Simplifying and Securing Network Segmentation with F5 Distributed Cloud and Nutanix Flow
Introduction Enterprises often separate environments—such as development and production—to improve efficiency, reduce risk, and maintain compliance. A critical enabler of this separation is network segmentation, which isolates networks into smaller, secured segments—strengthening security, optimizing performance, and supporting regulatory standards. In this article, we explore the integration between Nutanix Flow and F5 Distributed Cloud, showcasing how F5 and Nutanix collaborate to simplify and secure network segmentation across diverse environments—on-premises, remote, and hybrid multicloud. Integration Overview At the heart of this integration is the capability to deploy a F5 Distributed Cloud Customer Edge (CE) inside a Nutanix Flow VPC, establish BGP peering with the Nutanix Flow BGP Gateway, and inject CE-advertised BGP routes into the VPC routing table. This architecture provides full control over application delivery and security within the VPC. It enables selective advertisement of HTTP load balancers (LBs) or VIPs to designated VPCs, ensuring secure and efficient connectivity. By leveraging F5 Distributed Cloud to segment and extend networks to remote location—whether on-premises or in the public cloud—combined with Nutanix Flow for microsegmentation within VPCs, enterprises achieve comprehensive end-to-end security. This approach enforces a consistent security posture while reducing complexity across diverse infrastructures. In our previous article (click here) , we explored application delivery and security. Here, we focus on network segmentation and how this integration simplifies connectivity across environments. Demo Walkthrough The demo consists of two parts: Extending a local network segment from a Nutanix Flow VPC to a remote site using F5 Distributed Cloud. Applying microsegmentation within the network segment using Nutanix Flow Security Next-Gen. San Jose (SJ) serves as our local site, and the demo environment dev3 is a Nutanix Flow VPC with an F5 Distributed Cloud Customer Edge (CE) deployed inside: *Note: The SJ CE is named jy-nutanix-overlay-dev3 in the F5 Distributed Cloud Console and xc-ce-dev3 in the Nutanix Prism Central. On the F5 Distributed Cloud Console, we created a network segment named jy-nutanix-sjc-nyc-segment and we assigned it specifically to the subnet 192.170.84.0/24: eBGP peering is ESTABLISHED between the CE and the Nutanix Flow BGP Gateway in this segment: At the remote site in NYC, a CE named jy-nutanix-nyc is deployed with a local subnet of 192.168.60.0/24: To extend jy-nutanix-sjc-nyc-segment from SJ to NYC, simply assign the segment jy-nutanix-sjc-nyc-segment to the NYC CE local subnet 192.168.60.0/24 in the F5 Distributed Cloud Console: Effortlessly and in no time, the segment jy-nutanix-sjc-nyc-segment is now extended across environments from SJ to NYC: Checking the CE routing table, we can see that the local routes originated from the CEs are being exchanged among them: At the local site SJ, the SJ CE jy-nutanix-overlay-dev3 advertises the remote route originating from the NYC CE jy-nutanix-nyc to the Nutanix Flow BGP Gateway via BGP, and installs the route in the dev3 routing table: SJ VMs can now reach NYC VMs and vice versa, while continuing to use their Nutanix Flow VPC logical router as the default gateway: To enforce granular security within the segment, Nutanix Flow Security Next-Gen provides microsegmentation. Together, F5 Distributed Cloud and Nutanix Flow Security Next-Gen deliver a cohesive solution: F5 Distributed cloud seamlessly extends network segments across environments, while Nutanix Flow Security Next-Gen ensures fine-grained security controls within those segments: Our demo extends a network segment between two data centers, but the same approach can also be applied between on-premises and public cloud environments—delivering flexibility across hybrid multicloud environments. Conclusion F5 Distributed Cloud simplifies network segmentation across hybrid and multi-cloud environments, making it both secure and effortless. By seamlessly extending network segments across any environment, F5 removes the complexity traditionally associated with connecting diverse infrastructures. Combined with Nutanix Flow Security Next-Gen for microsegmentation within each segment, this integration delivers end-to-end protection and consistent policy enforcement. Together, F5 and Nutanix help enterprises reduce operational overhead, maintain compliance, and strengthen security—while enabling agility and scalability across all environments. This integration is coming soon in CY2026. If you’re interested in early access, please contact your F5 representative. Reference URLs https://www.f5.com/products/distributed-cloud-services https://www.nutanix.com/products/flow
Show or List F5 XC Routes in the Web
Hi F5ers, After more than two years working with F5 XC, I have decided to explore a functionality to show the host associated with each route "I have requested this functionality to F5, but it´s in design." For anyone who has deployed XC and has created routes into the load balancers, they may have encountered the fact that the routes don't have any description or relevant information, and in the case that they have to find a specific route, it could be almost impossible in an incident, or it will take a lot of time to navigate the menu. So, what I propose as an alternative solution, meanwhile, is F5 solving the request? I have designed a JavaScript that can be integrated into a bookmark "easy way", and if you copy the entire JSON configuration of the load balancer, it will show you in a console over the main XC web page the specific routes and their position in the Routes Menu. The steps to deploy it are: Create a new bookmark and copy the next encoded JavaScript in the URL New Bookmark javascript:(async()=>{const H=h=>{if(!h)return'';const i=h.invert_match?%27NOT %27:%27%27;const n=(h.name||%27%27)+%27%27;if(n.toLowerCase()===%27host%27){if(h.regex)return`${i}Host Regex: ${h.regex}`;if(h.exact)return`${i}Host: ${h.exact}`;if(h.match_value)return`${i}Host: ${h.match_value}`;if(h.value)return`${i}Host: ${h.value}`;if(Array.isArray(h.values)&&h.values.length)return`${i}Host in [${h.values.join(%27 | %27)}]`;return`${i}Host Header Present`}if(h.regex)return`${i}Header Regex: ${n} ~ ${h.regex}`;if(h.exact)return`${i}Header: ${n} = ${h.exact}`;if(h.match_value)return`${i}Header: ${n} = ${h.match_value}`;if(h.value)return`${i}Header: ${n} = ${h.value}`;if(Array.isArray(h.values)&&h.values.length)return`${i}Header: ${n} in [${h.values.join(%27 | %27)}]`;return`${i}Header: ${n} (present)`},S=t=>{try{let s=t.replace(/^\uFEFF/,%27%27).replace(/\u200B/g,%27%27);s=s.replace(/\/\*[^]*?\*\//g,%27%27);s=s.replace(/(^|[^:])\/\/.*$/gm,%27$1%27);s=s.replace(/,\s*([}\]])/g,%27$1%27);return s}catch{return t}},J=t=>{if(!t)return null;try{return JSON.parse(t)}catch{try{return JSON.parse(S(t))}catch{return null}}},G=()=>{try{return(getSelection()?.toString()||%27%27).trim()}catch{return%27%27}},D=()=>{const o=[];document.querySelectorAll(%27pre,code,textarea,div%27).forEach(el=>{const t=(el.innerText||el.textContent||%27%27).trim();if(t&&t.includes(%27"spec"%27)&&t.includes(%27"routes"%27)&&t.includes(%27"metadata"%27))o.push(t)});return o},P=a=>{for(const r of a){let t=r,i=t.indexOf(%27{%27),j=t.lastIndexOf(%27}%27);if(i>=0&&j>i)t=t.slice(i,j+1);const x=J(t);if(x?.spec?.routes)return x}return null},M=()=>{try{if(window.monaco?.editor?.getModels){for(const m of window.monaco.editor.getModels()){const txt=m.getValue?.();const j=J(txt);if(j?.spec?.routes)return j}}}catch{}return null},Q=onOk=>{const host=document.createElement(%27div%27),shadow=host.attachShadow({mode:%27open%27}),ov=document.createElement(%27div%27);ov.style.cssText=%27position:fixed;inset:0;z-index:1000000;background:rgba(0,0,0,.55);display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:center;outline:none;%27;ov.tabIndex=0;const box=document.createElement(%27div%27);box.style.cssText=%27width:min(960px,92vw);height:min(76vh,720px);background:#111;color:#eee;border:1px solid #444;border-radius:10px;box-shadow:0 8px 24px rgba(0,0,0,.35);display:flex;flex-direction:column';const head=document.createElement('div');head.style.cssText='padding:10px 12px;border-bottom:1px solid #333;font:600 14px system-ui';head.textContent='Pega o carga el JSON del HTTP LB (vista JSON)';const bar=document.createElement('div');bar.style.cssText='display:flex;gap:8px;align-items:center;padding:8px 12px;border-bottom:1px solid #333';const btnRead=document.createElement('button');btnRead.textContent='📋 Leer portapapeles';btnRead.title='Requiere permiso del navegador';btnRead.style.cssText='background:#2b2b2b;color:#ddd;border:1px solid #444;border-radius:6px;padding:6px 10px;cursor:pointer';btnRead.onclick=async()=>{try{const txt=await navigator.clipboard.readText();ta.value=txt;ta.focus()}catch{alert('No se pudo leer del portapapeles. Permite el permiso o usa Archivo.')}};const file=document.createElement('input');file.type='file';file.accept='.json,.txt,application/json,text/plain';file.style.cssText='color:#bbb';file.onchange=async e=>{const f=e.target.files?.[0];if(!f)return;const txt=await f.text();ta.value=txt;ta.focus()};const tip=document.createElement('div');tip.style.cssText='margin-left:auto;color:#aaa;font-size:12px';tip.textContent='Consejo: arrastra y suelta un archivo aquí';bar.append(btnRead,file,tip);const ta=document.createElement('textarea');ta.style.cssText='flex:1;padding:10px 12px;background:#0f0f0f;color:#eee;border:0;outline:none;resize:none;font:12px/1.4 ui-monospace,Menlo,Consolas,monospace';ta.placeholder='Pega aquí el JSON (Ctrl+V). Si la página intercepta, usa "Leer portapapeles" o Archivo.';const pasteToTa=async e=>{try{let d=e.clipboardData?.getData('text/plain');if(!d&&navigator.clipboard?.readText)d=await navigator.clipboard.readText();if(typeof d==='string'){const st=ta.selectionStart??ta.value.length,en=ta.selectionEnd??ta.value.length;ta.value=ta.value.slice(0,st)+d+ta.value.slice(en);const pos=st+d.length;ta.setSelectionRange(pos,pos);ta.focus()}}catch{}};const globalPaste=e=>{e.stopImmediatePropagation?.