F5 API Security: Discovery and Protection
Introduction APIs are everywhere, accounting for around 83% of all internet traffic today, with API calls growing nearly 300% faster than overall web traffic. Last year, the F5 Office of the CTO estimated that the number of APIs being deployed to production could reach between 500 million to over a billion by 2030. At the time, the notion of over a billion APIs in the wild was overwhelming, made even more concerning by estimates indicating that a significant portion were unmanaged or, in some cases, entirely undocumented. Now, in the era of AI driven development and automation, that estimate of over a billion APIs may prove to be a significant understatement. According to recent research by IDC on API Sprawl and AI Enablement, "Organizations with GenAI enhanced applications/services in production have roughly 5x more APIs than organizations not yet investing significantly in GenAI". That all makes for a very large and complicated attack surface, and complexity is the enemy of security. Discovery, Monitoring, and Protection So, how do we begin securing such a large and complex attack surface? It requires a continuous approach that blends visibility, management, and enforcement. This includes multi-lens Discovery and Learning to detect unknown or shadow APIs, determine authentication status, identify sensitive data, and generate accurate OpenAPI schemas. It also involves Monitoring to establish baselines for endpoint parameters, behaviors, and characteristics, enabling the detection of anomalies. Finally, we must Protect by blocking suspicious requests, applying rate limiting, and enforcing schema validation to prevent misuse. The API Security capabilities of the F5 product portfolio are essential for providing that continuous, defense in depth approach to protecting your APIs from DevTime to Runtime. F5 API Security Essentials Additional Resources F5 API Security Article Series: Out of the Shadows: API Discovery Beyond Rest: Protecting GraphQL Deploy F5 Distributed Cloud API Discovery and Security: F5 Distributed Cloud WAAP Terraform Examples GitHub Repo Deploy F5 Hybrid Architectures API Discovery and Security: F5 Distributed Cloud Hybrid Security Architectures GitHub Repo F5 Distributed Cloud Documentation: F5 Distributed Cloud Terraform Provider Documentation F5 Distributed Cloud Services API Documentation
NGINX App Protect v5 Signature Notifications
When working with NAP (NGINX App Protect) you don't have an easy way of knowing when any of the signatures are updated. As an old BigIP guy I find that rather strange. Here you have build-in automatic updates and notifications. Unfortunately there isn't any API's you can probe which would have been the best way of doing it. Hopefully it will come one day. However, "friction" and "hard" will not keep me from finding a solution š I have previously made a solution for NAPv4 and I have tried mentally to get me going on a NAPv5 version. The reason for the delay is in the different way NAPv4 and NAPv5 are designed. Where NAPv4 is one module loaded in NGINX, NAPv5 is completely detached from NGINX (well almost, you still need to load a small module to get the traffic from NGINX to NAP) and only works with containers. NAPv5 has moved the signature "storage" from the actual host it is running on (e.g. an installed package) to the policy. This has the consequence that finding a valid "source of truth", for the latest signature versions, is not as simple as building a new image and see which versions got installed. There are very good reasons for this design that I will come back to later. When you fire up NAPv5 you got three containers for the data plane (NGINX, waf-enforcer and waf-config-mgr) and one for the "control plane" (waf-compiler). For this solution the "control plane" is the useful one. It isn't really a control plane but it gives a nice picture of how it is detached from the actual processing of traffic. When you update your signatures you are actually doing it through the waf-compiler. The waf-compiler is a container hosting the actual signature databases and every time a new verison is released you need to rebuild this container and compile your policies into a new version and reload NGINX. And this is what I take advantage of when I look for signature updates. It has the upside that you only need the waf-compiler to get the information you need. My solution will take care of the entire process and make sure that you are always running with the latest signatures. Back to the reason why the split of functions is a very good thing. When you build a new version of the NGINX image and deploy it into production, NAP needs to compile the policies as they load. During the compilation NGINX is not moving any traffic! This becomes a annoying problem even when you have a low number of policies. I have installations where it takes 5 to 10 minutes from deployment of the new image until it starts moving traffic. That is a crazy long time when you are used to working with micro-services and expect everything to flip within seconds. If you have your NAPv4 hooked up to a NGINX Instance Manager (NIM) the problem is somewhat mitigated as NIM will compile the policies before sending them to the gateways. NIM is not a nimble piece of software so it doesn't always fit into the environment. And now here is my hack to the notification problem: The solution consist of two bash scripts and one html template. The template is used when sending a notification mail. I wanted it to be pretty and that was easiest with html. Strictly speaking you could do with just a simple text based mail. Save all three in the same directory. The main script is called "waf_policy_auto_compile.sh"and is the one you put into crontab. The main script will build a new waf-compiler image and compile a test policy. The outcome of that is information about what versions are the newest. It will then extract versions from an old policy and simply see if any of the versions differ. For this to work you need to have an uncompiled policy (you can just use the default one) and a compiled version of it ready beforehand. When a diff has been identified the notification logic is executed and a second script is called: "compile_waf_policies.sh". It basically just trawls through the directory of you policies and logging profiles and compiles a new version of them all. It is not necessary to recompile the logging profiles, so this will probably change in the next version. As the compilation completes the main script will nudge NGINX to reload thus implement