OWASP Automated Threats - OAT-005 Scalping
Introduction: In thisOWASP Automated ThreatArticle we'll be highlightingOAT-005 Scalpingwith some basic threat information as well as a recorded demo to dive into the concepts deeper. In our demo we'll show how Automation is used to monitor and wait for goods or services to become available and then take rapid action to beat normal users to obtain them. We'll wrap it up by highlightingF5 XC Bot Defenseto show how we solve this problem for our customers. Scalping Description: Acquisition of goods or services using the application in a manner that a normal user would be unable to undertake manually. Although Scalping may include monitoring awaiting availability of the goods or services, and then rapid action to beat normal users to obtain these.Scalping includes the additional concept of limited availability of sought-after goods or services, and is most well known in the ticketing business where the tickets acquired are then resold later at a profit by the scalpers. OWASP Automated Threat (OAT) Identity Number OAT-005 Threat Event Name Scalping Summary Defining Characteristics Obtain limited-availability and/or preferred goods/services by unfair methods. OAT-005 Attack Demographics: Sectors Targeted Parties Affected Data Commonly Misused Other Names and Examples Possible Symptoms Entertainment Many Users NA Bulk purchase High peaks of traffic for certain limited-availability goods or services Financial Application Owner Purchase automation Increased circulation of limited goods reselling on secondary market Retail Purchase bot Queue jumping Ticket Scalping Scalping Demo: In this demo we will be showing a simple example of how automation is used to monitor and wait for goods or services to become available and then take rapid action to beat normal users to obtain them. We'll then have a look at the same attack with F5 Distributed Cloud Bot Defense protecting the application. In Conclusion: Scalping Bots are a real problem for organization and customers as they are made up of a vast ecosystem to acquire large amounts of inventory at scale to be sold for a profit. F5 has the solutions to provide superior efficacy to interrupt and stop this unwanted automation. OWASP Links OWASP Automated Threats to Web Applications Home Page OWASP Automated Threats Identification Chart OWASP Automated Threats to Web Applications Handbook F5 Related Content Deploy Bot Defense on any Edge with F5 Distributed Cloud (SaaS Console, Automation) F5 Bot Defense Solutions The OWASP Automated Threats Project OWASP Automated Threats - CAPTCHA Defeat (OAT-009) OWASP Automated Threats - Credential Stuffing (OAT-008) OWASP Automated Threats - OAT-001 Carding Operationlizing Online Fraud Detection, Prevention, and Response JavaScript Supply Chains, Magecart, and F5 XC Client-Side Defense (Demo) How Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud Part: 1 How Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud Part: 2 F5 Distributed Cloud Bot DefenseOWASP Automated Threats - Credential Stuffing (OAT-008)
Introduction: In this OWASP Automated Threat Article we'll be highlighting OAT-008 Credentials Stuffing with some basic threat information as well as a recorded demo to dive into the concepts deeper. In our demo we'll show how Credential Stuffing works with Automation Tools to validate lists of stolen credentials leading to manual Account Takeover and Fraud. We'll wrap it up by highlightingF5 Bot Defenseto show how we solve this problem for our customers. Credential Stuffing Description: Lists of authentication credentials stolen from elsewhere are tested against the application’s authentication mechanisms to identify whether users have re-used the same login credentials. The stolen usernames (often email addresses) and password pairs could have been sourced directly from another application by the attacker, purchased in a criminal marketplace, or obtained from publicly available breach data dumps. Unlike OAT-007 Credential Cracking, Credential Stuffing does not involve any bruteforcing or guessing of values; instead credentials used in other applications are being tested for validity Likelihood & Severity Credential stuffing is one of the most common techniques used to take-over user accounts. Credential stuffing is dangerous to both consumers and enterprises because of the ripple effects of these breaches. Anatomy of Attack The attacker acquires usernames and passwords from a website breach, phishing attack, password dump site. The attacker uses automated tools to test the stolen credentials against many websites (for instance, social media sites, online marketplaces, or web apps). If the login is successful, the attacker knows they have a set of valid credentials. Now the attacker knows they have access to an account. Potential next steps include: Draining stolen accounts of stored value or making purchases. Accessing sensitive information such as credit card numbers, private messages, pictures, or documents. Using the account to send phishing messages or spam. Selling known-valid credentials to one or more of the compromised sites for other attackers to use. OWASP Automated Threat (OAT) Identity Number OAT-008 Threat Event Name Credential Stuffing Summary Defining Characteristics Mass log in attempts used to