BIG-IP iRulesLX FakeADFS - WS-Federation/SAML11
Details This was created as a solution to REPLACE the need for AD FS to tie APM into SharePoint. The goal was originally to demonstrate the flexibility of iRulesLX and also to find a way to add WS-Federation support very quickly. This solution is currently SP initiated, but wouldn't take much to handle IdP initiated as well. An example of the process flow is detailed in the following image. All that's needed for this solution is to create or import the iRulesLX workspace, configure SharePoint as if you are connecting to AD FS as a trusted Identity Provider, but point to a virtual server on the BIG-IP. Instructions First, ensure that you have a certificate / key for the IDP, as well as the CA Chain/Root CA. These do not have to be from the same domain CA that SharePoint lives on, if it exists. We are going to add these to SharePoint as trusted. On one of the SharePoint servers, open the SharePoint Management Powershell, issue the following. To import the Trusted Root CA, that issued the signing cert: $root = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509Certificate2("") New-SPTrustedRootAuthority -Name "Token Signing Cert Parent" -Certificate $root To import the Trusted Certificate $cert = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509Certificate2("") Next, create the Claim mappings for SharePoint: $emailClaimMap = New-SPClaimTypeMapping -IncomingClaimType "http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/emailaddress " -IncomingClaimTypeDisplayName "EmailAddress" –SameAsIncoming $upnClaimMap = New-SPClaimTypeMapping -IncomingClaimType "http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/upn " -IncomingClaimTypeDisplayName "UPN" –SameAsIncoming $roleClaimMap = New-SPClaimTypeMapping -IncomingClaimType "http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2008/06/identity/claims/role " -IncomingClaimTypeDisplayName "Role" –SameAsIncoming $sidClaimMap = New-SPClaimTypeMapping -IncomingClaimType "http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2008/06/identity/claims/primarysid " -IncomingClaimTypeDisplayName "SID" –SameAsIncoming Note: Additional claim options here. Next, create the Trusted Identity Provider. $realm = "urn:sharepoint:" $signInURL = "https:///adfs/ls" $ap = New-SPTrustedIdentityTokenIssuer -Name (ProviderName) -Description (ProviderDescription) -realm $realm -ImportTrustCertificate $cert -ClaimsMappings $emailClaimMap,$upnClaimMap,$roleClaimMap,$sidClaimMap -SignInUrl $signInURL -IdentifierClaim $emailClaimmap.InputClaimType To Associate a SharePoint Web Application with the new Identity Provider. To configure an existing web application to use the FakeADFS identity provider Verify that the user account that is performing this procedure is a member of the Farm Administrators SharePoint group. In Central Administration, on the home page, click Application Management. On the Application Management page, in the Web Applications section, click Manage web applications. Click the appropriate web application. From the ribbon, click Authentication Providers. Under Zone, click the name of the zone. For example, Default. On the Edit Authentication page in the Claims Authentication Types section, select Trusted Identity provider, and then click the name of your SAML provider (<ProviderName> from the New-SPTrustedIdentityTokenIssuer command). Click OK. Next, you must enable SSL for this web application. You can do this by adding an alternate access mapping for the “https://” version of the web application’s URL and then configuring the web site in the Internet Information Services (IIS) Manager console for an HTTPS binding. APM Policy Flow The current workflow works as follows: 1. A user opens a link to SharePoint. 2. SharePoint presents Authentication options for the WebApp. 3. A user selects Authentication Source (FakeADFS), enters credentials, which then redirects the user to Virtual Server configured with FakeADFS iRulesLX solution. 