all the new versions. You can run "waf_policy_auto_compile.sh" with a verbose flag (-v) and a debug flag (-d). The verbose flag is intended to be used when you run it on a terminal and want the information displayed there. Debug is, well, for debug š The construction of the scripts are based on my own needs but they should be easy to adjust for any need. I will be happy for any feedback, so please don't hold back š version_report_template.html: <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <title>WAF Policy Version Report</title> <style> body { font-family: system-ui, sans-serif; } .ok { color: #28a745; font-weight: bold; } .warn { color: #f0ad4e; font-weight: bold; } .section { margin-bottom: 1.2em; } .label { font-weight: bold; } </style> </head> <body> <h2>WAF Policy Version Report</h2> <div class="section"> <div class="label">Attack Signatures:</div> <div>Current: <span>{{ATTACK_OLD}}</span></div> <div>New: <span>{{ATTACK_NEW}}</span></div> <div>Status: <span class="{{ATTACK_CLASS}}">{{ATTACK_STATUS}}</span></div> </div> <div class="section"> <div class="label">Bot Signatures:</div> <div>Current: <span>{{BOT_OLD}}</span></div> <div>New: <span>{{BOT_NEW}}</span></div> <div>Status: <span class="{{BOT_CLASS}}">{{BOT_STATUS}}</span></div> </div> <div class="section"> <div class="label">Threat Campaigns:</div> <div>Current: <span>{{THREAT_OLD}}</span></div> <div>New: <span>{{THREAT_NEW}}</span></div> <div>Status: <span class="{{THREAT_CLASS}}">{{THREAT_STATUS}}</span></div> </div> <div>Run completed: {{RUN_DATETIME}}</div> </body> </html> compile_waf_policies.sh: #!/bin/bash # ============================================================================== # Script Name: compile_waf_policies.sh # # Description: # Compiles: # 1. WAF policy JSON files from the 'policies' directory # 2. WAF logging JSON files from the 'logging' directory # using the 'waf-compiler-latest:custom' Docker image. Output goes to # '/opt/napv5/app_protect_etc_config' where NGINX and waf-config-mgr # can reach them. # # Requirements: # - Docker installed and accessible # - Docker image 'waf-compiler-latest:custom' present locally # # Usage: # ./compile_waf_policies.sh # ============================================================================== set -euo pipefail IFS=$'\n\t' SECONDS=0 # Track total execution time # ======================== # CONFIGURABLE VARIABLES # ======================== BASE_DIR="/root/napv5/waf-compiler" OUTPUT_DIR="/opt/napv5/app_protect_etc_config" POLICY_INPUT_DIR="$BASE_DIR/policies" POLICY_OUTPUT_DIR="$OUTPUT_DIR" LOGGING_INPUT_DIR="$BASE_DIR/logging" LOGGING_OUTPUT_DIR="$OUTPUT_DIR" GLOBAL_SETTINGS="$BASE_DIR/global_settings.json" DOCKER_IMAGE="waf-compiler-latest:custom" # ======================== # VALIDATION # ======================== echo "š§ Validating paths..." [[ -d "$POLICY_INPUT_DIR" ]] || { echo "ā Error: Policy input directory '$POLICY_INPUT_DIR' does not exist."; exit 1; } [[ -f "$GLOBAL_SETTINGS" ]] || { echo "ā Error: Global settings file '$GLOBAL_SETTINGS' not found."; exit 1; } mkdir -p "$POLICY_OUTPUT_DIR" mkdir -p "$LOGGING_OUTPUT_DIR" # ======================== # POLICY COMPILATION # ======================== echo "š¦ Compiling WAF policies from: $POLICY_INPUT_DIR" for POLICY_FILE in "$POLICY_INPUT_DIR"/*.json; do [[ -f "$POLICY_FILE" ]] || continue BASENAME=$(basename "$POLICY_FILE" .json) OUTPUT_FILE="$POLICY_OUTPUT_DIR/${BASENAME}.tgz" echo "āļø [Policy] Compiling $(basename "$POLICY_FILE") -> $(basename "$OUTPUT_FILE")" docker run --rm \ -v "$POLICY_INPUT_DIR":"$POLICY_INPUT_DIR" \ -v "$POLICY_OUTPUT_DIR":"$POLICY_OUTPUT_DIR" \ -v "$(dirname "$GLOBAL_SETTINGS")":"$(dirname "$GLOBAL_SETTINGS")" \ "$DOCKER_IMAGE" \ -g "$GLOBAL_SETTINGS" \ -p "$POLICY_FILE" \ -o "$OUTPUT_FILE" done # ======================== # LOGGING COMPILATION # ======================== echo "š Compiling WAF logging configs from: $LOGGING_INPUT_DIR" if [[ -d "$LOGGING_INPUT_DIR" ]]; then for LOG_FILE in "$LOGGING_INPUT_DIR"/*.json; do [[ -f "$LOG_FILE" ]] || continue BASENAME=$(basename "$LOG_FILE" .json) OUTPUT_FILE="$LOGGING_OUTPUT_DIR/${BASENAME}.tgz" echo "āļø [Logging] Compiling $(basename "$LOG_FILE") -> $(basename "$OUTPUT_FILE")" docker run --rm \ -v "$LOGGING_INPUT_DIR":"$LOGGING_INPUT_DIR" \ -v "$LOGGING_OUTPUT_DIR":"$LOGGING_OUTPUT_DIR" \ "$DOCKER_IMAGE" \ -l "$LOG_FILE" \ -o "$OUTPUT_FILE" done else echo "ā ļø Skipping logging config compilation: directory '$LOGGING_INPUT_DIR' does not exist." fi # ======================== # COMPLETION MESSAGE # ======================== RUNTIME=$SECONDS printf "\nā Compilation complete.\n" echo " - Policies output: $POLICY_OUTPUT_DIR" echo " - Logging output: $LOGGING_OUTPUT_DIR" echo printf "ā±ļø Total time taken: %02d minutes %02d seconds\n" $((RUNTIME / 60)) $((RUNTIME % 60)) echo waf_policy_auto_compile.sh: #!/bin/bash ############################################################################### # waf_policy_auto_compile.sh # # - Only prints colorized summary output to terminal if -v/--verbose is used # - Mails a styled HTML report using a template, substituting version numbers/status/colors # - Debug output (step_log) only to syslog if -d/--debug is used # - Otherwise: completely silent except for errors # - All main blocks are modularized in functions ############################################################################### set -euo pipefail IFS=$'\n\t' # ===== CONFIGURABLE VARIABLES ===== WORKROOT="/root/napv5" WORKDIR="$WORKROOT/waf-compiler" DOCKERFILE="$WORKDIR/Dockerfile" BUNDLE_DIR="$WORKDIR/test" NEW_BUNDLE="$BUNDLE_DIR/test_new.tgz" OLD_BUNDLE="$BUNDLE_DIR/test_old.tgz" NEW_META="$BUNDLE_DIR/test_new_meta.json" COMPILER_IMAGE="waf-compiler-latest:custom" EMAIL_RECIPIENT="example@example.com" EMAIL_SUBJECT="WAF Compiler Update Notification" NGINX_RELOAD_CMD="docker exec nginx-plus nginx -s reload" HTML_TEMPLATE="$WORKDIR/version_report_template.html" HTML_REPORT="$WORKDIR/version_report.html" VERBOSE=0 DEBUG=0 # ===== DEBUG AND ERROR LOGGING ===== exec 2> >(tee -a /tmp/waf_policy_auto_compile_error.log | /usr/bin/logger -t waf_policy_auto_compile_error) step_log() { if [ "$DEBUG" -eq 1 ]; then echo "DEBUG: $1" | /usr/bin/logger -t waf_policy_auto_compile fi } # ===== ARGUMENT PARSING ===== while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do case "$1" in -v|--verbose) VERBOSE=1 shift ;; -d|--debug) DEBUG=1 echo "Debug log can be found in the syslog..." shift ;; -*) echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2 exit 1 ;; *) shift ;; esac done # ----- LOG INITIAL ENVIRONMENT IF DEBUG ----- step_log "waf_policy_auto_compile starting (PID $$)" step_log "Script PATH: $PATH" step_log "which docker: $(which docker 2>/dev/null)" step_log "which jq: $(which jq 2>/dev/null)" # ===== COLOR DEFINITIONS ===== color_reset="\033[0m" color_green="\033[1;32m" color_yellow="\033[1;33m" # ===== LOGGING FUNCTIONS ===== log() { # Only log to terminal if VERBOSE is enabled if [ "$VERBOSE" -eq 1 ]; then echo "[$(date --iso-8601=seconds)] $*" fi } # ===== HTML REPORT GENERATOR ===== generate_html_report() { local attack_old="$1" local attack_new="$2" local attack_status="$3" local attack_class="$4" local bot_old="$5" local bot_new="$6" local bot_status="$7" local bot_class="$8" local threat_old="$9" local threat_new="${10}" local threat_status="${11}" local threat_class="${12}" local datetime datetime=$(date --iso-8601=seconds) cp "$HTML_TEMPLATE" "$HTML_REPORT" sed -i "s|{{ATTACK_OLD}}|$attack_old|g" "$HTML_REPORT" sed -i "s|{{ATTACK_NEW}}|$attack_new|g" "$HTML_REPORT" sed -i "s|{{ATTACK_STATUS}}|$attack_status|g" "$HTML_REPORT" sed -i "s|{{ATTACK_CLASS}}|$attack_class|g" "$HTML_REPORT" sed -i "s|{{BOT_OLD}}|$bot_old|g" "$HTML_REPORT" sed -i "s|{{BOT_NEW}}|$bot_new|g" "$HTML_REPORT" sed -i "s|{{BOT_STATUS}}|$bot_status|g" "$HTML_REPORT" sed -i "s|{{BOT_CLASS}}|$bot_class|g" "$HTML_REPORT" sed -i "s|{{THREAT_OLD}}|$threat_old|g" "$HTML_REPORT" sed -i "s|{{THREAT_NEW}}|$threat_new|g" "$HTML_REPORT" sed -i "s|{{THREAT_STATUS}}|$threat_status|g" "$HTML_REPORT" sed -i "s|{{THREAT_CLASS}}|$threat_class|g" "$HTML_REPORT" sed -i "s|{{RUN_DATETIME}}|$datetime|g" "$HTML_REPORT" } # ===== BUILD COMPILER IMAGE ===== build_compiler() { step_log "about to build_compiler" docker build --no-cache --platform linux/amd64 \ --secret id=nginx-crt,src="$WORKROOT/nginx-repo.crt" \ --secret id=nginx-key,src="$WORKROOT/nginx-repo.key" \ -t "$COMPILER_IMAGE" \ -f "$DOCKERFILE" "$WORKDIR" > "$WORKDIR/waf_compiler_build.log" 2>&1 || { echo "ERROR: docker build failed. Dumping build log:" | /usr/bin/logger -t waf_policy_auto_compile_error cat "$WORKDIR/waf_compiler_build.log" | /usr/bin/logger -t waf_policy_auto_compile_error exit 1 } step_log "after build_compiler" } # ===== COMPILE TEST POLICY ===== compile_test_policy() { step_log "about to compile_test_policy" docker run --rm -v "$BUNDLE_DIR:/bundle" "$COMPILER_IMAGE" \ -p /bundle/test.json -o /bundle/test_new.tgz > "$NEW_META" step_log "after compile_test_policy" if [ -f "$NEW_META" ]; then step_log "$(cat "$NEW_META")" else step_log "NEW_META does not exist" fi } # ===== CHECK OLD_BUNDLE ===== check_old_bundle() { step_log "about to check OLD_BUNDLE" if [ -f "$OLD_BUNDLE" ]; then step_log "$(ls -l "$OLD_BUNDLE")" else step_log "OLD_BUNDLE does not exist" fi } # ===== GET NEW VERSIONS FUNCTION ===== get_new_versions() { jq -r ' { "attack": .attack_signatures_package.version, "bot": .bot_signatures_package.version, "threat": .threat_campaigns_package.version }' "$NEW_META" } # ===== VERSION EXTRACTION FROM OLD BUNDLE ===== extract_bundle_versions() { docker run --rm -v "$BUNDLE_DIR:/bundle" "$COMPILER_IMAGE" \ -dump -bundle "/bundle/test_old.tgz" } extract_versions_from_dump() { extract_bundle_versions | awk ' BEGIN { print "{" } /attack-signatures:/ { in_attack=1; next } /bot-signatures:/ { in_bot=1; next } /threat-campaigns:/ { in_threat=1; next } in_attack && /version:/ { gsub("version: ", "") printf "\"attack\":\"%s\",\n", $1 in_attack=0 } in_bot && /version:/ { gsub("version: ", "") printf "\"bot\":\"%s\",\n", $1 in_bot=0 } in_threat && /version:/ { gsub("version: ", "") printf "\"threat\":\"%s\"\n", $1 in_threat=0 } END { print "}" } ' } get_old_versions() { extract_versions_from_dump } # ===== GET & PRINT VERSIONS ===== get_versions() { step_log "about to get_new_versions" new_versions=$(get_new_versions) step_log "new_versions: $new_versions" step_log "after get_new_versions" step_log "about to get_old_versions" old_versions=$(get_old_versions) step_log "old_versions: $old_versions" step_log "after get_old_versions" } # ===== VERSION COMPARISON ===== compare_versions() { step_log "compare_versions start" attack_old=$(echo "$old_versions" | jq -r .attack) attack_new=$(echo "$new_versions" | jq -r .attack) bot_old=$(echo "$old_versions" | jq -r .bot) bot_new=$(echo "$new_versions" | jq -r .bot) threat_old=$(echo "$old_versions" | jq -r .threat) threat_new=$(echo "$new_versions" | jq -r .threat) attack_status=$([[ "$attack_old" != "$attack_new" ]] && echo "Updated" || echo "No Change") bot_status=$([[ "$bot_old" != "$bot_new" ]] && echo "Updated" || echo "No Change") threat_status=$([[ "$threat_old" != "$threat_new" ]] && echo "Updated" || echo "No Change") attack_class=$([[ "$attack_status" == "Updated" ]] && echo "warn" || echo "ok") bot_class=$([[ "$bot_status" == "Updated" ]] && echo "warn" || echo "ok") threat_class=$([[ "$threat_status" == "Updated" ]] && echo "warn" || echo "ok") echo "Attack:$attack_status Bot:$bot_status Threat:$threat_status" > "$WORKDIR/status_flags.txt" [[ "$attack_status" == "Updated" ]] && attack_status_colored="${color_yellow}*** Updated ***${color_reset}" || attack_status_colored="${color_green}No Change${color_reset}" [[ "$bot_status" == "Updated" ]] && bot_status_colored="${color_yellow}*** Updated ***${color_reset}" || bot_status_colored="${color_green}No Change${color_reset}" [[ "$threat_status" == "Updated" ]] && threat_status_colored="${color_yellow}*** Updated ***${color_reset}" || threat_status_colored="${color_green}No Change${color_reset}" { echo -e "Version comparison for container \033[1mNAPv5\033[0m:\n" echo -e "Attack Signatures:" echo -e " Current Version: $attack_old" echo -e " New Version: $attack_new" echo -e " Status: $attack_status_colored\n" echo -e "Threat Campaigns:" echo -e " Current Version: $threat_old" echo -e " New Version: $threat_new" echo -e " Status: $threat_status_colored\n" echo -e "Bot Signatures:" echo -e " Current Version: $bot_old" echo -e " New Version: $bot_new" echo -e " Status: $bot_status_colored" } > "$WORKDIR/version_report.ansi" sed 's/\x1B\[[0-9;]*[mK]//g' "$WORKDIR/version_report.ansi" > "$WORKDIR/version_report.txt" step_log "Calling log_versions_syslog" log_versions_syslog "$attack_old" "$attack_new" "$attack_status" "$attack_class" \ "$bot_old" "$bot_new" "$bot_status" "$bot_class" \ "$threat_old" "$threat_new" "$threat_status" "$threat_class" step_log "compare_versions finished" } # ===== SYSLOG VERSION LOGGING and HTML REPORT GEN ===== log_versions_syslog() { # Args: # 1-attack_old 2-attack_new 3-attack_status 4-attack_class # 5-bot_old 6-bot_new 7-bot_status 8-bot_class # 9-threat_old 