



F5 Distributed Cloud Bot Defense & Account Protection

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Agenda



Today's threat landscape and how it is affecting state agencies



The unique challenges Agencies are having fighting off bots and manual fraud



The benefits of F5 Distributed Cloud Bot Defense & Account Protection

Fraud occurs when criminals act like legitimate users



Users (criminals mixed in with good users)

"Hackers don't break in, they log in" – Fortune 50 CISO

Typical large enterprises lose >\$25M / year to criminals who act like users

Bots cause harm across your organization



65

The Threat Landscape – Economic



Modern attacks begin with breaches and end with fraud

BREACHES, FRAUD, AND ABUSE HAVING GREATER BUSINESS IMPACT



#1

Credential attacks leading cause of extreme financial loss over past 5 years (\$10BN)





of orgs reported increase in customer complaints or churn due to **bot attacks** since start of pandemic



1 in 3

global consumers have experienced fraud in past 3 months





Revenue Loss



Bots are a fundamentally different type of threat



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Using our WAF and traditional firewalls to manually block IP addresses was a horribly ineffective way to mitigate the very real threat posed by bots.

-CISO, Major US Retailer

 Bots look like customers and abuse inherent app functionality

XC Bot Defense: Examples and Use Cases

Attack on State Agency:

XC Bot Defense was implemented on 12/08/2020 at 08:20PT

NON-AUTOMATED AND AUTOMATED TRANSACTIONS



Yellow indicates automated traffication blocked

Red indicates traffic blocked

Green indicates legitimate human connections

Attack on State Agency:

NON-AUTOMATED AND AUTOMATED TRANSACTIONS



Immediately after XC Bot Defense was implemented the attacker increased the volume of the attack The attacker attempted to incorporate a brief ddos attack

Attacker retools, then attempts new attack parameters

Attack on State Agency:



Past 24 hours





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Confidential /

Attack traffic is coming from all over the globe

Macro Trend: Convergence across functional areas





The XC Bot Defense Platform

Bot Defense

Identify and mitigate unwanted traffic

Account Protection

Differentiate good customers from bad customers

Authentication Intelligence

Create a friction free user experience and increase revenue

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Current customer: Sustained 99% effectiveness (3+ years)



Bots have significant impact on the Organizations.



Account takeover





Gift Card Fraud



Inventory Hoarding



Scraping

Carding

The XC Bot Defense Signals

Bot Detection

XC Bot Defense analyzes three categories of signals to identify illegitimate traffic





× Headers Preview Response Cookies Timing Request URL: http://localhost/drupal-7/user **Request Method: GET** Status Code: @ 208 OK ► Request Headers (10) * Response Headers view source Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Language: en Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 10:43:04 GMT ETag: "1382006584" Expires: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 10:53:04 +0000 Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 Last-Modified: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 10:43:04 +0000 Server: Apache/2.2.23 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.23 OpenSSL/0.9.8y DAV/2 PHP/5.4.10 Transfer-Encoding: chunked X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN X-Generator: Drupal 7 (http://drupal.org) X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.10

Environment

Behavior

Network



Browser Environment Signals (Web & Mobile Web)

GATHERED VIA JAVASCRIPT TELEMETRY



6

Behavior Signals Gathered via JavaScript & SDK Telemetry



Network Signals + XC Bot Defense's Global Intelligence Enable API Channel Protection

Header field name	Description
Accept	Content-Types that are acceptable for the response. See Content negotiation.
Accept-Charset	Character sets that are acceptable.
Accept-Encoding	List of acceptable encodings. See HTTP compression.
Accept-Language	List of acceptable human languages for response. See Content negotiation.
Accept-Datetime	Acceptable version in time.
Authorization	Authentication credentials for HTTP authentication.
Cache-Control	Used to specify directives that <i>must</i> be obeyed by all caching mechanisms along the request-response chain.
Connection	Control options for the current connection and list of hop-by-hop request fields. ^[8]
Cookie	An HTTP cookie previously sent by the server with Set-Cookie (below).
Content-Length	The length of the request body in octets (8-bit bytes).
Content-MD5	A Base64-encoded binary MD5 sum of the content of the request body.
Content-Type	The MIME type of the body of the request (used with POST and PUT requests).
	The data and time that the measure originated (in 11 ITTD data)

Known Bad True Client IP & ASN

Ε	xar	n	D	е	
				-	

AS #	IP	СС	Registry	Allocated	AS Name	
48817	185.156.73.21	RU	ripencc	2016-06-15	RELDAS-NET, RU	

Indicators in the HTTP Header, such as header field order, can reveal crafted requests and signs of automation



Threat actors & attack campaigns can be profiled by source:

- Foreign & Bulletproof Hosting Services
- AWS / GCP / Azure Hosting
- Residential ISPs
- Shape-tracked Known Bad ASNs



Mobile Environment Signals (Native Mobile Apps)

GATHERED VIA SHAPE MOBILE SDK TELEMETRY



Shape's Mobile SDK is currently deployed on over 1 billion mobile devices worldwide

"Shape (XC Bot Defense) understands web browsers and mobile devices in a way nobody else in the industry does"

"Today, Shape is by far the most influential contributor to JavaScript in the world."

