Evaluating common integrations between Azure AD and APM - Part 1
Identity as a Service providers (IDaaS) are exploding in adoption rate, Azure AD being one that I encounter most frequently. Given that, I am often asked what options are available for integration between Azure AD and BIG-IP APM, including implementation steps. In this 4-part series, I will first summarize and contrast the integration options, including the pros and cons of each, then in each subsequent article we will dive into the requirements and implementation details for each method of integration. Please note that there may be additional integrations and authentication flows, this article series is however only covering 3 in particular. The 3 authentication flows we will discuss in this article series are: Network Policy Server (NPS) Azure MFA extension** SAML federation ROPC Oauth grant authentication flow **This replaces the legacy integration with Azure MFA Server which is no longer supported: https://devcentral.f5.com/s/articles/heres-how-i-did-it-integrating-azure-mfa-with-the-big-ip-19634 Method 1: Azure NPS Extension The method we will be examining in the first article of this series is integration between BIG-IP APM and Azure AD via a Network Policy Server (NPS) extension. This method is used to achieve Azure AD Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) capabilities for user authentication which is most often the primary business requirement for integration. User authentication requests are sent from BIG-IP APM to the NPS server where the NPS extension for Azure MFA will then inform Azure AD to initiate the MFA challenge. The NPS extension for Azure MFA does NOT support any conditional access policies, as the source of every authentication request from Azure AD's perspective will be that of the NPS server itself.By using this method, we can capture the username and password on the APM logon page for seamless password-based Single Sign-On (SSO), plus we get the MFA capabilities of Azure AD, truly the best of both worlds. Architecture and authentication flow: User requests a resource protected by BIG-IP APM and is presented with an APM logon page where they enter their credentials. BIG-IP captures these credentials as session variables and sends them to the predefined RADIUS AAA server, in this case that would be the NPS server with Azure MFA extension. The RADIUS server first validates user credentials, if successful then the 'AzureMFA' extension will notify Azure AD of the incoming user authentication request and initiate MFA challenge. The user is challenged using the chosen MFA method. Azure AD notifies the NPS extension of the MFA challenge result. The NPS extension responds back to the BIG-IP with a RADIUS response based on the outcome of the MFA challenge. If successful, the user is granted access to the protected application, webtop or resource. Pros: BIG-IP APM can capture both the username and password as session variables as part of the logon process, making password-based Single Sign-on (SSO) viable Requires no federation between BIG-IP and Azure AD Cons: Requires external infrastructure dependencies (Redundant NPS infrastructure) Azure AD Conditional access policy support is limited ***This however can be augmented with conditional policies on BIG-IP APM Method 2: SAML federation with Azure AD SAML is a well understood and adopted standard for federation between identity domains. By federating BIG-IP APM with Azure AD as the Identity Provider (IDP) we direct all user authentication requests to Azure AD. This means that all authentication features supported by Azure AD, such as Conditional Access Policies and MFA will work as intended, as the user is interfacing directly with Azure AD during authentication. By its very design, SAML federation limits the SAML Service Provider (SP), which is the role of BIG-IP APM in this case, from receiving the user's password as part of the authentication flow; this means we must use passwordless Single Sign-On (SSO) methods such as Kerberos or SAML for seamless access to applications and resources. Architecture and authentication flow: **Above depicts SP-initiated SAML authentication flow where BIG-IP APM is the Service Provider (SP) and Azure AD is the (IDP) User requests a resource protected by BIG-IP APM. APM responds to the user with a SAML request and directs them to the IDP (Azure AD). The user browser relays the SAML request to Azure AD. It is at this point that the user authenticates DIRECTLY with Azure AD. Once successfully authenticated (including MFA, if applicable), Azure AD responds to the user with a SAML response containing an Assertion and directs the user back to the BIG-IP APM. The user browser relays the SAML response to the BIG-IP and is provided access to the protected application or resource. Pros: Widely deployed and understood + very easy implementation Full support for conditional access policies and authentication functionality in Azure AD Cons: BIG-IP APM will not receive a password as part of the logon process - this means that password-based Single Sign-On (SSO) will not work out of the box ***We will explore options to get around this further in Article #3 Method 3: ROPC Oauth Grant The Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) grant allows an application or intermediary to sign a user in by directly handling their password. Put simply, BIG-IP APM first captures the user credentials with a standard logon page and then validates them with Azure AD directly. This authentication flow may resemble that of traditional authentication flows such as Active Directory domain controllers or RADIUS servers. In most cases, ROPC grant flows are not highly recommended, as the user credentials are provided to the Oauth 2.0 client (BIG-IP) directly instead of to the Authorization Server (Azure AD) which arguably introduces additional risk.By using this method however, we capture the username and password on the APM logon page for password-based Single Sign-On (SSO) without requiring any on-premises infrastructure such as domain controllers or AAA servers to handle authentication. Architecture and authentication flow: User requests a resource protected by BIG-IP APM and is presented with an APM logon page where credentials are input. BIG-IP captures these credentials as session variables and sends them to the predefined Oauth Authorization Server (AS), Azure AD. If