10-threat_new 11-threat_status 12-threat_class local msg msg="AttackSig (current: $1, latest: $2), BotSig (current: $5, latest: $6), ThreatCamp (current: $9, latest: $10)" /usr/bin/logger -t waf_policy_auto_compile "$msg" # Also print to terminal if VERBOSE is enabled if [ "$VERBOSE" -eq 1 ]; then echo "$msg" fi # Always (re)generate HTML for the mail at this point generate_html_report "$@" } # ===== RESPONSE ACTIONS ===== compile_all_policies() { log "Change detected ā compiling all policies..." if [ "$VERBOSE" -eq 1 ]; then "$WORKDIR/compile_waf_policies.sh" else "$WORKDIR/compile_waf_policies.sh" > /dev/null 2>&1 fi } reload_nginx() { log "Reloading NGINX..." eval "$NGINX_RELOAD_CMD" } rotate_bundles() { log "Archiving new test bundle as old..." mv "$NEW_BUNDLE" "$OLD_BUNDLE" rm -f "$NEW_META" } send_report_email() { local html_report="$1" mail -s "$EMAIL_SUBJECT" -a "Content-Type: text/html" "$EMAIL_RECIPIENT" < "$html_report" } # ===== MAIN LOGIC ===== main() { build_compiler compile_test_policy check_old_bundle get_versions compare_versions if [[ "$VERBOSE" -eq 1 ]]; then cat "$WORKDIR/version_report.ansi" fi if grep -q "Updated" "$WORKDIR/status_flags.txt"; then if [[ "$VERBOSE" -eq 1 ]]; then echo "Detected updates. Recompiling policies, reloading NGINX, sending report." fi compile_all_policies reload_nginx rotate_bundles send_report_email "$HTML_REPORT" else log "No changes detected ā nothing to do." fi log "Done." } main "$@" And should be it.NGINX Plus Request body Rate Limit with the NJS module and javascript
The nginx njs module allows javascript to process the code or as they call it on the backend nodejs. The module is dynamic for Nginx Plus https://docs.nginx.com/nginx/admin-guide/dynamic-modules/dynamic-modules/ while for the community nginx it needs to be compiled. The code and nginx configuration are also present at: https://github.com/Nikoolayy1/nginx_njs_request_body_limit/tree/main I have used the example rate limiter from https://github.com/nginx/njs-examples and https://clouddocs.f5.com/training/community/nginx/html/class3/class3.html and modified rate limit example to be based on the request body. It works as expected. The "r.internalRedirect('@app-backend');" internal redirect is needed as nginx by default does not populate or save the request body and this is why the request needs to pass 2 times in nginx proxy for the body variable to be properly populated! The nginx plus rootless container is a great option for F5 XC RE where root containers are not accepted and for Nginx on XC RE I have made another article at F5 XC vk8s open source nginx deployment on RE | DevCentral NJS "main" file code: const defaultResponse = "0"; const user = 'username'; const pass = 'username'; function ratelimit(r) { switch (r.method) { case 'POST': var body = r.requestText; r.log(`body: ${body}`); if (r.headersIn['Content-Type'] != 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' || !body.length) { r.internalRedirect('@app-backend'); return; } var result_user = body.includes(user); var result_pass = body.includes(pass); if (!result_user) { r.internalRedirect('@app-backend'); return; } const zone = r.variables['rl_zone_name']; const kv = zone && ngx.shared && ngx.shared[zone]; if (!kv) { r.log(`ratelimit: ${zone} js_shared_dict_zone not found`); r.internalRedirect('@app-backend'); return; } const key = r.variables['rl_key'] || r.variables['remote_addr']; const window = Number(r.variables['rl_windows_ms']) || 60000; const limit = Number(r.variables['rl_limit']) || 10; const now = Date.now(); let requestData = kv.get(key); if (requestData === undefined || requestData.length === 0) { requestData = { timestamp: now, count: 1 } kv.set(key, JSON.stringify(requestData)); r.internalRedirect('@app-backend'); return; } try { requestData = JSON.parse(requestData); } catch (e) { requestData = { timestamp: now, count: 1 } kv.set(key, JSON.stringify(requestData)); r.internalRedirect('@app-backend'); return; } if (!requestData) { requestData = { timestamp: now, count: 1 } kv.set(key, JSON.stringify(requestData)); r.internalRedirect('@app-backend'); return; } if (now - requestData.timestamp >= window) { requestData.timestamp = now; requestData.count = 1; } else { requestData.count++; } const elapsed = now - requestData.timestamp; r.log(`limit: ${limit} window: ${window} elapsed: ${elapsed} count: ${requestData.count} timestamp: ${requestData.timestamp}`) let retryAfter = 0; if (requestData.count > limit) { retryAfter = 1; } kv.set(key, JSON.stringify(requestData)); if (retryAfter) { r.return(401, "Unauthorized\n"); return; } default: r.internalRedirect('@app-backend'); return; } } export default {sub, header, ratelimit, parseRequestBody, log}; Nginx nginx.conf file: server { listen 80 default_server; server_name localhost; access_log /var/log/nginx/host.access.log main; js_var $rl_zone_name kv; # shared dict zone name; requred variable js_var $rl_windows_ms 30000; # optional window in miliseconds; default 1 minute window if not set js_var $rl_limit 3; # optional limit for the window; default 10 requests if not set js_var $rl_key $remote_addr; # rate limit key; default remote_addr if not set js_set $rl_result main.ratelimit; # call ratelimit function that returns retry-after value if limit is exceeded root /var/www/html; index index.html; include /etc/nginx/mime.types; error_log /var/log/nginx/host.error_log debug; if ($target) { return 401; } location / { js_content main.ratelimit; } location @app-backend { internal; proxy_pass http://backend; } location /backend { internal; proxy_set_header Host httpforever.com; proxy_pass http://backend/; } Summary: There is another example how to populate the internal request body variable using that is needed by the njs module using the " mirror " option, shown at https://www.f5.com/company/blog/nginx/deploying-nginx-plus-as-an-api-gateway-part-2-protecting-backend-services but it did not work for me, so I used the " internal " option with "r.internalRedirect(uri)" https://nginx.org/en/docs/njs/reference.html Nginx njs feature r.subrequest can be used to populate response headers and body but mainly it is for logging and not for rate limiting and I think making a real http subrequest using javascript is not optimal and will not scale well, so I will not recommend this option as rate limiters are best left to be request based. Also I saw strange bug that the subrequest changes the content type header of the response and I had use "js_header_filter" to again change the response header.Nginx App Protect has the BD process from F5 BIG-IP AWAF/ASM that has DOS protections that can monitor the Server's response latency dynamically and make auto thresholds!NGINX App Protect v5 Signature Notifications