Brendan Eich, Creator of JavaScript Founder of Mozilla/Firefox



Shape invented 5 of the 9 total new official features added to JavaScript in the last year



Spoof-proof JavaScript

JS EXPERTISE AND SECURITY PATENTS CREATE THE HIGHEST QUALITY TELEMETRY AND EFFICACY

Competitor JavaScript



- Static, single obfuscation model
- Easily reverse engineered
- Easily spoofed
- Re-used between customers

Shape JavaScript

```
, function(vd) {
    vd.V[vd.V.length - 2] = vd.V[vd.V.length - 2] === vd.V[vd.V.length - 1];
    vd.V.length -= 1
}
;;
function Qh(vn, vY, vQ, vG) {
    "use strict";
    var va = 8[vn];
    return vR(vY, vQ, vG, va.E, va.b, va.C, va.Z, va.q, va.h)
};var Rj = n;
```

var dg = M("JqV7XBgPAQduSwCTBc5GrNoC_FMAdQBGaQReGaL2AykAAcgCBLQvNQ8CH9cAAnUJqQEq tDMc7gAcAAXIAgW0R-ruAJQABsgCALQ1J04CPwAHyAIAtPTuDwM1UwB1CEZpAV70sukC4tcACXUIXvN3 qQEq_MYAWe4ANww7NwCx0JUJAU0ADcgCBbThrg8BClMAdQ5GaQReepXpANFTAHUPRmkAXlq09gDjABDI yAIDtLqMDwHAUwB1E0ZpAl7aGvYCKQAUyAIBtMfq7qELABXIAqW03m_uAzMAFsqCCekBJmftAlsAF283 Agm@T3APAnzXABp1A6kBEXRwAHoAGzs3ArGN0wkDGwAcvAIItE3tDwIXUwB1HUZpA179N-kAxlMAdR5G ACDIAgW0-2buAsIAIcgCCLSXge4CQAAiyAIAt06WDwBLUwB1I0ZpAF7pu-kAE1MAdSRGaQGpAQhDxgCM AsMAJzs3ArG3d9oA_tcAKHUEXmyL6QKIUwB1KUZpBV7rb-kAP1MAdSpGaQZeC_j2Am8AK8qCA7RMuA8B AMTXAC51CV6pLekBtVMAdS9GaQFejzb2AaIAMMgCArRYpe4CkAAxyAIJtNCNDwBTUwB1MkZpAl7aNekC XhD39gCAADXIAgC0tDcPAaxTAHU2RmkAXsc-9gDIADfIAg005doPAwzXADh1Al6rI_YBYAA5yAIBtHpz Xo4e6QKB1wA8dQVe3SL2AowAPcqCA0kBGeiYArebAMc-1McFe j0DwMyUwB1P0ZpAqkBE-twAf8AQDs3 Agm0MiAPAkRTAHVDRmkEXoBB6QGHUwB1REZpAF7qdukC31MAdUVGaQVeixbpAPHXAEZ1CV4ULukC5FMA 6QJ1UwB1SUZpCakBNKpwAv0ASjs3B7G5g9oB39cAS3UJXmGH6QMk1wBMdQmpASdvcALzAE07NwSxq_Ta vtoAI9cAUHUHqQEwhXAAUgBR0zcH5wEeFNsAUABS0zcBsY0M2gE0UwB1U0ZpAqkBKgHGAZ7uADdU0zcB AHVWRmkGXuhj6QIC1wBXdQVeIibpAlZTAHVYRmkFXpMi6QFv1wBZdQZerUbpAhJTAHVaRmkCXgeb6QAB DwC21wBddQJet0rpAVFTAHVeRmkIXs196QLcUwB1X0ZpAF4VHukB7LMAdwBGaQReI8H2ABgAYcgCA7QR Yzs3ALEIAAkB90BkyAIDtJMxDwIaUwB1ZUZpCV5KxukC6LMAdWZGa0NeFPH2ApwAZ8qCBb0P7q8CmFMA MVMAdWpGaQKpASaAxqCy7qA3azs3BLH5uqkAKABsyAIJtAh17qAkAG3IAqm0FNoPABdTAHVuRmkFXs32 aQBe7yHpAxlTAHVxRmkJXugr6QDKUwB1ckZpB14_wekASFMAdXNGaQReggv2ANUAdMgCBrSqdA8A19cA PlMAdXdGHgBMvmBLSDYBVE8ESwE2AVPmAE8BRBsAUwEXAU_SBEuNNgFATQdrAjlZAcWWQF8AUQEADAA rwLOns9ShqYFCZmDowCSAIWvABqefs8GBAQmB09lWQFzRFoGIQMMSAIA0BMB0vIEJ0QGIAfiWQCTBqqB JqNTAMDuA84Dva8CecgCBLR_WQ8A6XEDAlNpBF50fekA91MDtwSrWQMPs5MBJQEgiRIBBQMCcEcAJdTH

