Hands-On Quantum-Safe PKI: A Practical Post-Quantum Cryptography Implementation Guide
Update (April 2026): The CNSA 2.0 section of this article originally listed both ML-DSA-65/87 and ML-KEM-768/1024 as approved. That's incorrect — CNSA 2.0 requires ML-DSA-87 and ML-KEM-1024 exclusively per draft-jenkins-cnsa2-pkix-profile §4. FIPS 204/203 standardize additional parameter sets but CNSA 2.0 only adopts Category 5. Is your Public Key Infrastructure quantum-ready? Remember way back when we built the PQC CNSA 2.0 Implementation guide in October 2025? So long ago! Due to popular request, we've expanded the lab to now include THREE distinct learning paths: NIST FIPS standards, NSA CNSA 2.0 compliance, AND alternative post-quantum algorithms for those wanting diversity or international compliance options.. The GitHub lab guide walks you through building quantum-resistant certificate authorities using OpenSSL with hands-on exercises. Why learn and implement post-quantum cryptography (PQC) now? While quantum computing is a fascinating area of science, all technological advancements can be misused. Nefarious people and nation-states are extracting encrypted data to decrypt at a later date when quantum computers become available, a practice you better know by now called "harvest now, decrypt later." Close your post-quantum cryptographic knowledge gap so you can get secured sooner and reduce the impact(s) that may not surface until after it's too late. Ignorance is not bliss when it comes to cryptography and regulatory fines, so let's get started. The GitHub lab provides step-by-step instructions to create: Quantum-resistant Root CA using ML-DSA-87 (FIPS and CNSA 2.0) Algorithm flexibility based on your compliance needs Quantum-safe server and client certificates OCSP and CRL revocation for quantum-resistant certificates TLS 1.3 key exchange testing with ML-KEM and hybrid modes Alternative algorithm exploration (FrodoKEM, BIKE, HQC) for TLS/KEM usage Access the Complete Lab Guide on GitHub → At A Glance: OpenSSL Quantum-Resistant CA Learning Paths Select the path that aligns with your requirements: FIPS 203/204/205 CNSA 2.0 Alt. Algorithms Target Audience Commercial organizations Government contractors, classified systems Researchers, international compliance, defense-in-depth Compliance Standard NIST FIPS standards NSA CNSA 2.0 Non-NIST algorithms, international standards Algorithm Coverage ML-DSA, ML-KEM, SLH-DSA, Hybrid ML-DSA-87, ML-KEM-/1024 FrodoKEM, BIKE, HQC Use Case General quantum-resistant infrastructure National security systems Algorithm diversity, conservative security 📚 Learning Path 1: NIST FIPS 203/204/205 For commercial organizations implementing quantum-resistant cryptography using NIST standards. This path uses OpenSSL 3.5.x's native post-quantum cryptography support—no external quantum library providers required. So nice, so easy. Modules Module Description 00 - Introduction Overview of FIPS 203/204/205, prerequisites, and lab objectives 01 - Environment Setup Verifying OpenSSL with PQC support 02 - Root CA Building a Root CA with ML-DSA-87 03 - Intermediate CA Creating an Intermediate CA with ML-DSA-65 04 - Certificates Issuing end-entity certificates for servers and users 05 - Revocation Implementing OCSP and CRL certificate revocation 06 - Hybrid Methods IETF hybrid PQC methods (X25519MLKEM768, composite signatures) Algorithms Covered ML-DSA-44/65/87 (FIPS 204) - Lattice-based signatures ML-KEM-512/768/1024 (FIPS 203) - Lattice-based key encapsulation X25519MLKEM768 - Hybrid TLS 1.3 key exchange 📚 Learning Path 2: NSA CNSA 2.0 For government contractors and organizations requiring CNSA 2.0 compliance. This path uses OpenSSL 3.2+ with Open Quantum Safe (OQS) providers for strict CNSA 2.0 algorithm compliance. Modules Module Description 01 - Introduction Overview of CNSA 2.0 requirements and compliance deadlines 02 - Root CA Building a Root CA with ML-DSA-87 03 - Intermediate CA Creating an Intermediate CA with ML-DSA-87 04 - Certificates Issuing CNSA 2.0 compliant certificates 05 - Revocation Implementing OCSP and CRL certificate revocation CNSA 2.0 Approved Algorithms Algorithm Type Approved Algorithms NIST Designation Digital Signatures ML-DSA-87 FIPS 204 Key Establishment ML-KEM-1024 FIPS 203 Hash Functions SHA-384, SHA-512 FIPS 180-4 Note: CNSA 2.0 requires ML-DSA-87 and ML-KEM-1024 exclusively — no other parameter sets are approved. ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, SLH-DSA, and Falcon are NOT part of CNSA 2.0, even though several are FIPS-approved. See draft-jenkins-cnsa2-pkix-profile §4. 📚 Learning Path 3: Alternative PQC Algorithms (NEW!) For researchers, organizations requiring algorithm diversity, and those interested in international PQC implementations. This path explores post-quantum algorithms outside the primary NIST standards, providing options for defense-in-depth strategies and understanding of the broader PQC landscape. Perfect for organizations wanting to hedge against potential future vulnerabilities in current adopted standards. Modules Module Description 00 - Introduction Overview of non-NIST algorithms, international standards, use cases 01 - Environment Setup OpenSSL and modifying OQS provider configuration 02 - FrodoKEM Conservative unstructured lattice KEM (European recommended: BSI, ANSSI) 03 - BIKE and HQC Code-based KEMs (HQC is NIST-selected backup to ML-KEM) 04 - International PQC EU, South Korean, and Chinese algorithm standards 05 - Performance Analysis Comparing algorithms, latency impacts, use cases, nerd stats Algorithms Covered Algorithm Type Mathematical Basis Key Characteristic FrodoKEM KEM Unstructured lattice (LWE) Conservative security, European endorsed (BSI, ANSSI) BIKE KEM Code-based (QC-MDPC) NIST Round 4 candidate, smaller keys than HQC HQC KEM Code-based (Quasi-cyclic) NIST-selected backup to ML-KEM (standard expected 2027) Why Alternative Algorithms Matter Algorithm Diversity: If a vulnerability is found in lattice-based cryptography (ML-KEM), code-based alternatives provide a backup International Compliance: European agencies (BSI, ANSSI) specifically recommend FrodoKEM for conservative security Future-Proofing: HQC will become a FIPS standard in 2027 as NIST's official backup to ML-KEM Research & Testing: Understand the broader PQC landscape for informed decision-making What This Lab Guide Achieves Complete PKI Hierarchy Implementation The lab walks through building an internal PKI infrastructure from scratch, including: Root Certificate Authority: Using ML-DSA-87 providing the highest quantum-ready NIST security level Intermediate Certificate Authority: Intermediate Certificate Authority: ML-DSA-65 in the FIPS path, ML-DSA-87 in the CNSA 2.0 path for hierarchy-wide compliance. End-Entity Certificates: Server and user certificates with comprehensive Subject Alternative Names (SANs) for real-world applications Revocation Infrastructure: Both Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) implementation TLS 1.3 Key Exchange Testing: Hands-on testing with ML-KEM, hybrid modes, and alternative algorithms Security Best Practices: Restrictive Unix file permissions, secure key storage, and backup procedures throughout Key Takeaways After completing one or more of the labs, you will: Understand ML-DSA Cryptography: Gain hands-on experience with both ML-DSA-65 (Level 3 security) and ML-DSA-87 (Level 5 security) algorithms Explore Algorithm Diversity: Understand when and why to use alternative algorithms like FrodoKEM, BIKE, and HQC Configure Modern PKI Features: Implement SANs with DNS, IP, email, and URI entries, plus both CRL and OCSP revocation mechanisms Test TLS 1.3 Key Exchange: Hands-on experience with ML-KEM and hybrid key exchange in real TLS sessions Troubleshoot Effectively: Learn to diagnose and resolve common issues with opensl and oqsproviders for PQC compatibility Prepare for Migration: Start the practical steps needed to transition existing PKI infrastructure to quantum-resistant algorithms Access the Complete Lab Guide on GitHub → About This Guide We built the first guide for NSA Suite B in the distant past (2017) to learn ECC and modern cipher requirements. It was well received enough to built a new guide for CNSA 2.0 but it's quite specific for US federal audiences. That lead us to build a NIST FIPS PQC guide which should apply to more practical use cases. And now we've added alternative algorithms because things are only going to get a bit more complicated moving forward. In the spirit of Learn Python the Hard Way, it focuses on manual repetition, hands-on interactions and real-world scenarios. It provides the practical experiences needed to implement quantum-resistant PKI in production environments. By building it on GitHub, other PKI fans can help where we may have missed something; or simply to expand on it with additional modules or forks. Have at it! Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Q: What is CNSA 2.0? A: CNSA 2.0 (Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0) is the NSA's updated cryptographic standard requiring quantum-resistant algorithms. Q: When do I need to implement quantum-resistant cryptography? A: The NSA and NIST mandate CNSA 2.0 and FIPS 203/204/205 implementation by 2030. Organizations should begin now due to "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks where adversaries collect encrypted data today for future quantum decryption. Q: What is ML-DSA (Dilithium)? A: ML-DSA (Module-Lattice Digital Signature Algorithm), formerly known as Dilithium, is a NIST-standardized quantum-resistant digital signature algorithm specified in FIPS 204. Q: What is ML-KEM (Kyber)? A: ML-KEM... ships in three parameter sets — ML-KEM-512 (~AES-128), ML-KEM-768 (~AES-192), and ML-KEM-1024 (~AES-256). ML-KEM-768 is the common enterprise default; CNSA 2.0 requires ML-KEM-1024. Q: What are the alternative algorithms and why should I care? A: FrodoKEM, BIKE, and HQC are non-NIST-primary algorithms that provide algorithm diversity. If a vulnerability is discovered in lattice-based cryptography (which ML-KEM and ML-DSA use), code-based alternatives like HQC could provide a backup. HQC is actually NIST's selected backup to ML-KEM and will become a FIPS standard in 2027. Q: What's the difference between BIKE and HQC? A: Both are code-based KEMs. BIKE has smaller key sizes but wasn't selected by NIST. HQC has larger keys and was selected as NIST's official backup to ML-KEM. Q: Why do European agencies recommend FrodoKEM? A: FrodoKEM uses unstructured lattices (standard LWE) rather than the structured lattices used in ML-KEM. This provides more conservative security assumptions at the cost of larger key sizes. Germany's BSI and France's ANSSI specifically recommend FrodoKEM for high-security applications. Q: Is this guide suitable for production use? A: NOPE. While the guide teaches production-ready techniques and compliance requirements, always use Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) and air-gapped systems for production Root CAs (cold storage too). The lab is great for internal environments or test harnesses where you may need to test against new quantum-resistant signatures. ALWAYS rely on trusted public PKI infrastructure for production cryptography. 🤓 Happy PKI'ing! Reference Links NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards - Official NIST PQC project page FIPS 203: ML-KEM Standard - Module-Lattice Key Encapsulation Mechanism FIPS 204: ML-DSA Standard - Module-Lattice Digital Signature Algorithm FIPS 205: SLH-DSA Standard - Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm NSA CNSA 2.0 Algorithm Requirements - NSA's official CNSA 2.0 announcement Open Quantum Safe Project - Home of the OQS provider for alternative algorithms OQS Provider for OpenSSL 3 - GitHub repository for OQS provider HQC Specification - Official HQC algorithm documentation BIKE Specification - Official BIKE algorithm documentation OpenSSL 3.5 Documentation - Comprehensive OpenSSL documentationEven More Hands-On Quantum-Safe PKI: Building Enterprise PQC Certificate Authorities with EJBCA Community Edition