the credentials are correct, Azure AD responds to the BIG-IP with an ID token, Access token and optionally a refresh token. If successful, the user is granted access to the protected application or resource. Pros: BIG-IP APM can capture both the username and password as session variables as part of the logon process, making password-based Single Sign-on (SSO) viable Requires no on-premises infrastructure such as Active Directory or RADIUS/NPS for authentication Cons: Not recommended by Microsoft for Security reasons. No direct support for Azure AD MFA No support for Azure AD conditional access policies ***This however can be augmented with conditional policies on BIG-IP APM Summary In the first article of this series we reviewed 3 unique options for integration between BIG-IP APM and Azure AD. We also described the authentication flow as well as the pros and cons for each method. In each subsequent article, we will dive deeper into these three methods, providing detailed implementation instructions, caveats, and requirements as well as some anecdotal wisdom from the field!1.2KViews7likes4CommentsVDI Gateway Federation with BIG-IP
Today let’s look at how F5 BIGIP APM can consolidate, secure and federate all the core VDI gateways technology. For instance, if an organization decides move from one VDI technology to another or if you’re consolidating VDI technologies, BIG-IP can help. On the BIG-IP we’ve set up three VDI environments. Microsoft RDS/RDP with a broker authentication server, VMware Horizon and Citrix XenApp. With only a corporate account, a user can authenticate to all of them as needed and access all available desktop content. In this example, we connect to the BIG-IP APM. This is the default view. And here we’ve put some advanced security fields like OTP or multifactor authentication for instance. So here we’d use our username and password and for additional security we'll choose a secondary grid. By default, a grid is not generally available from any of the VDI vendors. When we select grid, BIG-IP APM will present a grid for a PIN entry. This is provided through a partnership with Gemalto. BIG-IP is connecting to Gemalto servers to present the grid to the user. We then enter our confidential PIN. Upon auth, we’re presented with our BIG-IP APM Webtop and BIG-IP did the necessary single sign on for all the VDI technologies and environments assigned to us. With a single, multifactor authentication we’re able to gain access to our federated BIG-IP Webtop and select the specific VDI resource we need. From an administrative view, here is the full Visual Policy Editor (VPE) for the overall solution. This also shows where the OTP/Grid is if you follow the Host FQDN path. And here are the specific inspections and criteria for the VDI scenario. You can see a path for each VDI vendor along with specific inspections and actions depending on the situation. Special thanks to F5 Sr. Security SE Matthieu Dierick for the explanation and you can watch the demo video. ps752Views0likes6CommentsEnabling SharePoint 2013 Hybrid Search with the BIG-IP
Over my past several blog posts, I’ve talked about federating our on-premise environments with Office 365. Now, that we have that handled, (it’s handled right?) let’s talk about another lesser known piece of the puzzle; hybrid SharePoint environments. With federation and SSO between on-premise applications and Office 365 provided by the BIG-IP and APM, (Access Policy Manager) users can move seamlessly between their on-premise SharePoint and SharePoint online as if they were one integrated application. Cool right? But what about when I need to search for content across environments? Funny I should ask. That’s what this post is all about. Microsoft actually has this figured out. The only piece missing is a device that can act as the reverse proxy for the on-premise environment and facilitate the secure connection between the two environments. Hmmm… What could we use? Configuring Hybrid Search for SharePoint 2013 This post covers the pieces required to use the BIG-IP as a reverse-proxy for a hybrid SharePoint search deployment. For guidance on configuring both your on-premise SharePoint 2013 and SharePoint Online environments refer to the Hybrid for SharePoint 2013 guidance provided by Microsoft. It’s quite thorough and, to be honest a little daunting. Currently, Microsoft’s SharePoint 2013 hybrid capabilities are intended to let users in Office 365 access and search across certain content from an on premises SharePoint farm. For detailed information on architectural recommendations and limitations take a look at the blog post from Microsoft architect, Steve Peschka. Client Certificate authentication is utilized to allow secure access for hybrid search, (SharePoint content located both on-premise and in the cloud) from Office 365 environment. To accomplish this a target application is configured in the SharePoint Online Secure Store where a client certificate, (issued by a public root certificate authority). Figure 1 – SharePoint Online Secure Store & Target application Configuring the BIG-IP for Client Certificate Authentication The following configuration was tested by F5 in collaboration with the Office365 product team. The testing was conducted at the Microsoft Technology Center in Irvine where an environment was provided for hybrid enterprise search & LOB scenarios between O365 and on-premise SharePoint farms. We collaborated with the MTC’s expert staff and took advantage of the alliance partnership between Microsoft and F5, whose solutions were made available as part of their engagement. For the purposes of hybrid search, the BIG-IP and LTM, (Local Traffic Manager) acts as a reverse proxy providing a secure Internet facing endpoint for connections from the SharePoint Online environment. The deployment of SharePoint behind the BIG-IP can either be configured manually or via the BIG-IP iApp configuration. Once SharePoint 2013 has been successfully deployed it is simple matter of modifying the virtual server’s Client SSL Profile. Figure 2 – SharePoint 2013 On-Premise Virtual Server The SSL Profile is configured to require a client certificate for successful access. Additionally, the certificate must be issued from the specified certificate authority whose CA certificate is installed on the BIG-IP. In the example below, (Figure 3) the client certificate presented must be issued by