Breaking Down the Quantum Challenge: Why Post-Quantum Cryptography Can't Wait
The Quantum Challenge is Now Post-quantum cryptography represents the next steps of our digital security evolution. Sure, quantum systems capable of breaking current encryption may still be an a few years away, but those beginning their transition now will be well-positioned for when the crypto hits the fan. Nation-state adversaries and sophisticated private entities may be collecting data today hoping to decrypt it tomorrow so it's never to early to start solving the problem now. It's an excellent time to get ahead of the curve with quantum-resistant cryptography. What does this mean for your organization? Any sensitive data encrypted today using standard methods (RSA, ECDSA) could potentially become readable to future quantum-powered attackers. F5 Community Evangelist Chase Abbott discusses the real world implications of quantum computing, and how you can prepare and migrate to NIST-approved hybrid PQC standards. The transition to post-quantum cryptography represents a perfect opportunity to modernize enterprise PKI practices. Those of you that begin planning today have ample time to implement these changes thoughtfully and strategically, positioning yourselves as leaders in the next generation of cybersecurity; high fives all around. The Business Impact: Beyond Technical Considerations Regulatory and Compliance Pressure Government regulations across the globe are creating concrete deadlines for migration strategies: NSA CNSA 2.0 mandates quantum-resistant algorithms for classified systems by 2030 NIST has standardized post-quantum cryptography algorithms (FIPS 203, 204, 205) Industry regulations in finance, healthcare, and defense are beginning to incorporate quantum-safety requirements adhering to the update FIPS governance Your Quantum-Ready Roadmap: A Manageable Transition Phase 1: Assessment and Inventory Action items for leadership: Conduct cryptographic inventory across all systems and applications Identify critical data requiring long-term protection Assess vendor and third-party quantum readiness Establish quantum cryptography governance and budget allocation Phase 2: Pilot Implementation Strategic focus areas: Deploy quantum-resistant algorithms in non-critical environments Train IT and security teams on post-quantum cryptography Establish partnerships with quantum-ready technology vendors Begin updating security policies and procedures Phase 3: Production Migration Enterprise-wide deployment: Implement hybrid classical/quantum-resistant systems and software Migrate critical applications and PKI aggregation points to quantum-safe algorithms Update business continuity and disaster recovery plans Achieve full compliance with regulatory requirements as a priority over other systems Key Takeaways for Business Leaders Start planning now: The quantum threat timeline is uncertain, but the need for preparation is immediate Prioritize critical assets: Focus initial efforts on protecting your most sensitive and long-lived data Invest in capabilities: Quantum cryptography expertise will become as essential as any other IT security skill Engage stakeholders: Quantum security requires coordination across IT, compliance, procurement, and business units Monitor developments: Stay informed about quantum computing advances and regulatory updates Mahalo! Further Reading: Post Quantum Cryptography Coalition: PQC Migration Roadmap Post Quantum Cryptography Coalition: International PQC Requirements Post Quantum Cryptography Coalition: Inventory Workbook Essence of Linear Algebra Quantum Computing for the Very Curious Looking Glass Universe: Why I Left Quantum Computing Research US National Quantum Initiative
Decrypting tcpdumps in Wireshark without key files (such as when FIPS is in use)
Problem this snippet solves: This procedure allows you to decrypt a tcpdump made on the F5 without requiring access to the key file. Despite multiple F5 pages that claim to document this procedure, none of them worked for me. This solution includes the one working iRule I found, trimmed down to the essentials. The bash command is my own, which generates a file with all the required elements from the LTM log lines generated by the iRule, needed to decrypt the tcpdump in Wireshark 3.x. How to use this snippet: Upgrade Wireshark to Version 3+. Apply this iRule to the virtual server targeted by the tcpdump: rule sessionsecret { when CLIENTSSL_HANDSHAKE { log local0.debug "CLIENT_RANDOM [SSL::clientrandom] [SSL::sessionsecret]" log local0.debug "RSA Session-ID:[SSL::sessionid] Master-Key:[SSL::sessionsecret]" } when SERVERSSL_HANDSHAKE { log local0.debug "CLIENT_RANDOM [SSL::clientrandom] [SSL::sessionsecret]" log local0.debug "RSA Session-ID:[SSL::sessionid] Master-Key:[SSL::sessionsecret]" } } Run tcpdump on the F5 using all required hooks to grab both client and server traffic. tcpdump -vvni 0.0:nnnp -s0 host <ip> -w /var/tmp/`date +%F-%H%M`.pcap Conduct tests to reproduce the problem, then stop the tcpdump (Control C) and remove the iRule from the virtual server. Collect the log lines into a file. cat /var/log/ltm | grep -oe "RSA Session.*$" -e "CLIENT_RANDOM.*$" > /var/tmp/pms Copy the .pcap and pms files to the computer running Wireshark 3+. Reference the "pms" file in "Wireshark > Preferences > Protocols > TLS > (Pre)-Master-Secret log filename" (hence the pms file name). Ensure that Wireshark > Analyze > Enabled Protocols > "F5 Ethernet trailer" and "f5ethtrailer" boxes are checked. Open the PCAP file in Wireshark; it will be decrypted. IMPORTANT TIP: Decrypting any large tcpdump brings a workstation to its knees, even to the point of running out of memory. A much better approach is to temporarily move the pms file, open the tcpdump in its default encrypted state, identify the problem areas using filters or F5 TCP conversation and export them to a much smaller file. Then you can move the pms file back to the expected location and decrypt the smaller file quickly and without significant impact on the CPU and memory. Code : Please refer to the "How to use this Code Snippet" section above. This procedure was successfully tested in 12.1.2 with a full-proxy virtual server. Tested this on version: 12.1Moving FIPS keys from 8900 to 10200
Hello, According to DOC, it seems likely FIPS-2 keys sync is not possible between 8900 and 10200 due to FIPS hardware difference (no exact platform mention, but it's close enough): https://support.f5.com/kb/en-us/products/big-ip_ltm/manuals/product/bigip-platform-fips-administration.pdf?sr=32944290 Important: Because of hardware differences, it is not possible to synchronize security domains between the newer platforms(10000/11000/11050 platforms) and older platforms (6900/8900platforms). Q: Assuming identical software version and security world configuration - is there an alternate way to move FIPS keys from 8900 to 10200? Regards,
Unable to import SSL Keys in FIPS
Hi F5 Community ! I have to upgrade hadware of a LTM cluster. FIPS is enabled on this platforms. I have activated the FIPS on the new cluster. When i try to import SSL keys on the new BIGIP from the old cluster, every keys in FIPS mode can not be imported on the new appliance. I 'm getting this following message on the GUI and in SSH: Dec 7 12:29:22 Fips-1 err mcpd[7623]: 010713e4:3: FIPS subsystem reported error while attempting file object operation: import_key_file: failed to open key file(s) /config/ssl/ssl.cavfips/.exp, /config/ssl/ssl.cavfips/.exp, /config/ssl/ssl.cavfips/.key.exp. Dec 7 12:29:22 Fips-1 err mcpd[7623]: 01070712:3: Caught configuration exception (0), unable to import key (/Common/****.key) in FIPS card. Did you meet this type of error ? And if yes what is the workaround. Thanks for your help B.