4. FakeADFS Generates a SAML11 assertion, then wraps it in the WS-Federation elements. <t:RequestSecurityTokenResponse xmlns:t="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/trust"> <t:Lifetime> <wsu:Created xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd">2016-12-20T13:56:01.349Z</wsu:Created> <wsu:Expires xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd">2016-12-20T14:56:01.349Z</wsu:Expires> </t:Lifetime> <wsp:AppliesTo xmlns:wsp="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/09/policy"> <wsa:EndpointReference xmlns:wsa="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"> <wsa:Address>urn:sharepoint:f5test</wsa:Address> </wsa:EndpointReference> </wsp:AppliesTo> <t:RequestedSecurityToken> <saml:Assertion xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion" MajorVersion="1" MinorVersion="1" AssertionID="_8Ed1lOeqLhnGTETTOn9BHJn72TZ8lE25" IssueInstant="2016-12-20T13:56:01.363Z" Issuer="http://fakeadfs.f5ttest.com/adfs/services/trust"> <saml:Conditions NotBefore="2016-12-20T13:56:01.363Z" NotOnOrAfter="2016-12-20T14:56:01.363Z"> <saml:AudienceRestrictionCondition> <saml:Audience>urn:sharepoint:f5test</saml:Audience> </saml:AudienceRestrictionCondition> </saml:Conditions> <saml:AttributeStatement> <saml:Subject> <saml:SubjectConfirmation> <saml:ConfirmationMethod>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:bearer</saml:ConfirmationMethod> </saml:SubjectConfirmation> </saml:Subject> <saml:Attribute AttributeNamespace="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims" AttributeName="emailaddress"> <saml:AttributeValue>flip@f5test.com</saml:AttributeValue> </saml:Attribute> <saml:Attribute AttributeNamespace="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims" AttributeName="upn"> <saml:AttributeValue>0867530901@f5test.com</saml:AttributeValue> </saml:Attribute> </saml:AttributeStatement> <saml:AuthenticationStatement AuthenticationMethod="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:password" AuthenticationInstant="2016-12-20T14:56:01.363Z"> <saml:Subject> <saml:ConfirmationMethod>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:bearer</saml:ConfirmationMethod> </saml:SubjectConfirmation> </saml:Subject> </saml:AuthenticationStatement> <Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> <SignedInfo> <CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/> <SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/> <Reference URI="#_8Ed1lOeqLhnGTETTOn9BHJn72TZ8lE25"> <Transforms> <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/> <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/> </Transforms> <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/> <DigestValue>fqLP9yVFDNveaOWwyEVl2Bc9M6bEzKb7KMZ2x33VgUc=</DigestValue> </Reference> </SignedInfo> <SignatureValue>tSLsHUu5m1Mc7qNmdfa5daEK2+noAgbuZ5faGaXQw7qCPEvNihXFUjGuwT4qgeIWFsiFcinin 6Q42DwjRZBL1jcYpAYxP3WQFc+JvRlOaaWecklLmlLGBp9qjyzNzNhgT374T1YkgWJLTm4Jky7bW6HAMWJzT2vCpbSWLbtU=</SignatureValue> <KeyInfo> <X509Data> <X509Certificate>MIIGgjCCBGqgAwIBAgITFQAAAAVVlNqAr99awAAAAAAABTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBJMRMwEQYKCZImiZ PyLGQBGRYDY29tMRUwEwYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRZjVsYWIxGzAZBgNVBAMTEkY1IExhYiBDQSAoMksxNlIyKTAeFw0xNjEyMTYxN TE1MjNaFw0xODEyMTYxNTE1MjNaMG8xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIEwJQQTEUMBIGA1UEBxMLRG93bmluZ3Rvd24xDzAN BgNVBAoTBkY1IExhYjEPMA0GA1UECxMGRjUgTGFiMRswGQYDVQQDExJmYWtlYWRmcy5mNWxhYi5jb20wgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQE BBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBALgtr7ROiet3GPUg0yWa2dGPoirQ9dI8XiA7BsUwjTUG5yhAysKm0ZsCstKN92a2e8HxoHxiEZL39XzTxg 5+3fY4A8hWttlqkKoWutnUS3GpPhfoVdufr8bTcr/vhLPCkuy9GsiDqAMwuiX/B3r0EHqFk3utfL3KDxZ5V94ArwqJAgMBAAGjg gK/MIICuzAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBaAwEwYDVR0AwwCgYIKwYBBQUHAwEweAYJKoZIhvcNAQkPBGswaTAOBggqhkiG9w0DAgIC