();e.stopPropagation();e.preventDefault();pasteToTa(e)};window.addEventListener('paste',globalPaste,true);ta.addEventListener('dragover',e=>{e.preventDefault();ta.style.outline='1px dashed #555'});ta.addEventListener('dragleave',()=>ta.style.outline='');ta.addEventListener('drop',async e=>{e.preventDefault();ta.style.outline='';const f=e.dataTransfer.files?.[0];if(f)ta.value=await f.text()});const foot=document.createElement('div');foot.style.cssText='display:flex;gap:10px;justify-content:flex-end;padding:10px 12px;border-top:1px solid #333';const ok=document.createElement('button');ok.textContent='Validar y mostrar';ok.style.cssText='background:#2b2b2b;color:#ddd;border:1px solid #444;border-radius:6px;padding:6px 12px;cursor:pointer';ok.onclick=()=>{const j=J(ta.value);if(!(j?.spec?.routes)){alert('No parece un JSON válido con spec.routes.\nAsegúrate de copiar la vista JSON completa.');return}cleanup();onOk(j)};const cancel=document.createElement('button');cancel.textContent='Cancelar';cancel.style.cssText='background:#222;color:#bbb;border:1px solid #444;border-radius:6px;padding:6px 12px;cursor:pointer';const cleanup=()=>{try{window.removeEventListener('paste',globalPaste,true)}catch{}host.remove()};cancel.onclick=cleanup;foot.append(ok,cancel);box.append(head,bar,ta,foot);ov.append(box);shadow.append(ov);document.body.append(host);setTimeout(()=>ta.focus(),0);ov.addEventListener('mousedown',()=>ta.focus())},A=()=>{const s=G();let j=J(s);if(j?.spec?.routes)return Promise.resolve(j);j=M();if(j?.spec?.routes)return Promise.resolve(j);const hits=D();j=P(hits);if(j?.spec?.routes)return Promise.resolve(j);return new Promise(res=>Q(res))},R=jobj=>{const routes=jobj?.spec?.routes||[],id='xcHostMatchesPanel';document.getElementById(id)?.remove();const panel=document.createElement('div');panel.id=id;panel.style.cssText=['position:fixed','z-index:999999','top:12px','left:12px','max-width:560px','max-height:75vh','overflow:auto','background:#111','color:#eee','border:1px solid #444','border-radius:8px','font:13px/1.35 system-ui,Segoe UI,Roboto,Arial','padding:0','box-shadow:0 8px 24px rgba(0,0,0,.35)','cursor:grab'].join(';');const header=document.createElement('div');header.style.cssText='user-select:none;background:#1b1b1b;border-bottom:1px solid #333;border-top-left-radius:8px;border-top-right-radius:8px;padding:8px 12px;position:relative';header.innerHTML='<div style="font-weight:600">F5 XC — Host match (sin API)</div><div style="opacity:.8;font-size:12px">Fuente: selección/DOM/portapapeles/archivo</div>';const close=document.createElement('button');close.textContent='×';close.title='Cerrar';close.style.cssText='position:absolute;top:6px;right:8px;background:#333;color:#ddd;border:0;border-radius:4px;padding:2px 6px;cursor:pointer';close.addEventListener('pointerdown',e=>{e.stopPropagation();e.preventDefault()});close.addEventListener('click',e=>{e.stopPropagation();e.preventDefault();cleanup()});header.appendChild(close);panel.appendChild(header);const body=document.createElement('div');body.style.cssText='padding:10px 12px 8px';const hr=()=>{const x=document.createElement('div');x.style.cssText='height:1px;background:#333;margin:8px 0';body.appendChild(x)};if(!routes.length){body.append('Sin routes en el JSON.')}else{routes.forEach((r,i)=>{const idx=i+1,s=r.simple_route||{},rd=r.redirect_route||{};let host='';const others=[];(s.headers||[]).forEach(h=>{const t=H(h);((h.name||'').toLowerCase()==='host')?(host=host||t):others.push(t)});(rd.headers||[]).forEach(h=>{const t=H(h);((h.name||'').toLowerCase()==='host')?(host=host||t):others.push(t)});const path=s.path?(s.path.prefix?%60Path Match: ${s.path.prefix}%60:(s.path.regex?%60Path Regex: ${s.path.regex}%60:'')):(rd.path&&rd.path.prefix?%60Path Match: ${rd.path.prefix}%60:'');const type=s?'Simple Route':(rd?'Redirect Route':'(otro)');const block=document.createElement('div');block.style.marginBottom='8px';block.innerHTML=%60<div style="color:#8bd;">#${idx} — ${type}</div>%60+(host?%60<div>• ${host}</div>%60:'<div>• (sin Host)</div>')+(path?%60<div>• ${path}</div>%60:'')+(others.length?%60<div>• ${others.join('<br>• ')}</div>%60:'');body.appendChild(block);hr()})}const foot=document.createElement('div');foot.style.cssText='display:flex;gap:8px;align-items:center;justify-content:space-between';const left=document.createElement('div');left.style.cssText='display:flex;gap:8px;align-items:center';const reset=document.createElement('button');reset.textContent='Reset posición';reset.style.cssText='background:#2b2b2b;color:#ddd;border:1px solid #444;border-radius:4px;padding:4px 8px;cursor:pointer';reset.onclick=()=>{panel.style.left='12px';panel.style.top='12px';panel.style.right='auto';localStorage.removeItem('XC_PANEL_POS')};left.appendChild(reset);foot.appendChild(left);body.appendChild(foot);panel.appendChild(body);document.body.appendChild(panel);const clamp=(v,min,max)=>Math.max(min,Math.min(max,v)),restore=()=>{try{const pos=JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem('XC_PANEL_POS')||'null');if(pos&&typeof pos.left==='number'&&typeof pos.top==='number'){panel.style.left=pos.left+'px';panel.style.top=pos.top+'px';panel.style.right='auto'}}catch{}},save=()=>{try{const r=panel.getBoundingClientRect();localStorage.setItem('XC_PANEL_POS',JSON.stringify({left:Math.round(r.left),top:Math.round(r.top)}))}catch{}};restore();let drag=false,sx=0,sy=0,sl=0,st=0;function onKey(e){if(e.key==='Escape')cleanup()}function cleanup(){try{window.removeEventListener('keydown',onKey)}catch{}panel.remove()}panel.addEventListener('pointerdown',e=>{if(e.button!==0)return;if(e.target.closest("button, a, input, textarea, select, [draggable='true']"))return;drag=true;panel.setPointerCapture(e.pointerId);sx=e.clientX;sy=e.clientY;const r=panel.getBoundingClientRect();sl=r.left;st=r.top;panel.style.willChange='left, top';panel.style.transition='none';panel.style.cursor='grabbing'});panel.addEventListener('pointermove',e=>{if(!drag)return;const dx=e.clientX-sx,dy=e.clientY-sy,w=panel.offsetWidth,h=panel.offsetHeight,maxL=innerWidth-w-6,maxT=innerHeight-h-6,newL=clamp(sl+dx,6,Math.max(6,maxL)),newT=clamp(st+dy,6,Math.max(6,maxT));panel.style.left=newL+'px';panel.style.top=newT+'px';panel.style.right='auto'});panel.addEventListener('pointerup',e=>{if(!drag)return;drag=false;panel.releasePointerCapture(e.pointerId);panel.style.willChange='';panel.style.cursor='grab';save()});window.addEventListener('resize',()=>{save();restore()});window.addEventListener('keydown',onKey)};try{const json=await A();R(json)}catch(e){console.error(e);alert('No fue posible obtener el JSON. Abre la vista JSON del LB o usa el cuadro para pegar/cargar.')}})(); If you want to explore the JavaScript code, I will leave it at the end of the publication. How does it work? Copy or upload the JSON code of the load balancer In the XC web menu, execute the bookmark and copy the JSON code, and then click on validate and show. It shows you the specific routes and number position for each route, giving the possibility to find the required route easily and quickly. Hope it works for anyone who has the same problem as me. The JavaScript code is: (async () => { /** * F5 XC Host Match Viewer (sin API) — blindado contra listeners externos * - Fuentes: Selección | Monaco | DOM | Cuadro (Pegar / Portapapeles / Archivo) * - Intercepción GLOBAL de 'paste' (captura) mientras el cuadro está abierto: * redirige el contenido al <textarea> propio y corta la propagación/defecto. * - Panel arrastrable, ESC/× para cerrar, posición persistente. */ // ---------- Utils ---------- const formatHeader = (h) => { if (!h) return ''; const inv = h.invert_match ? 'NOT ' : ''; const name = (h.name || '').toString(); if (name.toLowerCase() === 'host') { if (h.regex) return `${inv}Host Regex: ${h.regex}`; if (h.exact) return `${inv}Host: ${h.exact}`; if (h.match_value) return `${inv}Host: ${h.match_value}`; if (h.value) return `${inv}Host: ${h.value}`; if (Array.isArray(h.values) && h.values.length) { return `${inv}Host in [${h.values.join(' | ')}]`; } return `${inv}Host Header Present`; } if (h.regex) return `${inv}Header Regex: ${name} ~ ${h.regex}`; if (h.exact) return `${inv}Header: ${name} = ${h.exact}`; if (h.match_value) return `${inv}Header: ${name} = ${h.match_value}`; if (h.value) return `${inv}Header: ${name} = ${h.value}`; if (Array.isArray(h.values) && h.values.length) { return `${inv}Header: ${name} in [${h.values.join(' | ')}]`; } return `${inv}Header: ${name} (present)`; }; const sanitizeJson = (text) => { try { let s = text.replace(/^\uFEFF/, '').replace(/\u200B/g, ''); s = s.replace(/\/\*[^]*?\*\//g, ''); // /* ... */ s = s.replace(/(^|[^:])\/\/.*$/gm, '$1'); // // ... (evita http://) s = s.replace(/,\s*([}\]])/g, '$1'); // comas colgantes return s; } catch { return text; } }; const tryParseJson = (text) => { if (!text) return null; try { return JSON.parse(text); } catch { try { return JSON.parse(sanitizeJson(text)); } catch { return null; } } }; const getSelectionText = () => { try { return (window.getSelection()?.toString() || '').trim(); } catch { return ''; } }; const findDomCandidates = () => { const out = []; document.querySelectorAll('pre,code,textarea,div').forEach(el => { const t = (el.innerText || el.textContent || '').trim(); if (t && t.includes('"spec"') && t.includes('"routes"') && t.includes('"metadata"')) out.push(t); }); return out; }; const parseFirstJson = (texts) => { for (const raw of texts) { let t = raw; const i = t.indexOf('{'), j = t.lastIndexOf('}'); if (i >= 0 && j > i) t = t.slice(i, j + 1); const jn = tryParseJson(t); if (jn?.spec?.routes) return jn; } return null; }; const tryMonacoModels = () => { try { if (window.monaco?.editor?.getModels) { for (const m of window.monaco.editor.getModels()) { const txt = m.getValue?.