F5 Hybrid Security Architectures: One WAF Engine, Total Flexibility (Intro)
Layered security, we have been told for years that the most effective security strategy is composed of multiple, loosely coupled or independent layers of security controls. A WAF fits snuggly into the technical security controls area and has long been known as an essential piece of application security. What if we take this further and apply the layered approach directly to our WAF deployment? The F5 Hybrid Security Architectures explores this approach utilizing F5's best in class WAF products.Use F5 Distributed Cloud to service chain WAAP and CDN
The Content Delivery Network (CDN) market has become increasingly commoditized. Many providers have augmented their CDN capabilities with WAFs/WAAPs, DNS, load balancing, edge compute, and networking. Managing all these solutions together creates a web of operational complexity, which can be confusing. F5’s synergistic bundling of CDN with Web Application and API Protection (WAAP) benefits those looking for simplicity and ease of use. It provides a way around the complications and silos that many resource-strapped organizations face with their IT systems. This bundling also signifies how CDN has become a commodity product often not purchased independently anymore. This trend is encouraging many competitors to evolve their capabilities to include edge computing – a space where F5 has gained considerable experience in recent years. F5 is rapidly catching up to other providers’ CDNs. F5’s experience and leadership building the world’s best-of-breed Application Delivery Controller (ADC), the BIG-IP load balancer, put it in a unique position to offer the best application delivery and security services directly at the edge with many of its CDN points of presence. With robust regional edge capabilities and a global network, F5 has entered the CDN space with a complementary offering to an already compelling suite of features. This includes the ability to run microservices and Kubernetes workloads anywhere, with a complete range of services to support app infrastructure deployment, scale, and lifecycle management all within a single management console. With advancements made in the application security space at F5, WAAP capabilities are directly integrated into the Distributed Cloud Platform to protect both web apps and APIs. Features include (yet not limited to): Web Application Firewall: Signature + Behavioral WAF functionality Bot Defense: Detect client signals, determining if clients are human or automated DDoS Mitigation: Fully managed by F5 API Security: Continuous inspection and detection of shadow APIs Solution Combining the Distributed Cloud WAAP with CDN as a form of service chaining is a straightforward process. This not only gives you the best security protection for web apps and APIs, but also positions apps regionally to deliver them with low latency and minimal compute per request. In the following solution, we’ve combined Distributed Cloud WAAP and CDN to globally deliver an app protected by a WAF policy from the closest regional point of presence to the user. Follow along as I demonstrate how to configure the basic elements. Configuration Log in to the Distributed Cloud Console and navigate to the DNS Management service. Decide if you want Distributed Cloud to manage the DNS zone as a Primary DNS server or if you’d rather delegate the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) for your app to Distributed Cloud with a CNAME. While using Delegation or Managed DNS is optional, doing so makes it possible for Distributed Cloud to automatically create and manage the SSL certificates needed to securely publish your app. Next, in Distributed Cloud Console, navigate to the Web App and API Protection service, then go to App Firewall, then Add App Firewall. This is where you’ll create the security policy that we’ll later connect our HTTP LB. Let’s use the following basic WAF policy in YAML format, you can paste it directly in to the Console by changing the configuration view to JSON and then changing the format to YAML. Note: This uses the namespace “waap-cdn”, change this to match your individual tenant’s configuration. metadata: name: buytime-waf namespace: waap-cdn labels: {} annotations: {} disable: false spec: blocking: {} detection_settings: signature_selection_setting: default_attack_type_settings: {} high_medium_low_accuracy_signatures: {} enable_suppression: {} enable_threat_campaigns: {} default_violation_settings: {} bot_protection_setting: malicious_bot_action: BLOCK suspicious_bot_action: REPORT good_bot_action: REPORT allow_all_response_codes: {} default_anonymization: {} use_default_blocking_page: {} With the WAF policy saved, it’s time to configure the origin server. Navigate to Load Balancers > Origin Pools, then Add Origin Pool. The following YAML uses a FQDN DNS name reach the app server. Using an IP address for the server is possible as well. metadata: name: buytime-pool namespace: waap-cdn labels: {} annotations: {} disable: false spec: origin_servers: - public_name: dns_name: webserver.f5-cloud-demo.com labels: {} no_tls: {} port: 80 same_as_endpoint_port: {} healthcheck: [] loadbalancer_algorithm: LB_OVERRIDE endpoint_selection: LOCAL_PREFERRED With the supporting WAF and Origin Pool resources configured, it’s time to create the HTTP Load Balancer. Navigate to Load Balancers > HTTP Load Balancers, then create a new one. Use the following YAML to create the LB and use both resources created above. metadata: name: buytime-online namespace: waap-cdn labels: {} annotations: {} disable: false spec: domains: - buytime.waap.f5-cloud-demo.com https_auto_cert: http_redirect: true add_hsts: true port: 443 tls_config: default_security: {} no_mtls: {} default_header: {} enable_path_normalize: {} non_default_loadbalancer: {} header_transformation_type: default_header_transformation: {} advertise_on_public_default_vip: {} default_route_pools: - pool: tenant: your-tenant-uid namespace: waap-cdn name: buytime-pool kind: origin_pool weight: 1 priority: 1 endpoint_subsets: {} routes: [] app_firewall: tenant: your-tenant-uid namespace: waap-cdn name: buytime-waf kind: app_firewall add_location: true no_challenge: {} user_id_client_ip: {} disable_rate_limit: {} waf_exclusion_rules: [] data_guard_rules: [] blocked_clients: [] trusted_clients: [] ddos_mitigation_rules: [] service_policies_from_namespace: {} round_robin: {} disable_trust_client_ip_headers: {} disable_ddos_detection: {} disable_malicious_user_detection: {} disable_api_discovery: {} disable_bot_defense: {} disable_api_definition: {} disable_ip_reputation: {} disable_client_side_defense: {} resource_version: "517528014" With the HTTP LB successfully deployed, check that its status is ready on the status page. You can verify the LB is working by sending a basic request using the command line tool, curl. Confirm that the value of the HTTP header “Server” is “volt-adc”. da.potter@lab ~ % curl -I https://buytime.waap.f5-cloud-demo.com HTTP/2 200 date: Mon, 17 Oct 2022 23:23:55 GMT content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 content-length: 2200 vary: Origin access-control-allow-credentials: true accept-ranges: bytes cache-control: public, max-age=0 last-modified: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 11:06:36 GMT etag: W/"898-177d3b82260" x-envoy-upstream-service-time: 136 strict-transport-security: max-age=31536000 set-cookie: 1f945=1666049035840-557942247; Path=/; Domain=f5-cloud-demo.com; Expires=Sun, 17 Oct 2032 23:23:55 GMT set-cookie: 1f9403=viJrSNaAp766P6p6EKZK7nyhofjXCVawnskkzsrMBUZIoNQOEUqXFkyymBAGlYPNQXOUBOOYKFfs0ne+fKAT/ozN5PM4S5hmAIiHQ7JAh48P4AP47wwPqdvC22MSsSejQ0upD9oEhkQEeTG1Iro1N9sLh+w+CtFS7WiXmmJFV9FAl3E2; path=/ x-volterra-location: wes-sea server: volt-adc Now it’s time to configure the CDN Distribution and service chain it to the WAAP HTTP LB. Navigate to Content Delivery Network > Distributions, then Add Distribution. The following YAML creates a basic CDN configuration that uses the WAAP HTTP LB above. metadata: name: buytime-cdn namespace: waap-cdn labels: {} annotations: {} disable: false spec: domains: - buytime.f5-cloud-demo.com https_auto_cert: http_redirect: true add_hsts: true tls_config: tls_12_plus: {} add_location: false more_option: cache_ttl_options: cache_ttl_override: 1m origin_pool: public_name: dns_name: buytime.waap.f5-cloud-demo.com use_tls: use_host_header_as_sni: {} tls_config: default_security: {} volterra_trusted_ca: {} no_mtls: {} origin_servers: - public_name: dns_name: buytime.waap.f5-cloud-demo.com follow_origin_redirect: false resource_version: "518473853" After saving the configuration, verify that the status is “Active”. You can confirm the CDN deployment status for each individual region by going to the distribution’s action button “Show Global Status”, and scrolling down to each region to see that each region’s “site_status.status” value is “DEPLOYMENT_STATUS_DEPLOYED”. Verification With the CDN Distribution successfully deployed, it’s possible to confirm with the following basic request using curl. Take note of the two HTTP headers “Server” and “x-cache-status”. The Server value will now be “volt-cdn”, and the x-cache-status will be “MISS” for the first request. da.potter@lab ~ % curl -I https://buytime.f5-cloud-demo.com HTTP/2 200 date: Mon, 17 Oct 2022 23:24:04 GMT content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 content-length: 2200 vary: Origin access-control-allow-credentials: true accept-ranges: bytes cache-control: public, max-age=0 last-modified: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 11:06:36 GMT etag: W/"898-177d3b82260" x-envoy-upstream-service-time: 63 strict-transport-security: max-age=31536000 set-cookie: 1f945=1666049044863-471593352; Path=/; Domain=f5-cloud-demo.com; Expires=Sun, 17 Oct 2032 23:24:04 GMT set-cookie: 1f9403=aCNN1JINHqvWPwkVT5OH3c+OIl6+Ve9Xkjx/zfWxz5AaG24IkeYqZ+y6tQqE9CiFkNk+cnU7NP0EYtgGnxV0dLzuo3yHRi3dzVLT7PEUHpYA2YSXbHY6yTijHbj/rSafchaEEnzegqngS4dBwfe56pBZt52MMWsUU9x3P4yMzeeonxcr; path=/ x-volterra-location: dal3-dal server: volt-cdn x-cache-status: MISS strict-transport-security: max-age=31536000 To see a security violation detected by the WAF in real-time, you can simulate a simple XSS exploit with the following curl: da.potter@lab ~ % curl -Gv "https://buytime.f5-cloud-demo.com?<script>('alert:XSS')</script>" * Trying x.x.x.x:443... * Connected to buytime.f5-cloud-demo.com (x.x.x.x) port 443 (#0) * ALPN, offering h2 * ALPN, offering http/1.1 * successfully set certificate verify locations: * CAfile: /etc/ssl/cert.pem * CApath: none * (304) (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1): * (304) (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2): * TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11): * TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Server key exchange (12): * TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Server finished (14): * TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client key exchange (16): * TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1): * TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20): * TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1): * TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20): * SSL connection using TLSv1.2 / ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 * ALPN, server accepted to use h2 * Server certificate: * subject: CN=buytime.f5-cloud-demo.com * start date: Oct 14 23:51:02 2022 GMT * expire date: Jan 12 23:51:01 2023 GMT * subjectAltName: host "buytime.f5-cloud-demo.com" matched cert's "buytime.f5-cloud-demo.com" * issuer: C=US; O=Let's Encrypt; CN=R3 * SSL certificate verify ok. * Using HTTP2, server supports multiplexing * Connection state changed (HTTP/2 confirmed) * Copying HTTP/2 data in stream buffer to connection buffer after upgrade: len=0 * Using Stream ID: 1 (easy handle 0x14f010000) > GET /?<script>('alert:XSS')</script> HTTP/2 > Host: buytime.f5-cloud-demo.com > user-agent: curl/7.79.1 > accept: */* > * Connection state changed (MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS == 128)! < HTTP/2 200 < date: Sat, 22 Oct 2022 01:04:39 GMT < content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 < content-length: 269 < cache-control: no-cache < pragma: no-cache < set-cookie: 1f945=1666400679155-452898837; Path=/; Domain=f5-cloud-demo.com; Expires=Fri, 22 Oct 2032 01:04:39 GMT < set-cookie: 1f9403=/1b+W13c7xNShbbe6zE3KKUDNPCGbxRMVhI64uZny+HFXxpkJMsCKmDWaihBD4KWm82reTlVsS8MumTYQW6ktFQqXeFvrMDFMSKdNSAbVT+IqQfSuVfVRfrtgRkvgzbDEX9TUIhp3xJV3R1jdbUuAAaj9Dhgdsven8FlCaADENYuIlBE; path=/ < x-volterra-location: dal3-dal < server: volt-cdn < x-cache-status: MISS < strict-transport-security: max-age=31536000 < <html><head><title>Request Rejected</title></head> <body>The requested URL was rejected. Please consult with your administrator.