- Unique obfuscation for each telemetry source
- Continuous, revolving obfuscation
- Spoof proof data
- Unique for each enterprise

What Shape JavaScript Does Not Collect

- Security credentials
- Personally identifiable information (PII)*
- POST body (such as html form data)
- Files uploaded or downloaded
- Content in html web pages
- Characters typed by user on web page (e.g. a-z, 0-9, special characters)
- Application-level data beyond standard http headers
- User's geographic location



Shape does **NOT** collect any sensitive user data



Shape Performs Analysis & Provides Deterministic Results

AS OPPOSED TO RISK SCORING, WHICH PROVIDES ROOM FOR UNCERTAINTY



Continuous Improvement to Detection & Mitigation



<u>Modes</u>

- Non-Blocking (Observation)
- Blocking (Mitigation)

<u>Stage I</u>

- Advanced Signals Analysis
- Real-time Mitigation
 - Allow
 - Flag
 - Flag & Allow
 - Block

<u>Stage II</u>

- Artificial Intelligence
- Machine Learning
- Data Scientists
- Investigative Analysts
- 24x7 Threat Mitigation Center



The XC Account Protection

The Shape Platform

Once synthetic traffic is gone, we focus on identifying the bad organic traffic



Account Protection

Differentiate good humans from bad humans





Account Protection builds on top of battle-tested signals



What high risk actions did this user/device take (logging in, creating account, applying for claim etc.)



Behavioral insights

Were there any anomalous interaction that indicate fraudulent behavior?



Environment insights

"who" is the browser, device, and network that we're seeing? Is the environment spoofed or have any inconsistency?

SHAPE NETWORK INSIGHTS

Have we seen this user/device/environment conduct fraud elsewhere within Shape's network? Is the traffic profile or originating network strongly indicative of fraudulent behavior?

Live Traffic Replay - Replay of one login from fraudster is suspicious

Screen offset, visibility events, pasting all consistent with fraud at scale



Account Protection Also Collected Additional Fraud Metrics -Illustrating <u>Highly</u> Anomalous Device Behavior

		Pastings (4)	
Device AJofIZI5AQAAM-C_SSgjLa4DdrRgVuKXjgdI-4WI8gB26M xAOAizR0GrkjtU	Device age 23 days No. of transactions 3859	Search	_
Login		USR_LTPD_PASSWORD unknown	
Login SuccessAccounts Atten• 0.85%2699	npted	USR_LOGIN_NAME	
Account Access RateAccounts Succ0.74%20	eeded	IPs (100)	Usernames (30)
Account Repetition Score		Search	Search
Anomaly Indicators 💿		199.244.51.226	58f2da895c***
 ■ 99.7% pasting events ● 99.9% unu ● 1.6% hosting ASNs ● 5.3% VPN 	isual time zones IPs	199.244.51.74 138.128.245.65	c0181c3acc*** ☑ 4671ef3622*** ☑
0.75% unusual keys Image: 0% switch 99.6% small window 0% brows	ing in and out er spoofing	174.139.46.66 138.128.246.36	4518a46f27*** ⊠ 03d1908acc*** ⊠
© 0% likely VM Datestrings (1) Search		174.139.137.35 173.213.87.152	3fb28890b2*** ☑ 2ef1c0091b*** ☑

Confidential / SHE PE / Part of F5

In Conclusion

Globalized network of signals & ML used to catch retooling



F5 Reduces Fraud

delivers differentiated outcomes





LESS FRICTION

F5 recommends up to 90% FEWER MFA challenges for legitimate users than alternative solutions less user friction for legitimate users means more revenue



LESS EFFORT

F5 slashes number of transactions that require fraud team review by more than 50%