(); const j = tryParseJson(txt); if (j?.spec?.routes) return j; } } } catch {} return null; }; // ---------- Cuadro Pegar/Archivo con Shadow DOM + PASTE GLOBAL ---------- let modalState = { open: false, ta: null, host: null, removeGlobal: null }; const showPasteOrFileModal = (onOk) => { // Shadow host para aislar el cuadro const host = document.createElement('div'); const shadow = host.attachShadow({ mode: 'open' }); // Overlay clicable (lleva el foco al textarea) const ov = document.createElement('div'); ov.style.cssText = 'position:fixed;inset:0;z-index:1000000;background:rgba(0,0,0,.55);display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:center;outline:none;'; ov.tabIndex = 0; // para recibir foco ov.addEventListener('mousedown', () => ta?.focus()); const box = document.createElement('div'); box.style.cssText = 'width:min(960px,92vw);height:min(76vh,720px);background:#111;color:#eee;border:1px solid #444;border-radius:10px;' + 'box-shadow:0 8px 24px rgba(0,0,0,.35);display:flex;flex-direction:column'; const head = document.createElement('div'); head.style.cssText = 'padding:10px 12px;border-bottom:1px solid #333;font:600 14px system-ui'; head.textContent = 'Pega o carga el JSON del HTTP LB (vista JSON)'; const bar = document.createElement('div'); bar.style.cssText = 'display:flex;gap:8px;align-items:center;padding:8px 12px;border-bottom:1px solid #333'; const btnRead = document.createElement('button'); btnRead.textContent = '📋 Leer portapapeles'; btnRead.title = 'Requiere permiso del navegador'; btnRead.style.cssText = 'background:#2b2b2b;color:#ddd;border:1px solid #444;border-radius:6px;padding:6px 10px;cursor:pointer'; btnRead.onclick = async () => { try { const txt = await navigator.clipboard.readText(); ta.value = txt; ta.focus(); } catch { alert('No se pudo leer del portapapeles. Permite el permiso o usa Archivo.'); } }; const file = document.createElement('input'); file.type = 'file'; file.accept = '.json,.txt,application/json,text/plain'; file.style.cssText = 'color:#bbb'; file.onchange = async (e) => { const f = e.target.files?.[0]; if (!f) return; const txt = await f.text(); ta.value = txt; ta.focus(); }; const tip = document.createElement('div'); tip.style.cssText = 'margin-left:auto;color:#aaa;font-size:12px'; tip.textContent = 'Consejo: arrastra y suelta un archivo aquí'; bar.append(btnRead, file, tip); const ta = document.createElement('textarea'); ta.style.cssText = 'flex:1;padding:10px 12px;background:#0f0f0f;color:#eee;border:0;outline:none;resize:none;font:12px/1.4 ui-monospace,Menlo,Consolas,monospace'; ta.placeholder = 'Pega aquí el JSON (Ctrl+V). Si la página intercepta, usa "Leer portapapeles" o Archivo.'; // Pegar “blindado” en el <textarea> const pasteToTa = async (e) => { try { let data = e.clipboardData?.getData('text/plain'); if (!data && navigator.clipboard?.readText) { // Fallback si el navegador no expone clipboardData al evento data = await navigator.clipboard.readText(); } if (typeof data === 'string') { const start = ta.selectionStart ?? ta.value.length; const end = ta.selectionEnd ?? ta.value.length; ta.value = ta.value.slice(0, start) + data + ta.value.slice(end); const pos = start + data.length; ta.setSelectionRange(pos, pos); ta.focus(); } } catch {} }; // Interceptor GLOBAL (captura) — redirige SIEMPRE el paste al <textarea> const globalPasteCapture = (e) => { if (!modalState.open) return; e.stopImmediatePropagation?.(); e.stopPropagation(); e.preventDefault(); pasteToTa(e); }; window.addEventListener('paste', globalPasteCapture, true); // Drag&drop de archivo al <textarea> ta.addEventListener('dragover', e => { e.preventDefault(); ta.style.outline = '1px dashed #555'; }); ta.addEventListener('dragleave', () => { ta.style.outline = ''; }); ta.addEventListener('drop', async e => { e.preventDefault(); ta.style.outline = ''; const f = e.dataTransfer.files?.[0]; if (f) ta.value = await f.text(); }); const foot = document.createElement('div'); foot.style.cssText = 'display:flex;gap:10px;justify-content:flex-end;padding:10px 12px;border-top:1px solid #333'; const ok = document.createElement('button'); ok.textContent = 'Validar y mostrar'; ok.style.cssText = 'background:#2b2b2b;color:#ddd;border:1px solid #444;border-radius:6px;padding:6px 12px;cursor:pointer'; ok.onclick = () => { const j = tryParseJson(ta.value); if (!(j?.spec?.routes)) { alert('No parece un JSON válido con spec.routes.\nAsegúrate de copiar la vista JSON completa.'); return; } cleanup(); onOk(j); }; const cancel = document.createElement('button'); cancel.textContent = 'Cancelar'; cancel.style.cssText = 'background:#222;color:#bbb;border:1px solid #444;border-radius:6px;padding:6px 12px;cursor:pointer'; const cleanup = () => { try { window.removeEventListener('paste', globalPasteCapture, true); } catch {} modalState = { open: false, ta: null, host: null, removeGlobal: null }; host.remove(); }; cancel.onclick = cleanup; foot.append(ok, cancel); box.append(head, bar, ta, foot); ov.append(box); shadow.append(ov); document.body.append(host); // Estado global del modal modalState = { open: true, ta, host, removeGlobal: () => window.removeEventListener('paste', globalPasteCapture, true) }; // Foco inicial y al pulsar en overlay setTimeout(() => { ta.focus(); }, 0); ov.addEventListener('click', (ev) => { // Si clic fuera de controles, mueve foco al textarea if (ev.target === ov) ta.focus(); }); }; // ---------- Flujo de adquisición ---------- const acquireJson = () => { const sel = getSelectionText(); let j = tryParseJson(sel); if (j?.spec?.routes) return Promise.resolve(j); j = tryMonacoModels(); if (j?.spec?.routes) return Promise.resolve(j); const hits = findDomCandidates(); j = parseFirstJson(hits); if (j?.spec?.routes) return Promise.resolve(j); return new Promise(res => showPasteOrFileModal(res)); }; // ---------- Panel ---------- const drawPanel = (jobj) => { const routes = jobj?.spec?.routes || []; const id = 'xcHostMatchesPanel'; document.getElementById(id)?.remove(); const panel = document.createElement('div'); panel.id = id; panel.style.cssText = [ 'position:fixed','z-index:999999','top:12px','left:12px', 'max-width:560px','max-height:75vh','overflow:auto', 'background:#111','color:#eee','border:1px solid #444','border-radius:8px', 'font:13px/1.35 system-ui,Segoe UI,Roboto,Arial','padding:0', 'box-shadow:0 8px 24px rgba(0,0,0,.35)','cursor:grab' ].join(';'); const header = document.createElement('div'); header.style.cssText = 'user-select:none;background:#1b1b1b;border-bottom:1px solid #333;border-top-left-radius:8px;border-top-right-radius:8px;padding:8px 12px;position:relative'; header.innerHTML = ` <div style="font-weight:600">F5 XC — Host match (sin API)</div> <div style="opacity:.8;font-size:12px">Fuente: selección/DOM/portapapeles/archivo</div> `; const close = document.createElement('button'); close.textContent = '×'; close.title = 'Cerrar'; close.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:6px;right:8px;background:#333;color:#ddd;border:0;border-radius:4px;padding:2px 6px;cursor:pointer'; close.addEventListener('pointerdown', (e) => { e.stopPropagation(); e.preventDefault(); }); close.addEventListener('click', (e) => { e.stopPropagation(); e.preventDefault(); cleanup(); }); header.appendChild(close); panel.appendChild(header); const body = document.createElement('div'); body.style.cssText = 'padding:10px 12px 8px'; const hr = () => { const x = document.createElement('div'); x.style.cssText = 'height:1px;background:#333;margin:8px 0'; body.appendChild(x); }; if (!routes.length) { body.append('Sin routes en el JSON.'); } else { routes.forEach((r, i) => { const idx = i + 1; const s = r.simple_route || {}; const rd = r.redirect_route || {}; let hostLine = ''; const others = []; (s.headers || []).forEach(h => { const t = formatHeader(h); ((h.name || '').toLowerCase() === 'host') ? (hostLine = hostLine || t) : others.push(t); }); (rd.headers || []).forEach(h => { const t = formatHeader(h); ((h.name || '').toLowerCase() === 'host') ? (hostLine = hostLine || t) : others.push(t); }); const path = s.path ? (s.path.prefix ? `Path Match: ${s.path.prefix}` : (s.path.regex ? `Path Regex: ${s.path.regex}` : '')) : (rd.path && rd.path.prefix ? `Path Match: ${rd.path.prefix}` : ''); const type = s ? 'Simple Route' : (rd ? 'Redirect Route' : '(otro)'); const block = document.createElement('div'); block.style.marginBottom = '8px'; block.innerHTML = `<div style="color:#8bd;">#${idx} — ${type}</div>` + (hostLine ? `<div>• ${hostLine}</div>` : '<div>• (sin Host)</div>') + (path ? `<div>• ${path}</div>` : '') + (others.length ? `<div>• ${others.join('<br>• ')}</div>` : ''); body.appendChild(block); hr(); }); } const foot = document.createElement('div'); foot.style.cssText = 'display:flex;gap:8px;align-items:center;justify-content:space-between'; const left = document.createElement('div'); left.style.cssText = 'display:flex;gap:8px;align-items:center'; const reset = document.createElement('button'); reset.textContent = 'Reset posición'; reset.style.cssText = 'background:#2b2b2b;color:#ddd;border:1px solid #444;border-radius:4px;padding:4px 8px;cursor:pointer'; reset.onclick = () => { panel.style.left = '12px'; panel.style.top = '12px'; panel.style.right = 'auto'; localStorage.removeItem('XC_PANEL_POS'); }; left.appendChild(reset); foot.appendChild(left); body.appendChild(foot); panel.appendChild(body); document.body.appendChild(panel); // ---- Drag & persistencia ---- const clamp = (v, min, max) => Math.max(min, Math.min(max, v)); const restore = () => { try { const pos = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem('XC_PANEL_POS') || 'null'); if (pos && typeof pos.left === 'number' && typeof pos.top === 'number') { panel.style.left = pos.left + 'px'; panel.style.top = pos.top + 'px'; panel.style.right = 'auto'; } } catch {} }; const save = () => { try { const r = panel.getBoundingClientRect(); localStorage.setItem('XC_PANEL_POS', JSON.stringify({ left: Math.round(r.left), top : Math.round(r.top), })); } catch {} }; restore(); let dragging = false, sx = 0, sy = 0, sl = 0, st = 0; function onKey(ev) { if (ev.key === 'Escape') cleanup(); } window.addEventListener('keydown', onKey); function cleanup() { try { window.removeEventListener('keydown', onKey); } catch {} panel.remove(); } panel.addEventListener('pointerdown', (e) => { if (e.button !