dns sec
23 TopicsDNSSEC: Is Your Infrastructure Ready?
A few months ago, we teamed with Infoblox for a DNSSEC webinar. Jonathan George, F5 Product Marketing Manager, leads with myself and Cricket Liu of Infoblox as background noise. He’s a blast as always and certainly knows his DNS. So, learn how F5 enables you to deploy DNSSEC quickly and easily into an existing GSLB environment with BIG-IP Global Traffic Manager (GTM). BIG-IP GTM streamlines encryption key generation and distribution by dynamically signing DNS responses in real-time. Running time: 49:20 </p> <p>ps</p> <p>Resources:</p> <ul> <li><a href="http://www.f5.com/news-press-events/web-media/" _fcksavedurl="http://www.f5.com/news-press-events/web-media/">F5 Web Media</a></li> <li><a href="http://www.youtube.com/user/f5networksinc" _fcksavedurl="http://www.youtube.com/user/f5networksinc">F5 YouTube Channel</a></li> <li><a href="http://www.f5.com/products/big-ip/global-traffic-manager.html" _fcksavedurl="http://www.f5.com/products/big-ip/global-traffic-manager.html">BIG-IP GTM</a></li> <li><a href="http://www.f5.com/pdf/white-papers/dnssec-wp.pdf" _fcksavedurl="http://www.f5.com/pdf/white-papers/dnssec-wp.pdf">DNSSEC: The Antidote to DNS Cache Poisoning and Other DNS Attacks (whitepaper)</a> | <a href="http://devcentral.f5.com/s/weblogs/interviews/archive/2009/12/04/audio-tech-brief-dnssec-the-antidote-to-dns.aspx" _fcksavedurl="http://devcentral.f5.com/s/weblogs/interviews/archive/2009/12/04/audio-tech-brief-dnssec-the-antidote-to-dns.aspx">Audio</a></li> <li><a href="http://www.cricketondns.com" _fcksavedurl="http://www.cricketondns.com">Cricket on DNS</a></li> <li><a href="http://www.youtube.com/user/InfobloxInc" _fcksavedurl="http://www.youtube.com/user/InfobloxInc">Infoblox YouTube Channel</a></li> </ul> <p>Technorati Tags: <a href="http://devcentral.f5.com/s/weblogs/psilva/psilva/psilva/archive/2011/05/09/" _fcksavedurl="http://devcentral.f5.com/s/weblogs/psilva/psilva/psilva/archive/2011/05/09/">F5</a>, <a href="http://technorati.com/tags/webinar" _fcksavedurl="http://technorati.com/tags/webinar">webinar</a>, <a href="http://technorati.com/tags/Pete+Silva" _fcksavedurl="http://technorati.com/tags/Pete+Silva">Pete Silva</a>, <a href="http://technorati.com/tags/security" _fcksavedurl="http://technorati.com/tags/security">security</a>, <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/business" _fcksavedurl="http://technorati.com/tag/business">business</a>, <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/education" _fcksavedurl="http://technorati.com/tag/education">education</a>, <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/technology" _fcksavedurl="http://technorati.com/tag/technology">technology</a>, <a href="http://technorati.com/tags/internet" _fcksavedurl="http://technorati.com/tags/internet">internet, </a><a href="http://technorati.com/tags/big-ip" _fcksavedurl="http://technorati.com/tags/big-ip">big-ip</a>, <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/dnssec" _fcksavedurl="http://technorati.com/tag/dnssec">dnssec</a>, <a href="http://technorati.com/tags/infoblox" _fcksavedurl="http://technorati.com/tags/infoblox">infoblox</a> <a href="http://technorati.com/tags/dns" _fcksavedurl="http://technorati.com/tags/dns">dns</a></p> <table border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="2" width="378"><tbody> <tr> <td valign="top" width="200">Connect with Peter: </td> <td valign="top" width="176">Connect with F5: </td> </tr> <tr> <td valign="top" width="200"><a href="http://www.linkedin.com/pub/peter-silva/0/412/77a" _fcksavedurl="http://www.linkedin.com/pub/peter-silva/0/412/77a"><img style="border-bottom: 0px; border-left: 0px; display: inline; border-top: 0px; border-right: 0px" title="o_linkedin[1]" border="0" alt="o_linkedin[1]" src="http://devcentral.f5.com/s/weblogs/images/devcentral_f5_com/weblogs/macvittie/1086440/o_linkedin.png" _fcksavedurl="http://devcentral.f5.com/s/weblogs/images/devcentral_f5_com/weblogs/macvittie/1086440/o_linkedin.png" width="24" height="24" /></a> <a href="http://devcentral.f5.com/s/weblogs/psilva/Rss.aspx" _fcksavedurl="http://devcentral.f5.com/s/weblogs/psilva/Rss.aspx"><img style="border-bottom: 0px; border-left: 0px; display: inline; border-top: 0px; border-right: 0px" title="o_rss[1]" border="0" alt="o_rss[1]" src="http://devcentral.f5.com/s/weblogs/images/devcentral_f5_com/weblogs/macvittie/1086440/o_rss.png" _fcksavedurl="http://devcentral.f5.com/s/weblogs/images/devcentral_f5_com/weblogs/macvittie/1086440/o_rss.png" width="24" height="24" /></a> <a href="http://www.facebook.com/f5networksinc" _fcksavedurl="http://www.facebook.com/f5networksinc"><img style="border-bottom: 0px; 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display: inline; border-top-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px" title="o_slideshare[1]" border="0" alt="o_slideshare[1]" src="http://devcentral.f5.com/s/weblogs/images/devcentral_f5_com/weblogs/macvittie/1086440/o_slideshare.png" _fcksavedurl="http://devcentral.f5.com/s/weblogs/images/devcentral_f5_com/weblogs/macvittie/1086440/o_slideshare.png" width="24" height="24" /></a> <a href="http://bitly.com/mOVxf3?r=bb" _fcksavedurl="http://bitly.com/mOVxf3?r=bb"><img style="border-right-width: 0px; display: inline; border-top-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px" title="o_youtube[1]" border="0" alt="o_youtube[1]" src="http://devcentral.f5.com/s/weblogs/images/devcentral_f5_com/weblogs/macvittie/1086440/o_youtube.png" _fcksavedurl="http://devcentral.f5.com/s/weblogs/images/devcentral_f5_com/weblogs/macvittie/1086440/o_youtube.png" width="24" height="24" /></a></td> </tr> </tbody></table></body></html> ps Resources: F5 Web Media F5 YouTube Channel BIG-IP GTM DNSSEC: The Antidote to DNS Cache Poisoning and Other DNS Attacks (whitepaper) | Audio Cricket on DNS Infoblox YouTube Channel314Views0likes1CommentThe BIG-IP GTM: Configuring DNSSEC
This is the fourth in a series of DNS articles that I'm writing. The first three are: Let's Talk DNS on DevCentral DNS The F5 Way: A Paradigm Shift DNS Express and Zone Transfers The Domain Name System (DNS) is a key component of the Internet's critical infrastructure. So, if the foundation of the Internet itself relies on DNS, then let's take a quick look at how stable this foundation really is. After all, DNS was born in the early 1980s...back when REO Speedwagon and Air Supply were cranking out hits on the radio. The question is...does the DNS of the 1980s have any issues we need to worry about today? Well as it turns out, DNS was not initially built with security in mind. When a user types a web address in his browser, he expects to be reliably directed to that website. Unfortunately, that doesn't always happen. One common example is seen when an attacker disrupts the user's request and redirects to a malicious site. Several DNS vulnerabilities like this have led the way to an interest in DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) to secure this critical part of our Internet infrastructure. What is DNSSEC? DNSSEC is a suite of extensions that add security to the DNS protocol by enabling responses to be validated. With DNSSEC, the DNS protocol is much less susceptible to certain types of attacks (like the DNS spoofing situation described above). DNSSEC uses digital signatures to validate DNS responses so that the end user can be assured he is visiting the correct website. Based on the design features of DNSSEC, it is most effective when deployed at each step in the DNS lookup process...from root zone to the final domain name. If you leave any of the steps unsigned, it creates weakness in the process and you won't be able to trust the entire chain. Keep in mind that DNSSEC doesn't encrypt the data, it just signs it to attest to the validity of the response. When a user requests a site, DNS kicks into gear by translating the domain name into an IP address. It does this through a series of recursive lookups that form a "chain" of requests. The picture below shows an example of a user requesting f5.com and the DNS system chaining together requests in order to match the domain name to the IP address so that he can access the website. This is all well and good, but the issue that forms the need for DNSSEC is that each stop in this chain inherently trusts the other parts of the chain...no questions asked. So, what if an attacker could somehow manipulate one of the servers (or even the traffic on the wire) and send the wrong IP address back to the user? The attacker could redirect the user to a website where malware is waiting to scan the unsuspecting user's computer. The picture below shows the same chain of requests, but this time an attacker has manipulated the last response so that the incorrect IP address is returned to the user. Not good. DNSSEC addresses this problem by validating the response of each part of the chain by using digital signatures. These signatures help build a "chain of trust" that DNS can rely on when answering requests. To form the chain of trust, DNSSEC starts with a "trust anchor" and everything below that trust anchor is trusted. Ideally, the trust anchor is the root zone. Fortunately for all of us, ICANN published the root zone trust anchor, and root operators began serving the signed root zone in July, 2010. With the root zone signed, all other zones below it can also be signed, thus forming a solid and complete chain of trust. In fact, ICANN also lists the Top Level Domains (TLD) that are currently signed and have trust anchors published as DS records in the root zone (most of the TLDs are signed). The following picture (taken from iiw.idcommons.net) shows the process for building the chain of trust from the root zone. DNSSEC uses two kinds of keys: Key Signing Keys and Zone Signing