5 Years Later: OpenAJAX Who?
Five years ago the OpenAjax Alliance was founded with the intention of providing interoperability between what was quickly becoming a morass of AJAX-based libraries and APIs. Where is it today, and why has it failed to achieve more prominence? I stumbled recently over a nearly five year old article I wrote in 2006 for Network Computing on the OpenAjax initiative. Remember, AJAX and Web 2.0 were just coming of age then, and mentions of Web 2.0 or AJAX were much like that of “cloud” today. You couldn’t turn around without hearing someone promoting their solution by associating with Web 2.0 or AJAX. After reading the opening paragraph I remembered clearly writing the article and being skeptical, even then, of what impact such an alliance would have on the industry. Being a developer by trade I’m well aware of how impactful “standards” and “specifications” really are in the real world, but the problem – interoperability across a growing field of JavaScript libraries – seemed at the time real and imminent, so there was a need for someone to address it before it completely got out of hand. With the OpenAjax Alliance comes the possibility for a unified language, as well as a set of APIs, on which developers could easily implement dynamic Web applications. A unifiedtoolkit would offer consistency in a market that has myriad Ajax-based technologies in play, providing the enterprise with a broader pool of developers able to offer long term support for applications and a stable base on which to build applications. As is the case with many fledgling technologies, one toolkit will become the standard—whether through a standards body or by de facto adoption—and Dojo is one of the favored entrants in the race to become that standard. -- AJAX-based Dojo Toolkit , Network Computing, Oct 2006 The goal was simple: interoperability. The way in which the alliance went about achieving that goal, however, may have something to do with its lackluster performance lo these past five years and its descent into obscurity. 5 YEAR ACCOMPLISHMENTS of the OPENAJAX ALLIANCE The OpenAjax Alliance members have not been idle. They have published several very complete and well-defined specifications including one “industry standard”: OpenAjax Metadata. OpenAjax Hub The OpenAjax Hub is a set of standard JavaScript functionality defined by the OpenAjax Alliance that addresses key interoperability and security issues that arise when multiple Ajax libraries and/or components are used within the same web page. (OpenAjax Hub 2.0 Specification) OpenAjax Metadata OpenAjax Metadata represents a set of industry-standard metadata defined by the OpenAjax Alliance that enhances interoperability across Ajax toolkits and Ajax products (OpenAjax Metadata 1.0 Specification) OpenAjax Metadata defines Ajax industry standards for an XML format that describes the JavaScript APIs and widgets found within Ajax toolkits. (OpenAjax Alliance Recent News) It is interesting to see the calling out of XML as the format of choice on the OpenAjax Metadata (OAM) specification given the recent rise to ascendancy of JSON as the preferred format for developers for APIs. Granted, when the alliance was formed XML was all the rage and it was believed it would be the dominant format for quite some time given the popularity of similar technological models such as SOA, but still – the reliance on XML while the plurality of developers race to JSON may provide some insight on why OpenAjax has received very little notice since its inception. Ignoring the XML factor (which undoubtedly is a fairly impactful one) there is still the matter of how the alliance chose to address run-time interoperability with OpenAjax Hub (OAH) – a hub. A publish-subscribe hub, to be more precise, in which OAH mediates for various toolkits on the same page. Don summed it up nicely during a discussion on the topic: it’s page-level integration. This is a very different approach to the problem than it first appeared the alliance would take. The article on the alliance and its intended purpose five years ago clearly indicate where I thought this was going – and where it should go: an industry standard model and/or set of APIs to which other toolkit developers would design and write such that the interface (the method calls) would be unified across all toolkits while the implementation would remain whatever the toolkit designers desired. I was clearly under the influence of SOA and its decouple everything premise. Come to think of it, I still am, because interoperability assumes such a model – always has, likely always will. Even in the network, at the IP layer, we have standardized interfaces with vendor implementation being decoupled and completely different at the code base. An Ethernet header is always in a specified format, and it is that standardized interface that makes the Net go over, under, around and through the various routers and switches and components that make up the Internets with alacrity. Routing problems today are caused by human error in configuration or failure – never incompatibility in form or function. Neither specification has really taken that direction. OAM – as previously noted – standardizes on XML and is primarily used to describe APIs and components - it isn’t an API or model itself. The Alliance wiki describes the specification: “The primary target consumers of OpenAjax Metadata 1.0 are software products, particularly Web page developer tools targeting Ajax developers.” Very few software products have implemented support for OAM. IBM, a key player in the Alliance, leverages the OpenAjax Hub for secure mashup development and also implements OAM in several of its products, including Rational Application Developer (RAD) and IBM Mashup Center. Eclipse also includes support for OAM, as does Adobe Dreamweaver CS4. The IDE working group has developed an open source set of tools based on OAM, but what appears to be missing is adoption of OAM by producers of favored toolkits such as jQuery, Prototype and MooTools. Doing so would certainly make development of AJAX-based applications within development environments much simpler and more consistent, but it does not appear to gaining widespread support or mindshare despite IBM’s efforts. The focus of the OpenAjax interoperability efforts appears to be on a hub / integration method of interoperability, one that is certainly not in line with reality. While certainly developers may at times combine JavaScript libraries to build the rich, interactive interfaces demanded by consumers of a Web 2.0 application, this is the exception and not the rule and the pub/sub basis of OpenAjax which implements a secondary event-driven framework seems overkill. Conflicts between libraries, performance issues with load-times dragged down by the inclusion of multiple files and simplicity tend to drive developers to a single library when possible (which is most of the time). It appears, simply, that the OpenAJAX Alliance – driven perhaps by active members for whom solutions providing integration and hub-based interoperability is typical (IBM, BEA (now Oracle), Microsoft and other enterprise heavyweights – has chosen a target in another field; one on which developers today are just not playing. It appears OpenAjax tried to bring an enterprise application integration (EAI) solution to a problem that didn’t – and likely won’t ever – exist. So it’s no surprise to discover that references to and activity from OpenAjax are nearly zero since 2009. Given the statistics showing the rise of JQuery – both as a percentage of site usage and developer usage – to the top of the JavaScript library heap, it appears that at least the prediction that “one toolkit will become the standard—whether through a standards body or by de facto adoption” was accurate. Of course, since that’s always the way it works in technology, it was kind of a sure bet, wasn’t it? WHY INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICE PROVIDERS and VENDORS CARE ABOUT DEVELOPER STANDARDS You might notice in the list of members of the OpenAJAX alliance several infrastructure vendors. Folks who produce application delivery controllers, switches and routers and security-focused solutions. This is not uncommon nor should it seem odd to the casual observer. All data flows, ultimately, through the network and thus, every component that might need to act in some way upon that data needs to be aware of and knowledgeable regarding the methods used by developers to perform such data exchanges. In the age of hyper-scalability and über security, it behooves infrastructure vendors – and increasingly cloud computing providers that offer infrastructure services – to be very aware of the methods and toolkits being used by