<br/><br/> Your support ID is 85281693-eb72-4891-9099-928ffe00869c<br/><br/><a href='javascript:history.back();'>[Go Back]</a></body></html> * Connection #0 to host buytime.f5-cloud-demo.com left intact Notice that the above request intentionally by-passes the CDN cache and is sent to the HTTP LB for the WAF policy to inspect. With this request rejected, you can confirm the attack by navigating to the WAAP HTTP LB Security page under the WAAP Security section within Apps & APIs. After refreshing the page, you’ll see the security violation under the “Top Attacked” panel. Demo To see all of this in action, watch my video below. This uses all of the configuration details above to make a WAAP + CDN service chain in Distributed Cloud. Additional Guides Virtually deploy this solution in our product simulator, or hands-on with step-by-step comprehensive demo guide. The demo guide includes all the steps, including those that are needed prior to deployment, so that once deployed, the solution works end-to-end without any tweaks to local DNS. The demo guide steps can also be automated with Ansible, in case you'd either like to replicate it or simply want to jump to the end and work your way back. Conclusion This shows just how simple it can be to use the Distributed Cloud CDN to frontend your web app protected by a WAF, all natively within the F5 Distributed Cloud’s regional edge POPs. The advantage of this solution should now be clear – the Distributed Cloud CDN is cloud-agnostic, flexible, agile, and you can enforce security policies anywhere, regardless of whether your web app lives on-prem, in and across clouds, or even at the edge. For more information about Distributed Cloud WAAP and Distributed Cloud CDN, visit the following resources: Product website: https://www.f5.com/cloud/products/cdn Distributed Cloud CDN & WAAP Demo Guide: https://github.com/f5devcentral/xcwaapcdnguide Video: https://youtu.be/OUD8R6j5Q8o Simulator: https://simulator.f5.com/s/waap-cdn Demo Guide: https://github.com/f5devcentral/xcwaapcdnguide
Demo Guide: Edge Compute with F5 Distributed Cloud Services (SaaS Console, Automation)
This demo guide provides walk-through steps or Terraform scripts to deploy and connect with multi-cloud-networking (MCN) a sample Compute Edge app infrastructure across multiple cloud providers (Azure and AWS) or a single cloud of your choosing.Overview of Trusted Client IP Headers in F5 Distributed Cloud Platform
Introduction: With day-to-day enhancements in security architecture, a request initiated at the source point traverses through multiple hops before it reaches the destination point. By design, if a request passes through any CDN/ Proxy that is present between the real client and the load balancer, we will no longer see the client’s IP address as the source address in the Load Balancer but the CDN/Proxy IP instead. Identification of real Client IP address is sometimes necessary for monitoring, logging, defining allow/deny policies and other purposes. “Trusted Client IP Header” feature of F5 Distributed Cloud platform solves the above concern and provides the ability to identify the real client IP address that initiated the connection. Security events and request logs will show this real client IP address as the source IP, when this feature is enabled. Trusted Client IP Header feature in F5 Distributed Cloud platform allows the admin to configure Client IP Headers. The admin can define a list of one or more Client IP Headers as Trusted headers. Below are some key points to be considered while configuring headers list: When multiple headers are configured, F5 Distributed Cloud platform follows top to bottom precedence, which means initially first header is considered and system checks for its availability in the request. If not present in the request, the system will proceed to check for the second header, and so on, until one of the listed headers is found. When none of the defined headers exists, or the value of the configured header is not an IP address, then the system will use the source IP of the packet. When multiple IP addresses are available in header value, the system will read the rightmost IP address and considers it as real Client IP address. But when using X-Forwarded-For Header and if multiple IPs are available in value, the system reads the rightmost-1 IP address and considers it as real client IP address. Below video provies brief introduction to Trusted Client IP Headers feature: Demonstration: In this demonstration, we will see how to identify the real client IP address using “Trusted Client IP headers” option in F5 Distributed Cloud platform. We are using F5 Distributed Cloud Content Distribution Network (check references for more details) Load-balancer configured with “Trusted Client IP Header” option enabled Airlines test application as a backend origin server. As shown in the below demo architecture, the request initiated at the client initially reaches to the available F5 CDN server and then the request from CDN hits the load balancer. Load balancer validates the request for configured headers availability, identifies the true client IP address and displays it rather than the CDN IP. The request from load balancer finally hits the backend application. Step 1: Creation of Origin Pool From your desired namespace, navigate to Manage -> Load Balancers -> Origin pools Click on "Add Origin Pool" Provide a name for Origin pool Configure Origin server details with valid Port details. Proceed with “Save and Exit” Step 2: Creation of Load Balancer with Trusted Client IP Header enabled From your desired namespace, Navigate to Manage -> Load Balancers -> HTTP Load Balancers Click on "Add HTTP load balancer" Provide a name for the Load Balancer Provide valid domain name and choose appropriate load balancer type under Basic Configuration Associate the above created Origin Pool in the load balancer In Other Settings, Enable Trusted Client IP Headers Provide a list of one or more Client Headers. Admin can configure any header which is used to find client IP address. Click on “Save and Exit” to save the Load Balancer