connect, (smartphone, corporate laptop, personal tablet, etc.) adheres to corporate policies. Some remote access solutions provide a means to identify and evaluate the client endpoint as part of the authentication/authorization process. For example, (here comes a shameless plug), utilizing APM on the F5 Big-IP with LTM can provide a means to manage access to corporate resources based upon the device trying to connect as well as ensuring the approved device adheres to corporate policies for such things as AV status, OS versions, patch levels, etc.. A Strategic Point of Control for Application Delivery Pre-authentication / reverse-proxies provide a central point to administer access to multiple applications. Consider the alternatives. Without a reverse-proxy / pre-authentication solution access must be configured and controlled separately at each internal resource. All too often these internal resources, (such as Microsoft Exchange and SharePoint), are administered by different individuals or groups. What’s more, independent access control makes applying corporate security policy consistently a challenge to say the least. On the contrary, implementing an application delivery controller like the F5 Big-IP with Access Policy Manager provides a strategic point of control where corporate applications can be deployed in a secure and consistent manner. End-User Experience It’s not all about security. An application delivery controller that provides, among other things, pre-authentication can improve the user experience. Deploying applications behind the Big-IP with APM can provide single sign-on access as well as advanced application delivery. For example, once authenticated at the Big-IP users can access various corporate applications such as SharePoint and Exchange, often from a single namespace, while only needing to provide credentials once and often from a single namespace. Latest F5 Information F5 News Articles F5 Press Releases F5 Events F5 Web Media F5 Technology Alliance Partners F5 YouTube Feed1.1KViews0likes0CommentsF5 webmail exchange 2016 - "Access policy evaluation is already in progress for your current session."
We recently moved over to outlook 2016. Users that are on 2010 connect fine and never have an issue. the new users that have moved over to 2016 mailboxes get the error message above in the title. When they connect, they get the following addons to their URL: ?bO=1 sessiondata.ashxappcacheclient=1&acver=15.1.1591.8&crr=1 I have tried irules from the following devcentral questions and answers with no success: Access policy evaluation is already in progress for your current session How to avoid "Access policy evaluation is already in progress" - (irules from matt, Misty Spillers & Stanislan Piron tested and didn't help) If i have users open a browser in "InPrivate Browsing" or "Incognito" mode, they don't get the error. I have also tried the windows_10_anniversary_fix as well as all the irules on page 76 of the iapp deployment guide for exchange 2016. Deployment guide stuff i tested and doesn't work: when HTTP_REQUEST { if { [HTTP::cookie exists "IsClientAppCacheEnabled"] } { HTTP::cookie "IsClientAppCacheEnabled" False } } and tried this: when HTTP_REQUEST { if { [HTTP::cookie exists "IsClientAppCacheEnabled"] } { HTTP::cookie remove "IsClientAppCacheEnabled" HTTP::cookie insert name "IsClientAppCacheEnabled" value False } } I have a ticket open with F5 but they are saying oh just check the guide. not helpful. Hoping someone from the community can help me. thanks in advance!999Views0likes1CommentBig-IP and ADFS Part 4 – “What about Single Sign-Out?”
Why stop at 3 when you can go to 4? Over the past few posts on this ever-expanding topic, we’ve discussed using ADFS to provide single sign-on access to Office 365. But what about single sign-out? A customer turned me onto Tristan Watkins’ blog post that discusses the challenges of single sign-out for browser-based, (WS-Federation) applications when fronting ADFS with a reverse-proxy. It’s a great blog post and covers the topic quite well so I won’t bother re-hashing it here. However, I would definitely recommend reading his post if you want a deeper dive. Here’s the sign-out process: 1. User selects ‘Sign Out’ or ‘Sign in as Different User’, (if using SharePoint Online); 2. The user is signed out of the application; 3. The user is redirected to the ADFS sign out page; and 4. The user is redirected back to the Microsoft Federation Gateway and the user’s tokens are invalidated. In a nutshell, claims-unaware proxies, (Microsoft ISA and TMG servers for example) are unable to determine when this process has occurred and subsequently the proxy session remains active. This in turn will allow access to ADFS, (and subsequently Office 365) without be prompted for new credentials, (not good!). Here’s where I come clean with you dear readers. While the F5 Big-IP with APM is a recognized replacement for the AD FS 2.0 Federation Server Proxy this particular topic was not even on my radar. But now that it is…… Single Sign-Out with Access Policy Manager You’ll may have noticed that although the Big-IP with APM is a claims-unaware proxy I did not include it in the list above. Why you ask? Well, although the Big-IP is currently “claims-unaware”, it certainly is “aware” of traffic that passes through. With the ability to analyze traffic as it flows from both the client and the server side, the Big-IP can look for triggers and act upon them. In the case of the ADFS sign-out process, we’ll use the MSISSignOut cookie as our trigger to terminate the proxy session accordingly. During the WS-Federation sign out process, (used by browser-based applications) the MSISSignOut cookie is cleared out by the ADFS server, (refer to the HttpWatch example below). Once this has been completed, we need to terminate the proxy session. Fortunately, there’s an iRule for that. The iRule below analyzes the HTTP response back from the ADFS server and keys off of the MSISSignOut cookie. If the cookie’s value has been cleared, the APM session will be terminated. To allow for a clean sign-out process with the Microsoft Federation Gateway, the APM session termination is delayed long enough for the ADFS server to respond. Now, APM’s termination can act in concert with the ADFS sign-out process. 