Keys. The Key Signing Key is used to sign other keys in order to build the chain of trust. This key is sometimes cryptographically stronger and has a longer lifespan than a Zone Signing Key. The Zone Signing Key is used to sign the data that is published in a zone. DNSSEC uses the Key Signing Keys and Zone Signing Keys to sign and verify records within DNS. BIG-IP Configuration The BIG-IP Global Traffic Manager (GTM) will not only respond to DNS requests, but it will also sign DNSSEC validated responses. But before you can configure the GTM to handle nameserver responses that are DNSSEC-compliant, you have to create DNSSEC keys and zones. The first step is to create the Zone Signing Key(s) and the Key Signing Key(s). The Zone Signing Key specifies the keys that the system uses to sign requests to a zone. The BIG-IP responds to DNSSEC requests to a specific zone by returning signed nameserver responses based on the currently available generations of a key. The Key Signing Key works the same as the Zone Signing Key except that it applies to keys instead of zones. To create these keys, navigate to Global Traffic >> DNSSEC Key List and create a new key. Note: this menu looks slightly different starting in version 11.5 (it's listed under "DNS" instead of "Global Traffic") but the Key Creation is still the same. On this page, you can create a Zone Signing Key and a Key Signing Key, and you can also specify several other settings like HSM use, algorithm selection, and key management action. Note that you can let the BIG-IP automatically manage your key actions or you can choose to do it manually. Configuration Settings The Bit Width for the key can be either 1024, 2048, or 4096 bits. The default is 1024. The TTL value specifies the length of time the BIG-IP stores the key in cache. A key can be cached between 0 and 4294967295 seconds (by the way, 4294967295 seconds is a little more than 136 years!). The default value is 86400 seconds (one day). This value must be less than the difference between the values of the rollover period and expiration period (referred to as the "overlap period"). Setting this value to 0 seconds indicates that client resolvers do not cache the key. The Rollover Period specifies the interval after which the BIG-IP creates a new generation of an existing key. The valid range for values for the Rollover Period is from 0 to 4294967295 seconds. The default is 0 seconds, which means the key does not roll over. This value of the rollover period must be greater than or equal to one third of the value of the expiration period and less than the value of the expiration period. The Expiration Period specifies the interval after which the BIG-IP deletes an existing key. The valid range for values is from 0 to 4294967295 seconds. The default is 0 seconds, which means the key does not expire. The value of the expiration period must be more than the value of the rollover period. Also, the overlap period must be more than the value of the TTL. FYI...the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommends that a Zone Signing Key expire between 30-90 days, and that a Key Signing Key expire once a year. The Signature Validity Period specifies the interval after which the BIG-IP no longer uses the expired signature. The valid range for values is from 0 to 4294967295 seconds. The default is 7 days. This value must be greater than the value of the signature publication period. If you set this value to 0, the server verifying the signature never succeeds because the signature is always expired, so don't set it to 0! The Signature Publication Period specifies the interval after which the BIG-IP creates a new signature. The valid range for these values is from 0 to 4294967295 seconds. The default value is 4 days, 16 hours (two-thirds of a week). This value must be less than the value of the signature validity period. If you set this value to 0, the system does not cache the signature. TTL Values, Key Values, and Overlaps The following diagram shows an example of key generation timelines with rollover periods and overlaps. This diagram is useful when reviewing the configuration settings and values discussed in the section above. Notice that the expiration period must be greater than the rollover period, and the TTL must be less than the overlap period. You wouldn't want a key to expire before it rolls over; likewise, you wouldn't want a TTL period to outlast the overlap period...if it did, the key could still be valid after the expiration period. After you create and configure the Zone Signing Key(s) and Key Signing Key(s), the next step is to create a DNSSEC zone. A DNSSEC zone maps a domain name to a set of DNSSEC keys. In the BIG-IP, you create DNSSEC zones by navigating to Global Traffic >> DNSSEC Zone List and create a new zone. On this page, you can name the zone, configure state settings, assign algorithms, and activate zone