== 0) return; if (e.target.closest("button, a, input, textarea, select, [draggable='true']")) return; dragging = true; panel.setPointerCapture(e.pointerId); sx = e.clientX; sy = e.clientY; const r = panel.getBoundingClientRect(); sl = r.left; st = r.top; panel.style.willChange = 'left, top'; panel.style.transition = 'none'; panel.style.cursor = 'grabbing'; }); panel.addEventListener('pointermove', (e) => { if (!dragging) return; const dx = e.clientX - sx; const dy = e.clientY - sy; const w = panel.offsetWidth; const h = panel.offsetHeight; const maxLeft = innerWidth - w - 6; const maxTop = innerHeight - h - 6; const newLeft = clamp(sl + dx, 6, Math.max(6, maxLeft)); const newTop = clamp(st + dy, 6, Math.max(6, maxTop)); panel.style.left = newLeft + 'px'; panel.style.top = newTop + 'px'; panel.style.right = 'auto'; }); panel.addEventListener('pointerup', (e) => { if (!dragging) return; dragging = false; panel.releasePointerCapture(e.pointerId); panel.style.willChange = ''; panel.style.cursor = 'grab'; save(); }); window.addEventListener('resize', () => { save(); restore(); }); }; // ---------- Ejecuta ---------- try { const json = await (async () => { const sel = getSelectionText(); let j = tryParseJson(sel); if (j?.spec?.routes) return j; j = tryMonacoModels(); if (j?.spec?.routes) return j; const hits = findDomCandidates(); j = parseFirstJson(hits); if (j?.spec?.routes) return j; return await new Promise(res => showPasteOrFileModal(res)); })(); drawPanel(json); } catch (e) { console.error(e); alert('No fue posible obtener el JSON. Abre la vista JSON del LB o usa el cuadro para pegar/cargar.'); } })();Leveraging BGP and ECMP for F5 Distributed Cloud Customer Edge, Part Two
Introduction This is the second part of our series on leveraging BGP and ECMP for F5 Distributed Cloud Customer Edge deployments. In Part One, we explored the high-level concepts, architecture decisions, and design principles that make BGP and ECMP such a powerful combination for Customer Edge high availability and maintenance operations. This article provides step-by-step implementation guidance, including: High-level and low-level architecture diagrams Complete BGP peering and routing policy configuration in F5 Distributed Cloud Console Practical configuration examples for Fortinet FortiGate and Palo Alto Networks firewalls By the end of this article, you'll have everything you need to implement BGP-based high availability for your Customer Edge deployment. Architecture Overview Before diving into configuration, let’s establish a clear picture of the architecture we’re implementing. We’ll examine this from two perspectives: a high-level logical view and a detailed low-level view showing specific IP addressing and AS numbers. High-Level Architecture The high-level architecture illustrates the fundamental traffic flow and BGP relationships in our deployment: Key Components: Component Role Internet External connectivity to the network Next-Generation Firewall Acts as the BGP peer and performs ECMP distribution to Customer Edge nodes Customer Edge Virtual Site Two or more CE nodes advertising identical VIP prefixes via BGP The architecture follows a straightforward principle: the upstream firewall establishes BGP peering with each CE node. Each CE advertises its VIP addresses as /32 routes. The firewall, seeing multiple equal-cost paths to the same destination, distributes incoming traffic across all available CE nodes using ECMP. Low-Level Architecture with IP Addressing The low-level diagram provides the specific details needed for implementation, including IP addresses and AS numbers: Network Details: Component IP Address Role Firewall (Inside) 10.154.4.119/24 BGP Peer, ECMP Router CE1 (Outside) 10.154.4.160/24 Customer Edge Node 1 CE2 (Outside) 10.154.4.33/24 Customer Edge Node 2 Global VIP 192.168.100.10/32 Load Balancer VIP BGP Configuration: Parameter Firewall Customer Edge AS Number 65001 65002 Router ID 10.154.4.119 Auto-assigned based on interface IP Advertised Prefix None 192.168.100.0/24 le 32 This configuration uses eBGP (External BGP) between the firewall and CE nodes, with different AS numbers for each. The CE nodes share the same AS number (65002), which is the standard approach for multi-node CE deployments advertising the same VIP prefixes. Configuring BGP in F5 Distributed Cloud Console The F5 Distributed Cloud Console provides a centralized interface for configuring BGP peering and routing policies on your Customer Edge nodes. This section walks you through the complete configuration process. Step 1: Configure the BGP peering Go to: Multi-Cloud Network Connect --> Manage --> Networking --> External Connectivity --> BGP Peers & Policies Click on Add BGP Peer Then add the following information: Object name Site where to apply this BGP configuration ASN Router ID Here is an example of the required parameters. Then click on Peers --> Add Item And filled the relevant fields like below by adapting the parameters for your requirements. Step 2: Configure the BGP routing policies Go to: Multi-Cloud Network Connect --> Manage --> Networking --> External Connectivity --> BGP Peers & Policies --> BGP Routing Policies Click on Add BGP Routing Policy Add a name for your BGP routing policy object and click on Configure to add the rules. Click on Add Item to add a rule. Here we are going to allow the /32 prefixes from our VIP subnet (192.168.100.0/24). Save the BGP Routing Policy Repeat the action to create another BGP routing policy with the exact same parameters except the Action Type, which should be of type Deny. Now we have two BGP routing policies: One to allow the VIP prefixes (for normal operations) One to deny the VIP prefixes (for maintenance mode) We still need to a a third and final BGP routing policy, in order to deny any prefixes on the CE. For that, create a third BGP routing policy with this match. Step 3: Apply the BGP routing policies To apply the BGP routing policies in your BGP peer object, edit the Peer and: Enable the BGP routing policy Apply the BGP routing policy objects created before for Inbound and Outbound Fortinet FortiGate Configuration FortiGate firewalls are widely deployed as network security appliances and support robust BGP capabilities. This section provides the minimum configuration for establishing BGP peering with Customer Edge nodes and enabling ECMP load distribution. Step 1: Configure the Router ID and AS Number Configure the basic BGP settings: config router bgp set as 65001 set router-id 10.154.4.119 set ebgp-multipath enable Step 2: Configure BGP Neighbors Add each CE node as a BGP neighbor: config neighbor edit "10.154.4.160" set remote-as 65002 set route-map-in "ACCEPT-CE-VIPS" set route-map-out "DENY-ALL" set soft-reconfiguration enable next edit "10.154.4.63" set remote-as 65002 set route-map-in "ACCEPT-CE-VIPS" set route-map-out "DENY-ALL" set soft-reconfiguration enable next end end Step 3: Create Prefix List for VIP Range Define the prefix list that matches the CE VIP range: config router prefix-list edit "CE-VIP-PREFIXES" config rule edit 1 set prefix 192.168.100.0 255.255.255.0 set ge 32 set le 32 next end next end Important: The ge 32 and le 32 parameters ensure we only match /32 prefixes within the 192.168.100.0/24 range, which is exactly what CE nodes advertise for their VIPs. Step 4: Create Route Maps Configure route maps to implement the filtering policies: Inbound Route Map (Accept VIP prefixes): config router route-map edit "ACCEPT-CE-VIPS" config rule edit 1 set match-ip-address "CE-VIP-PREFIXES" next end next end Outbound Route Map (Deny all advertisements): config router route-map edit "DENY-ALL" config rule edit 1 set action deny next end next end Step 5: Verify BGP Configuration After applying the configuration, verify the BGP sessions and routes: Check BGP neighbor status: get router info bgp summary VRF 0 BGP router identifier 10.154.4.119, local AS number 65001 BGP table version is 4 1 BGP AS-PATH entries 0 BGP community entries Neighbor V AS MsgRcvd MsgSent TblVer InQ OutQ Up/Down State/PfxRcd 10.154.4.33 4 65002 2092 2365 0 0 0 00:05:33 1 10.154.4.160 4 65002 2074 2346 0 0 0 00:14:14 1 Total number of neighbors 2 Verify ECMP routes: get router info routing-table bgp Routing table for VRF=0 B 192.168.100.10/32 [20/255] via 10.154.4.160 (recursive is directly connected, port2), 00:00:11, [1/0] [20/255] via 10.154.4.33 (recursive is directly connected, port2), 00:00:11, [1/0] Palo Alto Networks Configuration Palo Alto Networks firewalls provide enterprise-grade security with comprehensive routing capabilities. This section covers the minimum BGP configuration for peering with Customer Edge nodes. Note: This part is assuming that Palo Alto firewall is configured in the new "Advanced Routing Engine" mode. And we will use the logical-router named "default". Step 1: Configure ECMP parameters set network logical-router default vrf default ecmp enable yes set network logical-router default vrf default ecmp max-path 4 set network logical-router default vrf default ecmp algorithm ip-hash Step 2: Configure objects IPs and firewall rules for BGP peering set address CE1 ip-netmask 10.154.4.160/32 set address CE2 ip-netmask 10.154.4.33/32 set address-group BGP_PEERS static [ CE1 CE2 ] set address LOCAL_BGP_IP ip-netmask 10.154.4.119/32 set rulebase security rules ALLOW_BGP from service set rulebase security rules ALLOW_BGP to service set rulebase security rules ALLOW_BGP source LOCAL_BGP_IP set rulebase security rules ALLOW_BGP destination BGP_PEERS set rulebase security rules ALLOW_BGP application bgp set