Your PQC CAs just graduated from the command line to the corner office. Back in December and again in January we published Hands-On Quantum-Safe PKI, a step-by-step lab for building quantum-resistant certificate authorities from scratch using OpenSSL. You learned ML-DSA algorithms, built a Root CA, chained an Intermediate CA, issued end-entity certificates, and stood up revocation infrastructure, all by hand, one command at a time. Billions of you went through it. Six of you even enjoyed it. But here's the thing about building a CA with OpenSSL: it works beautifully for learning and it works beautifully for testing. It does not work beautifully at 2 AM when someone asks you to revoke a certificate and your "management interface" is vim index.txt . Calgon, take me away! The lab has expanded. The Post-Quantum Cryptography Step-by-Step Lab now includes a complete EJBCA Community Edition deployment track, nine modules that take you from bare metal to enterprise-managed, quantum-resistant Certificate Authorities running inside a real PKI management platform. Same SassyCorp identity. Same ML-DSA-87 Root CA and ML-DSA-65 Intermediate CA. Now with a database, an application server, audit logs, and a web UI that doesn't require you to memorize openssl ca flags. But if you want to we won't stop you and we love you for that. 🔥🔥🔥 Access the Complete Lab on GitHub 🔥🔥🔥; The new lab walks through deploying Keyfactor's EJBCA Community Edition v9.3 on Ubuntu with WildFly 35, MariaDB, and OpenJDK 21. You configure a 3-port TLS architecture, HTTP on 8080, public HTTPS on 8442, and mutual TLS admin access on 8443 where your browser has to prove it's worth it is before EJBCA lets you touch anything. It's PKI with actual access control, which is a refreshing change from chmod 600 being your entire security model. The Evolution: Why This Matters Think of it as three stages of PQC readiness. The first lab (CNSA 2.0 with OpenSSL) taught you algorithm mechanics for federal use cases. The second lab (FIPS 203/204/205) broadened that to commercial compliance. This third expansion puts those same algorithms inside infrastructure that can actually manage certificates at scale — issuance, renewal, revocation, OCSP, CRL distribution, role-based access, and audit logging that doesn't live in a flat file. That progression is intentional. You can't meaningfully operate an enterprise PKI platform if you don't understand what's happening underneath it. And you can't stop at OpenSSL if your organization needs to manage more than a handful of certificates. The compliance clock is running - NIST is deprecating classical asymmetric algorithms by 2030, the NSA wants full CNSA 2.0 enforcement by 2033, and Australia is trying to eliminate classical public-key crypto entirely by 2030 (bless their ambitious hearts). Having people who can actually stand up and operate PQC certificate authorities isn't optional anymore. It's PKI Thunderdome! What You Can Do Next After completing the lab, you'll have a fully operational EJBCA instance with three CAs — the RSA ManagementCA for internal admin plumbing, plus your ML-DSA-87 Root and ML-DSA-65 Intermediate for quantum-resistant certificate operations. From here you can issue end-entity certificates through EJBCA's enrollment interface, configure CRL distribution points, set up OCSP responders, explore the REST API, and experiment with hybrid certificates that combine PQC and classical algorithms. You've got an enterprise PKI playground that happens to be quantum-resistant. The whole thing runs on a single VM if you want, that's what we did. No Docker, no scripts, no "just run this compose file and trust me." Every command is manual, every configuration file is edited by hand, and every step explains why. We remain faithful disciples of the "Learn Python the Hard Way" school of pedagogy, mostly because it works and partly because suffering builds character. The lab is open source, community-driven, and waiting for your pull requests. Go break something, then fix it. That's how you learn. Access the Complete Lab on GitHub → References Resource URL EJBCA Community Edition (Keyfactor) https://github.com/Keyfactor/ejbca-ce Keyfactor PQC Hybrid CA Tutorial https://docs.keyfactor.com/ejbca/latest/tutorial-create-pqc-hybrid-ca-chain Keyfactor EJBCA Installation Docs https://docs.keyfactor.com/ejbca-software/latest/installation WildFly 35 Documentation https://docs.wildfly.org/35/ PQC Coalition — International Requirements https://pqcc.org/international-pqc-requirements/Breaking Down the Quantum Challenge: Why Post-Quantum Cryptography Can't Wait