AIAwDgYIKoZIhvcNAwQCAgCAMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQBKjALBglghkgBZQMEAS0wCwYJYIZIAWUDBAECMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQBBTAHBgU 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34i+4tPtv1/bwTco2EZE8hy2XvJ4xHXzpXYytchRhv+8glYNKK229vhML0micJfnCJQ3xaiJ2e08/GSVoBF9x4J+z4V+XS9aZSn P2+N3tZESVVBA8U4kk9u6syfmDc4+ryoIw5XGcBIyitaH7FbKbYyUHY0XuWPHx6FOWWnCe2kIA/Zfs9IDCP/z07egIJabLymLC vRhOMyd1s5lajnTFfoFaDd7LlL1ipz94OdhxJ5/Aga7sTEtFPbjnfcSZ8lFglQUOkaKuZt6D/LQ/TW6TyDqPC3RDCoaqkY4MXgnm P0dUk9ql1y2qFU2l692ZDZQPB4Tiaa3yXDKwDwCWITQ0YBvIiCcSWoMKXXea96Q2lB3R9n7v9Y6I7eSniZjGqlYYQ3Bdi3FMVz+ HGPeMOFq6HbzgnNtjFKwjqokUbwpwA7vZOQmFwEahEEaCPTpK25h4LSpLPtYa3fjfQ=</X509Certificate> </X509Data> </KeyInfo> </Signature> </saml:Assertion> </t:RequestedSecurityToken> <t:TokenType>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion</t:TokenType> <t:RequestType>http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/trust/Issue</t:RequestType> <t:KeyType>http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/NoProofKey</t:KeyType> </t:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> 5. The results are injected into a form embedded in an HTTP::respond 200 content with javascript that will automatically POST the form data to SharePoint. SharePoint accepts the assertion from its Trusted Identity Provider. The current solution pulls attributed from LDAP, but this isn't required, you can basically enter anything as username and SharePoint accepts it without question. iRule/TCL Portion when HTTP_REQUEST { # Wctx: This is some session data that the application wants sent back to # it after the user authenticates. set wctx [URI::decode [URI::query [HTTP::uri] wctx]] # Wa=signin1.0: This tells the ADFS server to invoke a login for the user. set wa [URI::decode [URI::query [HTTP::uri] wa]] # Wtrealm: This tells ADFS what application I was trying to get to. # This has to match the identifier of one of the relying party trusts # listed in ADFS. wtrealm is used in the Node.JS side, but we dont need it # here. # Kept getting errors from APM, this fixed it. node 127.0.0.1 # Make sure that the user has authenticated and APM has created a session. if {[HTTP::cookie exists MRHSession]} { #log local0. "Generate POST form and Autopost " # tmpresponse is the WS-Fed Assertion data, unencoded, so straight XML set tmpresponse [ACCESS::session data get session.custom.idam.response] # This was the pain to figure out. The assertion has to be POSTed to # SharePoint, this was the easiest way to solve that issue. Set timeout # to half a second, but can be adjusted as needed. set htmltop "<html><script type='text/javascript'>window.onload=function(){ window.setTimeout(document.wsFedAuth.submit.bind(document.wsFedAuth), 500);};</script><body>" set htmlform "<form name='wsFedAuth' method=POST action='https://sharepoint.f5test.com/_trust/'><input type=hidden name=wa value=$wa><input type=hidden name=wresult value='$tmpresponse'><input type=hidden name=wctx value=$wctx><input type='submit' value='Continue'></form/>" set htmlbottom "</body></html>" set page "$htmltop $htmlform $htmlbottom" HTTP::respond 200 content $page } } when ACCESS_POLICY_AGENT_EVENT { # Create the ILX RPC Handler set fakeadfs_handle [ILX::init fakeadfs_extension] # Payload is just the incoming Querystring set payload [ACCESS::session data get session.server.landinguri] # Currently, the mapped attributes are Email & UPN. In some environments, # this may match, for my use case, they will not, so there is an LDAP AAA # which is queried based on the logon name (email), and the UPN is retrieved # from LDAP. set AttrUserName [ACCESS::session data get session.logon.last.username] set AttrUserPrin [ACCESS::session data get session.ldap.last.attr.userPrincipalName ] # Current solution uses Node.JS SAML module and can support SAML11, as well # as SAML20. The APM policy calls the irule even ADFS, with generates the token # based on the submitted QueryString and the logon attributed. switch [ACCESS::policy agent_id] { "ADFS" { log local0. "Received Process request for FakeADFS, $payload" set fakeadfs_response [ILX::call $fakeadfs_handle Generate-WSFedToken $payload $AttrUserName $AttrUserPrin] ACCESS::session data set session.custom.idam.response $fakeadfs_response } } } # This may or may not be needed, they arent populated with actual values, but # have not tested WITHOUT yet. # # MSISAuth and MSISAuth1 are the encrypted cookies used to validate the SAML # assertion produced for the client. These are what we call the "authentication # cookies", and you will see these cookies ONLY when AD FS 2.0 is the IDP. # Without these, the client will not experience SSO when AD FS 2.0 is the IDP. # # MSISAuthenticated contains a base64-encoded timestamp value for when the client # was authenticated. You will see this cookie set whether AD FS 2.0 is the IDP # or not. # # MSISSignout is used to keep track of the IDP and all RPs visited for the SSO # session. This cookie is utilized when a WS-Federation sign-out is invoked. # You can see the contents of this cookie using a base64 decoder. # MSISLoopDetectionCookie is used by the AD FS 2.0 infinite loop detection # mechanism to stop clients who have ended up in an infinite redirection loop # to the Federation Server. For example, if an RP is having an issue where it # cannot consume the SAML assertion from AD FS, the RP may continuously redirect # the client to the AD FS 2.0 server. When the redirect loop hits a certain # threshold, AD FS 2.0 uses this cookie to detect that threshold being met, # and will throw an exception which lands the user on the AD FS 2.0 error page # rather than leaving them in the loop. The cookie data is a timestamp that is # base64 encoded. when ACCESS_ACL_ALLOWED { HTTP::cookie insert name "MSISAuth" value "ABCD" path "/adfs" HTTP::cookie insert name "MSISSignOut" value "ABCD" path "/adfs" HTTP::cookie insert name "MSISAuthenticated" value "ABCD" path "/adfs" HTTP::cookie insert name "MSISLoopDetectionCookie" value "ABCD" path "/adfs" } iRulesLX / Node.JS Portion If you you are starting from scratch, the npm install xxx --save option below is required. If you are importing the workspace or the github solution, npm update will pull in the latest version of all the referenced modules. /* Import the f5-nodejs module. */ var f5 = require('f5-nodejs'); /* Import the additional Node.JS Modules npm install saml npm install querystring npm install fs npm install moment npm install https */ var saml11 = require('saml').Saml11; var queryString = require('querystring'); var fs = require('fs'); var moment = require('moment'); var https = require('https'); /* timeout is the length of time for the assertion validity wsfedIssuer is, believe it or not, the Issuer SigningCert, SigningKey are the required certificate and key pair for signing the assertion and specifically the DigestValue. */ var timeout = 3600; var wsfedIssuer = "http://fakeadfs.f5test.com/adfs/services/trust"; var SigningCert = "/fakeadfs.f5test.com.crt"; var SigningKey = "/fakeadfs.f5test.com.key"; /* Create a new rpc server for listening to TCL iRule calls. */ var ilx = new f5.ILXServer(); ilx.addMethod('Generate-WSFedToken', function(req,res) { /* Extract the ILX parameters to add to the Assertion data req.params()[0] is the first passed argument req.params()[1] is the second passed argument, and so on. */ var query = queryString.unescape(req.params()[0]); var queryOptions = queryString.parse(query); var AttrUserName = req.params()[1]; var AttrUserPrincipal = req.params()[2]; var wa = queryOptions.wa; var wtrealm = queryOptions.wtrealm; var wctx = queryOptions.wctx; /* This is where the WS-Fed gibberish is assembled. Moment is required to insert the properly formatted time stamps.