rulebase security rules ALLOW_BGP service application-default set rulebase security rules ALLOW_BGP action allow Step 3: Palo Alto Configuration Summary (CLI Format) set network routing-profile filters prefix-list ALLOWED_PREFIXES type ipv4 ipv4-entry 1 prefix entry network 192.168.100.0/24 set network routing-profile filters prefix-list ALLOWED_PREFIXES type ipv4 ipv4-entry 1 prefix entry greater-than-or-equal 32 set network routing-profile filters prefix-list ALLOWED_PREFIXES type ipv4 ipv4-entry 1 prefix entry less-than-or-equal 32 set network routing-profile filters prefix-list ALLOWED_PREFIXES type ipv4 ipv4-entry 1 action permit set network routing-profile filters prefix-list ALLOWED_PREFIXES description "Allow only m32 inside 192.168.100.0m24" set network routing-profile filters prefix-list DENY_ALL type ipv4 ipv4-entry 1 prefix entry network 0.0.0.0/0 set network routing-profile filters prefix-list DENY_ALL type ipv4 ipv4-entry 1 prefix entry greater-than-or-equal 0 set network routing-profile filters prefix-list DENY_ALL type ipv4 ipv4-entry 1 prefix entry less-than-or-equal 32 set network routing-profile filters prefix-list DENY_ALL type ipv4 ipv4-entry 1 action deny set network routing-profile filters prefix-list DENY_ALL description "Deny all prefixes" set network routing-profile bgp filtering-profile FILTER_INBOUND ipv4 unicast inbound-network-filters prefix-list ALLOWED_PREFIXES set network routing-profile bgp filtering-profile FILTER_OUTBOUND ipv4 unicast inbound-network-filters prefix-list DENY_ALL set network logical-router default vrf default bgp router-id 10.154.4.119 set network logical-router default vrf default bgp local-as 65001 set network logical-router default vrf default bgp install-route yes set network logical-router default vrf default bgp enable yes set network logical-router default vrf default bgp peer-group BGP_PEERS type ebgp set network logical-router default vrf default bgp peer-group BGP_PEERS address-family ipv4 ipv4-unicast-default set network logical-router default vrf default bgp peer-group BGP_PEERS filtering-profile ipv4 FILTER_INBOUND set network logical-router default vrf default bgp peer-group BGP_PEERS filtering-profile ipv4 FILTER_OUTBOUND set network logical-router default vrf default bgp peer-group BGP_PEERS peer CE1 peer-as 65002 set network logical-router default vrf default bgp peer-group BGP_PEERS peer CE1 local-address interface ethernet1/2 set network logical-router default vrf default bgp peer-group BGP_PEERS peer CE1 local-address ip svc-intf-ip set network logical-router default vrf default bgp peer-group BGP_PEERS peer CE1 peer-address ip 10.154.4.160 set network logical-router default vrf default bgp peer-group BGP_PEERS peer CE2 peer-as 65002 set network logical-router default vrf default bgp peer-group BGP_PEERS peer CE2 local-address interface ethernet1/2 set network logical-router default vrf default bgp peer-group BGP_PEERS peer CE2 local-address ip svc-intf-ip set network logical-router default vrf default bgp peer-group BGP_PEERS peer CE2 peer-address ip 10.154.4.33 Step 4: Verify BGP Configuration After committing the configuration, verify the BGP sessions and routes: Check BGP neighbor status: run show advanced-routing bgp peer status logical-router default Logical Router: default ============== Peer Name: CE2 BGP State: Established, up for 00:01:55 Peer Name: CE1 BGP State: Established, up for 00:00:44 Verify ECMP routes: run show advanced-routing route logical-router default Logical Router: default ========================== flags: A:active, E:ecmp, R:recursive, Oi:ospf intra-area, Oo:ospf inter-area, O1:ospf ext 1, O2:ospf ext 2 destination protocol nexthop distance metric flag tag age interface 0.0.0.0/0 static 10.154.1.1 10 10 A 01:47:33 ethernet1/1 10.154.1.0/24 connected 0 0 A 01:47:37 ethernet1/1 10.154.1.99/32 local 0 0 A 01:47:37 ethernet1/1 10.154.4.0/24 connected 0 0 A 01:47:37 ethernet1/2 10.154.4.119/32 local 0 0 A 01:47:37 ethernet1/2 192.168.100.10/32 bgp 10.154.4.33 20 255 A E 00:01:03 ethernet1/2 192.168.100.10/32 bgp 10.154.4.160 20 255 A E 00:01:03 ethernet1/2 total route shown: 7 Implementing CE Isolation for Maintenance As discussed in Part One, one of the key advantages of BGP-based deployments is the ability to gracefully isolate CE nodes for maintenance. Here’s how to implement this in practice. Isolation via F5 Distributed Cloud Console To isolate a CE node from receiving traffic, in your BGP peer object, edit the Peer and: Change the Outbound BGP routing policy from the one that is allowing the VIP prefixes to the one that is denying the VIP prefixes The CE will stop advertising its VIP routes, and within seconds (based on BGP timers), the upstream firewall will remove this CE from its ECMP paths. Verification During Maintenance On your firewall, verify the route withdrawal (in this case we are using a Fortigate firewall): get router info bgp summary VRF 0 BGP router identifier 10.154.4.119, local AS number 65001 BGP table version is 4 1 BGP AS-PATH entries 0 BGP community entries Neighbor V AS MsgRcvd MsgSent TblVer InQ OutQ Up/Down State/PfxRcd 10.154.4.33 4 65002 2070 2345 0 0 0 00:04:05 0 10.154.4.160 4 65002 2057 2326 0 0 0 00:12:46 1 Total number of neighbors 2 We are not receiving any prefixes anymore for the 10.154.4.33 peer. get router info routing-table bgp Routing table for VRF=0 B 192.168.100.10/32 [20/255] via 10.154.4.160 (recursive is directly connected, port2), 00:06:34, [1/0] End we have now only one path. Restoring the CE in the data path After maintenance is complete: Return to the BGP Peer configuration in the F5XC Console Restore the original export policy (permit VIP prefixes) Save the configuration On the upstream firewall, confirm that CE prefixes are received again and that ECMP paths are restored Conclusion This article has provided the complete implementation details for deploying BGP and ECMP with F5 Distributed Cloud Customer Edge nodes. You now have: A clear understanding of the architecture at both high and low levels Step-by-step instructions for configuring BGP in F5 Distributed Cloud Console Ready-to-use configurations for both Fortinet FortiGate and Palo Alto Networks firewalls Practical guidance for implementing graceful CE isolation for maintenance By combining the concepts from the first article with the practical configurations in this article, you can build a robust, highly available application delivery infrastructure that maximizes resource utilization, provides automatic failover, and enables zero-downtime maintenance operations. The BGP-based approach transforms your Customer Edge deployment from a traditional Active/Standby model into a full active topology where every node contributes to handling traffic, and any node can be gracefully removed for maintenance without impacting your users.Leveraging BGP and ECMP for F5 Distributed Cloud Customer Edge, Part One
Introduction Achieving high availability for application delivery while maintaining operational flexibility is a fundamental challenge for modern enterprises. When deploying F5 Distributed Cloud Customer Edge (CE) nodes in private data centers, on-premises environments or in some cases public cloud environments, the choice of how traffic reaches these nodes significantly impacts both service resilience and operational agility. This article explores how Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) combined with Equal-Cost Multi-Path (ECMP) routing provides an elegant solution for two critical operational requirements: High availability of traffic for load balancers running on Customer Edge nodes Easier maintenance and upgrades of CE nodes without service disruption By leveraging dynamic routing protocols instead of static configurations, you gain the ability to gracefully remove individual CE nodes from the traffic path, perform maintenance or upgrades, and seamlessly reintroduce them—all without impacting your application delivery services. Understanding BGP and ECMP Benefits for Customer Edge Deployments Why BGP and ECMP? Traditional approaches to high availability often rely on protocols like VRRP, which create Active/Standby topologies. While functional, this model leaves standby nodes idle and creates potential bottlenecks on the active node. The BGP with ECMP fundamentally changes this paradigm. The Power of ECMP Equal-Cost Multi-Path routing allows your network infrastructure to distribute traffic across multiple CE nodes simultaneously. When each CE node advertises the same VIP prefix via BGP, your upstream router learns multiple equal-cost paths and distributes traffic across all available nodes: This creates a true Active/Active topology where: All CE nodes actively process traffic Load is distributed across the entire set of CEs Failure of any single node automatically redistributes traffic to remaining nodes No manual intervention required for failover Key Benefits Benefit Description Active/Active/Active All nodes handle traffic simultaneously, maximizing resource utilization Automatic Failover When a CE stops advertising, its VIP, traffic automatically shifts to the remaining nodes Graceful Maintenance Withdraw BGP advertisements to drain traffic before maintenance Horizontal Scaling Add new CE nodes and they automatically join the traffic distribution Understanding Customer Edge VIP Architecture F5 Distributed Cloud Customer Edge nodes support a flexible VIP architecture that integrates seamlessly with BGP. Understanding how VIPs work is essential for proper BGP configuration. The Global VIP Each Customer Edge site can be configured with a Global VIP—a single IP address that serves as the default listener for all load balancers instantiated on that CE. Key characteristics: Configured at the CE site level in the F5 Distributed Cloud Console Acts as the default VIP for any load balancer that doesn’t have a dedicated VIP configured Advertised as a /32 prefix in the routing table To know: The Global VIP is NOT