When working with NAP (NGINX App Protect) you don't have an easy way of knowing when any of the signatures are updated. As an old BigIP guy I find that rather strange. Here you have build-in automatic updates and notifications. Unfortunately there isn't any API's you can probe which would have been the best way of doing it. Hopefully it will come one day. However, "friction" and "hard" will not keep me from finding a solution š I have previously made a solution for NAPv4 and I have tried mentally to get me going on a NAPv5 version. The reason for the delay is in the different way NAPv4 and NAPv5 are designed. Where NAPv4 is one module loaded in NGINX, NAPv5 is completely detached from NGINX (well almost, you still need to load a small module to get the traffic from NGINX to NAP) and only works with containers. NAPv5 has moved the signature "storage" from the actual host it is running on (e.g. an installed package) to the policy. This has the consequence that finding a valid "source of truth", for the latest signature versions, is not as simple as building a new image and see which versions got installed. There are very good reasons for this design that I will come back to later. When you fire up NAPv5 you got three containers for the data plane (NGINX, waf-enforcer and waf-config-mgr) and one for the "control plane" (waf-compiler). For this solution the "control plane" is the useful one. It isn't really a control plane but it gives a nice picture of how it is detached from the actual processing of traffic. When you update your signatures you are actually doing it through the waf-compiler. The waf-compiler is a container hosting the actual signature databases and every time a new verison is released you need to rebuild this container and compile your policies into a new version and reload NGINX. And this is what I take advantage of when I look for signature updates. It has the upside that you only need the waf-compiler to get the information you need. My solution will take care of the entire process and make sure that you are always running with the latest signatures. Back to the reason why the split of functions is a very good thing. When you build a new version of the NGINX image and deploy it into production, NAP needs to compile the policies as they load. During the compilation NGINX is not moving any traffic! This becomes a annoying problem even when you have a low number of policies. I have installations where it takes 5 to 10 minutes from deployment of the new image until it starts moving traffic. That is a crazy long time when you are used to working with micro-services and expect everything to flip within seconds. If you have your NAPv4 hooked up to a NGINX Instance Manager (NIM) the problem is somewhat mitigated as NIM will compile the policies before sending them to the gateways. NIM is not a nimble piece of software so it doesn't always fit into the environment. And now here is my hack to the notification problem: The solution consist of two bash scripts and one html template. The template is used when sending a notification mail. I wanted it to be pretty and that was easiest with html. Strictly speaking you could do with just a simple text based mail. Save all three in the same directory. The main script is called "waf_policy_auto_compile.sh"and is the one you put into crontab. The main script will build a new waf-compiler image and compile a test policy. The outcome of that is information about what versions are the newest. It will then extract versions from an old policy and simply see if any of the versions differ. For this to work you need to have an uncompiled policy (you can just use the default one) and a compiled version of it ready beforehand. When a diff has been identified the notification logic is executed and a second script is called: "compile_waf_policies.sh". It basically just trawls through the directory of you policies and logging profiles and compiles a new version of them all. It is not necessary to recompile the logging profiles, so this will probably change in the next version. As the compilation completes the main script will nudge NGINX to reload thus implement all the new versions. You can run "waf_policy_auto_compile.sh" with a verbose flag (-v) and a debug flag (-d). The verbose flag is intended to be used when you run it on a terminal and want the information displayed there. Debug is, well, for debug š The construction of the scripts are based on my own needs but they should be easy to adjust for any need. I will be happy for any feedback, so please don't hold back šDeploying NGINXplus with AppProtect in Tanzu Kubernetes Grid
Introduction Tanzu Kubernetes Grid (aka TKG) is VMware's main Kubernetes offering. Although Tanzu Kubernetes Grid is a certified conformant Kubernetes offering the different Kubernetes offerings can be customized in different ways. In the case of TKG a remarkable feature is the use of Pod Security Policies by default. TKG clusters are very easily spin-up in either public or private clouds by means of creating a single declaration YAML file such as the following: apiVersion: run.tanzu.vmware.com/v1alpha1 kind: TanzuKubernetesCluster metadata: name: tkg1 namespace: tkg1 spec: distribution: version: v1.18.15+vmware.1-tkg.1.600e412 topology: controlPlane: count: 1 class: best-effort-medium storageClass: vsan-default-storage-policy workers: count: 1 class: best-effort-medium storageClass: vsan-default-storage-policy As you can see from the schema a TKG cluster is deployed just as another Kubernetes resource. How does it work? In the case of public clouds, these TanzuKubernetesCluster resources are instantiated from a bootstrap cluster named "management Kubernetes cluster" whilst when using vSphere with Tanzu, the TanzuKubernetesCluster resources are instantiated from vSphere with Tanzu's supervisor cluster. In this blog post it will be shown an example from start to end: Creating wildcard certificate from custom CA with easy-rsa. Enabling Harbor registry. Installing NGINXplus with AppProtect. Using NGINXplus Ingress Controller without AppProtect. Adding AppProtect to an Ingress resource. AppProtect is an NGINXplus module for WAF and Bot protection based on market leading F5 BIG-IP's ASM. AppProtect provides enhanced capabilities and performance for those who require more than what mod_auth provides. We will finish with two relevant considerations: Updating NGINXplus Ingress controller using Helm. This is used for example for scaling-out NGINXplus hence improving the overall performance. Using NGINXplus alongside with other Ingress Controllers (such as Contour). Prerequisites You need an NGINXplus license which can be retrieved from https://www.nginx.com/free-trial-request-nginx-ingress-controller/. This license is in practice a cert/key pair with the file names nginx-repo.