StartCom, Ltd. Figure 3 – Client SSL Profile with Client Authentication Required As long as the certificate installed and configured in the SharePoint Online Secure Store is valid and issued by the appropriate certificate authority, users in O365 will be able to search for and receive results from the on-premise SharePoint environment. Enhancing Security with iRules Ok, the above configuration provides security to the hybrid connection via client certificates. However, it’s still vulnerable. As previously noted, the certificate used must be issued by a public root certificate authority. While this is good, this does not guarantee that the certificate presented is the actual certificate configured in the SharePoint Online environment. Merely, it just guarantees that the certificate was issued from the same place, (StartCom, Ltd. in our example). Fortunately, there’s an iRule for that! The iRule provided below examines the client certificate provided and ensures that the serial number of the certificate matches the SharePoint Online configured certificate. This ensures that not only is the presented certificate issued from a specific and valid certificate authority, but also ensures that the certificate itself is an exact match. Figure 4 – Granular_Cert_Verification iRule validating the Client Certificate Serial Number 1: when CLIENTSSL_CLIENTCERT { 2: 3: # Check if client provided a cert 4: if {[SSL::cert 0] eq ""}{ 5: 6: # Reset the connection 7: reject 8: 9: } else { 10: 11: #Example Subject SN: 01 ED 51 12: set subject_sn [X509::serial_number [SSL::cert 0]] 13: log "Client Certificate Received: $subject_sn" 14: #Check if the client certificate contains the correct serial number 15: if {$subject_sn contains "0c e4 11"} { 16: #Accept the client cert 17: log "Client Certificate Accepted: $subject_sn" 18: } else { 19: log "No Matching Client Certificate Was Found Using: $subject_sn" 20: reject 21: } 22: } 23: } Figure 5 – Client Certificate Subject Name Figure 6 – iRule Assigned to Virtual Server That’s It! Not too bad huh? Of course this is the easy part. We still need to ensure that we have properly configured both environments, (on-premise and Office 365) to enable the hybrid search functionality. Accomplishing that is a little more tricky, but definitely doable. Be sure to refer to the links below for information from Microsoft on how to set this up. In addition, check out Steve Peschka’s blog posts for information. Additional Links: Hybrid for SharePoint Server 2013 Configure hybrid Search for SharePoint Server 2013 F5 and SharePoint 2013 – Deployment Guidance Architecture Design Recommendation for SharePoint 2013 Hybrid Search Features – Steve Peschka Blog Big-IP and ADFS Part 1 – “Load balancing the ADFS Farm”1.7KViews0likes1CommentBig-IP and ADFS Part 2 - APM: An Alternative to the ADFS Proxy
So let’s talk Application Delivery Controllers, (ADC). In part one of this series we deployed both an internal ADFS farm as well as a perimeter ADFS proxy farm using the Big-IP’s exceptional load balancing capabilities to provide HA and scalability. But there’s much more the Big-IP can provide to the application delivery experience. Here in part 2 we’ll utilize the Access Policy Manager, (APM) module as a replacement for the ADFS Proxy layer. To illustrate this approach, we’ll address one of the most common use cases; ADFS deployment to federate with and enable single sign-on to Microsoft Office 365 web-based applications. The purpose of the ADFS Proxy server is to receive and forward requests to ADFS servers that are not accessible from the Internet. As noted in part one, for high availability this typically requires a minimum of two proxy servers as well as an additional load balancing solution, (F5 Big-IPs of course). By implementing APM on the F5 appliance(s) we not only eliminate the need for these additional servers but, by implementing pre-authentication at the perimeter and advanced features such as client-side checks, (antivirus validation, firewall verification, etc.), arguably provide for a more secure deployment. Assumptions and Product Deployment Documentation - This deployment scenario assumes the reader is assumed to have general administrative knowledge of the BIG-IP LTM module and basic understanding of the APM module. If you want more information or guidance please check out F5’s support site, ASKF5. The following diagram shows a typical internal and external client access AD FS to Office 365 Process Flow, (used for passive-protocol, “web-based” access). Both clients attempts to access the Office 365 resource; Both clients are redirected to the resource’s applicable federation service, (Note: This step may be skipped with active clients such as Microsoft Outlook); Both client are redirected to their organization’s internal federation service; The AD FS server authenticates the client to active directory; * Internal clients are load balanced directly to an ADFS server farm member; and * External clients are: * Pre-authenticated to Active Directory via APM’s customizable sign-on page; *Authenticated users are directed to an AD FS server farm member. The ADFS server provides the client with an authorization cookie containing the signed security token and set of claims for the resource partner; The client connects to the Microsoft Federation Gateway where the token and claims are verified. The Microsoft Federation Gateway provides the client with a new service token; and The client presents the new cookie with included service token to the Office 365 resource for access. Virtual Servers and Member Pool – Although all users, (both internal and external) will access the ADFS server farm via the same Big-IP(s), the requirements and subsequent user experience differ. While internal authenticated users are load balanced directly to the ADFS farm, external users must first be pre-authenticated, (via APM) prior to be allowed access to an ADFS farm member. To accomplish this two, (2) virtual servers are used; one for the internal access and another dedicated for external access. Both the internal and external virtual servers are associated with the same internal ADFS server farm pool. INTERNAL VIRTUAL SERVER – Refer to Part 1 of this guidance for configuration settings for the internal ADFS farm virtual server. EXTERNAL VIRTUAL SERVER – The configuration for the external virtual server is similar to that of the virtual server