developers to build applications. Applying security policies to JSON-encoded data, for example, requires very different techniques and skills than would be the case for XML-formatted data. AJAX-based applications, a.k.a. Web 2.0, requires different scalability patterns to achieve maximum performance and utilization of resources than is the case for traditional form-based, HTML applications. The type of content as well as the usage patterns for applications can dramatically impact the application delivery policies necessary to achieve operational and business objectives for that application. As developers standardize through selection and implementation of toolkits, vendors and providers can then begin to focus solutions specifically for those choices. Templates and policies geared toward optimizing and accelerating JQuery, for example, is possible and probable. Being able to provide pre-developed and tested security profiles specifically for JQuery, for example, reduces the time to deploy such applications in a production environment by eliminating the test and tweak cycle that occurs when applications are tossed over the wall to operations by developers. For example, the jQuery.ajax() documentation states: By default, Ajax requests are sent using the GET HTTP method. If the POST method is required, the method can be specified by setting a value for the type option. This option affects how the contents of the data option are sent to the server. POST data will always be transmitted to the server using UTF-8 charset, per the W3C XMLHTTPRequest standard. The data option can contain either a query string of the form key1=value1&key2=value2 , or a map of the form {key1: 'value1', key2: 'value2'} . If the latter form is used, the data is converted into a query string using jQuery.param() before it is sent. This processing can be circumvented by setting processData to false . The processing might be undesirable if you wish to send an XML object to the server; in this case, change the contentType option from application/x-www-form-urlencoded to a more appropriate MIME type. Web application firewalls that may be configured to detect exploitation of such data – attempts at SQL injection, for example – must be able to parse this data in order to make a determination regarding the legitimacy of the input. Similarly, application delivery controllers and load balancing services configured to perform application layer switching based on data values or submission URI will also need to be able to parse and act upon that data. That requires an understanding of how jQuery formats its data and what to expect, such that it can be parsed, interpreted and processed. By understanding jQuery – and other developer toolkits and standards used to exchange data – infrastructure service providers and vendors can more readily provide security and delivery policies tailored to those formats natively, which greatly reduces the impact of intermediate processing on performance while ensuring the secure, healthy delivery of applications.XML Threat Prevention
Where should security live? The divide between operations and application developers is pretty wide, especially when it comes to defining who should be ultimately responsible for application security. Mike Fratto and I have often had lively discussions (read: arguments) about whether security is the responsibility of the developer or the network and security administrators. It's wholly inappropriate to recreate any of these discussions here, as they often devolve to including the words your mother said not to use in public. 'Nuff said. The truth is that when XML enters the picture then the responsibility for securing that traffic has to be borne by both the network/security administrators and the developers. While there is certainly good reason to expect that developers are doing simply security checks for buffer overflows, length restrictions on incoming data, and strong typing, the fact is that there are some attacks in XML that make it completely impractical to check for in the code. Let's take a couple of attack types as examples. XML Entity Expansion This attack is a million laughs, or at least a million or more bytes of memory. Applications need to parse XML in order to manipulate it, so the first thing that happens when XML hits an application is that it is parsed - before the developer even has a chance to check it. In an application server this is generally done before the arguments to the specific operation being invoked are marshaled - meaning it is the application server, not the developer that is responsible for handling this type of attack. These messages can be used to force recursive entity expansion or other repeated processing that exhausts server resources. The most common example of this type of attack is the "billion laughs" attack, which is widely available. The CPU is monopolized while the entities are being expanded, and each entity takes up X amount of memory - eventually consuming all available resources and effectively preventing legitimate traffic from being processed. It's essentially a DoS (Denial of Service) attack. ... ]> &ha128; It is accepted that almost all traditional DoS attacks (ping of death, teardrop, etc...) should be handled by a perimeter security device - a firewall oran application delivery controller - so why should a DoS attack that is perpetrated through XML be any different? It shouldn't. This isn't a developer problem, it's a parser problem and for the most part developers have little or no control over the behavior of the parser used by the application server. The application admin, however, can configure most modern parsers to prevent this type of attack, but that's assuming that their parser is modern and can be configured to handle it. Of course then you have to wonder what happens if that arbitrary limit inhibits processing of valid traffic? Yeah, it's a serious problem. SQL Injection SQL Injection is one of the most commonly perpetrated attacks via web-based applications. It consists basically of inserting SQL code into string-based fields which the attacks thinks (or knows) will be passed to a database as part of an SQL query. This type of attack can easily be accomplished via XML as well simply by inserting the appropriate SQL code into a string element. Aha! The developer can stop this one, you're thinking. After all, the developer has the string and builds the SQL that will be executed, so he can just check for it before he builds the string and sends it off for execution. While this is certainly true, there are myriad combinations of SQL commands that might induce the database to return more data than it should, or to return sensitive data not authorized to the user. This extensive list of commands and combinations of commands would need to be searched for in each and every parameter used to create an SQL query and on every call to the database. That's a lot of extra code and a lot of extra processing - which is going to slow down the application and impede performance. And when a new attack is discovered, each and every function and application needs to be updated, tested, and re-deployed. I'm fairly certain developers have better ways to spend their time than updating parameter checking in every function in every application they have in production. And we won't even talk about third-party applications and the dangers inherent in that scenario. One of the goals of SOA is engendering reuse, and this is one of the best examples of taking advantage of reuse in order to ensure consistent behavior between applications and to reduce the lengthy development cycle required to update, test, and redeploy whenever a new attack is discovered. By placing the onus for keeping this kind of attack from reaching the server on an edge device such as an application firewall like F5's application firewall, updates to address new attacks are immediately applied to all applications and there is no need to recode and redeploy applications. Although there are some aspects of security that are certainly best left to the developer, there are other aspects of security that are better deployed in the network. It's the most effective plan in terms of effort, cost, and consistent behavior where applications are concerned. Imbibing: Mountain Dew Technorati tags: security, application security, application firewall, XML, developers, networking, application deliveryHTML5 Web Sockets Changes the Scalability Game