keys. The hash algorithm options are SHA-1 (default) or SHA-256. The Zone Signing Key box specifies the zone keys that the BIG-IP uses to sign requests to a zone. The Key Signing Key works similar to the Zone Signing Key, except it is used to sign keys instead of requests. The following screenshot shows the options available for creating DNSSEC zones. To fully secure a zone, the parent zone needs to have copies of the child's public key. The parent zone then signs the child's public key with their own key and sends it up to their parent...this pattern is followed all the way to the root zone. Once you have created the DNSSEC keys and zones, you can submit the Delegation Signer (DS) record to the administrators of your parent zone. They will sign the DS record with their own key and upload it to their zone. You can find the DS record for your zone here: /config/gtm/dsset-dnssec.zone.name There's a lot to DNSSEC, and this article wasn't written to capture it all, but I hope it sheds a little light on what DNSSEC is and how you can create zones and keys on your BIG-IP. Stay tuned for more BIG-IP GTM articles in the coming days, weeks, and months. Until then, keep those DNS requests flowing, and make sure they are valid with DNSSEC! One last thing...did you know that F5 has an awesome Reference Architecture dedicated to Intelligent DNS Scale? The F5 Intelligent DNS Scale solution ensures that you can access your critical web, application, and database services whenever you need them...check it out!3.8KViews0likes5CommentsDNSSEC Configuration issue
Hi Team, I am trying to test DNSSEC on a trial version before rolling it out on production appliance. I have configured the Key signing key, Zone Signing key and mapped them to the DNSSEC Zone. However for some reason the DNSSEC zone is offline with error message: 'Offline (Enabled) - must contain at least one enabled KSK and enabled ZSK' I have verified that the KSK and ZSK are both in enabled state. Any pointers on why this could be happening? Best Regards, Shridhar Acharya592Views0likes3CommentsValidating resolver and trust anchors
Hi, I am trying to configure my F5 as a validating resolver. I am running 14.0 with a lab license so DNS is licensed. I am able to successfully resolve when using a transparent cache and a pool of DNS servers. I am able to successfully resolve when using a resolver cache. However, when trying to configure a validating resolver cache I am lost. If I am using a pool of dns servers which includes 8.8.8.8, what trust anchor should I configure? Also, what is the difference between a trust anchor and a dlv anchor? Do I need both? I have attempted to use the root trust anchors but I have no idea if that is correct either. Root trust anchors I used. . IN DS 19036 8 2 49AAC11D7B6F6446702E54A1607371607A1A41855200FD2CE1CDDE32F24E8FB5 . IN DS 20326 8 2 E06D44B80B8F1D39A95C0B0D7C65D08458E880409BBC683457104237C7F8EC8D543Views0likes2CommentsLightboard Lessons: DNSSEC
DNS is absolutely critical to your life on the Internet. But, did you know that DNS was designed back in the 1980s and didn't really consider security as a key component? DNSSEC was developed to help with that problem. In this edition of Lightboard Lessons, I discuss the basics of DNSSEC and talk about how the BIG-IP can help protect your critical DNS infrastructure. Related Resources: Configuring DNSSEC on the BIG-IP326Views0likes2CommentsA Living Architecture
You often hear people say, 'oh, this is a living document,' to indicate that the information is continually updated or edited to reflect changes that may occur during the life of the document. Your infrastructure is also living and dynamic. You make changes, updates or upgrades to address the ever changing requirements of your employees, web visitors, customers, partners, networks, applications and anything else tied to your systems. This is also true for F5's Reference Architectures. They too are living architectures. F5's Reference Architectures are the proof-points or customer scenarios that drive Synthesis to your data center and beyond. When we initially built out these RA's, we knew that they'd be continuously updated to not only reflect new BIG-IP functionality but also show new solutions to the changing challenges IT faces daily. We've recently updated the Intelligent DNS Scale Reference Architecture to include more security (DNSSEC) and to address the highly hybrid nature of enterprise infrastructures with Distributed DNS. F5’s end-to-end Intelligent DNS Scale reference architecture enables organizations to build a strong DNS foundation that maximizes the use of resources and increases service management, while remaining agile enough to support both existing and future network architectures, devices, and applications. It also provides a more intelligent way to respond and scale to DNS queries and takes into account a variety of network conditions and