described in Part 1 of this guidance. In addition an APM Access Profile, (see highlighted section and settings below) is assigned to the virtual server. APM Configuration – The following Access Policy Manager, (APM) configuration is created and associated with the external virtual server to provide for pre-authentication of external users prior to being granted access to the internal ADFS farm. As I mentioned earlier, the APM module provides advanced features such as client-side checks and single sign-on, (SSO) in addition to pre-authentication. Of course this is just the tip of the iceberg. Take a deeper look at client-side checks at AskF5. AAA SERVER - The ADFS access profile utilizes an Active Directory AAA server. ACCESS POLICY - The following access policy is associated with the ADFS access profile. * Prior to presenting the logon page client machines are checked for the existence of updated antivirus. If the client lacks either antivirus software or does not have updated, (within 30 days) virus definitions the user is redirected to a mitigation site. * An AD query and simple iRule is used to provide single-url OWA access for both on-premise and Office365 Exchange users. SSO CONFIGURATION - The ADFS access portal uses an NTLM v1 SSO profile with multiple authentication domains, (see below). By utilizing multiple SSO domains, clients are required to authenticate only once to gain access to both hosted applications such as Exchange Online and SharePoint Online as well as on-premise hosted applications. To facilitate this we deploy multiple virtual servers, (ADFS, Exchange, SharePoint) utilizing the same SSO configuration. CONNECTIVITY PROFILE – A connectivity profile based upon the default connectivity profile is associated with the external virtual server. Whoa! That’s a lot to digest. But if nothing else, I hope this inspires you to further investigate APM and some of the cool things you can do with the Big-IP beyond load balancing. Additional Links: Big-IP and ADFS Part 1 – “Load balancing the ADFS Farm” Big-IP and ADFS Part 3 - “ADFS, APM, and the Office 365 Thick Clients” BIG-IP Access Policy Manager (APM) Wiki Home - DevCentral Wiki Latest F5 Information F5 News Articles F5 Press Releases F5 Events F5 Web Media F5 Technology Alliance Partners F5 YouTube Feed4.2KViews0likes7CommentsBig-IP and ADFS Part 4 – “What about Single Sign-Out?”
Why stop at 3 when you can go to 4? Over the past few posts on this ever-expanding topic, we’ve discussed using ADFS to provide single sign-on access to Office 365. But what about single sign-out? A customer turned me onto Tristan Watkins’ blog post that discusses the challenges of single sign-out for browser-based, (WS-Federation) applications when fronting ADFS with a reverse-proxy. It’s a great blog post and covers the topic quite well so I won’t bother re-hashing it here. However, I would definitely recommend reading his post if you want a deeper dive. Here’s the sign-out process: 1. User selects ‘Sign Out’ or ‘Sign in as Different User’, (if using SharePoint Online); 2. The user is signed out of the application; 3. The user is redirected to the ADFS sign out page; and 4. The user is redirected back to the Microsoft Federation Gateway and the user’s tokens are invalidated. In a nutshell, claims-unaware proxies, (Microsoft ISA and TMG servers for example) are unable to determine when this process has occurred and subsequently the proxy session remains active. This in turn will allow access to ADFS, (and subsequently Office 365) without be prompted for new credentials, (not good!). Here’s where I come clean with you dear readers. While the F5 Big-IP with APM is a recognized replacement for the AD FS 2.0 Federation Server Proxy this particular topic was not even on my radar. But now that it is…… Single Sign-Out with Access Policy Manager You’ll may have noticed that although the Big-IP with APM is a claims-unaware proxy I did not include it in the list above. Why you ask? Well, although the Big-IP is currently “claims-unaware”, it certainly is “aware” of traffic that passes through. With the ability to analyze traffic as it flows from both the client and the server side, the Big-IP can look for triggers and act upon them. In the case of the ADFS sign-out process, we’ll use the MSISSignOut cookie as our trigger to terminate the proxy session accordingly. During the WS-Federation sign out process, (used by browser-based applications) the MSISSignOut cookie is cleared out by the ADFS server, (refer to the HttpWatch example below). Once this has been completed, we need to terminate the proxy session. Fortunately, there’s an iRule for that. The iRule below analyzes the HTTP response back from the ADFS server and keys off of the MSISSignOut cookie. If the cookie’s value has been cleared, the APM session will be terminated. To allow for a clean sign-out process with the Microsoft Federation Gateway, the APM session termination is delayed long enough for the ADFS server to respond. Now, APM’s termination can act in concert with the ADFS sign-out process. 1: when HTTP_RESPONSE { 2: # Review server-side responses for reset of WS-Federation sign-out cookie - MSISSignOut. 3: # If found assign ADFS sign-out session variable and close HTTP connection 4: if {[HTTP::header "Set-Cookie"] contains "MSISSignOut=;"} { 5: ACCESS::session data set session.user.adfssignout 1 6: HTTP::close 7: } 8: } 9: 10: when CLIENT_CLOSED { 11: # Remove APM session if ADFS sign-out variable exists 12: if {[ACCESS::session data get session.user.adfssignout] eq 1} { 13: after 5000 14: ACCESS::session remove 15: } 16: } What? Another iRule? Actually, the above snippet can be combined with the iRule we implemented in Part 3 creating a single iRule addressing all the ADFS/Office 365 scenarios. 1: when HTTP_REQUEST { 2: # For external Lync client access all external requests to the 3: # /trust/mex URL must be routed to /trust/proxymex. Analyze and modify the URI 4: # where appropriate 5: HTTP::uri [string map {/trust/mex /trust/proxymex} [HTTP::uri]] 6: 7: # Analyze the HTTP request and disable access policy enforcement WS-Trust calls 8: if {[HTTP::uri] contains "/adfs/services/trust"} { 9: ACCESS::disable 10: } 11: 12: # OPTIONAL ---- To allow publishing of the federation service metadata 13: if {[HTTP::uri] ends_with "FederationMetadata/2007-06/FederationMetadata.xml"} { 14: ACCESS::disable 15: } 16: } 17: 18: when HTTP_RESPONSE { 19: # Review serverside responses for reset of WS-Federation sign-out cookie - MSISSignOut. 