configuration. Step 3: Create any Content Delivery Network or Proxy Here we are using F5 XC CDN between the client and the load balancer. CDN is a server that is used to serve web content quickly. CDN servers are distributed globally, and the main aim is to reduce latency and delay in end-to-end communication and thereby increases the efficiency. Check references for more exploration links. Navigate to Home -> Content Delivery Network -> Manage -> Distributions Click on “Add Distribution” Provide a name for the CDN Provide a valid domain name Choose appropriate CDN type Create a CDN Origin Pool by clicking on “Configure” Provide your HTTP Load Balancer domain name which is created above in the DNS name Add above created HTTP Load balancer domain name in the list of Origin Servers of CDN Origin pool Click on “Apply” twice CDN Origin pool gets created and associated with the CDN Click on “Save and Exit” Note: F5 CDN has provided a dedicated header called “X-F5-True-Client-Ip” to extract the real client address. Customers who are using F5 CDN can use this header to identify the client IP address. Similarly, customer can configure any headers or custom headers to identify the client IP. Step 4: Access the backend Origin Server Open a browser Access the backend server using the configured domain Observe that request hits the backend server and response page is visible Step 5: Validate logs and source IP To check the source IP, in F5 Distributed Cloud Console, Navigate to Home -> Load Balancer -> Virtual Hosts -> HTTP Load Balancers Choose the appropriate load balancer and open Security Monitoring -> Requests Observe the Client IP and validate it with the client public IP address. Client IP address should be displayed in the logs rather than the CDN/Proxy IP as the feature is enabled. This source IP can further be used in WAF Exclusions rules, to block or allow clients. Conclusion: As you can see from the above demonstration, with Trusted Client IP Headers option enabled in F5 Distributed Cloud platform, the request logs and security events are getting logged with the real client IP address as the source IP rather than the CDN IP. Reference Links: F5 Distributed Cloud Services F5 Distributed Cloud WAF F5 XC CDN Exploration Configure CDN Distribution
Using F5 Distributed Cloud private connectivity orchestration for secure multi-cloud infrastructure
Introduction Enterprise businesses use modern apps that access services in many locations. Users running productivity apps, like Office365, must connect to services in the cloud from on-prem locations. To keep this running well, enterprises must provide connectivity that’s fast, reliable, and private. Traditionally, it has taken many steps to create private connections to a public cloud subscription and route application specific traffic to it. F5 Distributed Cloud Platform orchestrates ExpressRoutes in Azure and Direct Connect services in AWS, eliminating many of the steps needed for routing end-to-end. Distributed Cloud private connectivity orchestration makes it easier than ever to connect and configure routing over existing private and dedicated circuits from on-prem locations to cloud services running in AWS and in Azure. The illustration below outlines the basic components to an ExpressRoute service in Azure but there’s a lot more you’ll need to know about just under the cover. Without orchestration, many steps are needed to enable routing between on-prem sites and Azure. This requires expert knowledge of Azure Networking, numerous dependent resources to be built, and advanced routing protocols knowledge -- specifically the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). Extend on-prem network to a colo provider Create and provision the ExpressRoute Circuit Create a Virtual Network Gateway Create a connection between ExpressRoute Circuit & Virtual Network Gateway (VNG) Configure a Route Server to propagate routes between VNG and on-prem Configure user-defined routes on each subnet on each VNet in Azure Using Distributed Cloud to orchestrate ExpressRoutes in Azure and Direct Connect in AWS, the total number of steps is effectively reduced to just an essential few. Additional benefits include no longer needing to be an expert in Azure Networking or in BGP routing, and you get the ability to control connectivity with intent-based policies natively built into the Distributed Cloud Platform. An example of an intent-based policy is to configure VNet tagging in Azure to use with a firewall policy that just allow access to specific apps or by select users. Additional policies that support tagging include Distributed Cloud WAAP and Distributed Cloud App Infrastructure Protection. The following details cover the key components needed to support direct connectivity and show how to create the services and deploy a privately routed app in Distributed Cloud. Building ExpressRoute to Azure Extend on-prem network to a colo provider Create and provision the ExpressRoute Circuit Enable the ExpressRoute orchestration feature on an Azure VNet Site configured in Distributed Cloud To create an ExpressRoute orchestrated configuration in Distributed Cloud, navigate to Multi-Cloud Network Connect > Site Management > Azure VNET Sites > Add Azure VNET Site or Manage Configuration for an existing Site. Enter the required parameters, and when you reach the “Ingress Gateway or Ingress/Egress Gateway”, select “Ingress/Egress Gateway (Two Interface) …””. Here you have the option to deploy on a Recommended Region or an Alternate Region. This selection depends entirely on your business’ cloud deployment model. After choosing the model that best fits your environment, configure the number of Availability Zones for the Gateway and subnets (new/existing) that it will join and Apply the settings. Now scroll down to Advanced Options (enabling Advanced Fields) and Select VNet type: Hub VNet. Click “View Configuration”, and any existing VNet’s from your Azure Subscription that should inherit orchestrated routing. Next, change the “Express Route Configuration” to Enabled to expand the dropdown to access the ExpressRoute Circuit and Virtual Network Gateway settings. Under “* Connections”, add the ExpressRoute Circuit configuration for your Azure subscription(s). The required fields are the Name and the Express Route Circuit, this