#HTML5 Web Sockets are poised to completely change scalability models … again. Using Web Sockets instead of XMLHTTPRequest and AJAX polling methods will dramatically reduce the number of connections required by servers and thus has a positive impact on performance. But that reliance on a single connection also changes the scalability game, at least in terms of architecture. Here comes the (computer) science… If you aren’t familiar with what is sure to be a disruptive web technology you should be. Web Sockets, while not broadly in use (it is only a specification, and a non-stable one at that) today is getting a lot of attention based on its core precepts and model. Web Sockets Defined in the Communications section of the HTML5 specification, HTML5 Web Sockets represents the next evolution of web communications—a full-duplex, bidirectional communications channel that operates through a single socket over the Web. HTML5 Web Sockets provides a true standard that you can use to build scalable, real-time web applications. In addition, since it provides a socket that is native to the browser, it eliminates many of the problems Comet solutions are prone to. Web Sockets removes the overhead and dramatically reduces complexity. - HTML5 Web Sockets: A Quantum Leap in Scalability for the Web So far, so good. The premise upon which the improvements in scalability coming from Web Sockets are based is the elimination of HTTP headers (reduces bandwidth dramatically) and session management overhead that can be incurred by the closing and opening of TCP connections. There’s only one connection required between the client and server over which much smaller data segments can be sent without necessarily requiring a request and a response pair. That communication pattern is definitely more scalable from a performance perspective, and also has a positive impact of reducing the number of connections per client required on the server. Similar techniques have long been used in application delivery (TCP multiplexing) to achieve the same results – a more scalable application. So far, so good. Where the scalability model ends up having a significant impact on infrastructure and architectures is the longevity of that single connection: Unlike regular HTTP traffic, which uses a request/response protocol, WebSocket connections can remain open for a long time. - How HTML5 Web Sockets Interact With Proxy Servers This single, persistent connection combined with a lot of, shall we say, interesting commentary on the interaction with intermediate proxies such as load balancers. But ignoring that for the nonce, let’s focus on the “remain open for a long time.” A given application instance has a limit on the number of concurrent connections it can theoretically and operationally manage before it reaches the threshold at which performance begins to dramatically degrade. That’s the price paid for TCP session management in general by every device and server that manages TCP-based connections. But Lori, you’re thinking, HTTP 1.1 connections are persistent, too. In fact, you don’t even have to tell an HTTP 1.1 server to keep-alive the connection! This really isn’t a big change. Whoa there hoss, yes it is. While you’d be right in that HTTP connections are also persistent, they generally have very short connection timeout settings. For example, the default connection timeout for Apache 2.0 is 15 seconds and for Apache 2.2 a mere 5 seconds. A well-tuned web server, in fact, will have thresholds that closely match the interaction patterns of the application it is hosting. This is because it’s a recognized truism that long and often idle connections tie up server processes or threads that negatively impact overall capacity and performance. Thus the introduction of connections that remain open for a long time changes the capacity of the server and introduces potential performance issues when that same server is also tasked with managing other short-lived, connection-oriented requests. Why this Changes the Game… One of the most common inhibitors of scale and high-performance for web applications today is the deployment of both near-real-time communication functions (AJAX) and traditional web content functions on the same server. That’s because web servers do not support a per-application HTTP profile. That is to say, the configuration for a web server is global; every communication exchange uses the same configuration values such as connection timeouts. That means configuring the web server for exchanges that would benefit from a longer time out end up with a lot of hanging connections doing absolutely nothing because they were used to grab standard dynamic or static content and then ignored. Conversely, configuring for quick bursts of requests necessarily sets timeout values too low for near or real-time exchanges and can cause performance issues as a client continually opens and re-opens connections. Remember, an idle connection is a drain on resources that directly impacts the performance and capacity of applications. So it’s a Very Bad Thing™. One of the solutions to this somewhat frustrating conundrum, made more feasible by the advent of cloud computing and virtualization, is to deploy specialized servers in a scalability domain-based architecture using infrastructure scalability patterns. Another approach to ensuring scalability is to offload responsibility for performance and connection management to an appropriately capable intermediary. Now, one would hope that a web server implementing support for both HTTP and Web Sockets would support separately configurable values for communication settings on at least the protocol level. Today there are very few web servers that support both HTTP and Web Sockets. It’s a nascent and still evolving standard so many of the servers are “pure” Web Sockets servers, many implemented in familiar scripting languages like PHP and Python. Which means two separate sets of servers that must be managed and scaled. Which should sound a lot like … specialized servers in a scalability domain-based architecture. The more things change, the more they stay the same. The second impact on scalability architectures centers on the premise that Web Sockets keep one connection open over which message bits can be exchanged. This ties up resources, but it also requires that clients maintain a connection to a specific server instance. This means infrastructure (like load balancers and web/application servers) will need to support persistence (not the same as persistent, you can read about the difference here if you’re so inclined). That’s because once connected to a Web Socket service the performance benefits are only realized if you stay connected to that same service. If you don’t and end up opening a second (or Heaven-forbid a third or more) connection, the first connection may remain open until it times out. Given that the premise of the Web Socket is to stay open – even through potentially longer idle intervals – it may remain open, with no client, until the configured time out. That means completely useless resources tied up by … nothing. Persistence-based load balancing is a common feature of next-generation load balancers (application delivery controllers) and even most cloud-based load balancing services. It is also commonly implemented in application server clustering offerings, where you’ll find it called server-affinity. It is worth noting that persistence-based load balancing is not without its own set of gotchas when it comes to performance and capacity. THE ANSWER: ARCHITECTURE The reason that these two ramifications of Web Sockets impacts the scalability game is it requires an broader architectural approach to scalability. It can’t necessarily be achieved simply by duplicating services and distributing the load across them. Persistence requires collaboration with the load distribution mechanism and there are protocol-based security constraints with respect to incorporating even intra-domain content in a single page/application. While these security constraints are addressable through configuration, the same caveats with regards to the lack of granularity in configuration at the infrastructure (web/application server) layer must be made. Careful consideration of what may be accidentally allowed and/or disallowed is necessary to prevent unintended consequences. And that’s not even starting to consider the potential use of Web Sockets as an attack vector, particularly in the realm of DDoS. The long-lived nature of a Web Socket connection is bound to be exploited at some point in the future, which will engender another round of evaluating how to best address application-layer DDoS attacks. A service-focused, distributed (and collaborative) approach to scalability is likely to garner the highest levels of success when employing Web Socket-based functionality within a broader web application, as opposed to the popular cookie-cutter cloning approach made exceedingly easy by virtualization. Infrastructure Scalability Pattern: Partition by Function or Type Infrastructure Scalability Pattern: Sharding Sessions Amazon Makes the Cloud Sticky Load Balancing Fu: Beware the Algorithm and Sticky Sessions Et Tu, Browser? Forget Hyper-Scale. Think Hyper-Local Scale. Infrastructure Scalability Pattern: Sharding Streams Infrastructure Architecture: Whitelisting with JSON and API Keys Does This Application Make My Browser Look Fat? HTTP Now Serving … EverythingWhy you still need layer 7 persistence