{crt,key} referenced later on. The following software needs to be present in your in your machine: Docker v18.09+ GNU Make git Helm3 OpenSSL https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa.git Create a wildcard certificate with easy-rsa In the next steps it will be created a Certificate Authority (CA) and from it a wildcard certificate/key pair which will be loaded into Kubernetes as a TLS secret. This wildcard certificate will be used by all the services which will expose through Ingress. Retrieve easy-rsa and initialize a CA (output summarized): $ git clone https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa.git $ cd easyrsa3/ $ ./easyrsa init-pki $ ./easyrsa build-ca Generate the wildcard key/cert pair (output summarized): $ ./easyrsa gen-req wildcard Common Name (eg: your user, host, or server name) [wildcard]:*.tkg.bd.f5.com Keypair and certificate request completed. Your files are: req: /Users/alonsocamaro/Documents/VMware-Tanzu/tanzu/easy-rsa/easyrsa3/pki/reqs/wildcard.req key: /Users/alonsocamaro/Documents/VMware-Tanzu/tanzu/easy-rsa/easyrsa3/pki/private/wildcard.key $ ./easyrsa sign-req server wildcard Request subject, to be signed as a server certificate for 825 days: subject= commonName = *.tkg.bd.f5.com The Subject's Distinguished Name is as follows commonName :ASN.1 12:'*.tkg.bd.f5.com' Certificate is to be certified until Aug 21 15:58:24 2023 GMT (825 days) Write out database with 1 new entries Data Base Updated Certificate created at: /Users/alonsocamaro/Documents/VMware-Tanzu/tanzu/easy-rsa/easyrsa3/pki/issued/wildcard.crt The certificate is stored in ./pki/issued/wildcard.crt and the key is stored encrypted in pki/private/wildcard.key. Import these into a Kubernetes secret using the next steps: $ openssl rsa -in ./pki/private/wildcard.key -out ./pki/private/wildcard-unencrypted.key Enter pass phrase for ./pki/private/wildcard.key: writing RSA key $ kubectl create ns ingress-nginx $ kubectl create -n ingress-nginx secret tls wildcard-tls --key ./pki/private/wildcard-unencrypted.key --cert ./pki/issued/wildcard.crt secret/wildcard-tls created $ rm ./pki/private/wildcard-unencrypted.key As you might have noticed the secret is loaded in the namespace ingress-nginx where NGINXplus Ingress Controller will be installed. Enable your image registry in Tanzu You need an image registry. When using vSphere with Tanzu this comes with Harbor. In this case you have to follow the next steps: Enable Harbor by following https://docs.vmware.com/en/VMware-vSphere/7.0/vmware-vsphere-with-tanzu/GUID-AE24CF79-3C74-4CCD-B7C7-757AD082D86A.html. Trust Harbor's self-signed certificate: In the case of using vSphere with Tanzu Update 2 (U2) follow https://tanzu.vmware.com/content/blog/how-to-set-up-harbor-registry-self-signed-certificates-tanzu-kubernetes-clusters. If using a previous version follow https://cormachogan.com/2020/06/23/integrating-embedded-vsphere-with-kubernetes-harbor-registry-with-tkg-guest-clusters/ with the caveat that you will need to re-apply the changes if you upgrade the TKG cluster. Alternatively, you could also use your own certificates and follow https://docs.vmware.com/en/VMware-Tanzu-Kubernetes-Grid/1.3/vmware-tanzu-kubernetes-grid-13/GUID-cluster-lifecycle-secrets.html#trust-custom-ca-certificates-on-cluster-nodes-3. Installing NGINXplus Ingress Controller This blog shows step by step everything that needs to be done to create an AppProtect-secured Ingress Controller with a wildcard certificate that will created as well. This blog only assumes that the TKG cluster is up and running. If you want to perform further customizations you can check https://docs.nginx.com/nginx-ingress-controller and https://docs.nginx.com/nginx-app-protect/configuration. In this blog it has been used TKG 1.3 in vSphere with Tanzu with NSX-T. The steps are similar when using any other supported TKG environment. Build the NGINXplus DOCKER image Define the registry endpoint and namespace where the TKG cluster will be deployed: $ REGISTRY=<registry IP or FQDN> $ NS=<your namespace> Log in the registry $ docker login $REGISTRY Username: <your user> Password: <your password> Login Succeeded Retrieve NGINXplus $ git clone https://github.com/nginxinc/kubernetes-ingress/ $ cd kubernetes-ingress $ git checkout v1.11.1 Copy the license files into base folder of NGINXplus $ cp $LICDIR/nginx-repo.{crt,key} . Build the image $ make debian-image-nap-plus PREFIX=$REGISTRY/$NS/nginx-plus-ingress TARGET=container Docker version 19.03.8, build afacb8b docker build --build-arg IC_VERSION=1.11.1-32745366 --build-arg GIT_COMMIT=32745366 --build-arg VERSION=1.11.1 --target container -f build/Dockerfile -t 10.105.210.67/tkg1/nginx-plus-ingress:1.11.1 . --build-arg BUILD_OS=debian-plus-ap --build-arg PLUS=-plus --secret id=nginx-repo.crt,src=nginx-repo.crt --secret id=nginx-repo.key,src=nginx-repo.key [+] Building 4.9s (24/24) FINISHED After this we can verify the image is ready in our local docker: $ docker images REPOSITORY TAG IMAGE ID CREATED SIZE $REGISTRY/$NS/nginx-plus-ingress 1.11.1 70113ec38914 35 minutes ago 626MB If we wanted to push it into another namespace we would perform an image tag operation as follows: docker image tag 70113ec38914 $REGISTRY/$ANOTHERNS/nginx-plus-ingress:1.11.1 Upload the image into the repository: make push PREFIX=$REGISTRY/$NS/nginx-plus-ingress Configure NGINXplus installation Switch to the helm chart folder cd deployments/helm-chart Make a backup of the default nginx-plus config file cp values-plus.yaml values-plus.yaml.orig We will edit the file values-plus.yaml as follows in order to: Enable AppProtect Allow to specify a wildcard TLS certificate that we will use for all the services. Expose NGINXplus using a LoadBalancer with a Cluster externalTrafficPolicy. Exposing NGINXplus (or any other Ingress Controller such as Contour) using Cluster externalTrafficPolicy is required given that the NSX-T native load balancer doesn't perform any health checking when creating a Service of Type LoadBalancer. We will see how to improve this in future blogs with the use of BIG-IP. controller: nginxplus: true image: repository: nginx-plus-ingress tag: "1.11.1" service: externalTrafficPolicy: Cluster appprotect: ## Enable the App Protect module in the Ingress Controller. enable: true wildcardTLS: ## The base64-encoded TLS certificate for every Ingress host that has TLS enabled but no secret specified. ## If the parameter is not set, for such Ingress hosts NGINX will break any attempt to establish a TLS connection. cert: "" ## The base64-encoded TLS key for every Ingress host that has TLS enabled but no secret specified. ## If the parameter is not set, for such Ingress hosts NGINX will break any attempt to establish a TLS connection. key: "" ## The secret with a TLS certificate and key for every Ingress host that has TLS enabled but no secret specified. ## The value must follow the following format: `<namespace>/<name>`. ## Used as an alternative to specifying a certificate and key using `controller.wildcardTLS.cert` and `controller.wildcardTLS.key` parameters. ## Format: <namespace>/<secret_name> secret: ingress-nginx/wildcard-tls This file can also be found in https://raw.githubusercontent.com/f5devcentral/f5-bd-tanzu-tkg-nginxplus/main/values-plus.yaml Apply the required PodSecurityPolicy before NGINXplus installation The next step creates a PodSecurityPolicy which is required by Tanzu Kubernetes Grid and it is bound to the Service Account ingress-nginx used in the regular NGINXplus install. $ kubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/f5devcentral/f5-bd-tanzu-tkg-nginxplus/main/nginx-psp.yaml podsecuritypolicy.policy/ingress-nginx created clusterrole.rbac.authorization.k8s.io/ingress-nginx-psp created clusterrolebinding.rbac.authorization.k8s.io/ingress-nginx-psp created Install NGINXplus Ingress controller using Helm From the deployments/helm-chart directory of the downloaded NGINXplus, it is just needed to run the next command: $ helm -n ingress-nginx install ingress-nginx -f values-plus.yaml . NAME: ingress-nginx LAST DEPLOYED: Mon May 17 15:16:20 2021 NAMESPACE: ingress-nginx STATUS: deployed REVISION: 1 TEST SUITE: None NOTES: The NGINX Ingress Controller has been installed. Checking the resulting installation When checking the resulting resources we can see that by default a single POD is created. We can scale up/down this as required by using Helm. This will be shown later on. Note also that by default the NGINXplus Ingress Controller is automatically exposed using the Service Type LoadBalancer resource which configures an external load balancer. In this case the external load balancer is NSX-T's native LB as shown in the screenshot. below When using vSphere networking this would have been HAproxy by default. In next blogs we will show how to use F5 BIG-IP in TKG clusters instead. $ kubectl -n ingress-nginx get all NAME READY STATUS RESTARTS AGE pod/ingress-nginx-nginx-ingress-7d4587b44c-n9b8l 1/1 Running 0 16h NAME TYPE CLUSTER-IP EXTERNAL-IP PORT(S) AGE service/ingress-nginx-nginx-ingress LoadBalancer 100.69.127.66 10.105.210.68 80:30527/TCP,443:31185/TCP 16h NAME READY UP-TO-DATE AVAILABLE AGE deployment.apps/ingress-nginx-nginx-ingress 1/1 1 1 16h NAME DESIRED CURRENT READY AGE replicaset.apps/ingress-nginx-nginx-ingress-7d4587b44c 1 1 1 16h In the next screenshots we can see the resulting configuration in NSX-T: Both pools for port 80 and port 443 point to the worker's node addresses. This means that the traffic flow will be NSX-T LB -> ClusterIP -> Ingress Controller's POD address (in the same or in another node). This is the case of any regular Ingress Controller including TKG's provided Contour. In next blogs it will be shown how these many layers of indirection can be bypassed using F5 BIG-IP. Using NGINXplus Ingress Controller without AppProtect Creating a regular Ingress resource In this initial example we will create two services (coffee and tea) which will be exposed with an Ingress resource called cafe-ingress. This will expose the services in the URL https://cafe.tkg.bd.f5.com/coffee and https://cafe.tkg.bd.f5.com/tea using the previously created wildcard certificate for *.tkg.bd.f5.com as depicted in the next diagram. To create this setup run the following commands: $ kubectl create ns test $ kubectl -n test -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/f5devcentral/f5-bd-tanzu-tkg-nginxplus/main/cafe-rbac.yaml $ kubectl -n test -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/f5devcentral/f5-bd-tanzu-tkg-nginxplus/main/cafe.yaml $ kubectl -n test -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/f5devcentral/f5-bd-tanzu-tkg-nginxplus/main/cafe-ingress.yaml This is the same example provided in the official NGINXplus documentation but we add the cafe-rbac.yaml declaration which creates the necessary PodSecurity policies and bindings for TKG. To verify the result first we will check the Ingress resource itself: $ kubectl -n test get ingress NAME CLASS HOSTS ADDRESS PORTS AGE cafe-ingress nginx cafe.tkg.bd.f5.com 10.105.210.68 80, 443 3m44s where we can observe that the IP address is the one of the external loadbalancer seen before. To verify it is all working as expected we will use curl as follows: $ curl --cacert ca-tkg.bd.f5.com.crt --resolve cafe.tkg.bd.f5.com:443:10.105.210.68 https://cafe.tkg.bd.f5.com/coffee Server address: 100.96.1.16:8080 Server name: coffee-86954d94fd-pnvpq Date: 18/May/2021:16:18:59 +0000 URI: /coffee Request ID: 63964930a2d1038af5f204ef8fbe91fc which has the following key parameters: Use --cacert to specify our CA crt file previously created Use --resolve to allow curl resolve the FQDN of the request Adding AppProtect to an Ingress resource Additional configuration Our deployed NGINXplus has AppProtect built-in. It is up to the user of the Ingress resource if it wants to enable it, on a per Ingress basis. In our example we will apply the AppProtect security policies in the user namespace "test". We will also create a syslog store in the ingress-nginx namespace. All these can be customized. Ultimately, the user just needs to add the following annotations in order to secure the cafe site: annotations: appprotect.f5.com/app-protect-policy: "test/dataguard-alarm" appprotect.f5.com/app-protect-enable: "True" appprotect.f5.com/app-protect-security-log-enable: "True" appprotect.f5.com/app-protect-security-log: "test/logconf" appprotect.f5.com/app-protect-security-log-destination: "syslog:server=100.70.175.24:514" The custom AppProtect policy used in this example contains DataGuard protection for Credit Card Number, US Social Security number leaks and a custom signature. It is also defined where to send the AppProtect logs. These are sent in SYSLOG/TCP mode independently of the regular