20: # If found assign ADFS sign-out session variable and close HTTP connection 21: if {[HTTP::header "Set-Cookie"] contains "MSISSignOut=;"} { 22: ACCESS::session data set session.user.adfssignout 1 23: HTTP::close 24: } 25: } 26: 27: when CLIENT_CLOSED { 28: # Remove APM session if ADFS sign-out variable exists 29: if {[ACCESS::session data get session.user.adfssignout] eq 1} { 30: after 5000 31: ACCESS::session remove 32: } 33: } Gotta love them iRules! That’s all for now. Additional Links: Big-IP and ADFS Part 1 – “Load balancing the ADFS Farm” Big-IP and ADFS Part 2 – “APM–An Alternative to the ADFS Proxy” Big-IP and ADFS Part 3 – “ADFS, APM, and the Office 365 Thick Clients” BIG-IP Access Policy Manager (APM) Wiki Home - DevCentral Wiki AD FS 2.0 - Interoperability with Non-Microsoft Products MS TechNet - AD FS: How to Invoke a WS-Federation Sign-Out Tristan Watkins - Office 365 Single Sign Out with ISA or TMG as the ADFS Proxy Technorati Tags: load balancer,ADFS,Office365,active directory,F5,federation,exchange,microsoft,network,blog,APM,LTM,Coward,SSO,single sign-on,single sign-out957Views0likes2CommentsBig-IP and ADFS Part 1 – “Load balancing the ADFS Farm”
Just like the early settlers who migrated en masse across the country by wagon train along the Oregon Trail, enterprises are migrating up into the cloud. Well okay, maybe not exactly like the early settlers. But, although there may not be a mass migration to the cloud, it is true that more and more enterprises are moving to cloud-based services like Office 365. So how do you provide seamless, or at least relatively seamless, access to resources outside of the enterprise? Well, one answer is federation and if you are a Microsoft shop then the current solution is ADFS, (Active Directory Federation Services). The ADFS server role is a security token service that extends the single sign-on, (SSO) experience for directory-authenticated clients to resources outside of the organization’s boundaries. As cloud-based application access and federation in general becomes more prevalent, the role of ADFS has become equally important. Below, is a typical deployment scenario of the ADFS Server farm and the ADFS Proxy server farm, (recommended for external access to the internally hosted ADFS farm). Warning…. If the ADFS server farm is unavailable then access to federated resources will be limited if not completely inaccessible. To ensure high-availability, performance, and scalability the F5 Big-IP with LTM, (Local Traffic Manager), can be deployed to load balance the ADFS and ADFS Proxy server farms. Yes! When it comes to a load balancing and application delivery, F5’s Big-IP is an excellent choice. Just had to get that out there. So let’s get technical! Part one of this blog series addresses deploying and configuring the Big-IP’s LTM module for load balancing the ADFS Server farm and Proxy server farm. In part two I’m going to show how we can greatly simplify and improve this deployment by utilizing Big-IP’s APM, (Access Policy Manager) so stay tuned. Load Balancing the Internal ADFS Server Farm Assumptions and Product Deployment Documentation - This deployment scenario assumes an ADFS server farm has been installed and configured per the deployment guide including appropriate trust relationships with relevant claims providers and relying parties. In addition, the reader is assumed to have general administrative knowledge of the BIG-IP LTM module. If you want more information or guidance please check out F5’s support site, ASKF5. The following diagram shows a typical, (albeit simplified) process flow of the Big-IP load balanced ADFS farm. Client attempts to access the ADFS-enabled external resource; Client is redirected to the resource’s applicable federation service; Client is redirected to its organization’s internal federation service, (assuming the resource’s federation service is configured as trusted partner); The ADFS server authenticates the client to active directory; The ADFS server provides the client with an authorization cookie containing the signed security token and set of claims for the resource partner; The client connects to the resource partner federation service where the token and claims are verified. If appropriate, the resource partner provides the client with a new security token; and The client presents the new authorization cookie with included security token to the resource for access. VIRTUAL SERVER AND MEMBER POOL – A virtual server, (aka VIP) is configured to listen on port 443, (https). In the event that the Big-IP will be used for SSL bridging, (decryption and re-encryption), the public facing SSL certificate and associated private key must be installed on the BIG-IP and associated client SSL profile created. However, as will be discussed later SSL bridging is not the preferred method for this type of deployment. Rather, SSL tunneling, (pass-thru) will be utilized. ADFS requires Transport Layer Security and Secure Sockets Layer (TLS/SSL). Therefore pool members are configured to listen on port 443, (https). LOAD BALANCING METHOD – The ‘Least Connections (member)’ method is utilized. POOL MONITOR – To ensure the AD FS service is responding as well as the web site itself, a customized monitor can be used. The monitor ensures the AD FS federation service is responding. Additionally, the monitor utilizes increased interval and timeout settings. The custom https monitor requires domain credentials to validate the service status. A standard https monitor can be utilized as an alternative. PERSISTENCE – In this AD FS scenario, clients establish a single TCP connection with the AD FS server to request and receive a security token. Therefore, specifying a persistence profile is not necessary. SSL TUNNELING, (preferred method) – When SSL tunneling is utilized, encrypted traffic flows from the client directly to the endpoint farm member. Additionally, SSL profiles are not used nor are SSL certificates required to be installed on the Big-IP. In this instance Big-IP profiles requiring packet analysis and/or modification, (ex. compression, web acceleration) will not be relevant. To further boost the performance, a Fast L4 virtual server will be used. Load Balancing the ADFS Proxy Server Farm Assumptions and Product Deployment Documentation - This