Tony Bourke of the Load Balancing Digest points out that mega proxies are largely dead. Very true. He then wonders whether layer 7 persistence is really all that important today, as it was largely implemented to solve the problems associated with mega-proxies - that is, large numbers of users coming from the same IP address. Layer 7 persistence is still applicable to situations where you may have multiple users coming from a single IP address (such as a small client base coming from a handful of offices, with each office using on public IP address), but I wonder what doing Layer 4 persistence would do to a major site these days. I’m thinking, not much. I'm going to say that layer 4 persistence would likely break a major site today. Layer 7 persistence is even more relevant today than it has been in the past for one very good reason: session coherence. Session coherence may not have the performance and availability ramifications of the mega-proxy problem, but it is essential to ensure that applications in a load-balanced environment work correctly. Where's F5? VMWorld Sept 15-18 in Las Vegas Storage Decisions Sept 23-24 in New York Networld IT Roadmap Sept 23 in Dallas Oracle Open World Sept 21-25 in San Francisco Storage Networking World Oct 13-16 in Dallas Storage Expo 2008 UK Oct 15-16 in London Storage Networking World Oct 27-29 in Frankfurt SESSION COHERENCE Layer 7 persistence is still heavily used in applications that are session sensitive. The most common example is shopping carts stored in the application server session, but it also increasingly important to Web 2.0 and interactive applications where state is important. Sessions are used to store that state and therefore Layer 7 persistence becomes important to maintaining that state in a load-balanced environment. It's common to see layer 7 persistence driven by JSESSIONID or PHPSESSIONID header variables today. It's a question we see in the forums here on DevCentral quite often. Many applications are rolled out, and then inserted into a load balanced environment, and subsequently break because sessions aren't shared across web application servers and the client isn't always routed to the same server or they come back "later" (after the connections have timed out) and expect the application to continue where they left it. If they aren't load balanced back to the same server, the session data isn't accessible and the application breaks. Application server sessions generally persist for hours as opposed to the minutes or seconds allowed for a TCP connection. Layer 4 (TCP) persistence can't adequately address this problem. Source port and IP address aren't always enough to ensure routing to the correct server because it doesn't persist once the connection is closed, and multiple requests coming from the same browser use multiple connections now, each with a different source port. That means two requests on the same page may not be load balanced to the same server, even though they both may require access to the application session data. These sites and applications are used for hours, often with long periods of time between requests, which means connections have often long timed out. Could layer 4 persistence work? Probably, but only if the time-out on these connections were set unreasonably high, which would consume a lot more resources on the load balancer and reduce its capacity significantly. And let's not forget SaaS (Software as a Service) sites like salesforce.com, where rather than mega-proxy issues cropping up we'd have lots-of-little-proxy issues cropping up as businesses still (thanks to IPv4 and the need to monitor Internet use) employ forward proxies. And SSL, too, is highly dependent upon header data to ensure persistence today. I agree with Tony's assessment that the mega proxy problem is largely a non-issue today, but session coherence is taking its place a one of the best reasons to implement layer 7 persistence over layer 4 persistence.F5 Friday: It is now safe to enable File Upload
Web 2.0 is about sharing content – user generated content. How do you enable that kind of collaboration without opening yourself up to the risk of infection? Turns out developers and administrators have a couple options… The goal of many a miscreant is to get files onto your boxen. The second step after that is often remote execution or merely the hopes that someone else will look at/execute the file and spread chaos (and viruses) across your internal network. It’s a malicious intent, to be sure, and makes developing/deploying Web 2.0 applications a risky proposition. After all, Web 2.0 is about collaboration and sharing of content, and if you aren’t allowing the latter it’s hard to enable the former. Most developers know about and have used the ability to upload files of just about any type through a web form. Photos, documents, presentations – these types of content are almost always shared through an application that takes advantage of the ability to upload data via a simple web form. But if you allow users to share legitimate content, it’s a sure bet (more sure even than answering “yes” to the question “Will it rain in Seattle today?”) that miscreants will find and exploit the ability to share content. Needless to say information security professionals are therefore not particularly fond of this particular “feature” and in some organizations it is strictly verboten (that’s forbidden for you non-German speakers). So wouldn’t it be nice if developers could continue to leverage this nifty capability to enable collaboration? Well, all you really need to do is integrate with an anti-virus scanning solution and only accept that content which is deemed safe, right? After all, that’s good enough for e-mail systems and developers should be able to argue that the same should be good enough for web content, too. The bigger problem is in the integration. Luckily, ICAP (Internet Content Adaptation Protocol) is a fairly ready answer to that problem. SOLUTION: INTEGRATE ANTI-VIRUS SCANNING via ICAP The Internet Content Adaptation Protocol (ICAP) is a lightweight HTTP based protocol specified in RFC 3507 designed to off-load specific content to dedicated servers, thereby freeing up resources and standardizing the way in which features are implemented. ICAP is generally used in proxy servers to integrate with third party products like antivirus software, malicious content scanners and URL filters. ICAP in its most basic form is a "lightweight" HTTP based remote procedure call protocol. In other words, ICAP allows its clients to pass HTTP based (HTML) messages (Content) to ICAP servers for adaptation. Adaptation refers to performing the particular value added service (content manipulation) for the associated client request/response. -- Wikipedia, ICAP Now obviously developers can directly take advantage of ICAP and integrate with an anti-virus scanning solution directly. All that’s required is to extract every file in a multi-part request and then send each of them to an AV-scanning service and determine based on the result whether to continue processing or toss those bits into /dev/null. This is assuming, of course, that it can be integrated: packaged applications may not offer the ability and even open-source which ostensibly does may be in a language or use frameworks that require skills the organization simply does not have. Or perhaps the cost over time of constantly modifying the application after every upgrade/patch is just not worth the effort. For applications for which you can add this integration, it should be fairly simple as developers are generally familiar with HTTP and RPC and understand how to use “services” in their applications. Of course this being an F5 Friday post, you can probably guess that I have an alternative (and of course more efficient) solution than integration into the code. An external solution that works for custom as well as packaged applications and requires a lot less long term maintenance – a WAF (Web Application Firewall). BETTER SOLUTION: web application firewall INTEGRATION The latest greatest version (v10.2) of F5 BIG-IP Application Security Manager (ASM) included a little touted feature that makes integration with an ICAP-enabled anti-virus scanning solution take approximately 15.7 seconds to configure (YMMV). Most of that time is