verify the validity of stolen username/password pairs. OAT-008 Attack Demographics: Sectors Targeted Parties Affected Data Commonly Misused Other Names and Examples Possible Symptoms Entertainment Many Users Authentication Credentials Account Checker Attack Sequential login attempts with different credentials from the same HTTP client (based on IP, User Agent, device, fingerprint, patterns in HTTP headers, etc.) Financial Application Owner Account Checking High number of failed login attempts Government Account Takeover Increased customer complaints of account hijacking through help center or social media outlets Retail Login Stuffing Social Networking Password List Attack Password re-use Use of Stolen Credentials Credential Stuffing Demo: In this demo we will be showing how attackers leverage automation tools with increasing sophistication to execute credential stuffing against the sign in page of a web application. We'll then have a look at the same attack with F5 Distributed Cloud Bot Defense protecting the application. In Conclusion: A common truism in the security industry says that there are two types of companies—those that have been breached, and those that just don’t know it yet. As of 2022, we should be updating that to something like “There are two types of companies—those that acknowledge the threat of credential stuffing and those that will be its victims.” Credential stuffing will be a threat so long as we require users to log in to accounts online. The most comprehensive way to prevent credential stuffing is to use an anti-automation platform. OWASP Links OWASP Automated Threats to Web Applications Home Page OWASP Automated Threats Identification Chart OWASP Automated Threats to Web Applications Handbook F5 Related Content Deploy Bot Defense on any Edge with F5 Distributed Cloud (SaaS Console, Automation) F5 Bot Defense Solutions F5 Labs "I Was a Human CATPCHA Solver" The OWASP Automated Threats Project OWASP Automated Threats - CAPTCHA Defeat (OAT-009) How Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud Part: 1 How Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud Part: 2 F5 Distributed Cloud Bot Defense F5 Labs 2021 Credential Stuffing Report
OWASP Automated Threats - CAPTCHA Defeat (OAT-009)
Introduction: In this OWASP Automated Threat Article we'll be highlighting OAT-009 CAPTCHA Defeat with some basic threat information as well as a recorded demo to dive into the concepts deeper. In our demo we'll show how CAPTCHA Defeat works with Automation Tools to allow attackers to accomplish their objectives despite the presence of CAPTCHA's intended purpose of preventing unwanted automation. We'll wrap it up by highlighting F5 Bot Defense to show how we solve this problem for our customers. CAPTCHA Defeat Description: Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA) challenges are used to distinguish normal users from bots. Automation is used in an attempt to analyse and determine the answer to visual and/or aural CAPTCHA tests and related puzzles. Apart from conventional visual and aural CAPTCHA, puzzle solving mini games or arithmetical exercises are sometimes used. Some of these may include context-specific challenges. The process that determines the answer may utilise tools to perform optical character recognition, or matching against a prepared database of pre-generated images, or using other machine reading, or human farms. OWASP Automated Threat (OAT) Identity Number OAT-009 Threat Event Name CAPTCHA Defeat Summary Defining Characteristics Solve anti-automation tests. OAT-009 Attack Demographics: Sectors Targeted Parties Affected Data Commonly Misused Other Names and Examples Possible Symptoms Education Application Owners Authentication Credentials Breaking CAPTCHA High CAPTCHA solving success rate on fraudulent accounts Entertainment CAPTCHA breaker Suspiciously fast or fixed CAPTCHA solving times Financial CAPTCHA breaking Government CAPTCHA bypass Retail CAPTCHA decoding Social Networking CAPTCHA solver CAPTCHA solving Puzzle solving CAPTCHA Defeat Demo: In this demo we will be showing how it’s possible to leverage real human click farms via CAPTCHA solving services like 2CAPTCHA to bypass reCAPTCHA. We'll then have a look at the same attack with F5 Distributed Cloud Bot Defense protecting the application. In Conclusion: CAPTCHAs are only a speed bump for motivated attackers while introducing considerable friction for legitimate customers. Today, we’re at a point where bots solve CAPTCHAs more quickly and easily than most humans. Check out our additional resource links below to learn more. OWASP Links OWASP Automated Threats to Web Applications Home Page OWASP Automated Threats Identification Chart OWASP Automated Threats to Web Applications Handbook F5 Related Content Deploy Bot Defense on any Edge with F5 Distributed Cloud (SaaS Console, Automation) F5 Bot Defense Solutions F5 Labs "I Was a Human CATPCHA Solver" The OWASP Automated Threats Project How Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud Part: 1 How Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud Part: 2 F5 Distributed Cloud Bot Defense F5 Labs 2021 Credential Stuffing ReportBots, Fraud, and the OWASP Automated Threats Project (Overview)