deployment scenario assumes an ADFS Proxy server farm has been installed and configured per the deployment guide including appropriate trust relationships with relevant claims providers and relying parties. In addition, the reader is assumed to have general administrative knowledge of the BIG-IP LTM module. If you want more information or guidance please check out F5’s support site, ASKF5. In the previous section we configure load balancing for an internal AD FS Server farm. That scenario works well for providing federated SSO access to internal users. However, it does not address the need of the external end-user who is trying to access federated resources. This is where the AD FS proxy server comes into play. The AD FS proxy server provides external end-user SSO access to both internal federation-enabled resources as well as partner resources like Microsoft Office 365. Client attempts to access the AD FS-enabled internal or external resource; Client is redirected to the resource’s applicable federation service; Client is redirected to its organization’s internal federation service, (assuming the resource’s federation service is configured as trusted partner); The AD FS proxy server presents the client with a customizable sign-on page; The AD FS proxy presents the end-user credentials to the AD FS server for authentication; The AD FS server authenticates the client to active directory; The AD FS server provides the client, (via the AD FS proxy server) with an authorization cookie containing the signed security token and set of claims for the resource partner; The client connects to the resource partner federation service where the token and claims are verified. If appropriate, the resource partner provides the client with a new security token; and The client presents the new authorization cookie with included security token to the resource for access. VIRTUAL SERVER AND MEMBER POOL – A virtual server is configured to listen on port 443, (https). In the event that the Big-IP will be used for SSL bridging, (decryption and re-encryption), the public facing SSL certificate and associated private key must be installed on the BIG-IP and associated client SSL profile created. ADFS requires Transport Layer Security and Secure Sockets Layer (TLS/SSL). Therefore pool members are configured to listen on port 443, (https). LOAD BALANCING METHOD – The ‘Least Connections (member)’ method is utilized. POOL MONITOR – To ensure the web servers are responding, a customized ‘HTTPS’ monitor is associated with the AD FS proxy pool. The monitor utilizes increased interval and timeout settings. "To SSL Tunnel or Not to SSL Tunnel” When SSL tunneling is utilized, encrypted traffic flows from the client directly to the endpoint farm member. Additionally, SSL profiles are not used nor are SSL certificates required to be installed on the Big-IP. However, some advanced optimizations including HTTP compression and web acceleration are not possible when tunneling. Depending upon variables such as client connectivity and customization of ADFS sign-on pages, an ADFS proxy deployment may benefit from these HTTP optimization features. The following two options, (SSL Tunneling and SSL Bridging) are provided. SSL TUNNELING - In this instance Big-IP profiles requiring packet analysis and/or modification, (ex. compression, web acceleration) will not be relevant. To further boost the performance, a Fast L4 virtual server will be used. Below is an example of the Fast L4 Big-IP Virtual server configuration in SSL tunneling mode. SSL BRIDGING – When SSL bridging is utilized, traffic is decrypted and then re-encrypted at the Big-IP device. This allows for additional features to be applied to the traffic on both client-facing and pool member-facing sides of the connection. Below is an example of the standard Big-IP Virtual server configuration in SSL bridging mode. Standard Virtual Server Profiles - The following list of profiles is associated with the AD FS proxy virtual server. Well that’s it for Part 1. Along with the F5 business development team for the Microsoft global partnership I want to give a big thanks to the guys at Ensynch, an Insight Company - Kevin James, David Lundell, and Lutz Mueller Hipper for reviewing and providing feedback. Stay tuned for Big-IP and ADFS Part 2 – “APM – An Alternative to the ADFS Proxy”. Additional Links: Big-IP and ADFS Part 2 – “APM–An Alternative to the ADFS Proxy” Big-IP and ADFS Part 3 - “ADFS, APM, and the Office 365 Thick Clients”5.1KViews0likes3CommentsTech Fractals: Technology Trends and Integration
#IDAM #Cloud #SSO Patterns repeat. Anything else is irrational. First, the paragraph that spawned this post: The increasing use of cloud-based services is driving the need for better and more interactive single sign-on (SSO) and federated identity management (FIM) services. It is building relationship dependencies between businesses, their partners and suppliers, and customers. -- Ovum Research, "Cloud: Transforming the IAM Industry" First, I beg to differ on the conclusion that cloud is "transforming" the IAM industry. It's pretty much the same as it's ever been. Single-sign on (SSO) is still about protocol transitioning; it's just the case that protocols have been abstracted into APIs. Federated Identity Management (FIM) is SAML wrapped up in a nice name. This is not transformational. Organizations have been integrating authentication and authorization across the Internet since after the dot com bust. XML gateways, anyone? WS-SEC? Seriously, this is not transformational. At best it's evolutionary. Now, if you know anything about fractals, you know that they're fascinating mathematical constructs because they are patterns from micro-versions of the same pattern. If you look closely at one of my favorites, you can see the small "dragon" is repeated to form the larger "dragon" in increasingly sized replicas of the same pattern. Fractals are fairly easily created using well-understood algorithms (okay, they're easy if you're a student of computer science and aren't afraid of math) and they are also found (and given cool names) in nature. Turns out they're also found in technology trend cycles. Every single new technology trend seems to go through the same set of technologies through the maturation process. It's kind of the Hype Cycle, only it's not focused on the maturity and value of the technology, but rather the realization