likely logging in and navigating to the right place. The rest is typing the information required (server host name, IP address, and port number) and hitting “save”. F5 Application security manager (ASM) v10 includes easy integration with a/v solutions It really is that simple. The configuration is actually an HTTP “class”, which can be thought of as a classification of sorts. In most BIG-IP products a “class” defines a type of traffic closely based on a specific application protocol, like HTTP. It’s quite polymorphic in that defining a custom HTTP class inherits the behavior and attributes of the “parent” HTTP class and your configuration extends that behavior and attributes, and in some cases allows you to override default (parent) behavior. The ICAP integration is derived from an HTTP class, so it can be “assigned” to a virtual server, a URI, a cookie, etc… In most ASM configurations an HTTP class is assigned to a virtual server and therefore it sees all requests sent to that server. In such a configuration ASM sees all traffic and thus every file uploaded in a multipart payload and will automatically extract it and send it via ICAP to the designated anti-virus server where it is scanned. The action taken upon a positive result, i.e. the file contains bad juju, is configurable. ASM can block the request and present an informational page to the user while logging the discovery internally, externally or both. It can forward the request to the web/application server with the virus and log it as well, allowing the developer to determine how best to proceed. ASM can be configured to never allow requests to reach the web/application server that have not been scanned for viruses using the “Guarantee Enforcement” option. When configured, if the anti-virus server is unavailable or doesn’t respond, requests will be blocked. This allows administrators to configure a “fail closed” option that absolutely requires AV scanning before a request can be processed. A STRATEGIC POINT of CONTROL Leveraging a strategic point of control to provide AV scanning integration and apply security policies regarding the quality of content has several benefits over its application-modifying code-based integration cousin: Allows integration of AV scanning in applications for which it is not feasible to modify the application, for whatever reason (third-party, lack of skills, lack of time, long term maintenance after upgrades/patches ) Reduces the resource requirements of web/application servers by offloading the integration process and only forwarding valid uploads to the application. In a cloud-based or other pay-per-use model this reduces costs by eliminating the processing of invalid requests by the application. Aggregates logging/auditing and provides consistency of logs for compliance and reporting, especially to prove “due diligence” in preventing infection. Related Posts All F5 Friday Entries on DevCentral All About ASMHTTP Pipelining: A security risk without real performance benefits
Everyone wants web sites and applications to load faster, and there’s no shortage of folks out there looking for ways to do just that. But all that glitters is not gold, and not all acceleration techniques actually do all that much to accelerate the delivery of web sites and applications. Worse, some actual incur risk in the form of leaving servers open to exploitation. A BRIEF HISTORY Back in the day when HTTP was still evolving, someone came up with the concept of persistent connections. See, in ancient times – when administrators still wore togas in the data center – HTTP 1.0 required one TCP connection for every object on a page. That was okay, until pages started comprising ten, twenty, and more objects. So someone added an HTTP header, Keep-Alive, which basically told the server not to close the TCP connection until (a) the browser told it to or (b) it didn’t hear from the browser for X number of seconds (a time out). This eventually became the default behavior when HTTP 1.1 was written and became a standard. I told you it was a brief history. This capability is known as a persistent connection, because the connection persists across multiple requests. This is not the same as pipelining, though the two are closely related. Pipelining takes the concept of persistent connections and then ignores the traditional request – reply relationship inherent in HTTP and throws it out the window. The general line of thought goes like this: “Whoa. What if we just shoved all the requests from a page at the server and then waited for them all to come back rather than doing it one at a time? We could make things even faster!” Tada! HTTP pipelining. In technical terms, HTTP pipelining is initiated by the browser by opening a connection to the server and then sending multiple requests to the server without waiting for a response. Once the requests are all sent then the browser starts listening for responses. The reason this is considered an acceleration technique is that by shoving all the requests at the server at once you essentially save the RTT (Round Trip Time) on the connection waiting for a response after each request is sent. WHY IT JUST DOESN’T MATTER ANYMORE (AND MAYBE NEVER DID) Unfortunately, pipelining was conceived of and implemented before broadband connections were widely utilized as a method of accessing the Internet. Back then, the RTT was significant enough to have a negative impact on application and web site performance and the overall user-experience was improved by the use of pipelining. Today, however, most folks have a comfortable speed at which they access the Internet and the RTT impact on most web application’s performance, despite the increasing number of objects per page, is relatively low. There is no arguing, however, that some reduction in time to load is better than none. Too, anyone who’s had to access the Internet via high latency links can tell you anything that makes that experience faster has got to be a Good Thing. So what’s the problem? The problem is that pipelining isn’t actually treated any differently on the server than regular old persistent connections. In fact, the HTTP 1.1 specification requires that a “server MUST send its responses to those requests in the same order that the requests were received.” In other words, the requests are return in serial, despite the fact that some web servers may actually process those requests in parallel. Because the server MUST return responses to requests in order that the server has to do some extra processing to ensure compliance with this part of the HTTP 1.1 specification. It has to queue up the responses and make certain responses are returned properly, which essentially negates the performance gained by reducing the number of round trips using pipelining. Depending on the order in which requests are sent, if a request requiring particularly lengthy processing – say a database query – were sent relatively early in the pipeline, this could actually cause a degradation in performance because all the other responses have to wait for the lengthy one to finish before the others can be sent back. Application intermediaries such as proxies, application delivery controllers, and general load-balancers can and do support pipelining, but they, too, will adhere to the protocol specification and return responses in the proper order according to how the requests were received. This limitation on the server side actually inhibits a potentially significant boost in performance because we know that processing dynamic requests takes longer than processing a request for static content. If this limitation were removed it is possible that the server would become more efficient and the user would experience non-trivial improvements in performance. Or, if intermediaries were smart enough to rearrange requests such that they their execution were optimized (I seem to recall I was required to design and implement a solution to a similar example in graduate school) then we’d maintain the performance benefits gained by pipelining. But that would require an understanding of the application that goes far beyond what even today’s most intelligent application delivery controllers are capable of providing. THE SILVER LINING At this point it may be fairly disappointing to learn that HTTP pipelining today does not result in as significant a performance gain as it might at first seem to offer (except over high latency links like satellite or dial-up, which are rapidly dwindling in usage). But that may very well be a good thing. As miscreants have become smarter and more intelligent about exploiting protocols and not just application code, they’ve learned to take advantage of the protocol to “trick” servers into believing their requests are