The Quantum Challenge is Now Post-quantum cryptography represents the next steps of our digital security evolution. Sure, quantum systems capable of breaking current encryption may still be an a few years away, but those beginning their transition now will be well-positioned for when the crypto hits the fan. Nation-state adversaries and sophisticated private entities may be collecting data today hoping to decrypt it tomorrow so it's never to early to start solving the problem now. It's an excellent time to get ahead of the curve with quantum-resistant cryptography. What does this mean for your organization? Any sensitive data encrypted today using standard methods (RSA, ECDSA) could potentially become readable to future quantum-powered attackers. F5 Community Evangelist Chase Abbott discusses the real world implications of quantum computing, and how you can prepare and migrate to NIST-approved hybrid PQC standards. The transition to post-quantum cryptography represents a perfect opportunity to modernize enterprise PKI practices. Those of you that begin planning today have ample time to implement these changes thoughtfully and strategically, positioning yourselves as leaders in the next generation of cybersecurity; high fives all around. The Business Impact: Beyond Technical Considerations Regulatory and Compliance Pressure Government regulations across the globe are creating concrete deadlines for migration strategies: NSA CNSA 2.0 mandates quantum-resistant algorithms for classified systems by 2030 NIST has standardized post-quantum cryptography algorithms (FIPS 203, 204, 205) Industry regulations in finance, healthcare, and defense are beginning to incorporate quantum-safety requirements adhering to the update FIPS governance Your Quantum-Ready Roadmap: A Manageable Transition Phase 1: Assessment and Inventory Action items for leadership: Conduct cryptographic inventory across all systems and applications Identify critical data requiring long-term protection Assess vendor and third-party quantum readiness Establish quantum cryptography governance and budget allocation Phase 2: Pilot Implementation Strategic focus areas: Deploy quantum-resistant algorithms in non-critical environments Train IT and security teams on post-quantum cryptography Establish partnerships with quantum-ready technology vendors Begin updating security policies and procedures Phase 3: Production Migration Enterprise-wide deployment: Implement hybrid classical/quantum-resistant systems and software Migrate critical applications and PKI aggregation points to quantum-safe algorithms Update business continuity and disaster recovery plans Achieve full compliance with regulatory requirements as a priority over other systems Key Takeaways for Business Leaders Start planning now: The quantum threat timeline is uncertain, but the need for preparation is immediate Prioritize critical assets: Focus initial efforts on protecting your most sensitive and long-lived data Invest in capabilities: Quantum cryptography expertise will become as essential as any other IT security skill Engage stakeholders: Quantum security requires coordination across IT, compliance, procurement, and business units Monitor developments: Stay informed about quantum computing advances and regulatory updates Mahalo! Further Reading: Post Quantum Cryptography Coalition: PQC Migration Roadmap Post Quantum Cryptography Coalition: International PQC Requirements Post Quantum Cryptography Coalition: Inventory Workbook Essence of Linear Algebra Quantum Computing for the Very Curious Looking Glass Universe: Why I Left Quantum Computing Research US National Quantum Initiative
Any plans of supporting X25519MLKEM768 (0x11EC)
Hi Experts, It seems F5 is supporting the obsolete draft version, i.e., X25519Kyber768Draft00 (0x6399), whose support has been removed from the latest versions of Chrome and FireFox, instead X25519MLKEM768 (0x11EC) is supported on all the latest versions of Chrome and FireFox. So, does F5 have any plans to support X25519MLKEM768 (0x11EC) in its BIG-IP Next and TMOS flavours soon? Sources: - PQC support in BIG-IP Next: https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000148294 - PQC support in BIG-IP TMOS: https://my.f5.com/s/article/K000149577