that a certain technology is suddenly applicable or necessary to take the next step toward maturation of the trending technology. Single-sign on and identity federation are two similar technologies that appear in every technology trend cycle. Once adoption reaches about the half-way point (often considered mainstream) attention turns to enterprise-focused concerns about integration with corporate identity stores and how to include the distribution and supply-chain channels in the buy and sell-side process. It's a pattern. It happened with Web-based applications. Remember Passport? The Liberty Alliance? It happened when SOA was the trend du jour. There were literally hundreds of WS-* standards created by OASIS, most of them emerging at about the same point in the technology trend cycle as they did with the Web. And today the technology du jour is cloud. It should be no surprise that SSO and IDAM are rising to the fore. It's about time, after all. Adoption of cloud is well-established and organizations are beginning to turn to more corporatey, business concerns like how do I control who is using my services and how do I integrate my channel into the process. As SDN rises in ascendancy, we're going to see the same concerns in likely the same order raised. We're already started to see peppered here and there the inevitable "security" concerns that initially plagued and inhibited cloud adoption rise with respect to SDN. And soon after that we'll see interoperability with legacy networks rise to the fore as folks realize a hybrid approach (either transitory or by design) is necessary. Patterns. They happen on almost a predictable timetable when it comes to technology trends. Cloud and SDN are no different in that respect. The emergence of these concerns are not because of cloud, they're because it's a natural progression that stems from the greater implementation and adoption process. If you want to know what the next big thing is going to be for any given technology trend, just examine the last trend we left lying on the side of the information superhighway.268Views0likes0CommentsCloud Security: It’s All About (Extreme Elastic) Control
#iam #infosec #cloud #mobile Whether controlling access by users or flows of data, control is common theme to securing “the cloud” The proliferation of mobile devices along with the adoption of hybrid cloud architectures that integrate black-box services from external providers is bringing back to the fore issues of control. Control over access to resources, control over flow of data into and out of resources, and the ability to exert that control consistently whether the infrastructure is “owned” or “rented”. What mobile and BYOD illustrates is the extreme nature of computing today; of the challenges of managing the elasticity inherent in cloud computing . It is from the elasticity that the server side poses its greatest challenges – with mobile IP addresses and locations that can prevent security policies from being efficiently codified, let alone applied consistently. With end-points (clients) we see similar impacts; the elasticity of users lies in their device mobility, in the reality that users move from smart phone to laptop to tablet with equal ease, expecting the same level of access to corporate applications – both on and off-premise. This is extreme elasticity – disrupting both client and server variables. Given the focus on mobile today it should be no surprise to see the declaration that “cloud security” is all about securing “mobile devices.” "If you want to secure the cloud, you need to secure your mobile devices," he explained. "They are the access points to the cloud -- and from an end-user perspective, the difference between the cloud and the mobile phone is lost." -- BYOD: if you can't beat 'em, secure 'em If this were to be taken literally, it would be impossible. Without standardization – which runs contrary to a BYOD policy – it is simply not feasible for IT to secure each and every mobile device, let alone all the possible combinations of operating systems and versions of operating systems. To do so is futile, and IT already knows this, having experienced the pain of trying to support just varying versions of one operating system on corporate-owned desktops and laptops. It knows the futility in attempting to do the same with mobile devices, and yet they are told that this is what they must do, if they are to secure the cloud. Which brings us to solutions posited by experts and pundits alike: IAM (Identity and Access Management) automation and integration. IAM + “Single Control Point” = Strategic Point of (Federated Access) Control IAM is not a new solution, nor is the federation of such services to provide a single control point through which access can be managed. In fact, combining the two beliefs – that control over access to cloud applications with the importance of a “single control point” – is exactly what is necessary to address the “great challenge” for the security industry described by Wendy Nather of the 451 Group. It is the elasticity that exists on both sides of the equation – the client and the server – that poses the greatest challenge for IT security (and operations in general, if truth be told). Such challenges can be effectively met through the implementation of a flexible intermediation tier, residing in the data center and taking advantage of infrastructure and application integration techniques through APIs and process orchestration. Intermediation via the application delivery tier, residing in the data center to ensure the control demanded and required (as a strategic point of control), when combined with context-awareness offer the means by which organizations can meet head on the security challenge of internal and external elasticity.212Views0likes0CommentsF5 Friday: Ops First Rule