is the Resource ID for the circuit in Azure. Note: When configuring more than one circuit, you may want to also configure the Routing Weight for circuit preference. When configuring an express route circuit from another subscription (not shown below), you’ll also need an Authorization Key. For ease of deployment, it’s recommended to use the default values for the remaining fields, including for the Gateway SKU, Subnet for Azure VNet Gateway, and Subnet for Azure Route Server, including ASN Configuration for BGP between Site and Azure Route Servers. After the configuration is fully saved and deployed, with site status Applied on the Cloud Sites page, all resources in Azure will now be set to use ExpressRoute Circuit(s) for all designated L3 routed traffic. Next, we’ll configured the orchestration of Direct Connect in an AWS VPC connected site. AWS TGW connected sites are also support. Building Direct Connect for AWS To create a Direct Connect orchestrated configuration in Distributed Cloud, navigate to Multi-Cloud Network Connect > Site Management > AWS VPC Sites > Add AWS VPC Site or Manage Configuration for an existing Site. Enter the required parameters, and when you reach the “Ingress Gateway or Ingress/Egress Gateway”, choose the form factor that meets your deployment requirements. Scroll down to Advanced Configuration, enable Advanced Fields, and then Enable Direct Connect. Configuring the Direct Connect connection feature, choose either Hosted VIF or Standard VIF mode. Use Hosted VIF when you’re already using the Direct Connect connection for other purposes in AWS or when the VIF is in another AWS subscription. Otherwise, choosing Standard VIF allows Distributed Cloud to automatically create the VIF, and dependent services in AWS mentioned below to access the Direct Connect connection. Standard VIF mode creates the following additional resources in AWS: Virtual Gateway (VGW): associating it to the VPC and enabling route propagation to inside route tables Direct Connect Gateway (DCG): associating it to the VGW Note: In Standard VIF mode, at the end of the deployment admins may copy the direct connect gateway ID and use it to create other VIF’s. Admins may also copy the ASN. This is the AWS side of the ASN that’s needed by network ops teams to configure BGP peering. Note: In Hosted VIF mode, independent site deployment is responsible for: Creating VGW, and associating it to the VPC and enabling route propagation to inside route tables Creating DCG and associating it to the VGW Accepting the Hosted VIF and linking to the DCGW VIF Optionally, you may configure the Custom ASN if needed to work with an existing BGP configuration or choose Auto to let Distributed Cloud figure it out. Apply the config, save changes, and exit to the general Sites page. After the configuration is fully saved and deployed and having site status Applied on the Cloud Sites page, all resources in AWS will now be set to use the Direct Connect Gateway for all designated L3 routed traffic. Adding Private Connectivity On-Prem The final part to this deployment is routing both the ExpressRoute and Direct Connect circuits to an on-prem site. Both circuits must terminate at a colo space, and then standard IT/NetOps teams handle the routing outside the realm of Distributed Cloud to the destination. Building a Distributed App w/ Private Connectivity With Distributed Cloud having orchestrated the routing to each site’s workload, and IT/NetOps configured routing on-prem, including propagating the on-prem routes on BGP, an app with components that work independently can now be accessed as one unified interface. An example of a distributed app that run perfectly in this environment is the demo app, Arcadia Finance. This app has four components: Main – Frontend Web interface API – An App module accessed by Main to support money transfers Refer-A-Friend (Not used) – An App module interface accessed by Main to invite friends Backend – A DB server that stores money transfer accounts used by the API module, stock portfolio positions used by the Main module, and email addresses saved by the Refer-A-Friend module. Functionally, the connection flow is as follows: Users access a VIP advertised by an F5 Global Network Regional Edge to the Internet User traffic is connected to the Main (frontend) app running in AWS via the F5 Global Network Main App connects to API in Azure to load the money-transfer side frame, and then to the Backend DB on-prem to load the stocks portfolio balances. These connections transit the private connectivity links created in this article. API App in Azure connects to the Backend DB on-prem to retrieve money transfer accounts. This connection transits the private connectivity links created in this article. To support this topology and configuration, the apps are divided and run as follows: AWS Frontend (nginx) Main (Web) Refer-A-Friend Azure API (App) On-Prem Backend (DB) To make the app reachable to users, use the Distributed Cloud console Sites Distributed Apps feature to create one HTTP Load Balancer with the VIP advertised to the Internet, and with the origin pool of the Frontend (nginx) app. Note: This step assumes that you have previously created a fully connected AWS CE Site with connectivity to your VPC’s and a Direct Connect circuit in the section above. Navigate to Multi-Cloud App Connect > Manage > Load Balancers > Origin Pools, create a new origin pool. In the pool creation menu, at the top, select “JSON” and change the format to YAML, then paste the following example, changing the specific values, such as the namespace, to match your environment: metadata: name: mcn-aws-workload-pool namespace: mcn-privatelinks labels: ves.io/app_type: arcadia annotations: {} disable: false spec: origin_servers: - private_ip: ip: 10.100.2.238 site_locator: site: tenant: acmecorp-tnxbsial namespace: system name: soln-eng-aws-dc kind: site inside_network: {} labels: {} no_tls: {} port: 8000 same_as_endpoint_port: {} loadbalancer_algorithm: LB_OVERRIDE endpoint_selection: LOCAL_PREFERRED With the origin pool created, navigate to Distributed Apps > Manage > Load Balancers > HTTP Load Balancers, and add a new one with the following YAML provided as an example: metadata: name: mcn-arcadia-frontend namespace: mcn-privatelinks labels: ves.io/app_type: arcadia annotations: {} disable: false spec: domains: - mcn-arcadia-frontend.demo.internal http: dns_volterra_managed: false port: 80 downstream_tls_certificate_expiration_timestamps: [] advertise_on_public_default_vip: {} default_route_pools: - pool: tenant: acmecorp-tnxbsial namespace: mcn-privatelinks name: mcn-aws-workload-pool kind: origin_pool weight: 1 priority: 1 endpoint_subsets: {} Internally verify end-to-end connectivity Opening a command line shell to the Frontend Web App, a variation of traceroute with the tool hping3 and using curl, reveals each hop identified as privately connected along with connectivity established directly to the destination working without an intermediary. The following IP addresses are used to support a TCP connection from the Frontend (Web) app running in AWS to the API app running in Azure: 10.100.2.238 (Source): Frontend (Web) 172.18.0.1: Container host node 192.168.1.6: AWS Direct Connect Gateway 192.168.1.5: On-Prem router 192.168.1.22: Azure ExpressRoute Circuit endpoint 10.101.1.5 (Destination): App (API) In the CLI output, note each hop and the value in the HTTP Response header “Server”: root@1e40062cb314:/etc/nginx# hping3 -ST -p 8080 api HPING api (eth2 10.101.1.5): S set, 40 headers + 0 data bytes hop=1 TTL 0 during transit from ip=172.18.0.1 name=UNKNOWN hop=1 hoprtt=7.7 ms hop=2 TTL 0 during transit from ip=192.168.1.6 name=UNKNOWN hop=2 hoprtt=31.4 ms hop=3 TTL 0 during transit from ip=192.168.1.5 name=UNKNOWN hop=3 hoprtt=67.3 ms hop=4 TTL 0 during transit from ip=192.168.1.22 name=UNKNOWN hop=4 hoprtt=67.2 ms ^C --- api hping statistic --- 8 packets transmitted, 4 packets received, 50% packet loss round-trip min/avg/max = 7.7/43.4/67.3 ms root@1e40062cb314:/etc/nginx# curl -v api:8080 * Rebuilt URL to: api:8080/ * Hostname was NOT found in DNS cache * Trying 10.101.1.5... * Connected to api (10.101.1.5) port 8080 (#0) > GET / HTTP/1.1 > User-Agent: curl/7.35.0 > Host: api:8080 > Accept: */* > < HTTP/1.1 200 OK * Server nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu) is not blacklisted < Server: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu) < Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2023 18:59:32 GMT < Content-Type: text/html < Content-Length: 612 < Last-Modified: Fri, 11 Nov 2022 03:24:47 GMT < Connection: keep-alive < ETag: "636dc07f-264" < Accept-Ranges: bytes Conclusion As more services continue to be deployed to and run in the cloud, dedicated, reliable, and secure private connectivity is increasingly required by Enterprises. Establishing connectivity is not a rudimentary task and requires the assistance of many hands in different departments. Distributed Cloud private connectivity orchestration helps streamline this process by eliminating many of the steps required in each cloud provider, including no longer requiring dedicated cloud and routing protocol experts just to configure these services manually. To see all of this in action and to see how all the parts come together, watch the following video, a companion to this article. Visit the following resources for more information about this feature and other Distributed Cloud services: Multi-Cloud Network Connect Product Information Direct Connect orchestration for AWS TGW Sites Direct Connect orchestration for AWS VPC Sites ExpressRoutes orchestration for Azure VNet Sites YouTube VideoIntroduction to F5 Distributed Cloud Console Rate Limiting Feature
Introduction: Rate limiting is a method of protecting backend applications by keeping constraints on the rate of traffic coming into or out of an application. The rate is specified by how many times a route was used within a specific time interval (per second or minute). If the number of requests exceeds the configured limit, the incoming requests can overload the capacity of the services resulting in poor performance, reduced functionality, and sometimes downtime. These can be the result of either intentional (DDoS) or unintentional events (misconfiguration of applications/clients). Rate Limiting allows the administrator to limit the number of API requests per second or minute. Each incoming request can be monitored using ONE of the following: Client IP Address: The client IP source address as identifier. Cookie Name: An HTTP cookie value as the user identifier. HTTP Header Name: User a specific HTTP header value as the user identifier. Query Parameter Key: Use the query parameter value for the given key as the user identifier. Rate Limiter is a combination of the following: Number: The total number of allowed requests in the specified period. Per Period: Unit for a period per which the rate limit is applied. Use-Case: For ex. One of the customers website provides services to premium and free customers and this website gets overloaded frequently. We might increase the capacity temporarily as per need, but we want to ensure the user experience for premium users is not affected due to increased load from the free users. Solution: An alternative approach would be to simply prioritize the traffic. We can implement a http-header-name or cookie-name based rate limiting. Premium vs. free user’s traffic can be tagged at the client side with a premium-user-http-header or premium-user-cookie-name or free-user-http-header or free-user-cookie-name. And then you can rate limit the free user’s traffic to your website, ensuring the premium user’s user-experience is not affected by the free users. Step by step process: Version: Cloud Console at the time of article: crt-20220217-1449 Prerequisites: Access to F5 Distributed cloud account (contact sales for account access) Customer domain is configured and delegated properly (check reference links for more details) Kubernetes cluster and load balancer created in account (check getting started links for creation of cluster and load balancer) Step1: Login to F5 cloud account with valid credentials and then click on “Load Balancers” in Common Services section. Step2: Navigate to Manage section, click on “Load Balancers” and then select HTTP load balancers. Click on 3 dots in Actions column for any load balancer and then select “Manage configuration” option. Step3: Next click on “Edit Configuration” then select Security configuration in Left menu. Now toggle “Advanced Fields button” as below- Step4: Select “Rate-limiting parameters” option in “Rate limiting” field