situations to distribute user application requests and application services based on business policies, data center conditions, network conditions, and application performance. It ensures that your customers—and your employees—can access your critical web, application, and database services whenever they need them. In this latest DNS RA rev, DNSSEC can protect your DNS infrastructure, including cloud deployments, from cache poisoning attacks and domain hijacks. With DNSSEC support, you can digitally sign and encrypt your DNS query responses. This enables the resolver to determine the authenticity of the response, preventing DNS hijacking and cache poisoning. Also included is Distributed DNS. Meaning, all the DNS solution goodness also applies to cloud deployments or infrastructures where DNS is distributed. Organizations can replicate their high performance DNS infrastructure in almost any environment. Organizations may have Cloud DNS for disaster recovery/business continuity or even a Cloud DNS service with signed DNSSEC zones. F5 DNS Services enhanced AXFR support offers zone transfers from BIG-IP to any DNS service allowing organizations to replicate DNS in physical, virtual, and cloud environments. The DNS replication service can be sent to other BIG-IPs or other general DNS servers in Data Centers/Clouds that are closest to the users. In addition, Organizations can send users to a site that will give them the best experience. F5 DNS Services uses a range of load balancing methods and intelligent monitoring for each specific app and user. Traffic is routed according to your business policies and current network and user conditions. F5 DNS Services includes an accurate, granular geolocation database, giving you control of traffic distribution based on user location. DNS helps make the internet work and we often do not think of it until we cannot connect to some resource. With the Internet of Nouns (or Things if you like) hot on our heels, I think Port 53 will continue to be a critically important piece of the internet puzzle. ps Related: Intelligent DNS Scale Resources F5 Synthesis DNS Reimagined keeps your Business Online DNS Does the Job The DNS of Things DNS Doldrums The Internet of Things and DNS Technorati Tags: f5,big-ip,dns,reference architecture,dnssec,iot,things,name_resolution,silva,security,cloud,synthesis Connect with Peter: Connect with F5:310Views0likes0CommentsDevCentral Top 5: May 27, 2014
And here we are again...that fateful time when we admire and, yes, celebrate the amazing contributions of our DevCentral authors. The easy part is writing about all the great content; the hard part is picking just 5 articles to highlight. Nonetheless, here they are in no particular order...the DevCentral Top 5: Mitigating sslsqueeze and other no-crypto, brute force SSL handshake attacks If you don't know David Holmes, you pretty much need to stop whatever you are doing and start reading his stuff. In this article, he wows us again with his security expertise and shows us why we all love the flexibility (and programmability) of F5 technology. David wrote an article back in 2011 on an SSL Renegotiation DOS Attack and showed how a client can take advantage of a server in the SSL handshake because an SSL handshake requires at least 10 times more processing power on the server than on the client. Well, David recently found a new class of SSL attacks where the client doesn't do any cryptography at all...the client just sends a bunch of pre-canned packets that look like an SSL handshake. In this attack, the server uses 100 times more processing power than the client! David was able to get a copy of one of the tools (called sslsqueeze) that runs this attack and use it against a real, physical BIG-IP with cryptographic offload accelerators. He was able to take a $200 used computer and overload the BIG-IP with fake SSL handshakes. The good news is that he wrote an iRule (actually 2 iRules for different scenarios) to mitigate this attack. You gotta love the flexibility that iRules provide! The security world is an interesting one...attackers will always find a new vulnerability to exploit, and good guys will find a way to stop them. Thank goodness David Holmes is a good guy. Hybrid DDoS Needs Hybrid Defense It's not if you get DDoS attacked, but when. Lori MacVittie publishes another masterful write-up where she outlines a DDoS approach that many top analysts recommend. In the world of DDoS protection, it's best to implement off-premise detection and mitigation with on-premise protection. A hybrid solution provides the resiliency and scale of cloud based solutions with the granularity and always-on capabilities of on-premise solutions. Many times, when an organization is under attack, the answer is to shut down computationally expensive services to prevent overall service outages. But, this means IPS, firewalls, anti-fraud detection, etc