#cloud #microsoft #iam “An application is only as reliable as its least reliable component” It’s unlikely there’s anyone in IT today that doesn’t understand the role of load balancing to scale. Whether cloud or not, load balancing is the key mechanism through which load is distributed to ensure horizontal scale of applications. It’s also unlikely there’s anyone in IT that doesn’t understand the relationship between load balancing and high-availability (reliability). High-Availability (HA) architectures are almost always implemented using load balancing services to ensure seamless transition from one service instance to another in the event of a failure. What’s often overlooked is that scalability and HA isn’t important just for applications. Services – whether application or network-focused – must also be reliable. It’s the old “only as strong as the weakest link in the chain” argument. An application is only as reliable as its least reliable component – and that includes services and infrastructure upon which that application relies. It is – or should be – ops first rule; the rule that guides design of data center architectures. This requirement becomes more and more obvious as emerging architectures combining the data center and cloud computing are implemented, particularly when federating identity and access services. That’s because it is desirable to maintain control over the identity and access management processes that authenticate and authorize use of applications no matter where they may be deployed. Such an architecture relies heavily on the corporate identity store as the authoritative source of both credentials and permissions. This makes the corporate identity store a critical component in the application dependency chain, one that must necessarily be made as reliable as possible. Which means you need load balancing. A good example of how this architecture can be achieved is found in BIG-IP load balancing support for Microsoft’s Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS). AD FS and F5 Load Balancing Microsoft’s Active Directory Federation Services, (AD FS) sever role is an identity access solution that extends the single sign-on, (SSO) experience for directory-authenticated clients, (typically provided on the Intranet via Kerberos), to resources outside of the organization’s boundaries, such as cloud computing environments. To ensure high-availability, performance, and scalability the F5 BIG-IP Local Traffic Manager (LTM) can be deployed to load balance an AD FS server farm. There are several scenarios in which BIG-IP can load balance AD FS services. 1. To enable reliability of AD FS for internal clients accessing external resources, such as those hosted in Microsoft Office 365. This is the simplest of architectures and the most restrictive in terms of access for end-users as it is limited to only internal clients. 2. To enable reliability of AD FS and AD FS proxy servers, which provide external end-user SSO access to both internal federation-enabled resources as well as partner resources like Microsoft Office 365. This is a more flexible option as it serves both internal and external clients. 3. BIG-IP Access Policy Manager (APM) can replace the need for AD FS proxy servers required for external end-user SSO access, which eliminates another tier and enables pre-authentication at the perimeter, offering both the flexibility required (supporting both internal and external access) as well as a more secure deployment. In all three scenarios, F5 BIG-IP serves as a strategic point of control in the architecture, assuring reliability and performance of services upon which applications are dependent, particularly those of authentication and authorization. Using BIG-IP APM instead of AD FS proxy servers both simplifies and makes more agile the architecture. This is because BIG-IP APM is inherently more programmable and flexible in terms of policy creation. BIG-IP APM, being deployed on the BIG-IP platform, can take full advantage of the context in which requests are made, ensuring that identity and access control go beyond simple credentials and take into consideration device, location, and other contextual-clues that enable a more secure system of authentication and authorization. High-availability – and ultimately scalability - is preserved for all services by leveraging the core load balancing and HA functionality of the BIG-IP platform. All components in the chain are endowed with HA capabilities, making the entire application more resilient and able to withstand minor and major failures. Using BIG-IP LTM for load balancing AD FS serves as an adaptable and extensible architectural foundation for a phased deployment approach. As a pilot phase, rolling out AD FS services for internal clients only makes sense, and is the simplest in terms of its implementation. Using BIG-IP as the foundation for such an architecture enables further expansion in subsequent phases, such as introducing BIG-IP APM in a phase two implementation that brings flexibility of access location to the table. Further enhancements can then be made regarding access when context is included, enabling more complex and business-focused access policies to be implemented. Time-based restrictions on clients or location can be deployed and enforced, as is desired or needed by operations or business requirements. Reliability is a Least Common Factor Problem Reliability must be enabled throughout the application delivery chain to ultimately ensure reliability of each application. Scalability is further paramount for those dependent services, such as identity and access management, that are intended to be shared across multiple applications. While certainly there are many other load balancing services that could be used to enable reliability of these services, an extensible and highly scalable platform such as BIG-IP is required to ensure both reliability and scalability of shared services upon which many applications rely. The advantage of a BIG-IP-based application delivery tier is that its core reliability and scalability services extend to any of the many services that can be deployed. By simplifying the architecture through application delivery service consolidation, organizations further enjoy the benefits of operational consistency that keeps management and maintenance costs reduced. Reliability is a least common factor problem, and Ops First Rule should be applied when designing a deployment architecture to assure that all services in the delivery chain are as reliable as they can be. F5 Friday: BIG-IP Solutions for Microsoft Private Cloud BYOD–The Hottest Trend or Just the Hottest Term The Four V’s of Big Data Hybrid Architectures Do Not Require Private Cloud The Cost of Ignoring ‘Non-Human’ Visitors Complexity Drives Consolidation What Does Mobile Mean, Anyway? At the Intersection of Cloud and Control… Cloud Bursting: Gateway Drug for Hybrid Cloud Identity Gone Wild! Cloud Edition219Views0likes0Comments