drop-down options and then click on configure. Step5: Toggle “Show Advanced fields” button, provide some valid number & period from drop-down options (secs or minutes) and leave burst multiplier field to default value of 1 as below- Step6: Apply the above configuration, then click on “Save and Exit” button. Step7: Copy the domain name of load balancer, open a browser, enter the domain name, and check if the demo application is accessible as below. Step8: Try to access the same application multiple times and once rate limit configuration is reached, we will see error below. Below are some more options available in rate limiting feature for more requests granularity: Allowed list: users added in this field will not hit these rate limiting constraints and application is always accessible to these users. Custom rate limiter policies – Users can also create their own custom rate limiters, add them to rate limiter policies and then apply these policies to load balancers. Admins can also add rate limiter rules in rate limiter policies matching specific methods (POST, GET, etc.), domain names, headers or paths and apply policy to load balancer. Conclusion: Rate Limiting protects applications against brute force attacks and limits access to searches, API calls, or resources that involve database-intensive operations at your origin. It also provides the ability to limit the number of requests originating from a particular user. For further information or to get started click the links below: Documentation of user-rate-limiting feature in cloud console Configuring load balancer and api-discovery in cloud console Security features in cloud console Steps to delegate domain in cloud consoleMitigating OWASP 2019 API Security Top 10 risks using F5 NGINX App Protect
This 2019 API Security article provides a valuable summary of the OWASP API Security Top 10 risks identified for that year, outlining key vulnerabilities. We will deep-dive into some of those common risks and how we can protect our applications against these vulnerabilities using F5 NGINX App Protect. API2:2019 - Broken User Authentication Problem Statement: A critical API security risk, Broken Authentication occurs when weaknesses in the API's identity verification process permit attackers to circumvent authentication mechanisms. Successful exploitation leads attackers to impersonate legitimate users, gain unauthorized access to sensitive data, perform actions on behalf of victims, and potentially take over accounts or systems. This demonstration utilizes the Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA) to illustrate the exploitability of Broken Authentication. We will execute a brute-force attack against the login interface, iterating through potential credential pairs to achieve unauthorized authentication. Below is the selenium automated script to execute brute-force attack, submitting multiple credential combinations to attempt authentication. The brute-force attack successfully compromised the authentication controls by iterating through multiple credential pairs, ultimately granting access. Solution: To mitigate the above vulnerability, NGINX App Protect is deployed and configured as reverse proxy in front of the application and requests are first validated by NAP for the vulnerabilities. The NGINX App Protect Brute Force WAF policy is utilized as shown below. Re-attempt to gain access to the application using the brute force approach is rejected and blocked. Support ID verification in the Security logs shows request is blocked because of Brute Force Policy. Request captured in NGINX App Protect security log API3:2019 - Excessive Data Exposure Problem Statement: As shown below in one of the demo application API’s, Personal Identifiable Information (PII) data, like Credit Card Numbers (CCN) and U.S. Social Security Numbers (SSN), are visible in responses that are highly sensitive. So, we must hide these details to prevent personal data exploits. Solution: To prevent this vulnerability, we will use the DataGuard feature in NGINX App Protect, which validates all response data for sensitive details and will either mask the data or block those requests, as per the configured settings. First, we will configure DataGuard to mask the PII data as shown below and will apply this configuration. Next, if we resend the same request, we can see that the CCN/SSN numbers are masked, thereby preventing data breaches. If needed, we can update configurations to block this vulnerability after which all incoming requests for this endpoint will be blocked. If you open the security log and filter with this support ID, we can see that the request is either blocked or PII data is masked, as per the DataGuard configuration applied in the above section. Request captured in NGINX App Protect security log API4:2019 - Lack of Resources & Rate Limiting Problem Statement: APIs do not have any restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be requested by the end user. Above mentioned scenarios sometimes lead to poor API server performance, Denial of Service (DoS), and brute force attacks. Solution: NGINX App Protect provides different ways to rate limit the requests as per user requirements. A simple rate limiting use case configuration is able to block requests after reaching the limit, which is demonstrated below. API6:2019 - Mass Assignment Problem Statement: API Mass Assignment vulnerability arises when clients can modify immutable internal object properties via crafted requests, bypassing API Endpoint restrictions. Attackers exploit this by sending malicious HTTP requests to escalate privileges, bypass security mechanisms, or manipulate the API Endpoint's functionality. Placing an order with quantity as 1: Bypassing API Endpoint restrictions and placing the order with quantity as -1 is also successful. Solution: To overcome this vulnerability, we will use the WAF API Security Policy in NGINX App Protect which validates all the API Security event triggered and based on the enforcement mode set in the validation rules, the request will either get reported or blocked, as shown below. Restricted/updated swagger file with .json extension is added as below: Policy used: App Protect API Security Re-attempting to place the order with quantity as -1 is getting blocked. Validating the support ID in