legitimate, even though the desired result is usually malicious. In the case of pipelining, it would be a simple thing to exploit the capability to enact a layer 7 DoS attack on the server in question. Because pipelining assumes that requests will be sent one after the other and that the client is not waiting for the response until the end, it would have a difficult time distinguishing between someone attempting to consume resources and a legitimate request. Consider that the server has no understanding of a “page”. It understands individual requests. It has no way of knowing that a “page” consists of only 50 objects, and therefore a client pipelining requests for the maximum allowed – by default 100 for Apache – may not be seen as out of the ordinary. Several clients opening connections and pipelining hundreds or thousands of requests every second without caring if they receive any of the responses could quickly consume the server’s resources or available bandwidth and result in a denial of service to legitimate users. So perhaps the fact that pipelining is not really all that useful to most folks is a good thing, as server administrators can disable the feature without too much concern and thereby mitigate the risk of the feature being leveraged as an attack method against them. Pipelining as it is specified and implemented today is more of a security risk than it is a performance enhancement. There are, however, tweaks to the specification that could be made in the future that might make it more useful. Those tweaks do not address the potential security risk, however, so perhaps given that there are so many other optimizations and acceleration techniques that can be used to improve performance that incur no measurable security risk that we simply let sleeping dogs lie. IMAGES COURTESTY WIKIPEDIA COMMONSClickjacking Protection Using X-FRAME-OPTIONS Available for Firefox
But browser support is only half the solution, don’t forget to implement the server-side, too. Clickjacking, unlike more well-known (and understood) web application vulnerabilities, has been given scant amount of attention despite its risks and its usage. Earlier this year, for example, it was used as an attack on Twitter, but never really discussed as being a clickjacking attack. Maybe because aside from rewriting applications to prevent CSRF (adding nonces and validation of the same to every page) or adding framekillers there just haven’t been many other options to prevent the attack technique from being utilized against users. Too, it is one of the more convoluted attack methods out there so it would be silly to expect non-technical media to understand it let alone explain how it works to their readers. There is, however, a solution on the horizon. IE8 has introduced an opt-in measure that allows developers – or whomever might be in charge of network-side scripting implementations – to prevent clickjacking on vulnerable pages using a custom HTTP header to prevent them from being “framed” inappropriately: X-FRAME-OPTIONS. The behavior is described in the aforementioned article as: If the X-FRAME-OPTIONS value contains the token DENY, IE8 will prevent the page from rendering if it will be contained within a frame. If the value contains the token SAMEORIGIN, IE will block rendering only if the origin of the top level-browsing-context is different than the origin of the content containing the X-FRAME-OPTIONS directive. For instance, if http://shop.example.com/confirm.asp contains a DENY directive, that page will not render in a subframe, no matter where the parent frame is located. In contrast, if the X-FRAME-OPTIONS directive contains the SAMEORIGIN token, the page may be framed by any page from the exact http://shop.example.com origin. But that’s only IE8, right? Well, natively, yes. But a development version of NoScript has been released that supports the X-FRAME-OPTIONS header and will provide the same protections as are natively achieved in IE8. The problem is that this is only half the equation: the X-FRAME-OPTIONS header needs to exist before the browser can act on it and the preventive measure for clickjacking completed. As noted in the Register, “some critics have contended the protection will be ineffective because it will require millions of websites to update their pages with proprietary code.” That’s not entirely true as there is another option that will provide support for X-FRAME-OPTIONS without updating pages/applications/sites with proprietary code: network-side scripting. The “proprietary” nature of custom HTTP headers is also debatable, as support for Firefox was provided quickly via NoScript and if the technique is successful will likely be adopted by other browser creators. HOW-TO ADD X-FRAME-OPTIONS TO YOUR APPLICATION – WITH or WITHOUT CODE CHANGES Step 1: Add the custom HTTP header “X-FRAME-OPTIONS” with a value of “DENY” or “SAMEORIGIN” before returning a response to the client Really, that’s it. The browser takes care of the rest for you. OWASP has a great article on how to implement a ClickjackFilter for JavaEE and there are sure to be many more blogs and articles popping up describing how one can implement such functionality in their language-of-choice. Even without such direct “how-to” articles and code samples, it is merely a matter of adding a new custom HTTP header – examples of which ought to be easy enough to find. Similarly a solution can be implemented using network-side scripting that requires no modification to applications. In fact, this can be accomplished via iRules in just one line of code: when HTTP_RESPONSE { HTTP::header insert "X-FRAME-OPTIONS" “(DENY || SAMEORIGIN)”} I believe the mod_rewrite network-side script would be as simple, but as I am not an expert in mod_rewrite I will hope someone who is will leave an appropriate example as a comment or write up a blog/article and leave a pointer to it. A good reason to utilize the agility of network-side scripting solutions in this case is that it is not necessary to modify each application requiring protection, which takes time to implement, test, and deploy. An even better reason is that a single network-side script can protect all applications, regardless of language and deployment platform, without a lengthy development and deployment cycle. Regardless of how you add the header, it would be a wise idea to add it as a standard part of your secure-code deployment requirements (you do have those, don’t you?) because it doesn’t hurt anything for the custom HTTP header to exist and visitors using X-FRAME-OPTIONS enabled browsers/solutions will be a lot safer than without it. Stop brute force listing of HTTP OPTIONS with network-side scripting Jedi Mind Tricks: HTTP Request Smuggling I am in your HTTP headers, attacking your application Understanding network-side scripting 9 ways to use network-side scripting to architect faster, scalable, more secure applicationsBack to Basics: The Many Faces of Load Balancing Persistence
Finally! It all makes sense now! Thanks to cloud and the very generic "sticky sessions", many more people are aware of persistence as it relates to load balancing. It's a critical capability of load balancing without which stateful applications (which is most of them including VDI, most web applications, and data analysis tools) would simply fail to scale. Persistence is, in general, like the many moods of Spock. They all look pretty much the same from the outside - ensure that a user, once connected, continues to be connected to the same application instance to ensure access to whatever state is stored in that instance. But though they act the same (and Spock's expression appears the same) deep down, where it counts, persistence is very different depending on how it's implemented. It requires different processing, different inspection, different data, even. Understanding these differences is important because each one has a different impact on performance. The Many Faces of Persistence There are several industry de facto standard types of persistence: simple, SSL, and cookie. Then there are more advanced forms of persistence: SIP, WTS, Universal and Hash. Generally speaking the de facto standard types of persistence are applicable for use with just about any web application. The more advanced forms of persistence are specific to a protocol or rely on a capability that is not necessarily standardized across load balancing services. Without further adieu, let's dive in! Simple Persistence Simple persistence is generally based on network characteristics, like source IP address. It can also include the destination port, to give the load balancer a bit more capacity in terms of simultaneously applications supported. Best practices avoid simple persistence to avoid reoccurrence of