Hello everyone,
I’m facing an architectural challenge with our OCSP stapling setup on the BIG-IP and would appreciate your input.
We are planning to configure OCSP stapling across multiple virtual servers and partitions. However, our security team has strict requirements regarding firewall rules:
We want all outgoing connections to external OCSP responders to leave the BIG-IP via a single, centralized source IP (for example, the Management IP or a dedicated source IP). The goal is to avoid having to create new firewall and proxy rules for every single Self-IP or partition whenever we add a new OCSP configuration. By default as far as we know, the BIG-IP uses the local Self-IP of the respective traffic group/subnet for outgoing OCSP traffic.
We looked into solving this via an HTTP proxy pool with a fixed egress address (as mentioned in F5 K75106155). However, that approach doesn’t really solve our core problem, it just shifts it, because we would still need to manage firewall/network rules between the individual BIG-IP Self-IPs and the proxy itself.
Has anyone tackled a similar requirement before? Is there a native way in TMOS to force all OCSP stapling traffic globally or centrally through one specific source IP without adding complexity across partitions?
Thanks in advance for any advice!
Hello Tobias,
I’m trying to understand your deployment a bit better, so I have a few questions:
- How many partitions do you have, and does each one use its own route domain?
- If so, is Strict Isolation enabled on those route domains?
- Is this an HA pair, and are you using IPv4 only or IPv4/IPv6?
I’m not sure this will fully solve your problem, but it may be worth evaluating:
- Note that OCSP stapling is performed by TMM, so the requests cannot be sourced from the Management IP; they will always leave through a self IP.
- In /Common, create a dedicated VLAN (or route domain) with a self IP that has a route to the OCSP responders. This becomes your single egress point for firewall rules.
- In /Common, create one DNS resolver and one OCSP certificate validator
(sys crypto cert-validator ocsp), setting its dns-resolver and route-domain to that dedicated egress path.
- Reference that same validator from the certificates in the Client SSL profiles in every partition. Objects in /Common can be referenced from other partitions, so new OCSP configurations would not require new firewall rules.
Before rolling it out, I would validate it in a lab with tcpdump to confirm the actual source IP, and in an HA pair, check which self IP each unit uses. Also, take a look at Bug ID 686626, which describes unexpected source IPs when the DNS resolver and the virtual servers are in different non-zero route domains.
Hope this helps.
Note: I used AI to help me with the translation.
Quiroman81