generated in the CE's routing table until at least one load balancer is configured on that CE This last point is particularly important: if you configure a Global VIP but haven't deployed any load balancers, the VIP won't be advertised via BGP. This prevents advertising unreachable services. For this article, we are going to use 192.168.100.0/24 as VIP subnet for all the examples. Load Balancer Dedicated VIPs Individual load balancers can be configured with their own Dedicated VIP, separate from the Global VIP. When a dedicated VIP is configured: The load balancer responds only to its dedicated VIP The load balancer does not respond to the Global VIP The dedicated VIP is also advertised as a /32 prefix Multiple load balancers can have different dedicated VIPs on the same CE This flexibility allows you to: Separate different applications on different VIPs Implement different routing policies per application Maintain granular control over traffic distribution VIP Summary VIP Type Scope Prefix Length When Advertised Global VIP Per CEs /32 When at least one LB is configured on CE Dedicated VIP Per load balancer /32 When the specific LB is configured BGP Filtering Best Practices Proper BGP filtering is essential for security and operational stability. This section covers the recommended filtering policies for both the upstream network device (firewall/router) and the Customer Edge nodes. Design Principles The filtering strategy follows the principle of explicit allow, implicit deny: Only advertise what is necessary Only accept what is expected Use prefix lists with appropriate matching for /32 routes Upstream Device Configuration (Firewall/Router) The device peering with your CE nodes should implement strict filtering: Inbound policy on Firewall/Router The firewall/router should accept only the CE VIP prefixes. In our example, all VIPs fall within 192.168.100.0/24: Why "or longer" (le 32)? Since VIPs are advertised as /32 prefixes, you need to match prefixes more specific than /24. The le 32 (less than or equal to 32) or "or longer" modifier ensures your filter matches the actual /32 routes while still using a manageable prefix range. Outbound policy on Firewall/Router By default, the firewall/router should not advertise any prefixes to the CE nodes. Customer Edge Configuration The CE nodes should implement complementary filtering: Outbound Policy CEs should advertise only their VIP prefixes. Since all VIPs on Customer Edge nodes are /32 addresses, your prefix filters must also follow the "or longer" approach. Inbound Policy CEs should not accept any prefixes from the upstream firewall/router. Filtering Summary Table Device Direction Policy Prefix Match Firewall/Router Inbound (from CE) Accept VIP range 192.168.100.0/24 le 32 Firewall/Router Outbound (to CE) Deny all N/A CE Outbound (to Router) Advertise VIPs only 192.168.100.0/24 le 32 CE Inbound (from Router) Deny all N/A Graceful CE Isolation for Maintenance One of the most powerful benefits of using BGP is the ability to gracefully remove a CE node from the traffic path for maintenance, upgrades, or troubleshooting. This section explains how to isolate a CE by manipulating its BGP route advertisements. The Maintenance Challenge When you need to perform maintenance on a CE node (OS upgrade, software update, reboot, troubleshooting), you want to: Stop new traffic from reaching the node Allow existing connections to complete gracefully Perform your maintenance tasks Reintroduce the node to the traffic pool With VRRP, this can require manual failover procedures. With BGP, you simply stop advertising VIP routes. Isolation Process Overview Step 1: Configure BGP Route Filtering on the CE To isolate a CE, you need to apply a BGP policy that prevents the VIP prefixes from being advertised or received. Where to Apply the Policy? There are two possible approaches to stop a CE from receiving traffic: On the BGP peer (firewall/router): Configure an inbound filter on the upstream device to reject routes from the specific CE you want to isolate. On the Customer Edge itself: Configure an outbound export policy on the CE to stop advertising its VIP prefixes. We recommend the F5 Distributed Cloud approach (option 2) for several reasons: Consideration Firewall/Router Approach F5 Distributed Cloud Approach Automation Requires separate automation for network devices Can be performed in the F5 XC Console or fully automated through API/Terraform infrastructure as a code approach. Team ownership Requires coordination with network team CE team has full autonomy Consistency Configuration syntax varies by vendor Single, consistent interface Audit trail Spread across multiple systems Centralized in F5 XC Console In many organizations, the team responsible for managing the Customer Edge nodes is different from the team managing the network infrastructure (firewalls, routers). By implementing isolation policies on the CE side, you eliminate cross-team dependencies and enable self-service maintenance operations. Applying the Filter The filter is configured through the F5 Distributed Cloud Console on the specific CE site. The filter configuration will be: Match the VIP prefix range (192.168.100.0/24 or longer) Set the action to Deny Apply to the outbound direction (export policy) Once applied, the CE stops advertising its VIP /32 routes to its BGP peers. Step 2: Perform Maintenance With the CE isolated from the traffic path, you can safely: Reboot the CE node Perform OS upgrades Apply software updates Existing long-lived connections to the isolated CE will eventually timeout, while new connections are automatically directed to the remaining CEs. Step 3: Reintroduce the CE in the data path After maintenance is complete: Remove or modify the BGP export filter to allow VIP advertisement The CE will begin advertising its VIP /32 routes again The upstream firewall/router will add the CE back to its ECMP paths Traffic will automatically start flowing to the restored CE Isolation Benefits Summary Aspect Benefit Zero-touch failover Traffic automatically shifts to the remaining CEs Controlled maintenance windows Isolate at your convenience No application impact Users experience no disruption Reversible Simply re-enable route advertisement to restore Per-node granularity Isolate individual nodes without affecting others Rolling Upgrade Strategy Using this isolation technique, you can implement rolling upgrades across your CEs: Rolling Upgrade Sequence: Step 1: Isolate CE1 → Upgrade CE1 → Put back CE1 in the data path Step 2: Isolate CE2 → Upgrade CE2 → Put back CE2 in the data path Throughout this process: • At least 1 CE is always handling traffic • No service interruption occurs • Each CE is validated before moving to the next Conclusion BGP with ECMP provides a robust, flexible foundation for high-availability F5 Distributed Cloud Customer Edge deployments. By leveraging dynamic routing protocols: Traffic is distributed across all active CE nodes, maximizing resource utilization Failover is automatic when a CE becomes unavailable Maintenance is graceful through controlled route withdrawal Scaling is seamless as new CEs automatically join the traffic distribution once they are BGP-peered The combination of proper BGP filtering (accepting only VIP prefixes, advertising only what’s necessary) and the ability to isolate individual CEs through route manipulation gives you complete operational control over your application delivery infrastructure. Whether you’re performing routine maintenance, emergency troubleshooting, or rolling out upgrades, BGP-based CE deployments ensure your applications remain available and your operations remain smooth.Overview of MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - TA0010 Exfiltration
Introduction In current times of cyber vulnerabilities, data theft is the ultimate objective with which attackers monetize their presence within a victim network. Once valuable information is identified and collected, the attackers can package sensitive data, bypass perimeter defences, and finalize the breach. Exfiltration (MITRE ATT&CK Tactic TA0010) represents a critical stage of the adversary lifecycle, where the adversaries focus on extracting data from the systems under their control. There are multiple ways to achieve this, either by using encryption and compression to avoid detection or utilizing the command-and-control channel to blend in with normal network traffic. To avoid this data loss, it is important for defenders to understand how data is transferred from any system in the network and the various transmission limits imposed to maintain stealth. This article walks through the most common Exfiltration techniques and how F5 solutions provide strong defense against them. T1020 - Automated Exfiltration To exfiltrate the data, adversaries may use automated processing after gathering the sensitive data during collection. T1020.001 – Traffic Duplication Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some devices for traffic analysis, which can be used by adversaries to automate data exfiltration. T1030 – Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration of the data in limited-size packets instead of whole files to avoid network data transfer threshold alerts. T1048 – Exfiltration over Alternative Protocol Stealing of data over a different protocol or channel other than the command-and-control channel created by the adversary. T1048.001 – Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Symmetric Encryption uses shared or the same keys/secrets on all the channels, which requires an exchange of the value used to encrypt and decrypt the data. This symmetric encryption leads to the implementation of Symmetric Cryptographic Algorithms, like RC4, AES, baked into the protocols, resulting in multiple layers of encryption. T1048.002 – Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Asymmetric encryption algorithms or public-key cryptography require a pair of cryptographic keys that