are sometimes eliminated for the sake of keeping the network running. With a hybrid approach, an organization can take advantage of additional capacity in the cloud but still maintain the flexibility of protecting against more frequent and easily managed attacks. Where do you turn for the technology to make all this happen? The good news for everyone is that Defense.Net just joined forces with the F5 family. By combining the cloud-based services of Defense.Net and the on-premise protection of the F5 firewall, organizations will be better armed to detect and mitigate DDoS attacks at the network and application layers...simultaneously! The BIG-IP GTM: Configuring DNSSEC Is it awkward that I'm including one of my own articles in this edition of the Top 5? It's only weird if we let it be weird. So, I'm cool with it if you are. OK, but for real, F5 does some seriously awesome work when it comes to DNS services. We all know that DNS was originally built back in the 1980s, and it was designed with some inherent trust features that bad guys could exploit. When a user types a web address in his browser, he expects to be reliably directed to the correct website. If an attacker is able to manipulate the response from a DNS server, he could send the unsuspecting user to a malicious site that is full of malware. This vulnerability (among others) created the need for a more secure DNS experience. DNSSEC addresses the security problem by validating the response of DNS servers. This is done through a trust relationship that is built with a series of security keys. As you can imagine, validating each DNS response can be computationally expensive, so it's nice if you have custom-built, high powered hardware and software to do this job for you. Well, the BIG-IP GTM does just that. It will authoritatively answer your DNS requests, but it will also sign DNSSEC validated responses. You'll need to configure a few things on the BIG-IP to make this happen, but this article shows you all the steps needed to take care of that. So get out there and configure your BIG-IP GTM and let it handle all your DNS needs. Is OpenStack Ready For Production? Ranjeet Sonone answers THE question that runs through the mind of anyone diving deep on OpenStack. Way back in 2012, OpenStack lacked solid networking design and required significant resource allocation to be implemented in a true production environment. By 2013, OpenStack was gaining momentum and user success stories were helping it grow in popularity. But even then, you needed lots of system knowledge and scripting skills to assemble all the moving parts. So, many people were watching as 2014 approached to see if OpenStack was truly ready for prime time. The answer was given at the recent OpenStack summit in Atlanta, GA where 4,500 networking professionals heard about real world OpenStack success stories. OpenStack is now sufficiently rich in service offerings, and the core components are now stable for production environments...so, yes, it's ready for production! F5 has been investigating OpenStack for several years now, and we joined the OpenStack Foundation last year. Customers are now using F5 plug-ins in their OpenStack labs and sharing workloads between the public cloud and their private cloud. In the end, Ranjeet shows how F5 ensures that our customers have access to our custom built solutions when evaluating cloud platform integrations. Great job Ranjeet! Heartbroken and then Redeemed The Heartbleed vulnerability blew up a little over a month ago, and F5 was right there to help mitigate this significant problem. After the initial press from the Hearbleed bug had calmed down a little, a security researcher named Yngve Pettersen discovered hundreds of new Internet hosts that appeared to be vulnerable to Heartbleed. He called these newly vulnerable hosts "heartbroken" servers. He also noted that a specific characteristic on these servers suggested that they might be F5 devices. Not good, right? Well, our worldwide security evangelist David Holmes contacted Yngve and asked about his research. Yngve was kind enough to share his data with us. After all, he wasn't trying to give F5 a black eye, he was simply stating the results of his research. David (and a host of other F5 security experts) analyzed the data and found that actually none of the devices were F5 equipment. That's good news! Unfortunately, Yngve had already posted a technology blog about his initial findings, but he was gracious to remove the F5 references from his blog and offer an apology to F5 and F5's customers. I think that's really awesome stuff. Yngve is a really smart guy who discovered some very interesting data, but he is also a true professional in that he is willing to admit when he makes a mistake (as we all do). So, kudos to David for asking the clarifying questions, and kudos to Yngve for being a true professional.219Views0likes0Comments