Introduction Many of us have heard of OWASP in the context of the OWASP Top 10. In this article series we will take a look at another very important threat classification list called the OWASP Automated Threats (OAT) Project and provide a foundational overview. The terms Malicious Bot and Automated Threat can be used interchangeably throughout. In future articles we'll dive deeper into individual key threats called OATs and demonstrate how these attacks work and how to defend against them. Why should we care about the OWASP Automated Threats Project? Web security is no longer constrained to inadvertent vulnerabilities and attackers are abusing inherent functionality to conduct Automated and Manual Fraud. Existing technologies are not capable of detecting advancedautomated abuse, fraud teams can’t keep up with new fraud mechanisms,while web users are increasingly adverse to encountering Authentication Friction created by legacy or traditional bot defenses like CAPTCHAs. From its original release in 2015, the OWASP Automated Threat Handbook has now become a de facto industry standard in classifying Bots and better understanding all aspects of Malicious Web Automation. What OATs Are Not - Not another vulnerability list - Not an OWASP Top N List - Not threat modelling - Not attack trees - Not non web - Not non application What Are OATs (aka Malicous Bots)? In order to quantify these threats, it is necessary to be able to name them. OAT stands for OWASP Automated Threat and there are currently 21 attack vectors defined. Currently OAT codes 001 to 021 are used. Within each OAT the Threat definition contains a description, the sectors targeted, parties affected, the data commonly misused, and external cross mappings to other lists like CAPEC Category, possible symptoms, suggested countermeasures, etc... Here is the Full List of OATs ordered by ascending name: Identifier OAT Name Summary Defining Characteristics OAT-020 Account Aggregation Use by an intermediary application that collects together multiple accounts and interacts on their behalf OAT-019 Account Creation Create multiple accounts for subsequent misuse OAT-003 Ad Fraud False clicks and fraudulent display of web-placed advertisements OAT-009 CAPTCHA Defeat Solve anti-automation tests OAT-010 Card Cracking Identify missing start/expiry dates and security codes for stolen payment card data by trying different values OAT-001 Carding Multiple payment authorisation attempts used to verify the validity of bulk stolen payment card data OAT-012 Cashing Out Buy goods or obtain cash utilising validated stolen payment card or other user account data OAT-007 Credential Cracking Identify valid login credentials by trying different values for usernames and/or passwords OAT-008 Credential Stuffing Mass log in attempts used to verify the validity of stolen username/password pairs OAT-021 Denial of Inventory Deplete goods or services stock without ever completing the purchase or committing to the transaction OAT-015 Denial of Service Target resources of the application and database servers, or individual user accounts, to achieve denial of service (DoS) OAT-006 Expediting Perform actions to hasten progress of usually slow, tedious or time-consuming actions OAT-004 Fingerprinting Elicit information about the supporting software and framework types and versions OAT-018 Footprinting Probe and explore application to identify its constituents and properties OAT-005 Scalping Obtain limited-availability and/or preferred goods/services by unfair methods OAT-011 Scraping Collect application content and/or other data for use elsewhere OAT-016 Skewing Repeated link clicks, page requests or form submissions intended to alter some metric OAT-013 Sniping Last minute bid or offer for goods or services OAT-017 Spamming Malicious or questionable information addition that appears in public or private content, databases or user messages OAT-002 Token Cracking Mass enumeration of coupon numbers, voucher codes, discount tokens, etc OAT-014 Vulnerability Scanning Crawl and fuzz application to identify weaknesses and possible vulnerabilities Automated Threats Breakdown By Industry Within each OAT definition there is a section for the Sectors Targeted for that particular attack vector. For example, a Carding Attack would be seen on ecommerce and retail type of sites with payment card processing. Here they would be able to validate a list of stolen credit card numbers to identify the working ones from non working. Example: OAT-001 Carding Attack example highlighting "Sectors Targeted" for this type of attack. This exists for each attack definition. OWASP Defined Countermeasures Countermeasure Classes: The technology and vendor agnostic countermeasure classes attempt to group together the types of design, development and operational controls identified from research that are being used to partially or fully mitigate the likelihood and/or impact of automated threats to web applications. In all applications, builder-defender collaboration is key in controlling and mitigating automated threats – the best protected applications do not rely solely upon standalone external operational protections, but also have integrated protection built into the design. Similarly to other types of application security threat, it is important to build consideration of automated threats into multiple phases of a secure software development lifecycle (S-SDLC). 