can encrypt/decrypt data from the corresponding keys on each end of the channel. T1048.003 – Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol Instead of encryption, adversaries may obfuscate the routine channel without encryption within network protocols either by custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (base64, hex-code) and embedding the data. T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Adversaries can also steal the data over command-and-control channels and encode the data into normal communications. T1011 – Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration can also occur through a wired Internet connection, for example, a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection or Bluetooth. T1011.001 – Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Bluetooth can also be used to exfiltrate the data instead of a command-and-control channel in case the command-and-control channel is a wired Internet connection. T1052 – Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Under circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration occurs through a physical medium. Adversaries can exfiltrate data using a physical medium, for example, say a removable drive. Some examples of such media include external hard drives, USB drives, cellular phones, or MP3 players. T1052.001 – Exfiltration Over USB One such circumstance is where the adversary may attempt to exfiltrate data over a USB connected physical device, which can be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between other disconnected systems. T1567 – Exfiltration Over Web Services Adversaries may use legitimate external Web Service to exfiltrate the data instead of their command-and-control channel. T1567.001 – Exfiltration to Code Repository To exfiltrate the data to a code repository, rather than adversary’s command-and-control channel. These code repositories are accessible via an API over HTTPS. T1567.002 – Exfiltration to Cloud Storage To exfiltrate the data to a cloud storage, rather than their primary command-and-control channel. These cloud storage services allow storage, editing and retrieval of the exfiltrated data. T1567.003 – Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites To exfiltrate the data to a text storage site, rather than their primary command-and-control. These text storage sites, like pastebin[.]com, are used by developers to share code. T1567.004 – Exfiltration Over Webhook Adversaries also exfiltrate the data to a webhook endpoint, which are simple mechanisms for allowing a server to push data over HTTP/S to a client. The creation of webhooks is supported by many public services, such as Discord and Slack, that can be used by other services, like GitHub, Jira, or Trello. T1029 – Scheduled Transfer To exfiltrate the data, the adversaries may schedule data exfiltration only at certain times of the day or at certain intervals, blending the traffic patterns with general activity. T1537 – Transfer Data to Cloud Account Many a times, exfiltration of data can also be through transferring the data through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environment to another cloud account under adversary control on the same service. How F5 Can Help F5 offers a comprehensive suite of security solutions designed to safeguard applications and APIs across diverse environments, including cloud, edge, on-premises, and hybrid platforms. These solutions enable robust risk management to effectively mitigate and protect against MITRE ATT&CK Exfiltration threats, delivering advanced functionalities such as: Web Application Firewall (WAF): Available across all F5 products, the WAF is a flexible, multi-layered security solution that protects web applications from a wide range of threats. It delivers consistent defense, whether applications are deployed on-premises, in the cloud, or in hybrid environments. HTTPS Encryption: F5 provides robust HTTPS encryption to secure sensitive data in transit, ensuring protected communication between users and applications by preventing unauthorized access or data interception. Protecting sensitive data with Data Guard: F5's WAF Data Guard feature prevents sensitive data leakage by detecting and blocking exposure of confidential information, such as credit card numbers and PII. It uses predefined patterns and customizable policies to identify transmissions of sensitive data in application responses or inputs. This proactive mechanism secures applications against data theft and ensures compliance with regulatory standards. For more information, please contact your local F5 sales team. Conclusion Adversaries Exfiltration of data often aims to steal sensitive information by packaging it to evade detection, using methods such as compression or encryption. They may transfer the data through command-and-control channels or alternate paths while applying stealth techniques like transmission size limitations. To defend against these threats, F5 provides a layered approach with its advanced offerings. The Web Application Firewall (WAF) identifies and neutralizes malicious traffic aimed at exploiting application vulnerabilities. HTTPS encryption ensures secure data transmission, preventing unauthorized interception during the attack. Meanwhile, a data guard policy set helps detect and block exposure of confidential information, such as credit card numbers and PII. Together, these F5 solutions effectively counteract data exfiltration attempts and safeguard critical assets. Reference links MITRE | ATT&CK Tactic 10 – Exfiltration MITRE ATT&CK: What It Is, how it Works, Who Uses It and Why | F5 Labs MITRE ATT&CK®Overview of MITRE ATT&CK Tactic: TA0040 - Impact
This article focuses on the Impact Tactic, and the techniques adversaries use to manipulate, disrupt or damage the systems and data as they reach the final stage of an attack. This is one of the critical tactics, as it highlights the adverse effects attackers can cause, including exploitation, operational disruption, data destruction, or financial gainOverview of MITRE ATT&CK Tactic : TA0009 - Collection
This article is a continuation of our MITRE ATT&CK series. In this article, we focus on the Collection tactic, and the techniques adversaries use to gather, stage, and organize data from compromised systems before exfiltration. As attackers progress through an intrusion, Collection becomes critical for assembling sensitive files, credentials, screenshots, and other high‑value information that will fuel data theft, espionage, or destructive operations.Overview of MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - TA0011 Command and Control
Introduction In modern days, cyber violations, command and control are one of the main set of techniques with which attackers can gain control over the system within a victim’s network. Once control is gained over the system, the attackers can steal sensitive data, move laterally and blend into normal activity. Command and Control (MITRE ATT&CK Tactic TA0011) represents another critical stage of the adversary lifecycle, where the adversaries focus on communicating with the systems under their control. There are multiple ways to achieve this, either by mimicking the expected traffic flow to avoid detection or mimicking a normal behavior of the compromised system. To avoid the vulnerability, it is important for defenders to understand how communication is established to any system in the network and the various levels of stealth depending on the network structure. This article walks through the most common Command and Control techniques, and how F5 solutions provide strong defense against them. T1071 - Application Layer Protocol To communicate with the systems, the adversaries blend in with the existing traffic of the OSI layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering. The results of these commands will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and the server. T1071.001 - Web Services Adversaries mimic normal, expected HTTP/HTTPS traffic that carries web data to communicate with the systems under their control within a victim network. T1071.002 - File Transfer Protocol Protocols used to implement this technique includes SMB, FTP, FTPS and TFTP. The malicious data is concealed within the fields and headers of the packets produced from these protocols. T1071.003 - Mail Protocols Protocols carrying electronic mail such as SMTP/S, POP3/S, and IMAP is utilized by concealing the data within the email messages themselves. T1071.004 - DNS An administrative function in computer networking is served by the DNS Protocol, and DNS traffic may also be allowed even before the authentication of the network. Data is concealed in the fields and headers of these packets. T1071.005 - Publish/Subscribe Protocols For message distribution managed by a centralized broker, where Publish/Subscribe design utilizes MQTT, XMPP, AMQP and STOMP protocols. T1092 - Communication Through Removable Media On disconnected networks, command and control between the compromised hosts can be performed using removable media to execute commands from system to system. For a successful execution, both systems need to be compromised and need to replicate the removable media through lateral movement. T1659 - Content Injection Adversaries may also gain control over the victim’s system by injecting malicious content into the systems, by initially accessing the compromised data-transfer channels where the traffic can be manipulated or content can be injected. T1132 – Data Encoding Another technique to gain control over the system is by encoding the information using a standard data encoding system. Encoding includes the use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME or other binary-to-text encoding systems. T1132.001 - Standard Encoding Data Encoding schemes utilized for Standard Encoding includes ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64 and MIME. Data compression, such as gzip, are