the mega-proxy problem which had a tendency to overwhelm application instances. Network load balancing uses a form of simple persistence. SSL Session ID Persistence SSL Session ID persistence became necessary when SSL was broadly accepted as the de facto means of securing traffic in flight for web applications. Because SSL sessions need to be established and are very much tied to a session between client and server, failing to "stick" SSL-secured sessions results in renegotiation of the session, which takes a noticeable amount of time and annoys end-users. To avoid unnecessary renegotiation, load balancers use the SSL Session ID to ensure sessions are properly routed to the application instance to which they first connected. Cookie Persistence Cookie persistence is a technique invented by F5 (shameless plug) that uses the HTTP cookie header to persist connections across a session. Most application servers insert a session id into responses that is used by developers to access data stored in the server session (shopping carts, etc... ). This value is used by load balancing services to enable persistence. This technique avoids the issues associated with simple persistence because the session id is unique. Universal Persistence Universal persistence is the use of any piece of data (network, application protocol, payload) to persist a session. This technique requires the load balancer to be able to inspect and ultimately extract any piece of data from a request or response. This technique is the basis for application-specific persistence solutions addressing popular applications like SIP, WTS, and more recently, VMware View. SIP, WTS, Username Persistence Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Windows Terminal Server (WTS) persistence are application-specific persistence techniques that use data unique to a session to persist connections. Username persistence is a similar technique designed to address the needs of VDI - specifically VMware View solutions - in which sessions are persisted (as one might expect) based on username. When a type of persistence becomes very commonly used it is often moved from being a customized, universal persistence implementation to a native, productized persistence profile. This improves performance and scalability by removing the need to inspect and extract the values used to persist sessions from the data flow and results in an application-specific persistence type, such as SIP or WTS. Hash Persistence Hash persistence is the use of multiple values within a request to enable persistence. To avoid problems with simple persistence, for example, a hash value may be created based on Source IP, Destination IP, Destination Port. While not necessarily unique to every session, this technique results in a more even distribution of load across servers. Non-unique value-based persistence techniques (simple, hash) are generally used with stateless applications or streaming content (video, audio) as a means to more evenly distribute load. Unique value-based persistence techniques (universal, application-specific, SSL ID) are generally used with stateful applications that depend on the client being connected to the same application instance through the session's life. Cookie persistence can be used with both techniques, provided the application is web based and uses HTTP headers for each request (Web Sockets breaks this technique).I am wondering why not all websites enabling this great feature GZIP?
Understanding the impact of compression on server resources and application performance While doing some research on a related topic, I ran across this question and thought “that deserves an answer” because it certainly seems like a no-brainer. If you want to decrease bandwidth – which subsequently decreases response time and improves application performance – turn on compression. After all, a large portion of web site traffic is text-based: CSS, JavaScript, HTML, RSS feeds, which means it will greatly benefit from compression. Typical GZIP compression affords at least a 3:1 reduction in size, with hardware-assisted compression yielding an average of 4:1 compression ratios. That can dramatically affect the response time of applications. As I said, seems like a no-brainer. Here’s the rub: turning on compression often has a negative impact on capacity because it is CPU-bound and under certain conditions can actually cause a degradation in performance due to the latency inherent in compressing data compared to the speed of the network over which the data will be delivered. Here comes the science. IMPACT ON CPU UTILIZATION Compression via GZIP is CPU bound. It requires a lot more CPU than you might think. The larger the file being compressed, the more CPU resources are required. Consider for a moment what compression is really doing: it’s finding all similar patterns and replacing them with representations (symbols, indexes into a table, etc…) to a single instance of the text instead. So it makes sense that the larger a file is, the more resources are required – RAM and CPU – to execute such a process. Of course the larger the file is the more benefit you see from compression in terms of bandwidth and improvement in response time. It’s kind of a Catch-22: you want the benefits but you end up paying in terms of capacity. If CPU and RAM is being chewed up by the compression process then the server can handle fewer requests and fewer concurrent users. You don’t have to take my word for it – there are quite a few examples of testing done on web servers and compression that illustrate the impact on CPU utilization. Measuring the Performance Effects of Dynamic Compression in IIS 7.0 Measuring the Performance Effects of mod_deflate in Apache 2.2 HTTP Compression for Web Applications They all essentially say the same thing; if you’re serving dynamic content (or static content and don’t have local caching on the web server enabled) then there is a significant negative impact on CPU utilization that occurs when enabling GZIP/compression for web applications. Given the exceedingly dynamic nature of Web 2.0 applications, the use of AJAX and similar technologies, and the data-driven world in which we live today, that means there are very few types of applications running on web servers for which compression will not negatively impact the capacity of the web server. In case you don’t (want || have time) to slog through the above articles, here’s a quick recap: File Size Bandwidth decrease CPU utilization increase IIS 7.0 10KB 55% 4x 50KB 67% 20x 100KB 64% 30x Apache 2.2 10KB 55% 4x 50KB 65% 10x 100KB 63% 30x It’s interesting to note that IIS 7.0 and Apache 2.2 mod_deflate have essentially the same performance characteristics. This data falls in line with the aforementioned Intel report on HTTP compression which noted that CPU utilization was increased 25-35% when compression was enabled. So essentially when you enable compression you are trading its benefits – bandwidth reduction, response time improvement – for a reduction in capacity. You’re robbing Peter to pay Paul, because instead of paying for bandwidth you’re paying for more servers to handle the same load. THE MYTH OF IMPROVED RESPONSE TIME One of the reasons you’d want to compress content is to improve response time by decreasing the total number of packets that have to traverse a wire. This is a necessity when transferring content via a WAN, but can actually cause a decrease in performance for application delivery over the LAN. This is because the time it takes to compress the content and then deliver it is actually greater than the time to just transfer the original file via the LAN. The speed of the network over which the content is being delivered is highly relevant to whether compression yields benefits for response time. The increasing consumption of CPU resources as volume increases, too, has a negative impact on the ability of the server to process and subsequently respond, which also means an increase in application response time, which is not the desired result. Maybe you’re thinking “I’ll just get more CPU then. After all, there’s like billion core servers out there, that ought to solve the problem!” Compression algorithms, like FTP, are greedy. FTP will, if allowed, consume as much bandwidth as possible in an effort to transfer data as quickly as possible. Compression will do the same thing to CPU resources: consume as much as it can to perform its task as quickly as possible. Eventually, yes, you’ll find a machine with enough cores to support both compression and capacity needs, but at what cost? It may well have been more financially efficient to invest in a better solution (that also brings additional benefits to the table) than just increasing the size of the