*/ var now = moment.utc(); var wsfed_wrapper_head = "<t:RequestSecurityTokenResponse xmlns:t=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/trust\">"; wsfed_wrapper_head += "<t:Lifetime><wsu:Created xmlns:wsu=\"http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd\">" + now.format('YYYY-MM-DDTHH:mm:ss.SSS[Z]') +"</wsu:Created>"; wsfed_wrapper_head += "<wsu:Expires xmlns:wsu=\"http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd\">" + now.add(timeout, 'seconds').format('YYYY-MM-DDTHH:mm:ss.SSS[Z]') + "</wsu:Expires>"; wsfed_wrapper_head += "</t:Lifetime><wsp:AppliesTo xmlns:wsp=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/09/policy\"><wsa:EndpointReference xmlns:wsa=\"http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing\">"; wsfed_wrapper_head += "<wsa:Address>" + wtrealm + "</wsa:Address>"; wsfed_wrapper_head += "</wsa:EndpointReference></wsp:AppliesTo><t:RequestedSecurityToken>"; /* Generate and insert the SAML11 Assertion. These attributed are configured previously in the code. cert: this is the cert used for encryption key: this is the key used for the cert issuer: the assertion issuer lifetimeInSeconds: timeout audiences: this is the application ID for sharepoint, urn:sharepoint:webapp attributes: these should map to the mappings created for the IDP in SharePoint */ var saml11_options = { cert: fs.readFileSync(__dirname + SigningCert), key: fs.readFileSync(__dirname + SigningKey), issuer: wsfedIssuer, lifetimeInSeconds: timeout, audiences: wtrealm, attributes: { 'http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/emailaddress': AttrUserName , 'http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/upn': AttrUserPrincipal } }; /* Sign the Assertion */ var signedAssertion = saml11.create(saml11_options); /* Add the WS-Fed footer */ var wsfed_wrapper_foot = "</t:RequestedSecurityToken><t:TokenType>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion</t:TokenType><t:RequestType>http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/trust/Issue</t:RequestType><t:KeyType>http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/NoProofKey</t:KeyType></t:RequestSecurityTokenResponse>"; /* Put them all together */ var wresult = wsfed_wrapper_head + signedAssertion + wsfed_wrapper_foot; /* respond back to TCL with the complete assertion */ res.reply(wresult); }); /* Start listening for ILX::call and ILX::notify events. */ ilx.listen(); And thats it. You can now get away with WS-Fed and SAML1.1 assertions with a quick import to your BIG-IP.
Sliding session for "FedAuth" Persistent cookie delivered by ADFS
Problem this snippet solves: ADFS deliver persistent cookies that allow the user to connect to Sharepoint using WS-Fed. By default, the lifetime is about 12 hours and for security reason, should be changed to a lower value. This irule provide a 12 hours validity for the cookie but add a shorter timeout for inactivity. How to use this snippet: This irule change the default expiration time of the FedAuth cookie to a lower value. The expiration time is reset every time a user make a request until it reach the max expiration time. After the timeout or the max expiration time has been reached, the user is redirected back to the ADFS for authentication. External links Github : https://github.com/e-XpertSolutions/f5 Code : when RULE_INIT { set static::timeout 900 set static::httponly 1 set static::debug 0 set static::irule_name "irule-test-sliding-session" } when HTTP_REQUEST { if { $static::debug } { set event "HTTP_REQUEST" } set hostname [string tolower [HTTP::host]] switch -glob $hostname { "sharepoint1" - "sharepoint2" { set key "" set valid 1 if { [HTTP::cookie exists FedAuth] } { set key [sha1 "$hostname:[HTTP::cookie FedAuth]"] if { [table lookup $key] == "" } { if { $static::debug } { log local0. "$static::irule_name - [string map -nocase {"/common/" ""} [virtual name]]: no valid sliding session key found for [IP::client_addr] with session FedAuth:[string range [HTTP::cookie FedAuth] 0 7] on $hostname - Action: redirect user to logout uri" } HTTP::redirect "https://[HTTP::host]/_trust/default.aspx?wa=wsignoutcleanup1.0" } else { if { $static::debug } { log