Security log as below: Request captured in NGINX App Protect security log API7:2019 - Security Misconfiguration Problem Statement: Security misconfiguration occurs when security best practices are neglected, leading to vulnerabilities like exposed debug logs, outdated security patches, improper CORS settings, unnecessary allowed HTTP methods, etc. To prevent this, systems must stay up to date with security patches, employ continuous hardening, ensure API communications use secure channels (TLS), etc. Example: Unnecessary HTTP methods/verbs represent a significant security misconfiguration under the OWASP API Top 10. APIs often expose a range of HTTP methods (such as PUT, DELETE, PATCH) that are not required for the application's functionality. These unused methods, if not properly disabled, can provide attackers with additional attack surfaces, increasing the risk of unauthorized access or unintended actions on the server. Properly limiting and configuring allowed HTTP methods is essential for reducing the potential impact of such security vulnerabilities. Let’s dive into a demo application which has exposed “PUT” method., this method is not required as per the design and attackers can make use of this insecure unintended method to modify the original content. Solution: NGINX App Protect makes it easy to block unnecessary or risky HTTP methods by letting you customize which methods are allowed. By easily configuring a policy to block unauthorized methods, like disabling the PUT method by setting "$action": "delete", you can reduce potential security risks and strengthen your API protection with minimal effort. As shown below the attack request is captured in security log which conveys the request was successfully blocked, because of “Illegal method” violation. Request captured in NGINX App Protect security log API8:2019 - Injection Problem Statement: Customer login pages without secure coding practices may have flaws. Intruders could use those flaws to exploit credential validation using different types of injections, like SQLi, command injections, etc. In our demo application, we have found an exploit which allows us to bypass credential validation using SQL injection (by using username as “' OR true --” and any password), thereby getting administrative access, as below: Solution: NGINX App Protect has a database of signatures that match this type of SQLi attacks. By configuring the WAF policy in blocking mode, NGINX App Protect can identify and block this attack, as shown below. App Protect WAF Policy If you check in the security log with this support ID, we can see that request is blocked because of SQL injection risk, as below. Request captured in NGINX App Protect security log API9:2019 - Improper Assets Management Problem Statement: Improper Asset Management in API security signifies the crucial risk stemming from an incomplete awareness and tracking of an organization's full API landscape, including all environments like development and staging, different versions, both internal and external endpoints, and undocumented or "shadow" APIs. This lack of comprehensive inventory leads to an expanded and often unprotected attack surface, as security measures cannot be consistently applied to unknown or unmanaged assets. Consequently, attackers can exploit these overlooked endpoints, potentially find older, less secure versions or access sensitive data inadvertently exposed in non-production environments, thereby undermining overall security posture because you simply cannot protect assets you don't know exist. We’re using a flask database application with multiple API endpoints for demonstration. As part of managing API assets, the “/v1/admin/users” endpoint in the demo Flask application has been identified as obsolete. The continued exposure of the deprecated “/v1/admin/users” endpoint constitutes an Improper Asset Management vulnerability, creating an unnecessary security exposure that could be leveraged for exploitation. <public_ip>/v1/admin/users The current endpoint for user listing is “/v2/users”. <public_ip>/v2/users with user as admin1 Solution: To mitigate the above vulnerability, we are using NGINX as an API Gateway. The API Gateway acts as a filtering gateway for API incoming traffic, controlling, securing, and routing requests before they reach the backend services. The server’s name used for the above case is “f1-api” which is listening to the public IP where our application is running. To query the “/v1/admin/users” endpoint, use the curl command as shown below. Below is the configuration for NGINX as API Gateway, in “api_gateway.conf”, where “/v1/admin/users” endpoint is deprecated. The “api_json_errors.conf” is configured with error responses as shown below and included in the above “api_gateway.conf”. Executing the curl command against the endpoint yields an “HTTP 301 Moved Permanently” response. https://f1-api/v1/admin/users is deprecated API10:2019 - Insufficient Logging & Monitoring Problem Statement: Appropriate logging and monitoring solutions play a pivotal role in identifying attacks and also in finding the root cause for any security issues. Without these solutions, applications are fully exposed to attackers and SecOps is completely blind to identifying details of users and resources being accessed. Solution: NGINX provides different options to track logging details of applications for end-to-end visibility of every request both from a security and performance perspective. Users can change configurations as per their requirements and can also configure different logging mechanisms with different levels. Check the links below for more details on logging: https://www.nginx.com/blog/logging-upstream-nginx-traffic-cdn77/ https://www.nginx.com/blog/modsecurity-logging-and-debugging/ https://www.nginx.com/blog/using-nginx-logging-for-application-performance-monitoring/ https://docs.nginx.com/nginx/admin-guide/monitoring/logging/ https://docs.nginx.com/nginx-app-protect-waf/logging-overview/logs-overview/ Conclusion: In short, this article covered some common API vulnerabilities and shows how NGINX App Protect can be used as a mitigation solution to prevent these OWASP API security risks. Related resources for more information or to get started: F5 NGINX App Protect OWASP API Security Top 10 2019 OWASP API Security Top 10 2023