1: when HTTP_RESPONSE { 2: # Review server-side responses for reset of WS-Federation sign-out cookie - MSISSignOut. 3: # If found assign ADFS sign-out session variable and close HTTP connection 4: if {[HTTP::header "Set-Cookie"] contains "MSISSignOut=;"} { 5: ACCESS::session data set session.user.adfssignout 1 6: HTTP::close 7: } 8: } 9: 10: when CLIENT_CLOSED { 11: # Remove APM session if ADFS sign-out variable exists 12: if {[ACCESS::session data get session.user.adfssignout] eq 1} { 13: after 5000 14: ACCESS::session remove 15: } 16: } What? Another iRule? Actually, the above snippet can be combined with the iRule we implemented in Part 3 creating a single iRule addressing all the ADFS/Office 365 scenarios. 1: when HTTP_REQUEST { 2: # For external Lync client access all external requests to the 3: # /trust/mex URL must be routed to /trust/proxymex. Analyze and modify the URI 4: # where appropriate 5: HTTP::uri [string map {/trust/mex /trust/proxymex} [HTTP::uri]] 6: 7: # Analyze the HTTP request and disable access policy enforcement WS-Trust calls 8: if {[HTTP::uri] contains "/adfs/services/trust"} { 9: ACCESS::disable 10: } 11: 12: # OPTIONAL ---- To allow publishing of the federation service metadata 13: if {[HTTP::uri] ends_with "FederationMetadata/2007-06/FederationMetadata.xml"} { 14: ACCESS::disable 15: } 16: } 17: 18: when HTTP_RESPONSE { 19: # Review serverside responses for reset of WS-Federation sign-out cookie - MSISSignOut. 20: # If found assign ADFS sign-out session variable and close HTTP connection 21: if {[HTTP::header "Set-Cookie"] contains "MSISSignOut=;"} { 22: ACCESS::session data set session.user.adfssignout 1 23: HTTP::close 24: } 25: } 26: 27: when CLIENT_CLOSED { 28: # Remove APM session if ADFS sign-out variable exists 29: if {[ACCESS::session data get session.user.adfssignout] eq 1} { 30: after 5000 31: ACCESS::session remove 32: } 33: } Gotta love them iRules! That’s all for now. Additional Links: Big-IP and ADFS Part 1 – “Load balancing the ADFS Farm” Big-IP and ADFS Part 2 – “APM–An Alternative to the ADFS Proxy” Big-IP and ADFS Part 3 – “ADFS, APM, and the Office 365 Thick Clients” BIG-IP Access Policy Manager (APM) Wiki Home - DevCentral Wiki AD FS 2.0 - Interoperability with Non-Microsoft Products MS TechNet - AD FS: How to Invoke a WS-Federation Sign-Out Tristan Watkins - Office 365 Single Sign Out with ISA or TMG as the ADFS Proxy Technorati Tags: load balancer,ADFS,Office365,active directory,F5,federation,exchange,microsoft,network,blog,APM,LTM,Coward,SSO,single sign-on,single sign-out931Views0likes2CommentsMicrosoft Exchange Server
F5 works closely with Microsoft to ensure we are delivering the best possible technology and deployment guidance to support highly available and scalable Exchange Server deployments. F5 performs extensive internal engineering and testing to develop deployment guides and associated iApp templates for Microsoft Exchange Server. The guides and templates enable organizations to easily provide additional performance, security and availability for Exchange Server deployments, ensuring maximum ROI with the minimum amount of work. The following simple, logical configuration example shows one of the ways you can configure the BIG-IP system for Microsoft Exchange Server. For specific information on Microsoft Exchange 2016, see https://devcentral.f5.com/s/articles/exchange-2016and for Exchange 2013/2010, see https://devcentral.f5.com/s/articles/microsoft-exchange-2010-and-2013-iapp-template. Go to https://f5.com/solutions/deployment-guidesto find the appropriate deployment guide for quickly and accurately configuring the BIG-IP system for Microsoft Exchange Server. If you have any feedback on these or other F5 guides or iApp templates, leave it in the comment section below or email us at solutionsfeedback@f5.com. We use your feedback to help shape our new iApps and deployment guides.800Views0likes4CommentsProvision IOS profile for Exchange ActiveSync with client certificate authentication
Problem this snippet solves: If you need to use client certificate authentication for ActiveSync services on IOS, you need to deploy custom profiles through a Mobile Device Management. MDM is maybe a little bit too much to achieve only this feature. The irule below provide necessary materials to provision a certificate and an exchange profile on IOS. Tested successfully on IOS 9. We use SCEP protocol for certificate enrollment. How to use this snippet: You need to define a Virtual Server and an access profile to publish ActiveSync. Then, you need to assign the irule on the Virtual Server. The certificate is retrieved using SCEP protocol on a Microsoft ADCS 2012 R2. The SCEP url should be changed in the Exchange payload. We configured APM to protect the access to this service and retrieve attributes from Active Directory but you can change the irule code to retrieve information and protect the service in a different manner. When a user reach /enroll uri with Safari browser, the provisioning process starts. /!\ I provide an IOS payload as example, but you need to modify it to fit your environment and save it as an ifile. Settings that need to be changed in the xml payload : <string>HOST.DOMAIN.COM</string> : Activesync FQDN <string>DOMAIN-Issuer-CA</string> : Issuing CA Name (if exists otherwise related code should be removed) <data>CERTIFICATE</data> : X.509 certificate in Base64 for Issuing CA <string>DOMAIN-Root-CA</string> : Root CA Name <data>CERTIFICATE</data> : X.509 certificate in Base64 for the Root CA <string>DOMAIN</string> : Organization name to be present in the user certificate <string>http://scep.domain.com/scep</string> : SCEP url External links Github : github.com/e-XpertSolutions/f5 Code : 68654 Tested this on version: 11.5799Views0likes1Comment