logs generated by NGINXplus. To make all these happen first we will create the syslog server: kubectl apply -n ingress-nginx -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/f5devcentral/f5-bd-tanzu-tkg-nginxplus/main/syslog-rbac.yaml kubectl apply -n ingress-nginx -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/f5devcentral/f5-bd-tanzu-tkg-nginxplus/main/syslog.yaml Next, we will create the AppProtect policies: kubectl apply -n test -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/f5devcentral/f5-bd-tanzu-tkg-nginxplus/main/ap-apple-uds.yaml kubectl apply -n test -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/f5devcentral/f5-bd-tanzu-tkg-nginxplus/main/ap-dataguard-alarm-policy.yaml kubectl apply -n test -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/f5devcentral/f5-bd-tanzu-tkg-nginxplus/main/ap-logconf.yaml Finally we will add the above annotations to the Ingress resource. For that, we will need to get SYSLOG's POD address and replace it in the cafe-ingress-ap.yaml definition. curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/f5devcentral/f5-bd-tanzu-tkg-nginxplus/main/cafe-ingress-ap.yaml SYSLOG_IP=<IP address of syslog's POD> sed -e "s/SYSLOG/$SYSLOG_IP/" cafe-ingress-ap.yaml > cafe-ingress-ap-syslog.yaml kubectl apply -n test -f cafe-ingress-ap-syslog.yaml Note: it might take few seconds to make the AppProtect configuration effective. Verifying AppProtect Run the following command to watch the requests live as handled by AppProtect: kubectl -n ingress-nginx exec -it <SYSLOG POD NAME> -- tail -f /var/log/messages Send a request that triggers the custom signature: curl --cacert ca-tkg.bd.f5.com.crt --resolve cafe.tkg.bd.f5.com:443:10.105.210.69 "https://cafe.tkg.bd.f5.com/coffee/" -X POST -d "apple" You should see a log similar to the following one in the syslog logs: May 24 13:43:23 ingress-nginx-nginx-ingress-7d4587b44c-wvrxs ASM:attack_type="Non-browser Client,Brute Force Attack",blocking_exception_reason="N/A",date_time="2021-05-24 13:43:23",dest_port="443",ip_client="10.105.210.69",is_truncated="false",method="POST",policy_name="dataguard-alarm",protocol="HTTPS",request_status="blocked",response_code="0",severity="Critical",sig_cves="N/A",sig_ids="300000000",sig_names="Apple_medium_acc [Fruits]",sig_set_names="{apple_sigs}",src_port="4096",sub_violations="N/A",support_id="15704273797572010868",threat_campaign_names="N/A",unit_hostname="ingress-nginx-nginx-ingress-7d4587b44c-wvrxs",uri="/coffee/",violation_rating="3",vs_name="24-cafe.tkg.bd.f5.com:9-/coffee",x_forwarded_for_header_value="N/A",outcome="REJECTED",outcome_reason="SECURITY_WAF_VIOLATION",violations="Attack signature detected,Bot Client Detected",violation_details="<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><BAD_MSG><violation_masks><block>10000000200c00-3030430000070</block><alarm>2477f0ffcbbd0fea-8003f35cb000007c</alarm><learn>200000-20</learn><staging>0-0</staging></violation_masks><request-violations><violation><viol_index>42</viol_index><viol_name>VIOL_ATTACK_SIGNATURE</viol_name><context>request</context><sig_data><sig_id>300000000</sig_id><blocking_mask>7</blocking_mask><kw_data><buffer>YXBwbGU=</buffer><offset>0</offset><length>5</length></kw_data></sig_data></violation></request-violations></BAD_MSG>",bot_signature_name="curl",bot_category="HTTP Library",bot_anomalies="N/A",enforced_bot_anomalies="N/A",client_class="Untrusted Bot",request="POST /coffee/ HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: cafe.tkg.bd.f5.com\r\nUser-Agent: curl/7.64.1\r\nAccept: */*\r\nContent-Length: 5\r\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n\r\napple" Updating NGINXplus Ingress controller using Helm By default a single NGINXplus instance is created, if you want to increase the performance of it, scaling-out is as simple as editing the values-plus.yaml file and setting a replicaCount parameter with the desired value: controller: replicaCount: 4 And running helm upgrade as follows $ helm -n ingress-nginx upgrade ingress-nginx -f values-plus.yaml . Release "ingress-nginx" has been upgraded. Happy Helming! NAME: ingress-nginx LAST DEPLOYED: Thu May 20 14:20:38 2021 NAMESPACE: ingress-nginx STATUS: deployed REVISION: 2 TEST SUITE: None NOTES: The NGINX Ingress Controller has been installed. Using NGINXplus alongside with other Ingress Controllers (such as Contour). NGINXplus does support Ingress/v1 resource version available in Kubernetes 1.18+ as well as previous Ingress/v1beta1 API resource version for backwards compatibility. Contour Ingress Controller is provided in TKG by VMware as an add-on which is not installed by default. If installed, you have to be aware that Contour, at time of this writting (May 2021), only supports the older Ingress/v1beta1 API resource version. This means that when defining Ingress resources you have to specify the Ingress Controller to use by means of adding the following annotation: kubernetes.io/ingress.class: <ingress conroller name> where <ingress controller name> could be nginx or contour. For further details on this topic you can check https://docs.nginx.com/nginx-ingress-controller/installation/running-multiple-ingress-controllers/ Conclusion In this blog post we have gone through all the steps required to install and use NGINXplus with AppProtect in Tanzu Kubernetes Grid with a real world example. Overall, the installation is the same as in any Kubernetes but the following two items need to be taken into account: Before deploying, make sure that the appropriate PodSecurityPolicies are in place for either NGINXplus or the workloads. PodSecurityPolicies are not enabled by default in many Kubernetes distributions so this represents a change from the usual practice. If deploying NGINXplus alongside another Ingress Controller make sure that the Ingress resources are defined appropriately in order to select the right Ingress Controller for the corresponding Ingress resource. In this blog we used NGINXplus in a TKG cluster deployed in an on-premises infrastructure (vSphere with Tanzu) with the Antrea CNI and NSX-T networking. The steps would have been the same if it had been used vSphere networking or Calico CNI. The only difference could come when exposing it through the external load balancer. If the external load balancer performed health checking it would be preferable to use local externalTrafficPolicy since this avoids a hop and allows keeping the client source address. In future blogs we will post how to expose NGINXplus more effectively and in a cloud-agnostic manner by using BIG-IP as external load balancer.