also an example of standard encoding. T1132.002 - Non-Standard Encoding Data Encoded in the message body of an HTTP request, such as modified Base64, is utilized as encoding schemes. T1001 – Data Obfuscation Obfuscation of command-and-control communication is hidden as part of this technique, making it even more difficult to discover or decipher. The focus is to make the communication less conspicuous and hidden, by incorporating several methods, which create below sub-techniques: T1001.001 - Junk Data Adversaries may abuse the protocols by adding random, meaningless junk data to the protocols, which can prevent trivial methods for decoding or deciphering the traffic. T1001.002 - Steganography Steganographic sub-techniques are used to transfer hidden digital data messages between systems, such as images or document files. T1001.003 - Protocol or Service Impersonation Adversaries can impersonate legitimate protocols or web services, to command-and-control traffic by blending in with legitimate network traffic. T1568 – Dynamic Resolution To establish connections dynamically to command-and-control the infrastructure and prevent any detections, adversaries use malware sharing a common algorithm with the infrastructure to dynamically adjust the parameters, such as a domain name, IP address, or port number. T1568.001 - Fast Flux DNS Fast Flux DNS is used to hide a command-and-control channel behind an array of rapidly changing IP addresses linked to a single domain resolution. T1568.002 - Domain Generation Algorithm Rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains, adversaries may utilize Domain Generation Algorithms to dynamically identify a destination domain for command-and-control traffic. T1568.003 - DNS Calculations Instead of utilizing the predetermined port number or the actual IP address, to dynamically determine which port and IP address to use, adversaries calculate on addresses returned in DNS results. T1573 – Encrypted Channel Adversaries rely on an encrypted algorithm channel to conceal command-and-control traffic rather than depending on any inherent protections by the communication protocols. T1573.001 - Symmetric Cryptography Symmetric Encryption Algorithms, such as AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish and RC4, use keys for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. T1573.002 - Asymmetric Cryptography Asymmetric cryptography, or public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public and one private. The sender encrypts the data with the receiver’s public key, and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. T1008 – Fallback Channels If the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible, then in order to maintain reliable command and control, adversaries use fallback communication channels. T1665 – Hide Infrastructure To hide and evade detection of the command-and-control infrastructure, adversaries identify and filter traffic from defensive tools, masking malicious domains to abuse the true destination, and otherwise hiding malicious contents to delay discovery and prolong the effectiveness of adversary infrastructure. T1105 – Ingress Tool Transfer Tools or other files transfer from an external adversary-controlled source into the compromised environment through controlled channels or protocols such as FTP. Also, adversaries may spread tools across the compromised environment as part of Lateral Movement. T1104 –Multi-Stage Channels To make detection more difficult, adversaries create multiple stages for command-and-control for several functions and different conditions. T1095 – Non-Application Layer Protocol To communicate between the host and command-and-control server, adversaries use non-application layer protocols, such as ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol), UDP (User Datagram Protocol), SOCKS (Secure Sockets), or SOL (Serial over LAN). T1571 – Non-Standard Port Adversaries communicate using port pairings that are not associated with the protocol, for, say, HTTPS over port 8088 or port 587 as opposed to the traditional port 443. T1572 – Protocol Tunneling Another approach to avoid detection/network filtering is to explicitly encapsulate a protocol within another protocol to enable routing of network packets which otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP. T1090 – Proxy To direct network communications to a command-and-control server to avoid direct connections to the infrastructure and override the existing actual communication paths to avoid suspicion and manage command-and-control communications inside a compromised environment, proxy act as an intermediary between the systems, such as, HTRAN, ZXProxy and ZXPortMap. T1090.001 - Internal Proxy Internal proxies are primarily used to conceal the actual destination while reducing the need for multiple connections to external systems, such as peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols. T1090.002 - External Proxy External proxy is used to mask the true destination of the traffic with port redirectors. Purchased infrastructure such as Virtual Private Servers which are the compromised systems outside the victim's network, are generally used for these purposes. T1090.003 - Multi-Hop Proxy Multiple proxies can also be chained together to abuse the actual traffic directions, making it more difficult for defenders to trace malicious activity and identify its source. T1090.004 - Domain Fronting Adversaries can even misuse Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) routing schemes to infect the actual HTTPS traffic destination or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. T1219 – Remote Access Tools To access the target system remotely and establish an interactive command-and-control within the network, remote access tools are used to bridge a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a CLI, or a hardware-level access (KVM, Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. T1219.001 - IDE Tunneling IDE Tunneling combines SSH, port forwarding, file sharing and letting the developers gain access as if they are local, by encapsulating the entire session and tunneling protocols alongside SSH, allowing the attackers to blend in with the actual development workflow. T1219.002 - Remote Desktop Software Adversary may access the target systems interactively through desktop support software, which provides a graphical interface to the remote adversary, such as VNC, Team Viewer, AnyDesk, LogMein, are commonly used legitimate support software. T1219.003 - Remote Access Hardware To access the legitimate hardware through commonly used legitimate tools, including IP-based keyboard, video, or mouse (KVM) devices such as TinyPilot and PiKVM. T1205 – Traffic Signaling Traffic signaling is used to hide open ports or any other malicious functionality to prolong command-and-control over the compromised system. T1205.001 - Port Knocking To hide the open ports for persistence, port knocking is included, to enable the port, in which the adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. T1205.002 - Socket filters Socket Filters are filters to allow or disallow certain types of data through the socket. If packets received by the network interface match the filtering criteria, desired actions are triggered. T1102 – Web Service Adversaries use an existing, legitimate external Web Service to transfer data to/from the compromised system. Also, web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, which gives adversaries an additional level of protection. T1102.001 - Dead Drop Resolver Adversaries post content called dead drop resolver on Web Services with encoded domains. These resolvers will redirect the victims to the infected domain/IP addresses. T1102.002 - Bidirectional Communication Once the system is infected, they can send the output back to the Web Service Channel. T1102.003 - One-Way Communication Compromised Systems may not return any output at all in a few cases where adversaries tend to send only one way instructions and do not want any response. How F5 Can Help F5 security solutions provide multiple different functionalities to secure and protect applications and APIs across various platforms including Clouds, Edge, On-prem or Hybrid. F5 supports risk management solutions mentioned below to effectively mitigate and protect against command-and-control techniques: Web Application Firewall (WAF): WAF is supported by all the F5 deployment modes, which is an adaptable, multi-layered security solution that defends web applications against a broad spectrum of threats, regardless of where they are deployed. API Security: F5 offers to ease the security of APIs with F5 Web Application and API Protection (WAAP) solutions, which protects API endpoints and other API dependencies by restricting the API definitions using specified rules and schemas. Rate-Limiting & Bot Protection: Brute-force, credential stuffing, and session attacks can be mitigated with configurable thresholds and automated bot protection. For more information, please contact your local F5 sales team. Conclusion Command and Control (C2) encompasses the methods adversaries employ to communicate with compromised systems within a target network. Adversaries disguise their C2 traffic as legitimate network activity to evade detection. To defend against Command-and-Control techniques, defenders should gain a clear understanding of implementation of robust segmentation and egress filtering using Web Application Firewalls (WAF) to limit communication channels and regularly monitor traffic for anomalous patterns and leverage threat intelligence to identify any C2 indicator. Additionally, employing endpoint detection and response (EDR) using API Security solutions can help detect and block malicious C2 activity at the host level. Reference links MITRE | ATT&CK Tactic 09 – Command and Control MITRE ATT&CK: What It Is, how it Works, Who Uses It and Why | F5 Labs MITRE ATT&CK®