local0. "$static::irule_name - [string map -nocase {"/common/" ""} [virtual name]]: a valid key has been found for [IP::client_addr] with session FedAuth:[string range [HTTP::cookie FedAuth] 0 7] on $hostname" } } } } default { set valid 0 } } } when HTTP_RESPONSE { if { $static::debug } { set event "HTTP_RESPONSE" } if {[HTTP::cookie exists FedAuth] and $valid } { if { $static::debug } { log local0. "$static::irule_name - [string map -nocase {"/common/" ""} [virtual name]]: set-cookie header found with FedAuth cookie ([string range [HTTP::cookie FedAuth] 0 7]) for [IP::client_addr]" } set key [sha1 "$hostname:[HTTP::cookie FedAuth]"] if { [table lookup $key] != "" } { if { [table lifetime -remaining $key] >= $static::timeout } { table timeout $key $static::timeout HTTP::cookie expires FedAuth $static::timeout relative if { $static::debug } { log local0. "$static::irule_name - [string map -nocase {"/common/" ""} [virtual name]]: FedAuth cookie ([string range [HTTP::cookie FedAuth] 0 7]) valid for [table lifetime -remaining $key] seconds - Action : cookie expiration set to 300 seconds" } } else { HTTP::cookie expires FedAuth [table lifetime -remaining $key] relative if { $static::debug } { log local0. "$static::irule_name - [string map -nocase {"/common/" ""} [virtual name]]: FedAuth cookie ([string range [HTTP::cookie FedAuth] 0 7]) valid for [table lifetime -remaining $key] seconds - Action : cookie expiration set to remaining lifetime" } } } else { table add $key [HTTP::cookie FedAuth] $static::timeout [HTTP::cookie expires FedAuth] if { $static::debug } { log local0. "$static::irule_name - [string map -nocase {"/common/" ""} [virtual name]]: FedAuth cookie ([string range [HTTP::cookie FedAuth] 0 7]) valid for [table lifetime -remaining $key] seconds - Action : Add cookie to the sliding session table for [HTTP::cookie expires FedAuth] seconds" } #HTTP::cookie expires FedAuth $static::timeout relative if { $static::debug } { log local0. "$static::irule_name - [string map -nocase {"/common/" ""} [virtual name]]: FedAuth cookie ([string range [HTTP::cookie FedAuth] 0 7]) valid for [table lifetime -remaining $key] seconds - Action : set cookie to expires within 300 seconds" } } } elseif { $key != "" } { if { [table lookup $key] != "" } { if { [table lifetime -remaining $key] >= $static::timeout } { table timeout $key $static::timeout if { $static::debug } { log local0. "$static::irule_name - [string map -nocase {"/common/" ""} [virtual name]]: FedAuth cookie ([string range [HTTP::cookie FedAuth] 0 7]) valid for [table lifetime -remaining $key] seconds - Action : insert FedAuth session cookie with 300 seconds expiration time" } HTTP::cookie insert name FedAuth value [table lookup $key] path / HTTP::cookie expires FedAuth $static::timeout relative HTTP::cookie secure FedAuth enable if { $static::debug } { log local0. "$static::irule_name - [string map -nocase {"/common/" ""} [virtual name]]: FedAuth cookie ([string range [HTTP::cookie FedAuth] 0 7]) valid for [table lifetime -remaining $key] seconds - Action : insert FedAuth session cookie with 300 seconds expiration time" } } else { HTTP::cookie insert name FedAuth value [table lookup $key] path / HTTP::cookie expires FedAuth [table lifetime -remaining $key] relative HTTP::cookie secure FedAuth enable if { $static::debug } { log local0. "$static::irule_name - [string map -nocase {"/common/" ""} [virtual name]]: FedAuth cookie ([string range [HTTP::cookie FedAuth] 0 7]) valid for [table lifetime -remaining $key] seconds - Action : insert FedAuth session cookie" } } # # insert httponly flag to FedAuth Cookie # if { $static::httponly } { set value [HTTP::cookie value FedAuth] set testvalue [string tolower $value] set valuelen [string length $value] switch -glob $testvalue { "*;httponly*" - "*; httponly*" { } default { set value "$value; HttpOnly"; } } if { [string length $value] > $valuelen} { HTTP::cookie value FedAuth "${value}" } } } } } Tested this on version: 11.5