server. But hey, it’s your data, you need to do what you need to do. The size of the content, too, has an impact on whether compression will benefit application performance. Consider that the goal of compression is to decrease the number of packets being transferred to the client. Generally speaking, the standard MTU for most network is 1500 bytes because that’s what works best with ethernet and IP. That means you can assume around 1400 bytes per packet available to transfer data. That means if content is 1400 bytes or less, you get absolutely no benefit out of compression because it’s already going to take only one packet to transfer; you can’t really send half-packets, after all, and in some networks packets that are too small can actually freak out some network devices because they’re optimized to handle the large content being served today – which means many full packets. TO COMPRESS OR NOT COMPRESS There is real benefit to compression; it’s part of the core techniques used by both application acceleration and WAN application delivery services to improve performance and reduce costs. It can drastically reduce the size of data and especially when you might be paying by the MB or GB transferred (such as applications deployed in cloud environments) this a very important feature to consider. But if you end up paying for additional servers (or instances in a cloud) to make up for the lost capacity due to higher CPU utilization because of that compression, you’ve pretty much ended up right where you started: no financial benefit at all. The question is not if you should compress content, it’s when and where and what you should compress. The answer to “should I compress this content” almost always needs to be based on a set of criteria that require context-awareness – the ability to factor into the decision making process the content, the network, the application, and the user. If the user is on a mobile device and the size of the content is greater than 2000 bytes and the type of content is text-based and … It is this type of intelligence that is required to effectively apply compression such that the greatest benefits of reduction in costs, application performance, and maximization of server resources is achieved. Any implementation that can’t factor all these variables into the decision to compress or not is not an optimal solution, as it’s just guessing or blindly applying the same policy to all kinds of content. Such implementations effectively defeat the purpose of employing compression in the first place. That’s why the answer to where is almost always “on the load-balancer or application delivery controller”. Not only are such devices capable of factoring in all the necessary variables but they also generally employ specialized hardware designed to speed up the compression process. By offloading compression to an application delivery device, you can reap the benefits without sacrificing performance or CPU resources. Measuring the Performance Effects of Dynamic Compression in IIS 7.0 Measuring the Performance Effects of mod_deflate in Apache 2.2 HTTP Compression for Web Applications The Context-Aware Cloud The Revolution Continues: Let Them Eat Cloud Nerd RageThe Next Evolution of Application Architecture is Upon Us
And what it means to #devops One of the realities of application development is that there are a lot of factors that go into its underlying architecture. I came of age during the Epoch of Client-Server Architecture (also known as the 1990s and later the .com era) and we were taught, very firmly, that despite the implication of "client-server" that there were but two, distinct "tiers" comprising an application, there were actually three. The presentation layer, the GUI, resided on the client. All business logic resided on the server, and a third, data access tier completed the trifecta. This worked well because developers tailored each application to a specific business purpose. Thus, implementation of business logic occurred along with application logic. There was no real reason to separate it out. As applications grew in complexity and use, SOA came of age. SOA introduced the principles of reuse we still adhere to today, and the idea that business logic should be consistent and shared across all applications that might need it. I know, revolutionary, wasn't it? Before SOA could complete its goal of world domination, however, the Internet and deployment models changed. Dramatically. [Interestingly enough, a post two years ago on this topic was fairly accurate on this migration ] THE NEW APP WORLD ORDER Today, an "application" is a no longer defined necessarily by business function, but by a unique combination of client and business function. It's not just the business logic, it's the delivery and presentation mechanism that make it unique and of course, more challenging for operations. Business logic has moved into a converged business logic-data tier more commonly known as The API. The client is still, of course, responsible for the presentation. But application logic - the domain of state and access - is in flux for some. As illustrated by the ill-advised decision to place application-logic in the presentation layer, some developers haven't quite adopted the practice of deploying an application (or domain) logic tier to intermediate and maintain consistent application behavior. But there always exist unique processing that must occur based on context. In some cases, some data might be marked cacheable as a means to achieve better performance for mobile clients when communicating over a mobile network while in others, it might not be because the client is a web-based application running on a PC over a LAN. A native mobile application deals with the state of the user "are they logged in" differently than a web application relying on cookies. The business logic should not be impacted by this. Ultimately the business logic for retrieving order X for customer Y does not inherently change based on client characteristics. It cannot, in fact, be shared - reused - if it contains application specific details regarding the validation of state, unless such an implementation uses a lot of conditional statements (that must be modified every time a new method is introduced, by the way) to determine whether a user is logged in or not. Thus, we move the application-specific, the domain, logic to its own tier, usually implemented by or on a proxy that intermediates between the API and the client. Domain Logic Tier Business Logic Tier • Maintains an internally consistent model representation on both sides of the app (client and server) • Is ontological • Often involves application state and access requirements such as "the user must be logged-in and an admin" or "this object is cacheable" • Consists of elements and functions that are specific to this application • Concerned with coordinating valid interactions between presentation and data (client and data) • Is teleological • Often involves direct access to data or application of business requirements such as “if order is > 1000 apply discount X” • Consists of elements that are common to all applications, i.e. does not rely on a given UI or interface What's most fascinating about this change is that a "proxy" tier traditionally proxies for the server-side application, but in this new model it is proxying for the client. That's not odd for developers, because if you break down the traditional model the "server" piece of the three-tiered architecture really was just a big application-specific proxy to the data. But it is odd for operations, because the new model takes advantage of a converged application-network proxy that is capable of performing tasks like load balancing and authentication and caching as well as mediating for an API, which may include transformative and translative functions. IMPACT ON DEVOPS What this ultimately means for devops is an increasing role in application architecture, from inception to production. It means devops will need to go beyond concerns of web performance or application deployment lifecycle management and into the realm of domain logic implementation and deployment. That may mean a new breed of developer; one that is still focused on development but does so in a primarily operational environment, in the network. It means enterprise architects will need to extend their view into operations, into the network, and codify for developers the lines of demarcation between domain and business logic. It means a very interesting new application model that basically adopts the premise of application delivery but adds domain logic to its catalog of services. It means devops is going to get even more interesting as more applications adopt this new, three-tiered architecture.