14 Countermeasure Classes: Value Authentication Requirements Rate Testing Monitoring Capacity Instrumentation Obfuscation Contract Fingerprinting Response Reputation Sharing Countermeasure Controls Countermeasures are controls that attempt to mitigate the identified automated threats in three ways: Prevent - Controls to reduce the susceptibility to automated threats Detect - Controls to identify whether a user is an automated process rather than a human, and/or to identify if an automated attack is occurring, or occurred in the past Recover - Controls to assist response to incidents caused by automated threats, including to mitigate the impact of the attack, and to to assist return of the application to its normal state. Cross References Other Threat Mappings Each OAT Threat is cross referenced with other external threat lists to provide and understanding of how this OAT Handbook can be integrated with other works. Example, OAT Threat below shows the cross referenced CAPEC, CWE, and WASC Threat ID's You can find links to each of the external classification models below: Mitre CAPEC - best full and/or partial match CAPEC category IDs and/or attack pattern IDs WASC Threat Classification - best match to threat IDs Mitre Common Weakness Enumeration - closely related base, class & variant weakness IDs Matching pages defining terms classified as Attacks on the OWASP wiki Youtube Conclusion In conclusion, the OWASP Automated Threat Handbook has now become a de facto industry standard in classifying and better understanding all aspects of malicious web automation. We can use this handbook to build secure software development lifecycles around our web properties and implement the appropriate countermeasure to prevent unwanted automation against them. OWASP Links OWASP Automated Threats to Web Applications Home Page OWASP Automated Threats Identification Chart OWASP Automated Threats to Web Applications Handbook F5 Related Content Deploy Bot Defense on any Edge with F5 Distributed Cloud (SaaS Console, Automation) How Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud Part: 1 How Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud Part: 2 F5 Distributed Cloud Bot Defense F5 Labs 2021 Credential Stuffing Report
OWASP Automated Threats - OAT-013 Sniping
Introduction: In thisOWASP Automated ThreatArticle we'll be highlightingOAT-013 Snipingwith some basic threat information as well as a recorded demo to dive into the concepts deeper. In our demo we'll explain how sniping works to leave insufficient time for another user to bid on a product. We'll wrap it up by highlightingF5 Bot Defenseto show how we solve this problem for our customers. Sniping Description: The defining characteristic of Sniping is an action undertaken at the latest opportunity to achieve a particular objective, leaving insufficient time for another user to bid/offer. Sniping can also be the automated exploitation of system latencies in the form of timing attacks. Careful timing and prompt action are necessary parts. It is most well known as auction sniping, but the same threat event can be used in other types of applications. Sniping normally leads to some disbenefit for other users, and sometimes that might be considered a form of denial of service.In contrast, OAT-005 Scalping is the acquisition of limited availability of sought-after goods or services, and OAT-006 Expediting is the general hastening of progress. OWASP Automated Threat (OAT) Identity Number OAT-013 Threat Event Name Sniping Summary Defining Characteristics Last minute bid or offer for goods or services. OAT-013 Attack Demographics: Sectors Targeted Parties Affected Data Commonly Misused Other Names and Examples Possible Symptoms Entertainment Few Individual Users Other Financial Data Auction Sniping Elevated basket abandonment Financial Application Owner Other Business Data Bid Sniper Reduced average basket price Retail Third Parties Last Minute Bet Higher proportion of failed payment authorisations Disproportionate use of the payment step Increased chargebacks Multiple failed payment authorizations from the same user and/or IP address and/or User Agent and/or session and/or deviceID/fingerprint Sniping Presentation: In this presentation we will be discussing how attackers leverage automation to execute sniping bids against the application to win last second bids. We'll then show you how to quickly protect you application with F5 Distributed Cloud Bot Defense. In Conclusion: Sniping remains a very common practice to win auctions where bidding is based on timing and last minute execution of that bid. It is very preventable if appropriate anti-automation controls are put into place. OWASP Links OWASP Automated Threats to Web Applications Home Page OWASP Automated Threats Identification Chart OWASP Automated Threats to Web Applications Handbook F5 Related Content F5 Bot Defense Solutions The OWASP Automated Threats Project OWASP Automated Threats - CAPTCHA Defeat (OAT-009) Operationlizing Online Fraud Detection, Prevention, and Response JavaScript Supply Chains, Magecart, and F5 XC Client-Side Defense (Demo) How Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud Part: 1 How Attacks Evolve From Bots to Fraud Part: 2 F5 Distributed Cloud Bot Defense
